Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (52 page)

Soejima returned to Japan in triumph, confident that Japan could now expand its territory to Korea and Taiwan. He was given a hero’s welcome at each of the stops made in Japan before reaching Yokohama. His joy in returning to Japan is suggested by a poem in Chinese he wrote at Nagasaki:

On July 27 he had an audience with the emperor during which he offered him the text of the treaty he had concluded with China and the gifts from the Chinese court.

In the meanwhile, relations between Japan and Korea had steadily deteriorated because of Japanese anger over the high-handed manner with which their attempts to open trade and diplomatic relations with Korea had been rebuffed. The de facto ruler of Korea, the
taewon’gun
,
²⁶
was determined to prevent the opening of his country to the West and was suspicious of the changes that had occurred in Japan. He insisted that relations between the two countries be in accordance with the precedents established during the previous 300 years.

A crisis occurred in July when members of the magistrate’s office that dealt with the Wakan discovered that some Japanese merchants who did not belong to the Tsushima domain had been slipping in and out. The Koreans expressed their strong disapproval by erecting a sign
²⁷
at the gates of the Wakan denouncing this violation of the custom of 300 years. They also expressed dismay over the changed appearance of these Japanese—men who cut their hair in Western style and wore Western clothes—and declared that such men did not deserve to be called Japanese. They insisted that the traditional manner of trade between the two countries, with members of the Tsushima domain serving as the intermediaries, was immutable. Persons from the other Japanese islands were not permitted to engage in this trade, and the arrival at the Wakan of such persons indicated that Japan had become a country without laws. The Japanese at the Wakan were directed to communicate this rebuke to their superiors so that nothing would happen that they would later regret.
²⁸

Scholars have persuasively argued that the message was not intended to insult Japanese in general but referred specifically to the illegal activities of Japanese merchants who had arrived at the Wakan intending to do business outside the traditional framework of Korean–Japanese trade.
²⁹
However, this was not how the Japanese of the time interpreted the message. The apparent insult to Japanese honor, especially the term “a country without laws” (
muh
ō
no kuni
), created a furor throughout Japan and precipitated calls for punishing Korea. When informed of this latest development, the emperor was extremely upset and commanded Sanj
ō
Sanetomi to dispose of the Korean incident.
³⁰

Sanj
ō
’s report to the cabinet recounted all the irritating encounters that had taken place between Japanese and Koreans. In 1871 when the government sent an envoy to Pusan with letters informing the Koreans of
haihan chiken
and asking for meetings with officials to discuss the possible effect of this change on the relations between the two countries, he had no success in meeting the
hundo
, the Korean officer who dealt with the Japanese at the Wakan. On no fewer than twenty occasions, the
hundo
claimed to be too ill to see the Japanese. Later, the
hundo
went to the capital and reported when he returned that an answer to the Japanese request for a meeting would not be forthcoming until an official decision had been reached. When the Japanese asked how long it would take to reach such a decision, they were informed it would be six to ten years.
³¹
Most recent was the incident of the offensive signs put up at the entrance to the Wakan.

Sanj
ō
predicted there was no telling to what humiliations Japanese might be subjected in the future. The Japanese had tried ever since the Restoration to enjoy friendly, neighborly relations with Korea, only to meet with insults. A small number of army and navy units—whose numbers could be reinforced if necessary—should be sent to protect the Japanese living in Korea. Sanj
ō
concluded by asking the council to approve his proposal.

Saig
ō
Takamori was the first to respond. He opposed sending troops, sure that such action would arouse the fears and suspicions of the Koreans, who would take it as a sign that Japan intended to swallow up Korea. This was not Japan’s intention, and to prove this, an ambassador plenipotentiary should be sent to enlighten them. If they refused to listen and insulted the envoy, their guilt would be apparent to all the world, and they should then be attacked. He concluded by proposing himself as the emissary.
³²

Saig
ō
’s proposal was supported by most of the leading men in the government, although some key figures were abroad or unable to attend the Court Council’s sessions.
³³
At this point Sanj
ō
Sanetomi, as was his wont, began to waver. He proposed telegraphing Iwakura to return at once to participate in the discussions, but Saig
ō
sent Sanj
ō
a letter on August 3 urging him to be firm in carrying out the Court Council’s decision. On August 16, not having received a response, Saig
ō
went to see Sanj
ō
and spoke his mind in stronger language. He said that if Sanj
ō
waited for Iwakura’s return, he would miss a valuable opportunity for action. He was absolutely certain that when the Japanese envoy arrived in Korea, he would be killed; only then would it be appropriate to send an army to punish the crime. He added that there were signs of discontent even in Japan that might result in disorder; it would be desirable to turn the point of accumulated wrath outward and, in so doing, display Japanese prestige abroad.
³⁴

Realizing that it was useless attempting to dissuade Saig
ō
, Sanj
ō
called a session of the Court Council on August 17 at which it was decided to send an envoy to Korea in the manner Saig
ō
had proposed. The only opposition came from Kuroda Kiyotaka, who claimed that settling the dispute with the Russians over Sakhalin was more urgent, and he also offered himself as a substitute for Saig
ō
.
³⁵

At the beginning of August the emperor and empress left T
ō
ky
ō
for Miyanoshita in order to escape the oppressive summer heat. In the light of the emperor’s future reluctance to leave the capital for any private reason, this was an unusual concession to human frailty. The emperor enjoyed the surroundings and the food, especially the fish caught in the rivers (he did not like saltwater fish) and the freshly dug taros.
³⁶
But this was an inconvenient time for him to be away from the capital. During the negotiations that followed, it was necessary for members of the government who wished to consult the emperor to travel what was then a considerable distance. On August 19 Sanj
ō
went to Miyanoshita and remained until the twenty-third, visiting the emperor each day. Even though the Court Council had voted to send Saig
ō
to Korea, Sanj
ō
still wavered, hoping that Iwakura would return in time to give his opinions. The contents of his discussions with the emperor are not known, but in the end the emperor commanded the council to wait until Iwakura’s return before deciding whether to send Saig
ō
to Korea. The decision should be reached only after thoughtful deliberation and should then be reported to him. Sanj
ō
hurried back to T
ō
ky
ō
and communicated the emperor’s wishes to Saig
ō
.

