After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (42 page)

Meanwhile, on a domestic level there continues to be criticism that the Qatari authorities promote self-censorship of the media, with local newspapers and television stations being unable to cover a number of delicate issues in the emirate. Indeed, further to the difficulties faced by the Doha Centre for Media Freedom, the leaked cable also commented that the US embassy had ‘assessed a steady lack of overall media freedom in Qatar’ and believed that ‘although overt and official censorship is not present, self and discreet official censorship continues to render Qatar’s domestic media tame and ineffective’.
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There has also been criticism that the Qatari authorities—in much the same way as the other Gulf monarchies—are quite prepared to repress their own citizens, if necessary. In March 2011, for example, Amnesty International reported that a Qatari blogger and human rights activist
¹⁷⁶
—the founder of an organisation that monitors cases of arbitrary detention in the emirate—was himself seized. He was reportedly arrested by eight members of Qatar’s security services and his home, car, and computer were searched without warrant.
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CONCLUSION

The state formation processes of the smaller Gulf monarchies, and in particular their historic relationships with Britain and other foreign powers, are crucial to understanding the political institutions that developed—especially those that fit with the neo-patriarchy and liberalised autocracy arguments. Equally, in Saudi Arabia knowledge of the state that formed around the long-running alliance between the ruling family and the religious establishment remains central to any contemporary analysis. Important too have been the various components of the ruling bargains or social contracts that have been constructed by these polities. As per the rentier state model, the distribution of wealth along with the creation of a national identity and the formation of an indigenous rentier elite class that sits above all expatriates have been paramount. But other, non-economic legitimacy resources also clearly matter. As expected by revised modernisation theory approaches, Michael Hudson’s mosaic model, and observers of these regimes’ re-orientalisation strategies, these bargains have included cults of personality, the cooption of religion, tribal heritage, and other traditional sources of power and authority.

The survival explanations can now be pressed even further, appreciating how the Gulf monarchies have applied aspects of their domestic strategies to both the wider region and even the international community. Notably, the distribution of rentier wealth has by no means been limited to national populations; it is increasingly used to buy influence and goodwill elsewhere, especially in other Arab and Muslim countries. Similarly, extensive and often costly peacekeeping missions are despatched to nearby conflict zones, which have again positioned the Gulf monarchies as benevolent, wealthy neighbours. More subtly these states have attempted
to buy influence and support in Western and Eastern superpowers, with headline-grabbing sovereign wealth investments, selective development assistance, and with the generous sponsorship of projects run by prestigious universities, museums, and other respected cultural and opinionmaking centres of excellence. In this manner the Gulf monarchies have become quintessential brokers of Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’ approach
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—as the various ruling families and their governments have not only sought to use their resources to provide payments to key external actors, but have also tried to position themselves as attractive, well-meaning, and responsible members of the international community.

Internal pressures and weaknesses are nonetheless already manifest, or soon to be so, in all of the Gulf monarchies. Affecting the six regimes’ ability to keep distributing wealth and meeting the expectations of citizens, the region’s declining natural resources and looming ‘youth bulge’ now really matter, as do the mounting challenges of unsustainable subsidies, labour nationalisation, and ‘voluntary unemployment’. In many ways, these are the byproducts of rentier state structures—in particular the cradle-to-grave welfare systems that continue to underpin political acquiescence. Corruption and the squandering of national resources by the ruling families and their neo-patriarchal governments is also a growing concern. These polities—which do not have legal-rational authority—are now playing host to unaccountable elites and decision-makers. These have been allowed to squander national resources by financing prestige projects, making duplicate investments, and accumulating vast personal wealth. Further interconnected internal pressures are also evident, including increasing poverty among Gulf nationals, even in the wealthiest of the monarchies, along with rising real unemployment, and a widening wealth gap between the richest and poorest citizens. Discrimination against certain sections of society is equally noticeable, especially relating to the hundreds of thousands of stateless persons living in the Gulf monarchies and the rights of Shia citizens and other religious sects that have lived there for centuries. The more extensive use of censorship is similarly worrying, as although the regimes have largely been effective in choking off channels of free expression, they are now required to deploy the latest and most sophisticated technologies. In this manner, and as predicted by Michael Ross,
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the Gulf’s rentier wealth is not always being used to distribute wealth to citizens, but is instead being used to finance powerful, expensive, and highly sophisticated police state apparatuses.

External pressures are having a similarly negative impact on the Gulf monarchies’ ruling bargains or socioeconomic contracts. The dangers of rapid economic liberalisation in many of these states—and most particularly those that have opened up to foreign direct investment and tourism—are already apparent. Various relaxations have taken place, often without the consent of citizens, as governments have tried to make their countries more appealing to foreign investors, residents, and visitors, despite necessarily eroding religious and tribal heritage legitimacy resources. The monarchies’ close military relationships with the Western and other non-Muslim powers are becoming another major source of concern for citizens as there are a growing number of foreign military bases being established on their soil and there has been accelerating spending on imported armaments. Also disquieting is the hawkish and seemingly dangerous stance being taken on Iran, and the monarchies’ discreet efforts to improve relations with Israel, despite official boycotts being in place and again regardless of public opinion, Meanwhile the lack of collective security and basic unity between the six monarchies, in particular their inability to settle long-running disputes and strengthen the existing Gulf Cooperation Council, and the frequent coup attempts in the region, all continue to expose these states to malicious neighbours and other foreign interests.

