Closing the Ring (100 page)

Prime Minister to Home Secretary
    3 Apr. 44

Let me have a report on why the Witchcraft Act, 1735, was used in a modern court of justice.

What was the cost of this trial to the State?—observing that witnesses were brought from Portsmouth and maintained here in this crowded London for a fortnight, and the Recorder kept busy with all this obsolete tomfoolery, to the detriment of necessary work in the courts.

Prime Minister to General Montgomery
    4 Apr. 44

You spoke to me the other night about the 6th Guards Army Tank Brigade. I have given a good deal of thought to this matter, which I am prepared to discuss with you as well as with the War Office at any time. Meanwhile I have said no action to destroy this brigade is to be taken.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.
    4 Apr. 44

There is the 6th Guards Army Tank Brigade, equipped with the latest Churchills. For over two years these men have been trained together with one object and purpose. It seems to me a disastrous procedure to disband them now and fling the men into the general pool, either of any particular armoured division or of the Foot Guards or infantry of the Line. No action should be taken on this point until it has been thoroughly discussed between us.

2. I had an idea, which I should like examined, of letting the two brigades of the Guards Armoured Division and the 6th Guards Army Tank Brigade, three brigades in all, go into action together, and fold up as casualties occur to
men and vehicles until they come down to the ordinary divisional strength. Thus we should have more punch at the outset and fold up out of the carefully prepared material, instead of dissipating a portion of this material and destroying all the unities that have been so laboriously evolved. I trust I may have your help in this.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S. (General Montgomery to see)
    9 Apr. 44

I have carefully considered the points you put to me. Instead of melting down the Guards, why do we not keep them up at the expense of the Line? The Russians are doing this; they make Guards divisions on a very large scale. The Germans also gear upwards; for instance, creating Panzer Grenadier divisions which actually cost them fewer men than infantry divisions, and calling a lot of determined youngsters, gathered largely from the airfields, “paratroops.” There is no doubt these special terms raise
esprit de corps.
No one doubts that the performances of the Guards fully justify the prestige which attaches to them.

2. Therefore, I wish that the Guards should draw upon the Line and that the existing Guards formation shall be maintained, not only from Guards recruits, but where necessary from Line recruits. This does not affect the pooling of the two brigades in Italy, for which I have already given approval.

3. Subject to the above writing-up of the Guards at the expense of the Line: (
a
) I agree to the running-down of the six lower establishment divisions and the reorganisation of the residues into two cadre divisions. (
b
) I do not agree to the abolition of the 6th Guards Tank Brigade.
⁹
(
c
) I agree to the dispersal of the headquarters and divisional troops of the 10th Armoured Division, retaining the Armoured Brigade of this division. (
d
) The largest possible block of the R.A.F. Regiment should be scraped off the airfields and incorporated in the general pool of infantry of the Army. Some may be fitted direct into the reinforcements of the Guards. At least twenty-five thousand men should be extracted from the Royal Air Force Regiment.

Prime Minister to Minister of State and Sir Alexander Cadogan
    13 Apr. 44

You will remember that we are purging all our secret establishments of Communists because we know they owe no allegiance to us or to our cause and will always betray secrets to the Soviet, even while we are working together. The fact of the two Communists being on the French Committee requires extremely careful treatment of the question of imparting secret information to them.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and Secretary of State for War
    18 Apr. 44

The serious reductions which we now have to face in the formations of the
Army make it necessary to examine all possible means of economy. I do not think we can afford to continue to maintain a special body of troops purely for the defence of airfields. The R.A.F. Regiment was established at a time when invasion of this country was likely, and when our life depended upon the security of our fighter airfields. Since then it has been reduced, but the time has now come to consider whether the greater part of it should not be taken to reinforce the field formations of the Army. Pray examine this proposal in consultation. The largest possible block of the R.A.F. Regiment should be incorporated in the general pool of infantry of the Army. I consider that at least twenty-five thousand men should be so transferred.
¹⁰

2. The matter is urgent, so I should like to have your definite proposals as soon as possible.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.
    19 Apr. 44

I think we ought to do something for Martel.
¹¹
You cannot blame him for his ill success in Russia. They treat all our people like dogs. Martel fought a good fight with his tanks about Armentières in France. He gave a very far-sighted account of the Russian Army when he visited it two years before the war. I do not agree with him in some ways about tanks, but I am sure he is an officer of exceptional quality. It should certainly be possible to find him a job. Let me know what you will do.

“U
NCONDITIONAL
S
URRENDER
”

Prime Minister to Sir Alexander Cadogan
    19 Apr. 44

I have pointed out to the Cabinet that the actual terms contemplated for Germany are not of a character to reassure them at all, if stated in detail. Both President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin at Teheran wished to cut Germany into smaller pieces than I had in mind. Stalin spoke of very large mass executions of over fifty thousand of the Staffs and military experts. Whether he was joking or not could not be ascertained. The atmosphere was jovial, but also grim. He certainly said that he would require four million German males to work for an indefinite period to rebuild Russia.’ We have promised the Poles that they shall have compensation both in East Prussia and, if they like, up to the line of the Oder. There are a lot of other terms implying the German ruin and indefinite prevention of their rising again as an armed Power. …

On the other hand, they know that “unconditional surrender” was interpreted in a very favourable manner in the case of the Italians, and we see now what the Rumanians are offered if they will come over.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary and Sir Alexander Cadogan
    23 Apr. 44

Our supreme object is that the Russians should declare war on the Japanese as soon as possible. You will remember Stalin’s declaration at Teheran. From
this point of view it is difficult to see why an agreement which shows the Russians’ eagerness to prevent the breaking of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 1941 is “good” for us. The mere fact that the Japanese are prepared to make substantial sacrifices for it shows what they think about it, and that they hope to delay a Russian breach. This is very natural on their part. Why is it “good” for us?

