America At War - Concise Histories Of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexington To Afghanistan (44 page)

Both groups were aided greatly by their ability to use eastern Pakistan as a safe haven. Al-Qaeda operatives would cross over into Afghanistan to strike at their foes, then retreat back into their camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. At times, the Pakistanis assisted the Americans in locating and killing al-Qaeda personnel. Particularly effective in this effort were American unmanned aerial vehicles. The United States employed these lethal devices often, over the public objections of Pakistani leaders. At other times, these leaders, especially those in Pakistan’s intelligence service, would provide support to al-Qaeda and to the Taliban. Pakistan’s goal was to have a friendly regime along its eastern border. These leaders saw no conflict in helping both sides.

In addition to raising troop levels in Afghanistan, Presidents Bush and Obama increased financial aid. Rejecting the notion that nation building was not an American role, the United States began an effort to rebuild that country. The funding allocated to Afghanistan was substantial. By 2010, it added up to $18.8 billion, with most of that coming in the later years. By 2011, the monthly expenditure was $320 million.

What was this money spent on? The answer is roads, schools, hospitals, generating plants, agricultural assistance, and other worthwhile endeavors. Although large sums evaporated due to waste and fraud, many projects were deemed successful. For example, according to the
Washington Post
of June 9, 2011, 680 schools were constructed or repaired. And these, no doubt, were open to females.

Despite some successes, failures in the reconstruction effort were numerous. For example, an American-led project to upgrade southern Afghanistan’s Kajaki hydroelectric plant went awry, with some $260 million expended. A project to upgrade a power plant in Kabul also failed, as the plant remained largely idle after the United States invested approximately $300 million. But the most compelling example of the difficulty the United States faced in building a modern Afghan state centered on road construction, something an infrastructure-poor Afghanistan desperately needed. Over a period of several years, the United States directed vast sums of money into the building of roads. Yet, as the
Wall Street Journal
reported, roads indeed were built, but they cost more than they should have and covered far fewer miles than planned. “You can find programs and projects that have been successful,” said Kai Eider, a Norwegian diplomat running U.N. activities in Afghanistan for a time, “but for me it is quite obvious that huge amounts of money have been misspent.” The newspaper pointed out one such example: a typical gravel road in Afghanistan was supposed to have cost some $290,000 per mile. Yet for every mile constructed, America’s Afghanistan Strategic Roads Project spent $2.8 million.

Another example of the failures the United States experienced in its nonmilitary efforts in Afghanistan dealt with the effort to build a consulate in the northern region of the country. This time, it was the
Washington Post
that reported the story. The consulate was to be constructed in the town of Masar-e Sharif. Yet, after spending some $80 million, the project was abandoned. The reason given was security concerns. With U.S. troops leaving the country and Afghan national forces unequal to their task, it became too dangerous for U.S. officials to work there.

The huge expense incurred to aid Afghanistan troubled many in the United States. Concerned with their own country’s fiscal well-being, they were troubled by the mismatch at home between revenues and expenditures. Concerns increased during 2010 and 2011, becoming a factor in Washington’s decision making. Of greater significance, however, was the number of casualties the war was causing. As of July 2013, 2,236 U.S. soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan. More than 12,000 had been wounded.

The cost to Americans of their Afghan endeavor, both financial and in lives lost, was such that opposition to the war became substantial. Aware of these concerns, believing al-Qaeda had been neutralized, and anxious to redirect U.S. resources to the home front, President Obama announced a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. By the summer of 2012, thirty-three thousand men and women were to be withdrawn. That would leave sixty-eight thousand troops in country. Their departure would continue during 2014, so that, by that year or the following, America’s military presence in Afghanistan would be minimal. “America,” said the president, “it is time to focus on nation-building at home.”

When the U.S. troops are home and the ISAF is disbanded, will the effort, again one that has consumed American dollars and American lives, have been worth it? Many will say no. Others will answer in the positive, pointing to the damage done to al-Qaeda and to the progress made in improving the daily life of ordinary Afghans.

