Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the C.I.A., the S.A.S., and Mossad (35 page)

Zardari, by now, had turned a blind eye to CIA attacks, using remotely controlled drones to strike enemy hideouts. On the ground, local spies were used to place microchips near the targets as aids to missile navigation. The number of significant kills grew steadily. A dozen al Qaeda commanders were removed by this means in 2008. In August 2009 Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban leader in Pakistan, was lying on the roof of a house owned by his father-in-law, an intravenous drip attached to his arm to relieve a kidney ailment, when a missile released from a drone demolished the building. In April, Sa’ad bin Laden, son of Osama, also fell victim to the intelligence+drone+missile weapon.

On the ground in Pakistan, U.S. and British Special Forces moved in to train the country’s Frontier Force at camps in Baluchistan. The real battleground, however, was not in camps, or the urban areas of Lahore in which increasing numbers of Taliban tried to hide, but in the minds of ordinary Pakistanis, many of whom believe that 9/11 was an Israeli/American plot to discredit a resurgent Islam. No surprise, then, that the new head of the British Army, General Sir David Richards, should predict that the U.K.’s involvement in Afghanistan might last for forty years, a prospect that daunted politicians both sides of the Atlantic.

Meanwhile, the campaign rolled on, turning up new surprises each day, particularly in the world of signals intelligence. In 2008, linguists flying with Nimrod aircraft of 51 Squadron RAF over Helmand, intercepting satcom telephones used by Taliban fighters, were astonished to eavesdrop on enemy warriors lost for words in Pashto, reverting to English. They then spoke with accents that were distinctive, nasal, Birmingham (“Brummy”) voices planning attacks on British forces. It confirmed that U.K. Islamists, born and educated in Britain, had joined the jihad.

EPILOGUE

A NIMBLE, PRECISE STRATEGY

A
s President Barack Obama celebrated his first year in the White House in that cool, intellectual style that had become his trademark, he knew that America faced a similar dilemma to that which confronted Richard Nixon almost exactly forty years before: how to resolve an apparently intractable conflict that had become a political and military quagmire. Nixon’s solution in Vietnam was not exactly to cut and run but to march elegantly backward while handing over mission impossible to indigenous forces as if this were a plan ordained by God. Nixon had Henry Kissinger’s word that, to paraphrase the secretary of state as well as Voltaire, all was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. In his version of the story of Candide, Leonard Bernstein even set the idea to music.

But when it came to Afghanistan 2009, there were discordant voices out there. Obama, as he prepared to receive his Nobel Peace Prize, might have felt like Horatius defending Ancient Rome almost singlehanded on a narrow bridge in 507
B
.
C
.
E
. in a scene described by the poet Macaulay:

Was none who would be foremost

To lead such dire attack;

But those behind cried ‘Forward!’

And those before cried ‘Back!’

Howard Hart, the CIA’s Scarlet Pimpernel in the days when the Agency was supplying the mujahideen with weapons to fight the Soviets, told the BBC: “There is no one in the world more indefatigable, more courageous, meaner, nastier, looking for a fight than the tribals are. They love to fight. It almost doesn’t matter who they are fighting. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan back in ’79 there was in existence a fairly large Soviet-trained Afghan army. They collapsed immediately as we turned on the insurgency. They deserted in large numbers. I think frankly if we were to raise an Afghan army that a great many of them would be providing the best trained and equipped insurgents that there were in the country.”
²³⁷
Hart recalled that he had worked very closely with “many of these people who are fighting America now…. We invaded Afghanistan [in 2001] which meant going in after the Taliban first on the theory that was the only way we could destroy al Qaeda. We are forgetting that the Taliban had no quarrel with us, the West. I don’t think it matters a bit—let’s be hard boiled about this—if Afghanistan was to revert back to being a Taliban-controlled state, we managed to live with that for any number of years before 9/11 and then we went in after al Qaeda.”

