A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (97 page)

Bizerta; France loses a friend

Amidst all this, France found herself embroiled in a totally unwanted and profitless sideshow not of her own seeking, the net result of which was only to diminish sympathy for her abroad and to jeopardise a unique and useful friendship. On 6 July de Gaulle received, out of the blue, what he describes as “a threatening letter” from President Bourguiba, demanding that France should forthwith withdraw her forces from the key naval base leased her at Bizerta, and at the same time agree to an important frontier rectification in the Sahara adjacent to the Algerian oil discoveries. For some time past Bourguiba had been pressing for a French withdrawal from Bizerta, but what took de Gaulle by surprise was the sudden peremptoriness of the note and its sequel. Having received no answer from Paris, a fortnight later — the eve of the resumption of the Franco-Algerian talks at Lugrin — the Tunisians fiercely attacked the French base. At first it took the form of a “spontaneous” demonstration, with women and children intermingled among Tunisian militiamen and troops; then Tunisian troops brought up from the interior opened fire on the French base with mortars and artillery, blockading it by land and sea.

Bourguiba’s motives remain somewhat obscure, but personal prestige seems to have played its part. After a series of poor harvests and economic misfortunes, his reputation at home was badly in need of a boost, while in the Arab world he may well have felt pressed to react to the outpourings over Nasser’s Radio Cairo, endlessly accusing him of having sold out to the West and of being a bad Arab. At the same time he was under pressure from his uncomfortable guests, the F.L.N., to do something more spectacular to force de Gaulle to make peace. Fed up with the way Evian had collapsed, he may also have wanted to prove to the Algerians that he too was a good radical nationalist. Whatever his motives, he seems to have believed that he could go right to the brink and de Gaulle — in his present state of debility — would yield. It was a tragic miscalculation, because — for that very reason — an obvious military challenge was something de Gaulle could not possibly countenance. “I could not permit France to be flouted,” he declared, adding in a notable understatement: “Our military rejoinder was short and sharp.”

In what looked a little like “overkill”, 7,000 French paras were dropped to reinforce the Bizerta base, planes from the aircraft carrier
Arromanches
hammered the attacking Tunisians, while three other French warships forced the harbour entrance. For three days the battle raged, at the end of which over 700 dead and 1,200 wounded were counted among the Tunisians, at the cost of twenty-four French dead and 100 wounded. By riposting with such crushing force, de Gaulle may well also have had at the back of his mind one final display of military might to impress the F.L.N. all the way to the peace table — much as President Nixon was to launch his all-out bombing of Hanoi on the eve of peace over a decade later. But, if this was his aim, it was equally counter-productive. In disillusion Bourguiba remarked: “I had wanted little Tunisia to become the West’s postage stamp on the African continent. Now all that is over.” After Bizerta, it would take France a year even to re-establish diplomatic relations with Bourguiba; meanwhile, de Gaulle lost his one ally capable of exerting a moderating influence on the G.P.R.A. and of encouraging it to accept peace terms in any way beneficial to France. It was also Bourguiba who had done more than any other to persuade the F.L.N. to “play it cool” to offers of Eastern bloc aid. At the same time the alienation of Bourguiba now meant the abrupt end to de Gaulle’s notions of “internationalising” the Sahara as a means of keeping it out of exclusively Algerian hands. In New York, the carnage at Bizerta brought fresh condemnations of France within the United Nations, with N.A.T.O. countries like Denmark, Norway and Turkey joining in with the Afro-Asian bloc to vote against France on 26 August.

For de Gaulle, the net effect of world opinion in the aftermath of Bizerta was simply to crystallise a growing determination to get out of Algeria at any price.

The F.L.N.: a new leadership crisis

Hard on the heels of this show of international disfavour in New York came fresh news from Tunis bearing little comfort to de Gaulle. Analysing the collapse of the Lugrin second round of talks, Bernard Tricot noted how “out of phase” the negotiators had been, with one of them going “farther than ever before”, but the other executing a steady withdrawal. This latter, Tricot suggested, was chiefly motivated by “internal reasons”. He was absolutely correct; for — despite the usual tight cloak of secrecy that enveloped rifts within the bosom of the F.L.N. — word had reached the outside world of a major upheaval in Tunis. What was perhaps the F.L.N.’s most serious leadership crisis of the war now boiled down to a straightforward challenge by the army hard-liners—headed by Boumedienne and backed by the absentee Ben Bella — to the political leadership of the F.L.N. Boumedienne had achieved in very few months a remarkable restructuring of the army (now 35,000 strong), which accorded him its unconditional loyalty, and, further reinforced by the flow of heavy weapons from the Communist bloc, his power and authority had reached imposing heights and continued to rise. Throughout Evian and Lugrin he had kept up a harassing fire on Krim for being “soft” on the French; which, indeed, went far to account for Krim’s bouts of unanticipated intransigence. In addition, Boumedienne and the new young chiefs he had appointed under him were showing thoughts that extended beyond the
métier
, about the political future of independent Algeria. They considered that it should be markedly more Socialist-orientated and authoritarian than intended by Krim and the “old-guard” F.L.N. politicians. Here they were staunchly supported by the Ben Bella faction, but ardently opposed by Krim who had always been sensitive to any threat of doctrinaire left-wing bias at work in the Algerian revolution. For the first time Boumedienne also found himself at odds with Boussouf, his old patron, and Ben Tobbal, the other key political leaders with Krim on the Comité Interministérielle de Guerre who had in the past generally backed Boumedienne in disputes with the moderates.

