A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival's Mind (41 page)

22
.   The exact text reads: “For there is one road which, if past experience is any guide to the future, will most certainly not lead to any permanent improvement of relations with any Power, least of all Germany, and which must therefore be abandoned: that is the road paved with graceful British concessions—concessions made without any conviction either of their justice or of their being set off by equivalent counter-services.” Op. Cit. F.O. 371/257, “Crowe Memorandum.”

23
.   Jerrold M. Post, ed.,
The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), p. 52.

Chapter 9

Parts of this chapter appeared in articles in
Armed Forces Journal
and
Joint Force Quarterly
. I am grateful to the editors for their permission to reprint that material here.

1
.   For more on the early history and uses of the telescope see Mario Biagioli,
Galileo’s Instruments of Credit: Telescopes, Images, Secrecy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

2
.   For more on the telescope, see Geoff Andersen,
The Telescope: Its History, Technology, and Future
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007) and Mario Biagioli,
Galileo’s Instruments of Credit: Telescopes, Images, Secrecy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

3
.   Nate Silver,
The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail–But Some Don’t
(New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 98.

4
.   Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,
The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future
(New York: Random House, 2010), p. 167.

5
.   Abraham Rabinovich,
The Yom Kippur War
(New York: Schockin Books, 2004).

6
.   Some of the information and quotations in this section stem from discussions between the author and Andrew Marshall, in person, by telephone, and through e-mail exchanges. Not all of Marshall’s assertions can be readily verified, as the details of some of these subjects remain classified. Marshall’s comments therefore must be viewed with this in mind.

7
.   See Andrew W. Marshall and Herbert Goldhamer,
Psychosis and Civilization: Two Studies in the Frequency of Mental Disease
(New York: Free Press, 1953).

8
.   Two useful studies of RAND in the 1950s are Alex Abella,
Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire
(Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2008), and Fred Kaplan,
The Wizards of Armageddon
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).

9
.   “Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment,” Paper by the Future Security Environment Working Group (Andrew Marshall and Charles Wolf, Chairmen). Submitted to the Commission on Integrating Long-term Strategy (Washington, DC: Pentagon, April 1988).

10
.   Douglas McGray, “The Marshall Plan,”
Wired Magazine
, February 2003.

11
.   See Mark Mazetti, “Obama Faults Spy Agencies’ Performance in Gauging Mideast Unrest, Officials Say,”
The New York Times
, February 4, 2011. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/world/middleeast/05cia.html
. See also Paul R. Pillar, “Don’t Blame the Spies,”
Foreign Policy
, March 16, 2011.

Afterword

1
.   Philip Tetlock,
Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

2
.   Daniel Gilbert,
Stumbling on Happiness
(New York: Knopf, 2006).

3
.   Nassim Taleb,
The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
(New York: Random House, 2007).

4
.   Dan Ariely,
Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions
(New York: Harper, 2009).

5
.   Silver,
The Signal and the Noise
.

6
.   Michael Spence, “Job Market Signaling,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
, vol. 87, no. 3. (1973), pp. 355–74.

7
.   Diego Gambetta,
Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

8
.   For a classic work on signals and noise in international relations see Roberta Wohlstetter,
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967). Another valuable work on how states signal their intentions and how they might try to transmit deceptive signals is Robert Jervis,
The Logic of Images in International Relations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

9
.   For more on Shannon, see James Gleich,
The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood
(New York: Pantheon Books, 2011).

10
.   Andrea D. Rosati, Eric D. Knowles, Charles W. Kalish, Alison Gopnik, Daniel R. Ames, and Michael W. Morris, “What Theory of Mind Can Teach Social Psychology? Traits as Intentional Terms,” Available at
http://corundum.education.wisc.edu/papers/TomTraits.pdf
.

11
.   Ray Kurzweil,
How To Create a Mind: The Secret of Human Thought Revealed
(New York: Viking, 2012).

12
.   Ariely,
Predictably Irrational
, p. 129.

13
.   Kahneman,
Thinking, Fast and Slow
, p. 56.

14
.   “World Giving Index 2011: A Global View of Giving Trends,” Charities Aid Foundation, 2011. Accessed on February 4, 2013, at
https://www.cafonline.org/pdf/World_Giving_Index_2011_191211.pdf
.