But wouldn’t such a policy be a terrible betrayal of many Afghans who supported America during the war against the Taliban? “Yes, it would be. Those who really put their neck on the line, we have to take care of them. We have to bring ’em out, just as we did in Vietnam. But the truth of the matter is, most people who are on our side and happen to be Afghans, really their heart is not in this game. I have long had a rule in this neck of the woods and the rule is this, now in the minds of the locals. It doesn’t matter who wins. What matters is that you are on the winning side when it’s all over, and we can see already that much of the population either tacitly or actively supports the insurgents.”

Did this mean it was time for the West to pull out, give up? “That is about right. Leave a few troops behind because we need some operating bases in country. The Taliban won’t like it but we can cut a deal with them, I’m sure. I think it’s time to say, ‘Thank you very much but we’re not going to pay in blood and in treasure for endless years to come.’ There will never be an honest election in any number of generations in Afghanistan. Why don’t we regard [the 2009 election] for what it is, just another example of why Afghanistan is not amenable to being fixed?”

Other clever, informed minds were pondering means by which deals might be cut with some of today’s enemies. General Sir Graeme Lamb, who spent most of his thirty-eight years’ soldiering with the SAS, turning enemies into allies in Iraq, retired in 2009 and was promptly invited by that other Special Forces veteran, General Stanley McChrystal, to attempt a repeat performance on the less tractable battlefield of Afghanistan. Like General McChrystal and Howard Hart, Lamb detected a failed strategy that combined drift with incoherence during the first eight years of war against the Taliban after 9/11. In spite of that, he was convinced that change, for the better, was possible. His doctrine was to convert swords into plowshares at the grass roots.

Speaking from Kabul, he said: “There are many young people out here who fight well for a bad cause. My view is if they could look at and reflect on the underlying reasons why they are fighting, then they may well question those. What we shouldn’t be doing is to be so fixated in our minds we cannot negotiate across these divides.” In Iraq, reconciling Shia militiamen and Sunnis running a major insurgency he had found “reasonably easy…. Actually the most difficult people to reconcile in many ways were the Americans; having Americans reconciled with the fact that at some point you have to talk to those you are fighting against. You know, Clausewitz didn’t finish the sentence, that ‘War is the continuation of politics.’ The bit he missed out was ‘To politics it must return.’…One of the comments in Iraq was why would you bring an alligator into your bedroom? Again one has to go back to [asking] who are these people? These are local people who need to understand why, and then they have a choice to have a better life. You know in Iraq I always said you can buy an insurgency if you have enough money…. But my view is the moment someone on the wrong side of the wire is inclined to come back, then we have to set the conditions whereby that young man comes back in and is not a pariah and is not, as he walks across the line, rearrested by somebody. Finding employment…is the reasonable basis for a more respectable and a better life. It’s not simply a question of my going out and finding people who might be inclined to come across and say ‘Right, pay you a dollar and stop fighting us for a month or two.’”
²³⁸

Defense Secretary Gates seemed to share Lamb’s position. “To truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it—to attain a political objective—the United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.” But this was easier said than done in Afghanistan, a loose federation of provinces where seventy per cent of the population was under twenty-five years old, only five per cent of them literate in the frontline province of Helmand; where corruption combined with drug rackets and kidnapping for ransom as the dominant economic activities. In Aghanistan, Lamb’s nostrums appeared as idealistic as the West’s worthy hopes of gender-equality and other dreams of human rights. Yet his concept of a Special Forces war-winning strategy that depended more on psychology than firepower fitted well enough with the new doctrine unveiled by McChrystal and his team as Obama’s first presidential anniversary approached.

The general’s assessment of the campaign was bleak. The West had lost the initiative. Unless it was regained in twelve months, defeat was possible. “Preoccupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us—physically and psychologically—from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily, but we can defeat ourselves…. Conventional wisdom is not sacred; security may not come from the barrel of a gun. Better force protection may be counterintuitive; it might come from less armor and less distance from the population…. Our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem. The Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency…. Protecting the people means shielding them from
all
threats.”
²³⁹
The new doctrine also demanded a classic counterinsurgency campaign, yet more allied manpower and a drastic overhaul of ISAF.

