Closing the Ring (19 page)

4. I am waiting here with the President to judge results of “Avalanche,” and thereafter returning home. I hope however to come out to you in the first half of October, and General Marshall will come from America. I shall have some important things to tell you then.

  Alexander replied that the Italian Government, being unable to announce the Armistice, had forced him to make certain changes. The 82d United States Airborne Division could not be flown in to the Rome area as no arrangement for its reception had been made by the Italians, and the Germans were thought to be in occupation of the airfields. “Avalanche” would go in as planned, except that no airborne forces would take part. About three thousand soldiers of the 1st Airborne Division had sailed in naval ships for Taranto, and should arrive there on September 9. It was impossible to say what reception they would receive. By opening the port of Taranto early, he hoped to increase the build-up into Italy.

At the same time our efforts to seize Rhodes and other islands in the Aegean began. Later chapters will tell the tale.

*  *  * *  *

In the White House the President and I sat talking after dinner in his study, and Admiral Pound came to see us upon a naval point. The President asked him several questions about the general aspects of the war, and I was pained to see that my trusted naval friend had lost the outstanding matter-of-fact precision which characterised him. Both the President and I were sure he was very ill. Next morning, Pound came to see me in my big bed-sitting-room and said abruptly, “Prime Minister, I have come to resign. I have had a stroke and my right side is largely paralysed. I thought it would pass off, but it gets worse every day and I am no longer fit for duty.” I at once accepted the First Sea Lord’s resignation, and expressed my profound sympathy for his breakdown in health. I told him he was relieved at that moment from all responsibility, and urged him to rest for a few days and then come home with me in the
Renown.
He was completely master of himself, and his whole manner was instinct with dignity. As soon as he left the room, I cabled to the Admiralty placing Admiral Syfret in responsible charge from that moment pending the appointment of a new First Sea Lord.

*  *  * *  *

On September 9, we held a formal conference with the President at the White House. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff had flown back to London some days before, and I was accompanied by Field-Marshal Dill, Ismay, and the three representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. The President brought with him Leahy, Marshall, King, and Arnold. A number of telegrams about the Italian Fleet coming over to us made an agreeable introduction. I expressed the hope that the Italian Fleet would be treated with respect by the Allies wherever it might arrive.

In preparation for this meeting, I had prepared a memorandum to the President, which I had submitted to him earlier in the day. He asked me to read it out, and thought it would make a basis for our discussion.

9 Sept. 43

It would surely be convenient before we separate to have a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to take stock of the new world situation which will arise on the assumption that the present battle for Naples and Rome is successful and that the Germans retreat to the line of the Apennines or the Po.

2. Assuming we get the Italian Fleet, we gain not only that fleet, but the British Fleet, which has hitherto contained it. This very heavy addition to our naval power should be used at the earliest possible moment to intensify the war against Japan. I have asked the First Sea Lord to discuss with Admiral King the movement of a powerful British battle squadron, with cruisers and ancillaries, to the Indian Ocean via the Panama Canal and the Pacific. We need a strong Eastern Fleet based on Colombo during the amphibious operations next year. I should be very glad if it were found possible for this fleet to serve under the American Pacific Command and put in at least four months of useful fighting in the Pacific before taking up its Indian Ocean station. We cannot afford to have idle ships. I do not know however how the arrival of such reinforcements would enable the various tasks assigned to United States forces in the Pacific to be augmented. Apart from strategy, from the standpoint of high policy His Majesty’s Government would desire to participate in the Pacific war in order to give such measure of assistance as is in their power, not only to their American Allies, but on account of the obligations to Australia and New Zealand. Such a movement of our ships to and through the Pacific would undoubtedly exercise a demoralising effect upon Japan, who must now be conscious of the very great addition of naval weight thrust against her, and besides this it would surely give satisfaction in the United States as being a proof positive of British resolve to take an active and vigorous part to the end in the war against Japan.

3. The public must be gradually led to realise what we and our Combined Staffs have so fully in mind, namely, the conversion of Italy into an active agent against Germany. Although we could not recognise Italy as an ally in the full sense, we have agreed she is to be allowed to work her passage, and that useful service against the enemy will not only be aided but recompensed. Should fighting break out between Italians and Germans, the public prejudices will very rapidly depart, and in a fortnight or so matters may be ripe, if we can so direct events, for an Italian declaration of war against Germany. The question of the Italian flag flying from Italian ships, and even some arrangement of Italians manning those vessels under British or American control, requires consideration. The whole problem of handling and getting the utmost use out of the Italian Navy requires review now on a high level.

4. On the over-all assumption of a decisive victory in the Naples area, we are, I presume, agreed to march northward up the Italian peninsula until we come up against the main German positions. If the Italians are everywhere favourable and their Army comes over to help, the deployment of at least a dozen Italian divisions will be of great advantage in holding the front across Italy and in permitting relief of Allied forces. If, after the battle of Naples is over, we are not seriously resisted south of the main German line, we ought not to be long getting up against it with light forces, and I should hope that by the end of the year at the latest we should be confronting it in full strength. If sooner, then better. There can be no question of whittling down “Overlord.” We must not forget at this juncture our agreement to begin moving the seven divisions away in succession from the beginning of November. All the more important is it to bring Italian divisions into the line, and our State policy should be adapted to procure this end.

