All In (44 page)

Asked during an interview with NATO TV about increasing violence levels in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign intended to protect the Afghan people, Petraeus said that most of the night raids involved the capture of insurgent leaders with no shooting at all—and when the raids did involve shooting, he said, “they are quite precise in their effects.”

His assessment of the quality of Afghan forces was measured. “You have to acknowledge, I think, an unevenness among some of the forces,” he said, noting that the more than twelve thousand Afghan special operations forces were “really quite capable” and leading nearly a quarter of all night raids.
They performed creditably and courageously, he said, in response to the recent attack on the Hotel Intercontinental. They now led all night raids in the Kabul area. Beyond that, he felt that many regular Army units were also developing impressively. The quality of the police ranged from very good to inadequate in some areas. But the conditions for transition had been set.

PETRAEUS WAS EFFUSIVE
at Lieutenant General Rodriguez's change-of-command ceremony on July 11. “General Rod is, in many respects,” Petraeus explained in his remarks, “the operational architect of the campaign plan that has guided the progress of the past year. But what he has done pales by comparison to the way in which he has done it. . . . He is always out there, meeting with ISAF troopers and Afghan counterparts, explaining our concepts, overseeing their execution, and keeping his finger on the pulse of every situation.”

Rodriguez chatted briefly with reporters before he left later in the day from Kabul's military airport. “The violence has gone down where we've focused our efforts,” he said on the tarmac, his tour at an end. “You have to watch it very carefully, because the violence is now outside instead of inside the populated areas. It takes a lot to really understand the nuances of what's happening. But, look, these things go up and down, and we're going to have to sustain that with our partners. Afghan forces are stepping up more and more. I'm confident the withdrawal will be all right now.”

WELL PAST MIDNIGHT
on the night following Rodriguez's departure, Petraeus wrote to Bob Gates, the now-retired secretary of Defense, thanking him for a formal letter Gates had written to him a few days earlier on official Pentagon stationery and for a more personal handwritten note several days later.

Dated June 27, 2011, Gates's official letter read:

 

Dear General Petraeus,

Please accept my congratulations and my deepest appreciation as you retire after nearly four decades of military service. To call that service remarkable is an understatement.

The strength of the United States military throughout our history has been its resilience and adaptability in the face of new threats and challenges. You have stepped forward as the indispensible soldier/scholar of this era, transforming the U.S. Army, and the entire military approach to warfighting, from training to capabilities.

In the field, you have changed the course of two wars, an unprecedented accomplishment. I especially commend you for answering the call to serve as Commander, International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan after sacrificing, and achieving, so much over the long fight in Iraq. But I believe your greatest legacy will be as the leader, mentor, and role-model of one of the most battle-tested, adaptive, and innovative generations of military leaders the United States has ever known—a generation ready and able to defend the United States against whatever threats the future may hold.

You have risen to every challenge and fulfilled every charge your country has asked of you and more. As you lay down one heavy mantle of service and responsibility, only to pick up another as you assume my one-time post as Director, Central Intelligence Agency, it has been a privilege and a pleasure to work with you these past 4 ½ years.

I wish you and your family the very best for the future.

 

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates

The handwritten note, dated June 29, on a secretary of Defense notepad, read:

 

Dear Dave,

As I leave this position, I want to tell you how much I have enjoyed working with you over the last 4 ½ years. We have had a unique partnership spanning two wars. I would be hard pressed to identify a secretary and a field commander who worked more closely—and beneficially—together. I suspect we will write about these times, and I, for one, would be gratified to have Dr. Petraeus review my draft.

I wish you all the best at CIA and thank you from the bottom of my heart for your brilliant and courageous service.

 

All the best,

Bob Gates

Petraeus responded in a note that “Dr. Petraeus” would be honored to help, adding, “Allow me, also, to thank you again for your determined, principled, and visionary leadership over the past 4½ years—and, again, for ‘having my back' and ‘having our troopers' backs' throughout that time!” He followed up with a formal letter of his own, on July 12:

 

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of June 27, 2011.

