Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (18 page)
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Authors: Jeremy Scahill
BOOK: Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army
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But while Blackwater raised its profit margin and profile with its training services in the aftermath of 9/11, its true fame and fortune would not be gained until it formed Blackwater Security Consulting in 2002 and burst into the world of soldiers-for-hire. As with Blackwater’s founding, Erik Prince would once again provide the medium for another’s idea. This time, it was the vision of former CIA operative Jamie Smith. Smith had been recruited by Al Clark to teach weapons classes while he was a law student at Regent University, “America’s preeminent Christian university,” in Virginia Beach, not far from Blackwater.
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In an interview, Smith said he first thought about the prospects for a private security company while working as a CIA operative during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. “I’m not trying to say that I was some sort of soothsayer a decade prior to all of this, but it was an infantile idea, it looked like it was just going to continue the trends of privatization,” Smith said. “There were already companies doing similar things. There wasn’t a lot of public knowledge surrounding that. DynCorp was working, there were other companies, SAIC, that were doing something along the same lines.” Smith said he realized that the military was beginning to use private forces to guard military facilities, a practice known as “force protection,” thus freeing up more forces for combat. It was a trend, and Smith said he “did not think it was something that could be arrested because of the nature of our military being a volunteer service. Do you really want to have your volunteer force standing guard out at the front gate when they could be doing things a lot more valuable for you? So I just didn’t see that it would change and that it would probably just continue.”
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Like Al Clark a few years earlier, Jamie Smith didn’t have the means at the time to start his own private security company, and while the demand was certainly there, it was not overwhelming. Then, after 9/11, Smith says Prince “called and said, ‘Hey, I’d like you to consider a full-time job and come back to work with us,’ and I told him that was interesting to me and that I would consider doing that with the caveat that we could create this security company.” Prince agreed. But, Smith contends, Prince didn’t see the payoff in what would shortly become Blackwater’s biggest moneymaker. “I was told, ‘You can’t devote all your time to this because it’s not going to work.’ They said, ‘You can devote about 20 percent of your total time to this, but no more than that—you need to stick to what you’re doing now,’” Smith said.
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Smith joined Blackwater full-time in December 2001, and Blackwater Security Consulting was incorporated in Delaware on January 22, 2002.
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Within months, as the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and began planning the Iraq invasion, Blackwater Security was already turning a profit, pulling in hundreds of thousands a month from a valuable CIA contract.
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Smith joined Blackwater full-time in December 2001, and Blackwater Security Consulting was incorporated in Delaware on January 22, 2002.
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Within months, as the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and began planning the Iraq invasion, Blackwater Security was already turning a profit, pulling in hundreds of thousands a month from a valuable CIA contract.
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One of the key players in landing that first Blackwater Security contract was A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, executive director of the CIA, the agency’s number-three position.
85
Krongard, who was named to that post in March 2001,
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had an unusual background for a spook, having spent most of his adult life as an investment banker. He built up Alex.Brown, the country’s oldest investment banking firm, into one of the most successful, eventually selling it to Bankers Trust, which he resigned from in 1998.
87
There have been some insinuations that Krongard was working undercover for the CIA years before he officially joined the agency in 1998 as a special adviser to George Tenet.
88
But he won’t reveal how he met the CIA director, except to say that it was through “mutual friends.”
89
The Princeton alum, Hall of Fame lacrosse player, and former Marine boasts of having once punched a great white shark in the jaw; and he keeps one of its teeth on a chain and pictures of the animal in his office.
90
Despite his bravado, some at the agency thought Krongard more of a wanna-be, according to a 2001
Newsweek
story published shortly after his ascension to the number-three spot. “A wanna-be? Maybe I am. Maybe I’m not. That’s as much as you’re going to get,” Krongard responded.
91
85
Krongard, who was named to that post in March 2001,
86
had an unusual background for a spook, having spent most of his adult life as an investment banker. He built up Alex.Brown, the country’s oldest investment banking firm, into one of the most successful, eventually selling it to Bankers Trust, which he resigned from in 1998.
87
There have been some insinuations that Krongard was working undercover for the CIA years before he officially joined the agency in 1998 as a special adviser to George Tenet.
88
But he won’t reveal how he met the CIA director, except to say that it was through “mutual friends.”
89
The Princeton alum, Hall of Fame lacrosse player, and former Marine boasts of having once punched a great white shark in the jaw; and he keeps one of its teeth on a chain and pictures of the animal in his office.
90
Despite his bravado, some at the agency thought Krongard more of a wanna-be, according to a 2001
Newsweek
story published shortly after his ascension to the number-three spot. “A wanna-be? Maybe I am. Maybe I’m not. That’s as much as you’re going to get,” Krongard responded.
