Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (28 page)

BOOK: Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army
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In most U.S. news reports on the ambush, Fallujah was described as a Sunni resistance stronghold filled with foreign fighters and Saddam loyalists. The dominant narrative became that the Blackwater men were innocent “civilian contractors” delivering food who were slaughtered by butchers in Fallujah. At one point after the incident, Kimmitt told reporters that the Blackwater men were “there to provide assistance, to provide food to that local area,”
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as though the men were humanitarians working for the Red Cross. But inside Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq, the ambush was viewed differently. The news that the men were technically not active U.S. forces did not change the fact that they were fully armed Americans who had traveled into the center of Fallujah at a time when U.S. forces were killing Iraqi civilians and attempting to take the city by force. The
New York Times
reported, “Many people in Falluja said they believed that they had won an important victory on Wednesday. They insisted that the four security guards, who were driving in unmarked sport utility vehicles, were working for the Central Intelligence Agency. ‘This is what these spies deserve,’ said Salam Aldulayme, a 28-year-old Falluja resident.”
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On CNN’s
Larry King Live, ABC News
anchor Peter Jennings, who had just returned from Iraq a few days before the Blackwater killings, said, “There is a sort of second army of Americans out there now in the form of security personnel, who can be seen almost anywhere in the country there is a member of the coalition doing something. And they struck me as being very high-profile targets. They’re armed to the teeth. A lot of them look like they come out of a Sylvester Stallone movie. And so, and they move around the country. And I think that the insurgents, whomever they are, have picked up on them and may be tracking them. So when it happened in Fallujah, as bad as it was, I must say I wasn’t deeply surprised.”
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Others described the ambush as a response to the recent U.S. killing of civilians in Fallujah, particularly the gun battle the previous week that left more than a dozen Iraqis dead. “Children and women were killed. They were innocent,” said Ibrahim Abdullah al-Dulaimi. “People in Fallujah are very angry with the American soldiers.”
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Leaflets began circulating in Fallujah claiming that the killings were carried out as revenge for the Israeli assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin.
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A Fallujah shop assistant named Amir said, “The Americans may think it is unusual, but this is what they should expect. They show up in places and shoot civilians, so why can’t they be killed?”
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These sentiments were even echoed among the ranks of the U.S.-created Iraqi police force. “The violence is increasing against the Americans,” said Maj. Abdelaziz Faisal Hamid Mehamdy, a Fallujan who joined the police force in 2003 after Baghdad fell. “They took over the country and they didn’t give us anything. They came for democracy and to help the people, but we haven’t seen any of this, just killing and violence.”
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A local Fallujan official, Sami Farhood al-Mafraji, who had been supportive of the occupation, said, “Americans are not meeting their promises here to help build up this country. . . . I used to support the military. But they have put me in a very difficult situation with my people. Now, they tell us to hand these people over?”
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He said the dire humanitarian situation and the violence of the occupation had “made people depressed and angry.” “Hungry people will eat you,” he said. “And people here are very hungry.”
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This context even seemed clear to some U.S. troops as well. “The people who did this heinous crime were looking for revenge,” said Marine Lt. Eric Thorliefson, positioned on the outskirts of Fallujah. He added, “We shall respond with force.”
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While U.S. officials condemned the public mutilation of the bodies, they refused to answer questions about the U.S. policy of distributing gruesome photos of the mangled corpses of “high value” Iraqis killed by U.S. forces, like Saddam’s sons Uday and Qusay in July 2003, as proof of death. Similar to the outrage expressed by Washington over the mauling of the Blackwater contractors, Iraqis were furious over this U.S. propaganda technique. At the White House the day of the Blackwater killings, McClellan was asked if the administration did “not see hypocrisy [when showing] embalmed bodies as proof of death is condemned but the dragging of American bodies through a street goes on without a comment?”
 