The key issue is whether the progress will be sustainable once the Americans have left. That depends on whether the Karzai government and its successors can survive without having U.S. troops on the ground. That, in turn, depends on the capability of the new American-trained Afghan National Army. Will it fill the vacuum created when Uncle Sam’s soldiers no longer are present? Perhaps it will, but maintaining this army is estimated to require approximately $4 billion each year, money the Afghan government does not have.

Even if it did, the Afghan central governments are not likely to make Afghanistan a place where its citizens are safe and free, and where the progress made so far can continue. A culture of corruption—so prevalent in Afghanistan—will remain as will the pull of tribal loyalties. Assassinations and rebellion, moreover, are part of the country’s political traditions, and there is no reason to believe they have been forsaken. Add to these the tenacity of the Taliban and future prospects become rather bleak.

In the days of its empire, the British tried and failed in Afghanistan. Much later, so did the Soviets. Regrettably, America is likely to follow their examples.

Was America’s entry into Afghanistan necessary?

Yes, it was. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda had declared war on the United States and its citizens.
They intended to bring great harm to Americans, and had done so already. President Bush’s response was swift and effective. He ordered CIA personnel and U.S. Special Forces to enter Afghanistan and destroy al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts. They arrived shortly after September 11, 2001, and, with great skill, toppled the Taliban and sent Bin Laden fleeing into Pakistan.

How did the CIA and Special Forces defeat their enemy?

Instead of employing massive conventional forces
,
as the Russians had done, the United States mounted a military campaign featuring small detachments of U.S. Special Forces and CIA operatives, armed with AK-47 assault rifles
,
medical supplies, sophisticated communications gear, and, according to
MHQ
journal, “three large boxes whose contents tipped the scales at 45 pounds: the weight of three million dollars in $100 bills.” These units—there were only seven of them—allied with Afghans opposed to the Taliban and went into battle. Employing both modern weapons and some not so modern (horse cavalry), they defeated their foe, though not without the assistance of considerable American airpower. The campaign lasted just twenty-seven days, from October 19, 2001, to November 14. 2001. No Americans were killed. Taliban and al-Qaeda deaths were in the thousands.

Did other nations besides the United States engage in Afghanistan?

Yes, they did. True, the bulk of the military effort to stabilize Afghanistan once the Taliban were removed from power was American. But Britain, France, Germany, and other nations participated. Germany sent 4,701 troops to Afghanistan, though, as mentioned earlier, they were limited to no-combat roles. Not so the French. In addition to ground troops, they deployed units of the
Armee del’Air
, the French air force. It
began operations early on and, employing Mirage and Super Entendard jet fighters
,
flew some seventy-two hundred sorties over a period of six years.

One nation that goes to war when the United States goes to war is Australia. In Korea, in Vietnam, in the Gulf, and in Iraq, troops from “Down Under” joined their American comrades in battle. So too in Afghanistan, where Australian Special Forces displayed their usual skill and courage.

What is likely to happen once the Americans depart in 2014?

If, as planned, the American military leaves Afghanistan in 2014, the security of its citizens and of the central government will rest on the shoulders of the Afghan national police and Afghan army. Neither organization appears equal to the task, despite efforts by ISAF troops to train and equip the personnel involved. Additionally, the central government is in need of financial assistance. Recognizing this need, donor nations, urged on by the United States, in July 2012 pledged $16 billion over four years. These funds, if they materialize, are to be directed toward civil projects. The hope is that they will enable the government in Kabul to continue the construction of a modern state, one that provides security and prosperity to its citizens.

What of the military situation? What will prevent a resurgence of the Taliban when the United States and other ISAF troops no longer are present? The hope is that the Afghans themselves will keep the Taliban from power. However, in May 2012 Leon Panetta, the American secretary of defense, said the United States would have “an enduring presence” in Afghanistan after 2014. What he meant was that U.S. troops would continue to train and support the Afghan forces. Whether they will engage in combat was not addressed.

