Caesar. Life of a Colossus (Adrian Goldsworthy) Yale University Press (74 page)

‘when Caesar understood that his entire speech was framed with a view to the present danger and the shortage of supplies, and that he offered no hope or serious offer of peace, he returned to his plans for continuing the war’.11

Bibulus succumbed to disease and fatigue soon afterwards. No one was appointed to replace him as overall commander of the fleet, but still the Pompeians maintained the blockade in spite of the difficulties. At the Apsus, the rival armies continued to stare at each other from the opposite banks. There were more negotiatons. At one point Vatinius went to the river bank and called out to the enemy outposts until finally he was told that an officer would come for a meeting the next day. This occurred, but was interrupted by the angry intervention of Labienus and ended in a shower of missiles. Caesar’s former legate shouted out afterwards that they could, ‘Stop all talk of peace terms; there was no possibility of peace until Caesar’s head was brought to them!’ Shortly before this Pompey himself is supposed to have said that he would not even consider peace if it looked as if he was holding on to life through ‘Caesar’s generosity’. The stand-off continued and Caesar grew increasingly desperate as the weeks and months went by without any reinforcement from Italy. Several sources claim that he grew suspicious of the determination and loyalty of his subordinates in Italy. Deciding that only his 413

CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49 – 44 BC

own presence could impart the necessary energy, he decided to go to Brundisium in person. He did so in disguise, pretending to be one of his own slaves who were often employed as messengers, aboard a small merchant ship anchored near the mouth of the River Aous. As the craft headed down river to the sea the crew had to struggle against a strong wind blowing in from the sea. After a while, the sailors decided to give up the attempt and turn back, but Caesar suddenly threw back his cloak and told them not to be afraid because they carried ‘Caesar and Caesar’s good fortune’. The rowers and helmsman redoubled their efforts, trying to force the craft out to sea, but in the end were forced to give up. It is extremely questionable whether a general should have left his army in such circumstances, even if this was to fetch reinforcements, and it was probably for this reason that no mention of the incident is made in the
Commentaries
. However, Plutarch claims that when his legionaries discovered what had happened, they did not feel abandoned, but merely offended that their commander did not feel confident in winning with them alone. As he returned to camp the men are supposed to have clustered around him, imploring him to have more faith in them. It was a mark of the incredible bond and trust between general and soldiers that had grown up since the early days in Gaul.12

Dyrrachium

Eventually, on 10 April, Mark Antony was finally able to bring the bulk of the troops across from Brundisium to Greece, landing near Lissus in the north with four legions and 800 cavalry. Pompey was too slow to prevent the two Caesarean forces from joining together. Caesar now had a more powerful army at his disposal. He was still outnumbered, especially in cavalry, but could rely on the better quality of his veteran legionaries to counterbalance this. However, the arrival of more troops increased the problems of supply, especially if the army was forced to remain in one place for any length of time. A number of large detachments were sent away from the main army to protect his allies in Thessaly and Macedonia. With the remainder Caesar offered battle to Pompey, who refused to be drawn. He remained convinced that the Caesareans could be worn down by depriving them of food. Caesar was aware of the danger and decided to try once again to capture Pompey’s main supply base at Dyrrachium. This time he managed to get there before the enemy, although not quickly enough to capture the town and its supplies. Instead he pitched camp between Dyrrachium and 414

M acedonia, November 49–August 48 bc

the Pompeian army, which took up position on a hill called Petra, overlooking a natural harbour. With ready access to the sea, Pompey was able to keep in easy communication with the town itself and his forces elsewhere. He sent orders instructing grain convoys to be brought directly to the army from as far afield as Asia. Caesar’s camp was on high ground inland and his troops would have to rely on gathering food and forage from the surrounding lands. He decided to construct a line of fortifications on the hills, both to protect his own foraging parties and to hinder those sent out by the Pompeians, who had far more cavalry mounts and supply animals and so even greater requirements than his own forces. In addition ‘he wished to reduce Pompey’s prestige (
auctoritas
) amongst foreign nations, when the story spread around the world that he was besieged by Caesar and was afraid to fight a battle’. Pompey could not afford to withdraw and allow Caesar to capture Dyrrachium and its depots. Therefore, he set his own men to constructing a fortified line facing Caesar. Skirmishes were fought to secure key points along the high ground, and in one instance a detachment of the
Ninth
had to be ordered to retire from a position where it was too exposed to enemy archers and slingers. At one point the legion turned around and, led by Mark Antony, charged and routed their pursuers to demonstrate that they were not retiring because they had been defeated, but through choice. When completed, the Pompeian line was 15 Roman miles long and strengthened by twenty-four forts. Caesar was on the outside, and inevitably his line had to be larger, especially since he hoped to hem the enemy in completely, and his siegeworks eventually stretched for some 17 miles.13