Having thought the matter over for three months, President Obama descended from Olympus by helicopter to West Point in December 2009 and revealed his plan for the future. Actually there were two futures: one for Afghanistan, the second for wherever else in the world the threat of al Qaeda might appear. “As Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After eighteen months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.” Integral to that timescale was the hope of training enough Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to control a society that had rarely known public order though, as Major-General Nick Carter, the British general responsible for security in the unruly Helmand province, acknowledged: “When the Taliban were here, they did ensure security on the main highways. They did it very effectively. You could put your daughter on the bus in Kabul sure in the knowledge she would get to Kandahar in one piece.”
²⁴⁰

The other—unlimited—timescale mentioned by Obama passed almost unnoticed by most commentators. “The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society and our leadership in the world. And unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve disorderly regions and diffuse enemies. So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars and prevent conflict. We have to be nimble and precise in our use of military power. Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold—whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere—they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships.”

America’s oracle had spoken at last—and, like most oracular pronouncements, it lacked concrete detail. Yet there could be little doubt that Obama’s nostrum of “nimble and precise” military power was his blessing on the emerging orchestra of Special Forces upon which, in this new kind of conflict, America’s strategy and that of its allies would rest in the future.

ENDNOTES

1
. Tony Geraghty:
BRIXMIS—The Untold Exploits of Britain’s Most Daring Cold War Spy Mission
—HarperCollins London 1996.

2
. Ibid.

3
. Colonel Roger M. Prezzelle U.S. Army (Retd) former chief, Special Operations Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization:
Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s
—in
Special Operations in US Strategy
edited by Frank R. Barnett; B. Hugh Tover; Richard H. Schultz—National Defense University Press & National Strategy Information Center Inc 1984.

4
. Gordon L. Rottman:
US Army Special Forces 1952–84
—Osprey London 1985.

5
.
The Times
Archive 21 April 2009.

6
. U.S. Senator Mike Gravel et al.:
The Pentagon Papers
Vol. 2 p. 439.

7
. Winston Churchill: Letter to Japanese Ambassador to London, 8 December.

8
. See Alfred H. Paddock:
Psychological Operations, Special Operations and US Strategy
in Barnett, Tover, Schultz, op. cit.

9
. Prezzelle op. cit.

10
. Fitzroy MacLean:
Eastern Approaches
—Jonathan Cape 1949.

11
. Max Hastings: Churchill’s War—Daily Mail (London) 22 August 2009.

12
. Alan Hoe:
David Stirling—the Authorized Biography of the Creator of the SAS
—Warner Books 1999.

13
. Ian Traynor:
UK arranged transfer of Nazi scientists to Australia—The Guardian
17 August 1999.

14
. Robert Gates:
Speech to National Defense University
29 September 2008.

15
. Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith (Retd) and Donald Knox:
Delta Force: The Inside Story of America’s Super-secret Counterterrorist Unit
—Fontana Paperbacks 1985.

16
. Colonel John T. Carney Jr. and Benjamin F. Schemmer:
No Room For Error—The Covert Operations of America’s Special Tactics Units from Iran to Afghanistan
—Ballantine Books 2002.

17
. James Bamford:
Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency
—Anchor Books 2002.

18
. President Franklin D. Roosevelt:
Memorandum to Secretary of State Hull, 24 January 1944
—Retrieved 15 September 2009 from Roosevelt’s Trusteeship Concept, U.S. Federal Government.

19
.
Pentagon Papers
op. cit. p. 104.

20
. Ibid.

21
. Ibid.

22
. Ibid.

23
. Ibid.

24
. Air Force General Edward G. Lansdale (OSS & CIA):
Lansdale Team’s Report on Covert Saigon Mission in 1954 and 1955
—quoted in
Pentagon Papers
op. cit.

25
. Colonel Francis John Kelly:
Vietnam Studies: US Army Special Forces 1961–1971
—CMH Publication 90-23 Department of the Army Washington 1973.

26
. Henry Kissinger:
Lessons of Vietnam
—12 May 1975.