5. I have been contemplating the 1944 campaign in the light of these new possibilities, and I remain strongly convinced that we should be very chary of advancing northward beyond the narrow part of the Italian peninsula. Of course, if the Germans retreat to the Alps another situation is presented, but, failing that, it would seem beyond our strength, having regard to the requirements of “Overlord,” to broaden out into the plains of Lombardy. We have also to consider that the Germans, working on interior lines, may perhaps bring a heavier force to bear upon our front in Italy than we shall have there at the end of the year. The possibility of a strong German counter-attack cannot be excluded. I should like it to be considered whether we should not, when we come up against the main German position, construct a strong fortified line of our own, properly sited in depth. Italian military labour could be used on a large scale for this purpose. Italian troops could naturally take part in defending the line. Thus by the spring we should be able in this theatre either to make an offensive if the enemy were weak, and anyhow to threaten one, or, on the other hand, stand on the defensive, using our air-power, which will in the meanwhile have been built up, from behind our fortified line, and divert a portion of our troops for action elsewhere, either to the west or to the east. I hope this may be studied.

6. We are both of us acutely conscious of the great importance of the Balkan situation. We should make sure that the Mediterranean High Command, absorbed in its present battle, does not overlook the needs of the patriot forces there. The problem of the Italian forces requires immediate study. The orders of the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Wilson, published today, are well conceived for the moment, but we require to see more clearly exactly what is intended. On the assumption that the Italians can be drawn into the war against Germany, far-reaching possibilities seem to be open. There is surely no need for us to work from the bottom of the Balkans upwards. If we can get an agreement between the patriots and the Italian troops, it should be possible to open quite soon one or more good ports on the Dalmatian coast, enabling munitions and supplies to be sent in by ship and all forces that will obey our orders to be raised to good fighting condition. The German situation in all this theatre will become most precarious, especially from the point of view of supplies. When the defensive line across Northern Italy has been completed, it may be possible to spare some of our own forces assigned to the Mediterranean theatre to emphasise a movement north and northeastward from the Dalmatian ports. For the moment the utmost efforts should be put forth to organise the attack upon the Germans throughout the Balkan peninsula and to supply agents, arms, and good direction.

7. Lastly, the question of islands is now ripe for consideration. Sardinia, I imagine, will come over immediately, though we may have to send some help to the Italians in procuring the disarmament of any German units there. In Corsica the Germans have perhaps already been overcome, but surely here is the place for a French expedition. Even if only one division could be sent by the French National Committee, the island could probably be quickly liberated, and there is little doubt that its manhood would enable at least another division or two to be raised locally. General Wilson’s telegram about the operations against Rhodes and other islands in the Dodecanese is all right so far as it goes, but I am
not satisfied that sufficient use is being made under the present conditions of the forces in the Middle East. I am making an immediate inquiry into the exact location of all troops above battalion strength, hoping that improvised expeditionary forces and garrisons may be provided for various minor ventures.

8. We must expect far-reaching reactions in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, and these again may produce a movement from the Turk without our having to make any request or incur any obligation. All this again requires military and political consideration on the high level, and I feel that we should do well to take a preliminary survey this afternoon if you are agreeable.

  There was wide agreement in principle between us all along the lines set forth in the above note, and the Staffs concerted the necessary action in the days that followed.

*  *  * *  *

The next day the President left Washington for his home at Hyde Park. He asked me to use the White House not only as a residence but for any conference I might wish to hold, either with the British Empire representatives who had gathered in Washington or with the United States war chiefs, and not to hesitate to call another plenary meeting should I deem it necessary. I availed myself fully of these generous facilities. Accordingly, as there was a general desire to take stock of the rapid movement of events in Italy and of the progress of the ferce and critical battle for Naples, I convened another meeting at the White House on September 11, at which I presided myself. The United States were represented by Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Harry Hopkins, Averell Harriman, and Lew Douglas. I brought with me Dill and Ismay, and our three representatives on the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

All current matters were discussed. General Marshall reported the conditions in the Naples area, and the rapid reinforcement of the German divisions. General Arnold mentioned that we had now nearly three thousand operative aircraft engaged over Italy, which, he said, was more than the
whole German Air Force on all fronts. I directed attention to the lamentable proposals for building up our forces on the mainland. I had been, I said, horrified to see the figure of only twelve divisions to be achieved by December 1. It was vitally important to accelerate the growth of the army in Italy by every possible division. Even the arrival of one division a fortnight earlier might make a serious difference. General Marshall entirely agreed and said that everything should be done.

He then told us about the brilliantly successful air landings by the United States Air Force in the South Pacific theatre. As a result of their descent in the Markham Valley, combined with seaborne attack, the garrison of eight to ten thousand Japanese had been virtually isolated. American troops were pounding Salamaua and were close to Lae. Airfields should soon be in our possession from which the enemy airfields could be made untenable. This in turn would change the whole sea situation. The Japanese position in New Britain might soon be desperate. There were also signs of Japanese evacuation from the Solomons.

It was an honour to me to preside over this conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and of American and British authorities in the Council Room of the White House, and it seemed to be an event in Anglo-American history.

¹
During the Quebec Conference the President invited me to come for an afternoon’s fishing with him in a lake to which he had been recommended. We had a very pleasant luncheon, but I caught only one small fish and be none. He therefore called the lake “One Lake.”

²
This sentence appears inconsistent with my general policy as so often expressed in these volumes. I did not mean “come into the Balkans” with an army.

³
See map, “Southern Italy Operations September—December 1943,” page 303.