I cannot tell you how much I appreciate your kind words. I remain deeply grateful for your support, counsel and mentorship over the past 4 ½ years. As I noted when you were here in June, you “had my back” throughout that time. More importantly, you had our troopers'—and our families'—backs throughout that time, too. You were masterful in ensuring they received the support and resources they needed, even when there was institutional resistance. As you well know, we never would have gotten MRAPs, more UAVs, M-ATVs, much of the Counter-IED systems, and a host of other vital enablers, were it not for your determined leadership. Please accept my sincere appreciation for that leadership and for your steadfast commitment during your time as our Secretary.

Best wishes to you and the Gates tribe as you begin the next chapter of your life. And thanks again for all that you have done for our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen and their families.

 

Very respectfully,

 

David H. Petraeus

General, United States Army Commander

LATER THAT MORNING,
Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president's half brother and the most powerful man in Kandahar, was killed at his home by one of his security force commanders, his trusted aide, Sardar Muhammad. Muhammad was immediately shot and killed by Karzai's bodyguards. Ahmed Wali Karzai and Muhammad were so close that the killing was at first seen as a personal vendetta. But in the days following the assassination, Afghan officials and members of the Karzai family began to express their suspicions that the Taliban had somehow turned Muhammad. It was ultimately determined, however, that Muhammad had become a heavy narcotics user and that he had learned that Ahmed Wali Karzai was going to fire him. Muhammad confronted Karzai, and the argument escalated into Muhammad shooting and killing Karzai. Even so, the mere suspicion of Taliban involvement sowed fear and made those Afghans closest to the United States realize that if someone as powerful and well guarded as the president's half brother could be assassinated, no one was really safe. Indeed, two days later, a suicide bomber with an explosive hidden in a turban attacked a memorial service for the slain Karzai at a mosque in Kandahar, killing himself and three others.

The attack came on the same day that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan released its midyear report,
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
Its stark conclusion: “In the first six months of 2011, the armed conflict in Afghanistan brought increasingly grim impacts and a bleak outlook for Afghan civilians.” Civilian deaths totaled 1,462, a 15 percent increase over the same period a year earlier. The UN attributed 80 percent to the Taliban and other insurgents, and it noted that the overall number killed by the Taliban had increased by 28 percent. Fourteen percent of the deaths were attributed to ISAF and Afghan forces, and the number killed had decreased by 9 percent from the previous year. The deaths occurred during an overall escalation of violence.

“The mounting toll of civilian casualties in the first six months of 2011 represents a deepening entrenchment of violence in the everyday lives of Afghans,” the UN concluded. Behind the grim statistics, there were a number of alarming developments. The UN documented the first two confirmed cases of attacks on hospitals. The recruitment and use of children as suicide bombers was also noted. The UN found that the increasing use of “night raids” by U.S. and Afghan special forces—three hundred a month, on average—had resulted in fewer civilian deaths: thirty fewer than were seen in the first six months of 2010. Still, the UN said that night raids “remain one of the most despised tactics in the eyes of the Afghan population.” While night raids produced fewer civilian casualties, ISAF air strikes produced more, despite all of Petraeus's efforts. Air strikes were the leading cause of civilian deaths, claiming seventy-nine lives in the first half of 2011, a 14 percent increase.

Petraeus noted that there had been more than 1,600 strikes involving improvised explosive devices in June, the highest number recorded for any month during ten years of war. U.S. military officials knew that the Taliban's deadly reliance on IEDs was the direct result of Pakistan's inability or unwillingness to stop large quantities of ammonium nitrate fertilizer from being smuggled into Afghanistan. Petraeus had become increasingly concerned about the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan and other Pakistani support for the Taliban from the moment he'd arrived in Afghanistan a year earlier; in fact, he had been seized with it as the Central Command commander as well. He had less influence while in command in Afghanistan, but it didn't stop him from engaging when he could.