27
. Joint Research and Test Activity APO San Francisco 96243:
Test of Armalite Rifle, AR-15
.

28
. Ken Connor, quoted by David Leppard:
SAS Men get GBP 100,000 To Bribe Iraqi Fighters—Sunday Times
21 August 2005.

29
. Kelly op. cit.

30
. Ibid.

31
. Ibid.

32
. Paris D. Davis, Major, U.S. Army:
Report of Action at Camp Bong Son
—Cited in Vietnam Studies, Kelly op. cit.

33
.
Pentagon Papers
op. cit.

34
. Ibid.

35
. Dr. Edwin E. Moise:
Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
—Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1996.

36
. Robert J. Hanyok:
Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery
—Cryptology Quarterly Vol. 19 No. 4/Vol. 20 No. 1, Winter 2000/Spring 2001 declassified November 2005. The quarterly is described by Weiner, op. cit., as “a highly classified NSA publication.”

37
. Hanyok op. cit.

38
. Alexander M. Haig Jr.:
Caveat
—Macmillan, 1984.

39
. Chairman, Joint Chiefs Special Studies Group report to Secretary McNamara—
Pentagon Papers
Vol IV p. 291.

40
. Kelly op. cit.

41
. Ibid.

42
. William Shawcross:
Sideshow—Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia
—Andre Deutsch 1979.

43
. Shelby L. Stanton:
Vietnam Order of Battle
—Stackpole Books 2003—Retrieved 10 September 2009.

44
. Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan:
Bombs Over Cambodia—The Walrus
(“Canada’s Best Magazine”) October 2006, retrieved 10 September 2009.

45
. Abrams cable obtained under Freedom of Information Act, quoted by Shawcross op. cit.

46
. John Morocco:
Operation Menu
—Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1988.

47
. Haig op. cit.

48
. Kelly op. cit.

49
. Ibid.

50
. Ibid.

51
. Weiner op. cit.

52
. Sedgwick Tourison:
Secret Army, Secret War
—Naval Institute Press 1996.

53
. Anon:
The Tet Offensive
—U.S. Library of Congress in countrystudies.us, retrieved 14 September 2009.

54
. Ibid.

55
. Ibid.

56
. Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, Richard H. Schultz et al.:
Special Operations in US Strategy
—National Defense University Press in cooperation with National Strategy Information Center Inc. 1984.

57
. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State:
Lessons of Vietnam
—Memorandum 3173-X The White House 12 May 1975 declassified 24 November 1998, retrieved 14 September 2009.

58
. Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian, Professor of Political Science, Loyola University:
Special Operations in US Strategy
, op. cit.

59
. Major General Michael D. Healey USA (Retd):
Special Operations in US Strategy
op. cit.

60
. See, for example: Susan Lynn Marquis:
Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces
—Brookings Institution Press.

61
. Ben Macintyre:
Obama must face down the ghost of Vietnam—The Times
28 October 2009.

62
. Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith (Retd) and Donald Knox:
Delta Force—The Inside Story of America’s Super-secret Counterterrorist Unit
—Arms & Armour Press UK 1984.

63
.
Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Report
—Statement of Admiral J.L. Holloway III USN (Ret.) Chairman of Special Operations Review Group (Unclassified Version), August 1980.

64
. Beckwith op. cit.

65
. James Bamford:
Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency
—First Anchor Books 2002.

66
. Heike Hasenauer:
A Special Kind of Hero
—Special Operations.com 2000 retrieved 28 May 2009.

67
. Beckwith op. cit.

68
. Anon:
Eagle Claw
—
www.specwarnet/miscinfo/eagleclaw.htm
retrieved 28 May 2009.

69
. Carney op. cit.

70
. Michael Smith:
Killer Elite—America’s Most Secret Soldiers
—St. Martin’s Press 2007.

71
. Lieutenant-General Philip C. Gast:
Memorandum…Intelligence Capability
10 December 1980 quoted in The National Security Archive,
A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson 23 May 2001, retrieved 4 June 2005.