If they do not, if American soldiers keep to the sidelines when the bullets start to fly, then the Taliban and al-Qaeda will gain in strength. The result will be pressure on the government in Kabul. Whether it will then survive is a problematic question to answer. If the government doesn’t survive, America’s war in Afghanistan, its longest war, will have been in vain, because al-Qaeda and the Taliban will rise again.

SELECTED READINGS

ONE—INDEPENDENCE

Allison, Robert J.,
The American Revolution: A Concise History
, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.

Billias, George Athan, editor,
George Washington’s Generals
, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1964.

Ferling, John,
Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence
, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Golway, Terry,
Washington’s General
:
Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution
, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2005.

Hairr, John,
Guilford Courthouse
, DeCapa Press, Cambridge, 2002.

Harvey, Robert,
A Few Bloody Noses: The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution
, The Overlook Press, Woodstock and New York, 2001.

Hibbert, Christopher,
Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes
, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1990.

Ketchum, Richard M.,
Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the American Revolution
, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004.

Marston, Daniel,
The American Revolution 1774–1783
, Osprey, Oxford, 2002.

Matloff, Maurice, general editor,
The Revolutionary War
, David McKay, undated.

Mitchell, Joseph B.,
Decisive Battles of the American Revolution
, Westholme Publishing Company, Yardley, 1962.

Stephenson, Michael,
Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought
, HarperCollins, New York, 2007.

Wood, Gordon S.,
The American Revolution: A History
, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2003

TWO—1812

Benn, Carl,
The War of 1812
, Osprey, Oxford, 2002.

Bickman, Troy,
The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the British Empire, and the War of 1812
, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.

Daughan, George C.,
1812 The Navy’s War
, Basic Books, New York, 2011.

Dudley, Wade G.,
Splintering the Wooden Wall: The British Blockade of the United States, 1812–1815
, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2003.

Fowler, William M. Jr.,
Jack Tars & Commodores
:
The American Navy 1783–1815
, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1984.

Gardiner, Robert, editor,
The Naval War of 1812
, Chatham Publishing, London, 1998.

Hitsman, J. Mackay, updated by Donald E. Graves,
The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History
, Robin Brass Studio, Toronto, 1999.

Latimer, Jon,
1812: War with America
, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 2007.

McCranie, Kevin D.,
Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812
, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2011.

Rutland, Robert Allen,
James Madison: The Founding Father
, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1987.

Robotti, Frances Diane, and Jame Vescovi,
The USS Essex and the Birth of the American Navy
, Adams Media Corp., Holbrook, 1999.

Sweetman, Jack,
American Naval History,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1991.

THREE—MEXICO

Bauer, K. Jack,
The Mexican War 1846–1848
, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1974.

Eisenhower, John S. D.,
So Far from God: The U.S. War With Mexico 1846–1848
, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2000. Originally published by Random House in 1989.

Henry, Robert Selph,
The Story of the Mexican War
, DeCapo Press, New York. Copyright 1950 by the Bobbs-Merrill Company.

Meed, Douglas V.,
The Mexican War 1846–1848
, Osprey, Oxford, 2002.

Seigenthaler, John,
James K. Polk
, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2003.

Winders, Richard Bruce,
Mr. Polk’s Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War
, Texas A & M University Press, College Station, 1997.

FOUR—BETWEEN THE STATES

Ades, Harry,
The Little Book of the Civil War
, Barnes and Noble, New York, 2002.

Gallagher, Gary W., Stephen D. Engle, Robert K. Krick, and Joseph T. Glatthaar,
The American Civil War: This Mighty Scourge of War
, Osprey, Oxford, 2003.

Masur, Louis P.,
The American Civil War: A Concise History
, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.

McPherson, James M.,
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era
, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988.