Even as U.S.-Pakistani relations had deteriorated in the wake of the bin Laden raid in Islamabad and the Obama administration had suspended $800 million in military aid, Petraeus tried to remain relatively optimistic—publicly, at least—about his ability to work with the Pakistanis. As the UN released its midyear report, Petraeus and Allen flew to Pakistan to meet with General Ashfaq Kayani, the head of the Pakistani military. As bad as the relationship was, the situation could only get worse in Afghanistan if that relationship fell apart completely. As Petraeus noted in a video teleconference he gave that week to Princeton alumni, “We've seen that movie before.” He was referring to the American withdrawal of support for Pakistan and lack of interest in Afghanistan after the end of the so-called Charlie Wilson's War—the support through Pakistan of the mujahideen fighters who forced the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989, after nearly ten years of war.

THAT SATURDAY,
July 16, Petraeus attended his final senior security
shura
at the Ministry of Defense, attended by Defense minister Wardak and the deputy minister from the Ministry of the Interior, among others. Listening to the discussion topics that day, Petraeus knew the future in Afghanistan was tenuous but far from hopeless. There had been setbacks, chief among them the recent infiltrations of the Afghan armed forces by insurgents and the worrisome Taliban assassination campaign. When Petraeus had the chance to speak at the end of the two-hour session in the crowded room, he wanted to assuage concerns, which had spread like wildfire, about the U.S. drawdown. He reminded the senior Afghan leaders in the room that the Afghan armed forces would be increasing by 70,000 by the time the last of the surge forces left the country next fall. “The U.S. drawdown is made possible by our combined progress,” he said. “We'll draw down 10,000 by the end of 2011, and 20,000 more by September 2012. This will allow us to fulfill our original surge timeline and allow Afghans to assume increasing responsibility for security.” He also wanted to assure them that there was no run to the exits. “The U.S. drawdown is not a reflection of a changing strategy or overall campaign plan. It does not undermine the 2014 commitment and post-2014 commitment,” he said. “We will not abandon our partners before you are capable, nor will we withdraw precipitously.”

PETRAEUS WAITED UNTIL
the last possible day, his second-to-last in command, to preside over his first-ever battlefield promotion. He had a special place in his heart for Sergeant Landon Nordby, a member of his personal security detail in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, a highly professional NCO and one of the greatest all-around athletes Petraeus had encountered in the Army. Petraeus had fought to bring back battlefield promotions in 2008, during the latter part of the surge in Iraq. The practice had been discontinued after the Vietnam War, with the advent of the Army's centralized promotion system. But Petraeus pushed the idea when he was commanding the effort in Iraq, based on his belief that promoting soldiers at war purely on the basis of “extraordinary performance of duties while serving in combat or under combat conditions”—with no promotion boards or time-in-grade requirements necessary—would be hugely motivational. “Today,” he said, “I am enormously proud, as is Command Sergeant Major Hill,” who had helped him gain approval of the battlefield promotions in Iraq, “to promote Sergeant Landon Nordby to staff sergeant, in recognition of his performance and proven ability to carry a few more rocks in his rucksack of responsibility.” It was a special moment for Petraeus and his inner circle, many of whom had uprooted their lives to follow Petraeus to Afghanistan—a number after having followed him to Central Command from Iraq.

PETRAEUS ALSO
released his farewell message to the troops that day:

 

As I prepare to depart Afghanistan, I want you to know what an honor it has been to be your commander for the past year. During that time, you and our Afghan counterparts have achieved important progress in a hugely complex, enormously important mission. In the face of resilient enemies and innumerable other challenges, you and our partners have halted the momentum of the insurgents in much of the country and reversed it in a number of key areas. While much hard work clearly lies ahead, the achievements of the past year have enabled gains in security, governance, and development and have helped bring new hope to the Afghan people in a number of villages, districts, and provinces.