15
.   Robert Frank, “The Biggest Gift in the World,”
Wall Street Journal
, October 28, 2011.

16
.   See for example Gerd Gigerenzer, “Surrogates for Theories,”
Theory and Psychology
, vol. 8, no. 2 (1998), 195–204; Gerd Gigerenzer, “On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahnemann and Tversky,”
Psychological Review
, vol. 103, no. 3 (1996), pp. 592–96; Gerd Gigerenzer, “Why the Distinction Between Single-Event Probabilities and Frequencies is Important for Psychology and Vice Versa,” in George Wright and Ayton, Peter, eds.,
Subjective Probability
(New York: Wiley, 1994), pp. 129–61.

17
.   Gerd Gigerenzer, “Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist Attacks,”
Risk Analysis
, vol. 26, no. 2 (2006).

18
.   For a related challenge from within the field of psychology, see Joseph Simmons, Leif Nelson, and Uri Simonsohn, “False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant,”
Psychological Science
, vol. 22, no. 11 (Nov. 2011), pp. 1359–66.

19
.   Richard K. Betts,
Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

20
.   Robert Jervis,
Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons From the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

21
.   Joshua Rovner,
Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). For a useful discussion of Rovner’s book, see the H-Diplo Roundtable reviews by prominent scholars of intelligence. ISSF Roundtable, vol. III, no. 17 (2012).

22
.   Daryl Press,
Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

23
.   Keren Yarhi-Milo,
Knowing Thy Adversary: Assessments of Intentions in International Relations
, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, Department of Political Science, 2009. See the more recent book version,
Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence Organizations, and Assessments of Intentions in International Relations
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

24
.   Yarhi-Milo,
Knowing the Adversary
, p. 504.

25
.   See for example Alexander George,
Presidential Decision Making: The Effective Use of Information and Advice
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

26
.   Ernest R. May, ed.,
Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessments Before the Two World Wars
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

27
.   Ernest R. May and Richard E. Neustadt,
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers
(New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 166.

28
.   Christopher R. Browning,
Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland
(New York: HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 173–74.

29
.   Marc Trachtenberg,
The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), preface.

Select Bibliography

BECAUSE THIS STUDY COVERS
such a wide range of conflicts, I have listed below only the secondary literature of greatest use to this book. The endnotes provide a more thorough account of primary sources used in each chapter, along with journal articles, newspaper accounts, and other relevant materials. For example, the chapters on German foreign policy include endnotes containing references to specific sections of Gustav Stresemann’s
Nachlass
, along with citation of the various American, British, and German archival records from collections such as
Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik, 1918–1945 (ADAP) Series A and B
. More specific microfilm records are also noted there, such as the Military Intelligence Division reports on German–Soviet relations. I have, however, selected for this bibliography some of the memoirs, intelligence reports, and other firsthand accounts of events that informed this book, as these may assist the reader seeking further exploration of a particular subject.

Abella, Alex.
Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire
. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2008.

Acheson, Dean.
Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department
. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969.

Ahamed, Liaquat.
Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World
. New York: Penguin, 2009.

Angress, Werner.
Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–1923
. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1972.

Ariely, Dan.
Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions
. New York: Harper, 2009.

Berman, Larry.
Perfect Spy: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent
. New York: Smithsonian Books, 2007.

Betts, Richard K.
Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security
. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Boyle, Thomas E. “France, Great Britain, and German Disarmament.” Unpublished dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1972. Available through University Microfilms of America Inc.

Bretton, Henry L.
Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles
. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1953.

Brown, Archie.
The Rise and Fall of Communism
. New York: Ecco, 2009.

Brown, Judith M.
Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915–1922
. London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Brown, Judith M.
The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi
. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Brown, Judith M., ed.
Mahatma Gandhi: The Essential Writings
. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Browning, Christopher R.
Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland
. New York: HarperCollins, 1992.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce.
The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future
. New York: Random House, 2010.

Carsten, F. L.
The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918–1933
. New York: Clarendon Press, 1966.

Catton, Philip E.
Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam
. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002.

Central Intelligence Agency. “The Responsibilities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Intelligence and Security Services in the Exploitation of American Prisoners of War.” November 17, 1975. Available at
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=11270323004
.