91
9/11 conspiracy theorists have long been interested in Krongard because the bank he headed until 1998, which was bought out by Deutsche Bank after he left, was allegedly responsible for the unusually high number of put options on United Airlines stock placed just before 9/11, options that were never collected.
92
There is no evidence of his having prior knowledge of the attacks. While at the CIA, working under George Tenet, Krongard acted internally, reorganizing divisions
93
and pushing for projects like an intelligence venture capital firm,
94
but he did on occasion speak publicly. In October 2001, he declared, “The war will be won in large measure by forces you do not know about, in actions you will not see and in ways you may not want to know about, but we will prevail.”
95
92
There is no evidence of his having prior knowledge of the attacks. While at the CIA, working under George Tenet, Krongard acted internally, reorganizing divisions
93
and pushing for projects like an intelligence venture capital firm,
94
but he did on occasion speak publicly. In October 2001, he declared, “The war will be won in large measure by forces you do not know about, in actions you will not see and in ways you may not want to know about, but we will prevail.”
95
Some three years later, in January 2005, Krongard made news when he became the most senior administration figure to articulate the benefits of having
not
killed or captured Osama bin Laden. “You can make the argument that we’re better off with him (at large),” he said. “Because if something happens to bin Laden, you might find a lot of people vying for his position and demonstrating how macho they are by unleashing a stream of terror. . . . He’s turning into more of a charismatic leader than a terrorist mastermind.”
96
Krongard also characterized bin Laden “not as a chief executive but more like a venture capitalist,” saying, “Let’s say you and I want to blow up Trafalgar Square. So we go to bin Laden. And he’ll say, ‘Well, here’s some money and some passports and if you need weapons, see this guy.’”
97
not
killed or captured Osama bin Laden. “You can make the argument that we’re better off with him (at large),” he said. “Because if something happens to bin Laden, you might find a lot of people vying for his position and demonstrating how macho they are by unleashing a stream of terror. . . . He’s turning into more of a charismatic leader than a terrorist mastermind.”
96
Krongard also characterized bin Laden “not as a chief executive but more like a venture capitalist,” saying, “Let’s say you and I want to blow up Trafalgar Square. So we go to bin Laden. And he’ll say, ‘Well, here’s some money and some passports and if you need weapons, see this guy.’”
97
It’s not clear exactly what the actual connection was between Prince and Krongard. Some have alleged that Krongard knew Prince’s father.
98
In a brief telephone interview, Krongard would only say he was “familiar” with Prince and Blackwater.
99
A former Blackwater executive, however, asserted, “I know that Erik and Krongard were good buddies.”
100
Whatever Krongard’s involvement, it was the CIA that handed Blackwater its first security contract in April 2002.
101
Krongard visited Kabul and said he realized the agency’s new station there was sorely lacking security.
102
Blackwater received a $5.4 million six-month no-bid contract to provide twenty security guards for the Kabul CIA station.
103
Krongard said it was Blackwater’s offering and not his connection to Prince that led to the company landing the contract, and that he talked to Prince about the contract but wasn’t positive who called who, that he was “not sure which came first, the chicken or the egg.”
104
He said that someone else was responsible for actually signing off on the CIA contract. “Blackwater got a contract because they were the first people that could get people on the ground,” Krongard said in the interview. “We were under the gun, we did whatever it took when I came back from Kabul. . . . The only concern we had was getting the best security for our people. If we thought Martians could provide it, I guess we would have gone after them.”
105
98
In a brief telephone interview, Krongard would only say he was “familiar” with Prince and Blackwater.
99
A former Blackwater executive, however, asserted, “I know that Erik and Krongard were good buddies.”
100
Whatever Krongard’s involvement, it was the CIA that handed Blackwater its first security contract in April 2002.
101
Krongard visited Kabul and said he realized the agency’s new station there was sorely lacking security.
102
Blackwater received a $5.4 million six-month no-bid contract to provide twenty security guards for the Kabul CIA station.
103
Krongard said it was Blackwater’s offering and not his connection to Prince that led to the company landing the contract, and that he talked to Prince about the contract but wasn’t positive who called who, that he was “not sure which came first, the chicken or the egg.”
104
He said that someone else was responsible for actually signing off on the CIA contract. “Blackwater got a contract because they were the first people that could get people on the ground,” Krongard said in the interview. “We were under the gun, we did whatever it took when I came back from Kabul. . . . The only concern we had was getting the best security for our people. If we thought Martians could provide it, I guess we would have gone after them.”