“It is offensive. It is despicable the way that these individuals have been treated,” McClellan responded, ignoring the question. “And we hope everybody acts responsibly in their coverage of it.”
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Indeed, most of the images of the ambush and its aftermath that were broadcast on U.S. networks and in newspapers were edited or blurred. Even so, the message was clear. With the Somalia comparisons increasing in the international media, the administration shot back. “We are not going to withdraw. We are not going to be run out,” Secretary of State Colin Powell, the first senior Bush administration official to comment directly on the Blackwater killings, told German television. “America has the ability to stay and fight an enemy and defeat an enemy. We will not run away.”
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Meanwhile, reporters began questioning who these four contractors were and what they were doing in the middle of Fallujah. “I will let individual contractors speak for themselves on the clients they have inside Iraq. My understanding is Blackwater has more than one. But again, I would have you contact them to get that information. I certainly do not have it,” said Dan Senor, the occupation spokesperson in Baghdad. “They—we do have a contract with Blackwater, with—relating to Ambassador Bremer’s security. They are involved with protecting Ambassador Bremer,” Senor said.
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On CNN, Senor was asked, “So with all due respect to the men who lost their lives, any concern that this security company is up to the task?”
 
“Absolutely,” Senor shot back. “We have the utmost confidence in Blackwater and the other security institutions that protect Mr. Bremer and provide security throughout the country.”
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In North Carolina, meanwhile, Blackwater’s phones were ringing off the hook as the identities of the four “civilian contractors” became public. The company refused to officially confirm the names of the dead, a Blackwater policy. “The enemy may have contacts in the U.S.,” said former Blackwater vice president Jamie Smith. “If you start putting names out there—any names—and they start finding out who your friends are and asking questions, it could become a security problem.”
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The day after the ambush, Blackwater hired the powerful, well-connected Republican lobbying firm the Alexander Strategy Group (founded and staffed by former senior staffers of then-House majority leader Tom DeLay) to help the company handle its newfound fame.
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Blackwater released a brief statement to the press. “The graphic images of the unprovoked attack and subsequent heinous mistreatment of our friends exhibits the extraordinary conditions under which we voluntarily work to bring freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people,” the Blackwater statement said.
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“Coalition forces and civilian contractors and administrators work side by side every day with the Iraqi people to provide essential goods and services like food, water, electricity and vital security to the Iraqi citizens and coalition members. Our tasks are dangerous and while we feel sadness for our fallen colleagues, we also feel pride and satisfaction that we are making a difference for the people of Iraq.”
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Republican Congressman Walter Jones Jr., who represents Currituck County, North Carolina (where Blackwater has its headquarters), said the contractors had “died in the name of freedom.”
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Republican Senator John Warner, head of the Senate Armed Services Committee, praised the Blackwater men at a hearing, saying, “Those individuals are essential to the work that we’re performing in Iraq, primarily the rebuilding of the infrastructure.”
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In the “Chaplain’s Corner” section of Blackwater’s newsletter,
Blackwater Tactical Weekly,
right after the ambush, Chaplain D. R. Staton continued the misleading characterization of the men as “humanitarian” workers who came to Iraq “to save a people,” writing, “Those four Americans were there because they were hired to provide security to food caravans delivering life giving substances to native Iraqis. . . . This one incident points up the hatred of Islamic militants for anyone not Islamic militant and especially those who are called by them the white devils or the ‘great Satan’ or simply ‘infidels. ’ Did you study those individuals in the mob as they were displayed to us via television? Did you note their attitudes and their ages? They are brainwashed from birth to hate all who are not with them. . . . And especially us!!! . . . And the Israelis!” The attackers’ message, Staton wrote, “is to discourage our forces from entering Fallujah and the special claimed area around that city!!! The message will backfire!!!” Staton ended his sermon with a plea to his readers: “Make the enemy pay dearly for every action brought against us as we stand for liberty and justice!!!”
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But not everyone working for Blackwater was on the same page. “I think they’re dying for no reason,” said Marty Huffstickler, a part-time electrician for the company in Moyock. “I don’t agree with what’s going on over there. The people over there don’t want us there.”
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To the Marines, which had just taken over command of Fallujah, the Blackwater ambush could not have come at a worse moment because it dramatically changed the course of Maj. Gen. James Mattis’s strategy. The local commanders wanted to treat the killings as a law enforcement issue, go into the city, and arrest or kill the perpetrators.
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But at the White House, the killings were viewed as a serious challenge to the U.S. resolve in Iraq—one that could jeopardize the whole project in the country. President Bush immediately summoned Rumsfeld and the top U.S. commander in the region, Gen. John Abizaid, to ask for a plan of action.
 