McPherson, James M.,
This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War
, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007.

McWhinney, Grady,
The Civil War: A Concise Account by a Noted Southern Historian
, McWhinney Foundation Press, Abilene, 2005.

Neillands, Robin H.,
Grant: The Man Who Won the Civil War
, Cold Spring Press, Cold Spring Harbor, 2004.

Reid, Brian Holden,
The American Civil War and the Wars of the Industrial Revolution
, Cassell and Company, London, 1999.

Sears, Stephen W.,
Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam
, Ticknor and Fields, New Haven and New York, 1983.

Sheehan-Dean, Aaron, editor,
Struggle for a Vast Future: The American Civil War
, Osprey, Oxford, 2006.

Sweetman, Jack,
American Naval History
, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1991.

Taaffe, Stephen R.,
Commanding the Army of the Potomac
, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2006.

Williams, T. Harry,
Lincoln and his Generals
, Gramercy Books, New York, 1952.

FIVE—SPAIN

Bradford, James C., editor,
Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War & Its Aftermath
, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1993.

Field, Ron,
Buffalo Soldiers 1892–1918
, Osprey, Oxford, 2005.

Goldstein, Donald M., and Katherine V. Dillon,
The Spanish-American War
, Brassey’s, Washington, 1998.

Halstead, Murat,
The Full Official History of the War With Spain
, Dominion, Chicago, 1899.

Konstam, Angus,
San Juan Hill: America’s Emergence as a World Power
, Osprey, Oxford, 2005.

Nofi, Albert A.,
The Spanish-American War, 1898
, Combined Books, Pennsylvania, 1996.

O’Toole, G. J. A.,
The Spanish War: An American Epic
, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1984.

Silby, David J.,
A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902
, Hill and Wang, New York, 2007.

SIX—WORLD WAR I

Bowen, Ezra,
Knights of the Air
, Time-Life Books, Alexandria, 1980.

Farwell, Byron,
Over There: The United States in the Great War, 1917–1918
, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1999.

Franks, Norman,
American Aces of World War I
, Osprey, Oxford, 2001.

Fussell, Paul,
The Great War and Modern Memory
, Sterling, New York, 2009.

Hart, B. H. Liddell,
The Real War: 1914–1918
, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1930.

Hindenburg, Paul von, edited by Charles Messenger,
The Great War
, Greenhill Books, London, 2006.

Hough, Richard,
The Great War at Sea: 1914–1918
, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983.

Keegan, John,
The First World War,
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1999.

Lengel, Edward G.,
To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918
, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2008.

Massie, Robert K.,
Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea,
Random House, New York, 2003.

Neiberg, Michael S.,
Fighting the Great War: A Global History
, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

Prior, Robin, and Trevor Wilson,
The First World War
, Cassell, London, 1999.

Strachan, Hew,
The First World War
, Viking, New York, 2003.

Terraine, John,
Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier
, Hutchinson, London, 1963.

Terraine, John,
The U-Boat Wars: 1916–1945
, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1989.

Willmott, H. P.,
World War I
, DK, New York, 2003.

Votaw, John F.,
The American Expeditionary Forces in World War I
, Osprey, 2005.

SEVEN—WORLD WAR II

The War in the Pacific

Dull, Paul S.,
A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941–1945)
, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1978.

Grove, Philip D.,
Midway
1942
, Brassey’s, London, 2004.

Hastings, Max,
Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1941–45
, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008.

Marston, Daniel, editor,
The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima
, Osprey, Oxford, 2005.

Polmar, Norman,
The Enola Gay: The B-29 That Dropped the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima
, The Smithsonian Institution and Brassey’s, Washington, 2004.

Potter, E. B.,
Nimitz
, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1976.

Spector, Ronald H.,
Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan
, The Free Press, New York, 1985.

Willmott, H. P.,
Pearl Harbor
, Cassell and Company, London, 2001.