Most of the earlier opposition groups that challenged the Gulf monarchies were successfully contained, as the various regimes were able to co-opt most of the modernising forces impacting on the region and keep the number of dissidents small. But the post-2011 opposition has been markedly different, with new pro-reform and pro-democracy figures and movements emerging in the region that can no longer be placed into the old categories. In particular, the impact of new, ‘greater’ modernising forces on the Gulf monarchies is becoming vitally important, especially relating to improved education and more advanced communication technologies. These include satellite television, and crucially social media and other peer-to-peer networking. Despite their best efforts the regimes seem unable to co-opt these effectively. Connecting back to the modernisation theory debate, these new forces may soon validate earlier lines of thinking, in addition to more recent writings such as Ronald Inglehart’s co-authored 2005 book
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy
,
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as an increasing number of Gulf nationals are now able to share information freely amongst themselves in an educated manner,
and can communicate more easily with activists in revolutionary Arab states and with the rest of the international community. Added to this, the Arab Spring revolutions elsewhere in the Middle East seem to be serving as catalysts for the beginning of the new movements in the Gulf, or at the very least have emboldened hitherto frightened opposition voices. Further eroding their stability, many of the Gulf monarchies have erred in their foreign policy since the onset of the Arab Spring, having openly positioned themselves on the side of other Arab authoritarian regimes and thus presented themselves as ‘status quo powers’—essentially trying to counter the pro-reform momentum that has been building in the region.

Of the six monarchies, Bahrain’s has by far the bleakest future, with little hope that the ruling family can restore sufficient legitimacy to ever govern again without resorting to martial law and extensive repression. It is currently being kept afloat by its regional allies—namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE—which will have to continue committing troops and supplying the kingdom with financial assistance. Although—unlike the other regimes that have faced Arab Spring revolutions—the Bahraini ruling family is not yet facing significant pressure from the international community, this will change within the next year or so, as the weight of evidence against the authorities grows. But for the time being the US and other Western powers are still willing to treat the revolution as an exceptional case, mainly due to the presence of the US Navy base in Bahrain and its potential front line role in any regional conflict with Iran. As described, the temporary block on the US arms trade to Bahrain has been lifted, and senior British and American police advisors have now been appointed by the king.
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Dozens of ill-researched opinion pieces have also been appearing in Western newspapers highlighting the supposed connection between Bahrain’s opposition and Iran. As a good example of the kingdom’s latest soft power strategy, these fear-mongering pieces have usually been written by Western academics, former diplomats, and other distinguished personalities who have been approached and paid by public relations companies employed by the Bahraini government. In most cases they have presented a skewed and inaccurate picture of the Bahraini opposition and have made unsubstantiated claims about Iran’s intentions in the Gulf monarchies. References to the Bassiouni report’s findings on the lack of Iranian connections are never discussed, and explanations are rarely made that most Bahraini Shia do not subscribe to the
Iranian doctrine of
wilayet-e-faqih
or rule by clerics, and instead look to Iraqi Shia clerics,
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rather than Iranians, for direction.
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Although the Omani ruling family’s outlook is less precarious than Bahrain’s, with the state not suffering from the same levels of sectarian strife or discrimination, nor having had to invite troops from neighbouring countries to assist in suppressing protests, there are nonetheless serious concerns about political stability. As with Bahrain, Oman only has limited resources and cannot rely indefinitely on creating public sector opportunities for its citizens in order to appease protests and demands. Indeed, Oman’s stability already rests on external assistance, mostly from Saudi Arabia, and over the next year or two this will serve to delegitimise the aging, heirless ruler and his government. Moreover, when fresh protests erupt—either as a result of continuing government corruption or the state’s likely failure to deliver on its economic promises—these will undoubtedly be met with an even heavier response than the 2011 riots, as the ruler’s new backers will be unwilling to tolerate fresh challenges to another monarchy on its doorstep.

In many ways the kingpin of the Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia’s ruling family may appear more stable than its Bahraini and Omani neighbours given that its government still has the ability to keep distributing wealth in order to appease citizens; but in reality the Saudi system is equally unsustainable and probably prone to implosion within the next couple of years. With ongoing demonstrations regardless of the new subsidies and job creation schemes, and with increasingly repressive tactics being used to suppress freedom of expression, the kingdom is now looking very brittle. If, as is likely, conditions in Bahrain deteriorate further, then more serious protests and even revolutionary activity will occur, especially in Saudi’s Shia-dominated Eastern Province. And if unemployment, the wealth gap, and other socioeconomic problems remain unchecked it is probable that insurgency will spread further across Sunni communities, thus helping the reform movement gain much broader support beyond the Shia population.

The most recent Saudi protests and demands have already been quite varied, occurring all over the country. They have ranged from men
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being arrested for filming and then uploading onto YouTube a video about widespread poverty among Saudi nationals in Riyadh—a video which has now been watched by more than 1 million,
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to women in Jeddah, Riyadh, and the Eastern Province filming themselves driving on motorways—a
flagrant act of civil disobedience given the prevailing ban on women driving. The women involved tweeted that they were carrying their belongings as they were ‘ready to go to prison without fear’ while others told the international media that ‘this is a right for women that no law or religion bans… [we] went out to get our rights, so that it would be up to us to drive or not’.
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As expected, Facebook and Twitter are also playing a key role, with leading activists claiming that ‘they can now speak to thousands across the world… without the strict censorship they live under in the offline world’ and that ‘we’re so thirsty for freedom of expression and a forum for expression that you see [we] are far more involved [in social media] than our neighbours’. Certainly, as the aforementioned Muhammad Fahad Al-Qahtani has claimed, ‘the government has underestimated the power of social media in Saudi Arabia and now it’s too widespread to censor’.
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