Caesar’s men were short of food, for it was still winter by the natural seasons even if by the calendar it was well into spring. Livestock was reasonably plentiful, so that meat was usually available and came to form a greater than usual proportion of the diet. Grain was hard to come by and often the men had to be content with barley – usually reserved for animal feed – rather than wheat. Even this could not always be found and sometimes they had to make do with the root of a plant called charax, which could be mixed with milk and baked into a sort of loaf. When Pompey saw some of these loaves his rueful comment was that they were fighting beasts rather than men. Caesar’s men had good access to water supplies, but he ordered them to divert or dam the streams that flowed through their lines into the enemy position. The Pompeians had plenty of food, since supplies were constantly coming in by sea, but began to run short of water. Pompey ordered them to dig new wells, but this was only partially successful. A very large number of men were concentrated in a small area within their siege lines and apart 415

CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49 – 44 BC

from the soldiers and servants there were many animals. Priority for fodder and water was given to cavalry mounts, and large numbers of baggage and pack animals started to die or were deliberately killed. In the crowded camps disease – perhaps typhus, but the descriptions in our sources are somewhat vague – also broke out. Both sides were suffering, for this was effectively a siege carried out on an enormous scale, but now that they were committed neither commander wished to back down, and the enemy’s problems only encouraged them to persist. Caesar felt that his own confidence was shared by his soldiers. At times they threw loaves of charax into the enemy lines to taunt them with this sign of their determination. As the weeks went by and the crops in the fields started to ripen there was further encouragement with the prospect of plentiful grain. Caesar anyway claims that some of his sentries were overheard saying that they would eat the bark from trees before letting Pompey escape.14

The building of the fortified lines went on, Caesar still hoping to complete his encirclement so that Pompey would be forced either to escape by sea, to break through Caesar’s lines or to watch his army wither. Skirmishes and raids continued. The Pompeian archers and slingers took to shooting at or near the fires visible in Caesar’s lines. In response the soldiers sat or slept away from the flames, preferring to be concealed and cold rather than warm but at risk. Pompey then launched a series of major attacks on a number of sections of Caesar’s fortifications, testing their strength and probing for weak spots. One attempt to capture a key hill was repelled when Publius Cornelius Sulla – the dictator’s nephew, for his son Faustus Sulla was with the Pompeians – brought up two legions to reinforce the threatened fort. The Pompeians were routed, but Sulla chose not to counter-attack and exploit the situation. Caesar approved his caution as appropriate for a legate, since such decisions were the prerogative of the commander-in-chief. The
Commentaries
proudly reported the bravery of Caesar’s legionaries. In one sector three cohorts of the
Ninth
held off an entire legion supported by large numbers of allied archers and slingers. After a day of bitter fighting virtually every one of the defenders was wounded, although clearly a good number were still able and willing to fight. Most of the wounds were caused by missiles – 30,000 arrows are said to have been picked up within the fort after the last attacks had been beaten off. Four out of the six centurions in one cohort were hit in the face and lost an eye. The shield of one centurion, a man named Scaeva, had been hit by no less than 120 missiles. Other sources tell us that he was one of the men hit in the eye, but in spite of this wound and others to the thigh and shoulder, kept fighting. At one point he feigned 416

M acedonia, November 49–August 48 bc

Caesar’s

Camp

Petra

Dyrrachium

Pompey’s

Camp

0

2 miles

0

2 km

Caesar’s siege line

Caesar’s old camp

Caesar’s uncompleted siege work

occupied by Pompey

Pompey’s siege line

Caesar’s unsuccessful attack on

his abandoned camp

Pompey’s successful counter-attack

Pompey’s

Camp

The lines at Dyrrachium

a willingness to surrender and then, when the enemy rushed forward, killed one and lopped the arm off another. Scaeva and his men then stood their ground, their defiance so intimidating the Pompeians that none dared to advance against them. Scaeva may have served with Caesar for many years, possibly having been with him during his time as propraetor in Spain as well as the years in Gaul. Their commander now rewarded the entire cohort lavishly, doubling their pay, awarding decorations to many of them, issuing them with new clothes and – at the time this may have been the most valued, although we should never doubt the importance of pride for good soldiers