According to the
L.A. Times
:
 
 
Rumsfeld and Abizaid were ready with an answer, one official said: “a specific and overwhelming attack” to seize Fallouja. That was what Bush was hoping to hear, an aide said later. What the president was not told was that the Marines on the ground sharply disagreed with a full-blown assault on the city. “We felt . . . that we ought to let the situation settle before we appeared to be attacking out of revenge,” the Marines’ commander, Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, said later. Conway passed this up the chain—all the way to Rumsfeld, an official said. But Rumsfeld and his top advisors didn’t agree, and didn’t present [Lt. Gen. Conway’s reservations] to the president. “If you’re going to threaten the use of force, at some point you’re going to have to demonstrate your willingness to actually use force,” Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita said later. Bush approved the attack immediately.
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In Fallujah, word of the President’s go-ahead for an attack reached the Marine base positioned on the city’s outskirts. “The president knows this is going to be bloody,” Sanchez told the commanders there. “He accepts that.”
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One officer characterized the orders as, “Go in and clobber people.”
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By April 2, 2004, forty-eight hours after the ambush, “Operation Vigilant Resolve” was put on the fast track. Marine Sgt. Maj. Randall Carter began to pump his men up for their mission. “Marines are only really motivated two times,” he declared. “One is when we’re going on liberty. One is when we’re going to kill somebody. We’re not going on liberty. . . . We’re here for one thing: to tame Fallujah. That’s what we’re going to do.”
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Inside the city, meanwhile, Fallujans, too, were preparing for a battle many believed was inevitable.
 
Before the U.S. troops launched the full assault on the city, Bremer deputy Jim Steele, the senior adviser on Iraqi security forces, was sent covertly into Fallujah with a small team of U.S.-trained Iraqi forces and people Steele referred to as “U.S. advisors.”
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Steele had most recently been an Enron executive before being tapped for the Iraq job by Paul Wolfowitz.
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Perhaps most appealing to the administration, Steele had a very deep history with U.S. “dirty wars” in Central America. As a colonel in the Marines in the mid-1980s, Steele had been a key “counterinsurgency” official in the bloody U.S.-fueled war in El Salvador, where he coordinated the U.S. Military Group there,
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supervising Washington’s military assistance and training of Salvadoran Army death squads battling the leftist FMLN guerrillas.
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In the late 1980s, Steele was called to testify during the Iran-Contra investigation about his role in Oliver North’s covert weapons pipeline to the Nicaraguan Contra death squads, running through the Salvadoran Air Force base at Ilopango.
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He also worked with the Panamanian police after the United States overthrew Manuel Noriega in 1990.
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Steele played a similar role with U.S.-trained Iraqi forces in the early days of the occupation and was central to a program some refer to as the “Salvadorization of Iraq.”
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Under this strategy, “U.S. soldiers are increasingly moving to a Salvador-style advisory role,” wrote Peter Maass in
The New York Times Magazine
. “In the process, they are backing up local forces that, like the military in El Salvador, do not shy away from violence. It is no coincidence that this new strategy is most visible in a paramilitary unit that has Steele as its main adviser; having been a central participant in the Salvador conflict, Steele knows how to organize a counterinsurgency campaign that is led by local forces.”
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