The Battle of the Atlantic

Dallies-Labourdette, Jean-Philippe,
U-Boote 1935–1945
The History of the Kriegsmarine U-Boats
,
Histoire & Collections, Paris, undated.

Doenitz, Grand Admiral Karl, translated by R. H. Stevens in collaboration with David Woodward,
Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days
, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1959.

Edwards, Bernard,
Donitz and the Wolfpacks
, Brockingham Press, London, 1999.

Hughes, Terry, and John Costello,
The Battle of the Atlantic
, Dial Press/James Wack, New York, 1977.

Showell, Jak P.,
U-Boat Command and the Battle of the Atlantic
, Vanwell Publishing, St. Catherine’s, 1989.

Syrett, David,
The Defeat of the German U-boats: The Battle of the Atlantic
, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1994.

Van der Vat, Dan,
The Atlantic Campaign: World War II’s Great Struggle at Sea
, Harper & Row, New York, 1988.

The War in North Africa and in Europe

Atkinson, Rick,
An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943
, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2002.

Badsey, Stephen,
Normandy, 1944
:
Allied Landings and Breakout
, Barnes and Noble/Osprey, 2000.

Davies, Norman,
No Simple Victory, World War II in Europe, 1939–1945
, Viking, New York, 2007.

Eisenhower, Dwight D.,
Crusade in Europe
, Doubleday and Company, Garden City, 1948.

Korda, Michael,
Ike: An American Hero
, HarperCollins, New York, 2007.

Messenger, Charles,
The D-Day Atlas
, Thames and Hudson, New York, 2004.

Penrose, Jane, editor,
The D-Day Companion: Leading Historians Explore History’s Greatest Amphibious Assault
, The National D-Day Museum, New Orleans, 2004.

Wilt, Alan F.,
The Atlantic Wall: Rommel’s Plan to Stop the Allied Invasion
, Enigma Books, New York, 2004.

The War in the Air

Carter, Ian,
Fighter Command 1939–1945
, Ian Allan, Hersham, 2002.

Cooper, Matthew,
The German Air Force 1933–1945: An Anatomy of Failure
, Jane’s, London, 1981.

Copp, DeWitt S.,
Forged in Fire: Strategy and Decisions in the Airwar over Europe 1940–1945
, Doubleday and Company, Garden City, 1982.

Goodson, James A.,
Tumult in the Clouds
, William Kimber, London, 1983.

Hansen, Randall,
Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942–1945
, NAL Caliber, New York, 2009.

Harvey, Maurice,
The Allied Bomber War 1939–1945
, Spellmount, Tunbridge Wells, 1992.

Hastings, Max,
Bomber Command: The Myths and Realities of the Strategic Bombing Offensive 1939–1945
, Dial Press/James Wade, New York, 1979.

Lyall, Gavin, editor,
The War in the Air: The Royal Air Force in World War II
, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1969.

McFarland, Stephen L., and Wesley Phillips Newton,
To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942–1945
, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, 1991.

Miller, Donald L.,
Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany
, Simon and Shuster, New York, 2006.

Parton, James,
Air Force Spoken Here: General Ira Eaker and the Command of the Air
, Adler & Adler, Bethesda, 1986.

The Second World War in General

Barnett, Correlli,
Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War
, W.W. Norton and Company, New York and London, 1991.

Bevor, Anthony,
The Second World War
, Little Brown and Company, New York, 2012.

Borneman, Walter R.,
The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King—The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea
, Little Brown and Company, New York, 2012.

Burns, James MacGregor,
Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom
, Konecky & Konecky, New York, 1970.

Corrigan, Gordon,
The Second World War: A Military History
, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2010.

Hart, B. H. Liddell,
History of the Second World War
, Konecky & Konecky, Old Saybrook, 1970.

Keegan, John,
The Second World War
, Viking, New York, 1989.

Kimball, Warren F.,
Forged in War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Second World War
, HarperCollins, London, 1997.