It is impossible to say whether the command to wait for Iwakura’s return originated with Meiji himself or if Sanj
ō
persuaded the emperor in the course of his visits. If this was indeed the emperor’s decision, it was his most important political action to date. War with Korea, though ardently desired by many Japanese at this time, would have been a disaster for both countries. Quite apart from the moral issues and the terrible suffering that an invasion would have inflicted on the Korean people, it was by no means certain that the Japanese had sufficient military strength to secure a quick victory. A war might have been costly to both sides.
³⁷

Saig
ō
wrote ten letters to Itagaki between July 29 and August 17. In the first, he opposed the plan, favored by Itagaki, to send troops to Korea without further delay. He argued that troops were needed to protect Japan from Russian incursions in the north, and war with Korea without sufficient provocation would alienate world opinion. He was sure that it would be far preferable to send an envoy first. The first letter concludes, “If it is decided to send an envoy officially, I feel sure that he will be murdered. I therefore beseech you to send me. I cannot claim to make as splendid an envoy as Soejima, but if it is a question of dying, that, I assure you, I am prepared to do.”
³⁸

In his letter of August 14 he wrote,

If we fail to seize this chance to bring us into war, it will be very difficult to find another. By enticing the Koreans with such a gentle approach we will certainly cause them to furnish us with an opportunity for war. But this plan is doomed to fail if you feel it would be unfortunate for me to die before the war, or if you have any thoughts of temporizing. The only difference is whether [my death comes] before or after the event. I shall be deeply grateful to you, even after death, if you exert yourself now on my behalf with the warm friendship you have always shown me.
³⁹

The repetition of the words “dying” and “death” in the course of these letters has suggested to historians that Saig
ō
longed not so much for a solution to the troubled relations with Korea as for death. In a letter to his uncle Shiihara Yosanji dated June 29, he described the illness from which he had been suffering since the beginning of May. Traditional Japanese medicine had proved completely ineffective, and he had resigned himself to the likelihood that his disease was incurable. The emperor had sent his personal physician and also a German doctor whose treatment had brought temporary relief from pain.
⁴⁰
In Saig
ō
’s letter of August 23 to Itagaki, he used the phrase
shi wo miru koto wa ki suru gotoku
—“I look on death as a return.” He promised in his letter not to rush into death, but he seemed determined all the same to die in Korea, perhaps because this seemed preferable to a meaningless death from illness.
⁴¹

It seems obvious from his letters as well as his remarks delivered at the Court Council that Saig
ō
thought his death in Korea would provide Japan with a plausible cause for war. Some scholars who wish to exonerate Saig
ō
of the charge of warmongering believe, however, that he was really a man of peace who hoped that he would be able to persuade the Koreans to meet the Japanese halfway. His insistence that the Japanese envoy sent to Korea be attired in court robes and not be accompanied by a military guard or warships has been held up as proof of his pacific intentions. But unless his letters to Itagaki deliberately falsified his real beliefs, as one scholar has claimed,
⁴²
he undoubtedly hoped for war. His death in Korea not only would make this possible but would bring him the satisfaction of having died for a cause. War in Korea would also provide members of the samurai class, who resented their loss of status and were ready for rebellion, with an identity as Japanese soldiers, fighting against a foreign country. Saig
ō
warned that unless action were taken immediately, an invaluable opportunity would be lost, but surely most people today are thankful he was frustrated in his plans.
⁴³

The emperor returned to T
ō
ky
ō
on August 31 in order to receive the duke of Genoa, the nephew of the king of Italy, who had arrived in Yokohama a week earlier. On September 9 he granted an audience to Sh
ō
Tai, the Ry
ū
ky
ū
king, and on September 12 to General LeGendre. On September 13 Iwakura Tomomi returned to T
ō
ky
ō
after twenty-one months abroad and visits to twelve countries.

Iwakura’s return did not put an end to the advocacy of an invasion of Korea. On October 15 the Court Council once again voted to send Saig
ō
to Korea. But opposition to the plan was developing. In his diary entry for September 3, Kido Takayoshi wrote,

At 4 I went to Prince Sanj
ō
’s where the prince told me, among other things, about Imperial Councilor Saig
ō
’s proposal to send an expedition to Taiwan and to subdue Korea. The government is prepared to decide in favor of the proposal, so I am deeply disturbed. At present our common people are undergoing hardships: they are bewildered by a myriad of new ordinances; and several times since last year they have risen in revolt. The government apparently regards this as a normal condition. To speak of planning for the present, nothing is more urgent than proper management of domestic affairs; and to mention our obligations in foreign affairs, nothing is of greater moment than protection for the people of Karafuto [Sakhalin]…. Why must we harp on speedy punishment of those guilty of “infringing on our national honor”? At this time the proper management of internal administration must have first priority.
⁴⁴