– an extra grain ration. Scaeva was promoted to
primus pilus
, the senior centurion of the legion, and given a bounty of 200,000 sestertii. It was not his last service to Caesar, and in later years he seems to have become an equestrian and for a while led a unit of auxiliary cavalry that took his own name – the
ala Scaevae
.15

417

CIVIL WAR AND DICTATORSHIP 49 – 44 BC

The attacks had been repulsed, but it was difficult for Caesar with fewer troops to hold a longer line than the enemy. The
Commentaries
claim that the Pompeians suffered around 2,000 casualties, including a number of centurions, one of whom was the son of a former praetor. In contrast Caesar lost only twenty dead, although even he implies that the number of wounded was substantial. It is questionable how soon Scaeva and many of his men would have been able to return to duty. After this burst of fighting Pompey’s men spent several days working hard to strengthen vulnerable parts of the line of fortification, raising the rampart to a height of 15 feet. Caesar countered by leading his army out for battle each morning and deploying in a line just out of catapult range of the enemy fortifications. Pompey felt that it would have lowered his own prestige and the confidence of his men if he did not respond, but formed his legions with the rear line of cohorts of the
triplex acies
only just in front of his rampart. He had no desire to fight, feeling that it was better to starve the enemy into submission. A battle was more likely to favour Caesar’s veterans than his own inexperienced legionaries, especially in the rough ground between the lines where it would have been difficult to exploit his superiority in cavalry. Caesar refused to give the order for an attack. The slope favoured the Pompeians, who would have had the additional benefit of support from missiles thrown or shot from the rampart behind them. Caesar contented himself with the knowledge that his soldiers would see this as a reluctance on the part of the Pompeians to face them on anything like equal terms. For the moment Caesar seems to have despaired of successfully negotiating with Pompey, but he made an indirect approach by sending an envoy with a personal letter to Metellus Scipio, who had arrived in Macedonia with the legions from Syria. In the meantime, to add to the pressure on Pompey, Caesar’s legionaries extended their fortifications to block the two approaches to Dyrrachium itself. Pompey had sent a force of cavalry by sea to land near the town. Around the same time he may have made an attempt to capture the town with a surprise night attack, possibly after a traitor had offered to admit his men. The attempt failed, but the additional fortifications made it even harder for Pompey’s cavalry to find sufficient fodder and after a few days they were taken by ship back to his main position within his own fortifications. By this time the horses were being fed mainly on leaves and reeds, since not enough proper feed could be brought by ships from Corcyra or even further afield.16

Pompey realised that his own army was suffering as much, perhaps even more than the enemy, and decided that he needed to seize back the initiative once again. An opportunity came with the desertion of two Gaulish 418

M acedonia, November 49–August 48 bc

noblemen, the brothers Roucillus and Egus. They were the sons of one of the main chieftains of the Allobroges from Transalpine Gaul and had served with Caesar for many years, leading a contingent of tribal cavalry with some distinction. Characteristically he had rewarded their loyalty well, making them senators, probably within their own tribe, although some have preferred to take the more natural reading of this passage to suggest that he had actually enrolled them in the Senate at Rome. It is certainly probable that the men were citizens. However, more recently the brothers had taken to siphoning off much of their men’s pay and also sending in false returns of the number of warriors they had to claim extra money and rations. In the end their own troopers went and complained to Caesar, who delayed making a formal decision, but privately spoke to them and warned them to stop these corrupt practices. The brothers realised that they had become unpopular and feared punishment in the future, so soon began to plan their escape. They borrowed substantial sums of money – the rumour was that they wished to make recompense to their men – and started buying up horses. A plan to murder the overall commander of Caesar’s cavalry was abandoned as impractical, so Roucillus and Egus then simply rode over to the enemy lines. With them went their household warriors, whose oaths of loyalty ensured that they must always follow their chieftains. Pompey was pleased, for up until this point no one had deserted from Caesar’s army during the entire campaign. He had them paraded around his lines and shown to the troops as a sign that the enemy must be weakening when two distinguished men chose to abandon them. Even more usefully the brothers had held senior positions and so were well acquainted with Caesar’s lines of fortification and the routine of his army.17