105
The relationship between Krongard and Prince apparently got chummier after the contract was signed. “Krongard came down and visited Blackwater, and I had to take his [family] around and let them shoot on the firing range a number of times,” said a former Blackwater executive in an interview. “That was after the contract was signed, and he may have come down just to see the company that he had just hired.”
106
Prince apparently became consumed with the prospect of being involved with secretive operations in the war on terror—so much so that he personally deployed on the front lines.
107
Prince joined Jamie Smith as part of the original twenty-man contingent Blackwater sent to fulfill its first CIA contract, which began in May 2002, according to Robert Young Pelton’s book
Licensed to Kill
.
108
Most of the team guarded the CIA Kabul station and its assets at the airport, but Smith and Prince also went to one of the most dangerous places in Afghanistan, Shkin, where the United States was establishing a base four miles from the Pakistani border. But after just one week, Prince left the Shkin detail and the mud fortress (that some called the “Alamo”) out of which U.S. forces operated. Smith told Pelton that Prince’s trip was more like “playing CIA paramilitary” and that he left to go “schmooze” those who could give more work to Blackwater Security.
109
Smith stayed in Shkin for two months and then in Kabul for four months. After leaving Shkin, Prince remained in Kabul for a week. Apparently Prince enjoyed the experience so much that he subsequently tried to join the CIA, but was reportedly rejected when his polygraph test came back inconclusive.
110
Though Prince was denied the status of a full CIA operative, he has apparently maintained close ties with the agency. Prince reportedly was given a “green badge” that permitted him access to most CIA stations.
111
“He’s over there [at CIA headquarters] regularly, probably once a month or so,” a CIA source told
Harper’s
journalist Ken Silverstein in 2006. “He meets with senior people, especially in the [directorate of operations].”
112
106
Prince apparently became consumed with the prospect of being involved with secretive operations in the war on terror—so much so that he personally deployed on the front lines.
107
Prince joined Jamie Smith as part of the original twenty-man contingent Blackwater sent to fulfill its first CIA contract, which began in May 2002, according to Robert Young Pelton’s book
Licensed to Kill
.
108
Most of the team guarded the CIA Kabul station and its assets at the airport, but Smith and Prince also went to one of the most dangerous places in Afghanistan, Shkin, where the United States was establishing a base four miles from the Pakistani border. But after just one week, Prince left the Shkin detail and the mud fortress (that some called the “Alamo”) out of which U.S. forces operated. Smith told Pelton that Prince’s trip was more like “playing CIA paramilitary” and that he left to go “schmooze” those who could give more work to Blackwater Security.
109
Smith stayed in Shkin for two months and then in Kabul for four months. After leaving Shkin, Prince remained in Kabul for a week. Apparently Prince enjoyed the experience so much that he subsequently tried to join the CIA, but was reportedly rejected when his polygraph test came back inconclusive.
110
Though Prince was denied the status of a full CIA operative, he has apparently maintained close ties with the agency. Prince reportedly was given a “green badge” that permitted him access to most CIA stations.
111
“He’s over there [at CIA headquarters] regularly, probably once a month or so,” a CIA source told
Harper’s
journalist Ken Silverstein in 2006. “He meets with senior people, especially in the [directorate of operations].”
112
Since CIA and other intelligence and security contracts are “black” contracts, it’s difficult to pin down exactly how much Blackwater began pulling in after that first Afghanistan job, but Smith described it as a rapid period of growth for Blackwater. The company’s work for the CIA and the military and Prince’s political and military connections would provide Blackwater with important leverage in wooing what would become its largest confirmed client, the U.S. State Department. “After that first contract went off, there was a lot of romancing with the State Department where they were just up the road, so we traveled up there a lot in Kabul and tried to sweet talk them into letting us on board with them,” Smith said. “Once the State Department came on and there was a contract there, that opened up some different doors. Once you get your foot in the door with a government outfit that has offices in countries all over the world, it’s like—and this is probably a horrible analogy—but it’s something maybe like the metastasis of a cancer, you know, once you get into the bloodstream you’re going to be all over the body in just a couple of days, you know what I mean? So if you get in that pipeline, then everywhere that they’ve got a problem and an office, there’s an opportunity.”
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For Blackwater, the opportunity of a lifetime would come when U.S. forces rolled into Baghdad in March 2003. Strapped with a GSA schedule and deep political and religious connections, Prince snagged a high-profile contract in Iraq that would position his men as the private bodyguards for the Bush administration’s top man in Baghdad, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III. Referred to as the “viceroy” or “proconsul,” Bremer was a diehard free-marketeer who, like Prince, had converted to Catholicism and passionately embraced the neoconservative agenda of using American military might to remake the world according to U.S. interests—all in the name of democracy. The Bremer contract meant that Prince would be at the helm of an elite private force deployed on the front lines of a war long sought by many of the forces that made up the theocon movement. Far from the simple shooting range on a North Carolina swamp that Blackwater was just a few years earlier, the company was now recognized by the Bush administration as an essential part of its war on terror armada. Blackwater president Gary Jackson, a career Navy SEAL, would soon boast that some of Blackwater’s contracts were so secret that the company couldn’t tell one federal agency about the business it was doing with another agency.