2. The Japanese motives are clear, but as to the Russian motives, personally I thought the business looked rather suspicious. They are cashing in on the fact that Britain and the United States are at war with Japan, which causes Japan embarrassment. They are getting their own quarrels with Japan settled. This will put them in a better position to drive a hard bargain with us when Hitler is defeated before they embark upon hostilities with Japan. It may of course be part of a deception scheme to lull the Japanese into a false sense of security. Personally I do not like it.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary
    29 Apr. 44

I agree with your minute [on negotiations with Germany about food relief for occupied countries]. There can be no question at present of interfering with the sink-at-sight zones, which have been increasingly established by the Admiralty to facilitate operations.

2. There is no question of our approaching the Swiss or any other Government on a policy we do not accept.

3. It should be made clear that in any relief of Europe we shall certainly subject our population to any levels of rationing or dieting for which the United States sets an example.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord
    29 Apr. 44

Admiral James Somerville has added new claims to our confidence by his brilliant attack at Sabang while the main Japanese Fleet was at Singapore. Why do we want to make a change here at all?

It seems to me he knows the theatre, has right ideas about it, and is capable of daring action. Does he want to go to Washington and give up his fighting command?

Prime Minister to Minister of Food
    29 Apr. 44

None of the papers you have sent me touch the question of the excessive demands of the United States for meat. I consented to delay putting the facts before the President because you said you would raise the matter. So far as I can make out, your Ministry take the line that provided the Americans meet our requirements then we should agree to their demands from Australia and New Zealand. But it is surely necessary for the Governments concerned, including our own, to be satisfied about the scale of provision.

2. Invaluable meat is being wasted, and at the same time the Americans are complaining that the Australians and New Zealanders are withdrawing men
from the front, while the Australians blithely retort that they have all come back to grow meat for the American Army.

Unless your reply to me is of a satisfactory character I shall have to telegraph to the President. I ought to have done it weeks ago.

Prime Minister to Lord Cherwell
    30 Apr. 44

Before I approve the Admiralty’s paper [on the German acoustic torpedo (“Gnat”)] let me know whether there is anything in the following idea:

Fire a mechanism from a depth-charge projector, which would be called a “Squawker.” This might either lie (floating or submerged) where it fell, and “squawk,” or it might be given a motion likely to intercept a “Gnat.” There seems to be no reason why fifteen or twenty of these, fired at the right time and on a reasonable judgment of the enemy’s attack, might not attract him.

Alternatively, “Squawkers” might circle round our own ships at moments of danger. They would do them no harm if they hit them, but they might cover their tails very effectively.

Is there anything in this?

M
AY

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, and to General Hollis for C.O.S. Committee
    1 May 44

I am all for getting the Brazilian division into Italy as soon as possible. Every effort should be made, subject to battle exigencies, to bring this [division] into Italy. There should be no talk of a token force. The above also applies to the air squadron.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary
    4 May 44

A paper should be drafted for the Cabinet, and possibly for the Imperial Conference, setting forth shortly—for that is essential—the brute issues between us and the Soviet Government which are developing in Italy, in Rumania, in Bulgaria, in Yugoslavia, and above all in Greece. It ought to be possible to get this on one page.

Broadly speaking, the issue is, Are we going to acquiesce in the Communisation of the Balkans and perhaps of Italy? Mr. Curtin touched upon this today, and I am of opinion on the whole that we ought to come to a definite conclusion about it, and that if our conclusion is that we resist the Communist infusion and invasion, we should put it to them pretty plainly at the best moment that military events permit. We should of course have to consult the United States first.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary
    4 May 44

Pray consider whether it might not be wise for us to recall our Ambassador from Moscow for consultation. We should like to have a talk to him. It would make a good gap with the Russians at the present time. Averell Harriman has already departed for the United States.

2. Let me know how you feel about this. I am not very clear on it myself, but evidently we are approaching a showdown with the Russians about their Communist intrigues in Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and I do not think they would like very much a period in which they had neither a British nor an American Ambassador in Moscow. I must say I think their attitude becomes more difficult every day. I hope you have had a talk with Harriman. Take some opportunity of telling me about all this.

Prime Minister to General Ismay
    7 May 44

I do not like press conferences, even off the record, on the eve of an important battle. Once zero hour has struck, the principles desired by General Alexander should be inculcated upon the press, who should be allowed to mingle in the fighting. I have recently been perturbed at reported statements from Naples, one in the
Corriere
, explaining that we are about to attack. Is it really necessary to tell the enemy this? Of course, he may possibly think we are such fools that it is an obvious blind, but this is a dangerous chance to take.

Prime Minister to General Hollis
    7 May 44

I certainly expressed myself strongly against these military missions to Algiers, from what I heard about them at the Gibraltar Conference, and I greatly regret that they should have piled themselves up and ensconced themselves at Algiers where they are not needed in any way, but only add to the horribly bloated staffs which are lurking there, most of them away from all participation in the war. I certainly wish this matter to be taken up with a view to recalling and putting to some useful work these highly paid and no doubt highly skilled and experienced officers. The best thing would be to form a Sacred Legion of about one thousand Staff officers and let them set an example to the troops in leading some particularly desperate attack. Anyhow, the missions should be liquidated.