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Iraq was a pivotal coming-of-age moment for mercenaries, and Blackwater would soon emerge as the industry trendsetter. But less than a year after Prince’s forces deployed in Iraq, four of Blackwater’s men would find themselves on a fatal mission in the Sunni Triangle that would propel Blackwater to international infamy and forever alter the course of the U.S. occupation and Iraqi resistance to it. It happened in a city called Fallujah.
114
Iraq was a pivotal coming-of-age moment for mercenaries, and Blackwater would soon emerge as the industry trendsetter. But less than a year after Prince’s forces deployed in Iraq, four of Blackwater’s men would find themselves on a fatal mission in the Sunni Triangle that would propel Blackwater to international infamy and forever alter the course of the U.S. occupation and Iraqi resistance to it. It happened in a city called Fallujah.
CHAPTER FOUR
FALLUJAH BEFORE BLACKWATER
“A stranger should be well-mannered.”
—Fallujah proverb
LONG BEFORE
Blackwater deployed in Iraq—more than a decade earlier, in fact—events beyond the control of Erik Prince and his colleagues were setting in motion the epic ambush that would take place on March 31, 2004, when Iraqi resistance fighters killed four Blackwater contractors in broad daylight in the center of Fallujah. The killing of those Americans would alter the course of the Iraq War, spark multiple U.S. sieges of Fallujah, and embolden the antioccupation resistance movement.
Blackwater deployed in Iraq—more than a decade earlier, in fact—events beyond the control of Erik Prince and his colleagues were setting in motion the epic ambush that would take place on March 31, 2004, when Iraqi resistance fighters killed four Blackwater contractors in broad daylight in the center of Fallujah. The killing of those Americans would alter the course of the Iraq War, spark multiple U.S. sieges of Fallujah, and embolden the antioccupation resistance movement.
But to begin the story of what happened to the Blackwater men that day with the particular details surrounding the ambush of their convoy, or even the events of the immediate days and weeks preceding the killings, is to ignore more than a decade of history leading up to the incident. Some would say the story goes even further back, to Fallujah’s fierce resistance to the British occupation of 1920, when an antioccupation rebellion in the city took the lives of some one thousand British soldiers almost a century before the United States invaded Iraq. Regardless, there is little question that the city of Fallujah has suffered like no other in Iraq since the U.S. invasion began in 2003. On several occasions, U.S. forces have attacked the city, killing thousands and displacing tens of thousands, and occupation troops have fired on unarmed demonstrators several times. Since the invasion, U.S. officials have brutally sought to make an example of the rebellious city. In the U.S. press and among the punditry, policy-makers, and military commanders, Fallujah has been portrayed as a hotbed of pro-Saddam resistance and as the seat of foreign fighters angered at the regime’s overthrow and furious at the U.S. occupation. But that is a very narrow, incomplete, and misleading presentation of history that serves only Washington’s agenda. As Pulitzer Prize-winning
Washington Post
correspondent Anthony Shadid noted, “[Fallujah’s] historical links with the former government constituted only part of the story. It was also a region shaped by rural traditions and reflexive nationalism, stitched together by a fierce interpretation of Islam and the certainty it brought. This fundamental identity and its attendant values became even more important as the community sank deeper into the sense of disenfranchisement voiced so often in this swath of Sunni land.”
1
What is seldom acknowledged in the media is that before the first U.S. troops rolled into Iraq, before the Blackwater killings and the ensuing sieges of the city, before it became a symbol of Iraqi resistance, the people of Fallujah knew suffering at the hands of the United States and its allies.
Washington Post
correspondent Anthony Shadid noted, “[Fallujah’s] historical links with the former government constituted only part of the story. It was also a region shaped by rural traditions and reflexive nationalism, stitched together by a fierce interpretation of Islam and the certainty it brought. This fundamental identity and its attendant values became even more important as the community sank deeper into the sense of disenfranchisement voiced so often in this swath of Sunni land.”
1
What is seldom acknowledged in the media is that before the first U.S. troops rolled into Iraq, before the Blackwater killings and the ensuing sieges of the city, before it became a symbol of Iraqi resistance, the people of Fallujah knew suffering at the hands of the United States and its allies.
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