In July, during the Lugrin conference, the crisis broke. Boumedienne, followed by Azedine and his two general staff “watchdogs” at Evian, Majors Mendjli and Slimane, sent in their resignations. The nominal pretext was over the fate of a French pilot, who had come down in Tunisia and whom the G.P.R.A. had removed from the hands of the A.L.N. and handed over to Bourguiba. But the violently critical tone of Boumedienne’s letter accompanying the resignations revealed that much more was at issue. Condemning the “corrupted who sit at the head of the revolution”, it spoke of “permanent abdication and the absence of authority … in one word, the most scandalous anarchy”. In conclusion, Boumedienne pointedly threw out a bouquet to Ben Bella: “the glimmers of hope and confidence which remain to us go directly towards those who are in prison and who for us continue to be the arbiters”. Boumedienne pledged to keep the resignations secret, but requested that the whole dispute be thoroughly aired at the forthcoming congress of the Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne.

The Fourth C.N.R.A.: Abbas replaced by Ben Khedda

Opening at Tripoli on 5 August, and running for three weeks, the Fourth C.N.R.A. was immediately accompanied by a strong smell of sulphur in the air. Mendjli and Slimane jointly launched the attack on Krim, declaring that he and his team had gone to Evian to “liquidate” Algeria. With skill and dignity Krim defended himself, producing the minutes of the talks and proving with what resolute firmness he had stood up to the French. When a vote was taken, the C.N.R.A. showed itself almost unanimously in favour of the veteran maquisard — with the exception of Boumedienne and his army supporters. Next, however, came the elections for the supreme leadership of the G.P.R.A., which would, presumably, conduct Algeria along the last stretch of the corridor towards independence. The incumbent president, that venerable moderate nationalist of such long standing who had then turned revolutionary, Ferhat Abbas, though fatigued after all his globe-trotting and his constant repairing of fences within the G.P.R.A., was still a world figure commanding much respect. Nonetheless, he was now cast aside in terms of almost humiliating disregard for his past distinction. Once again Krim was the logical candidate for the succession; but Boussouf and Ben Tobbal begged him not to accept the presidency on the grounds that it would inevitably bring conflict with Boumedienne and Ben Bella, possibly leading to internecine bloodshed once the war with France was terminated. Under pressure, Krim acceded.

Instead of Krim, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, the forty-one-year-old former secretary-general of Messali’s M.T.L.D. who had come over to the F.L.N. after being jailed by the French in November 1954, received the nomination. An ex-pharmacist like his predecessor, Abbas, Ben Khedda had been Minister for Social Affairs in the first G.P.R.A. of September 1958, had gone on the first expedition to China, but had been dropped in January 1960. After this he had travelled on various F.L.N. delegations to the Third World, had written a series of thoughtful articles for
El Moudjahid
, but had never done anything to give the impression that here might be a new focus of power. With cold eyes constantly protected by dark glasses, Ben Khedda was a reserved, quiet-spoken and rather austere personality. A doctrinaire with Marxist leanings, he had none of the popular appeal of an Abbas, a Krim or a Ben Bella. Physically he was far from strong, suffering from chronic amoebic dysentery, but was respected for his firmness of character. Together with Ramdane Abane and Saad Dahlab he had drafted the famous Soummam Platform of 1956, but he had never committed himself to any of the warring factions within the F.L.N., and was not now in conflict with Boumedienne and the General Staff. For these reasons particularly there was merit in his selection for the presidency. He was also regarded as a hard-liner, certainly when compared with the outgoing friend of moderation and compromise, Ferhat Abbas.

As for the rest of the reshuffle of the G.P.R.A., Krim found himself replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs by Saad Dahlab, his former secretary-general and Ben Khedda’s close associate, and whose appointment was one of Ben Khedda’s principal conditions for accepting the presidency. Krim was relegated to the lesser function of Minister of the Interior; he remained a vice-president but, instead of just sharing the dignity with Ben Bella, he was forced to accept the addition of a third in the form of another of Ben Bella’s imprisoned colleagues — Mohamed Boudiaf. Meanwhile, with Abbas there also fell from grace his old comrade from U.D.M.A. days and fellow moderate, Ahmed Francis. Boumedienne and his supporters, having won most of the tricks at the Fourth C.N.R.A., withdrew their resignations — “in the name of the higher interests of the party”.

Thus, as the Council closed at the end of August, the net results were: the eradication of the remaining moderates; the beginning of the total eclipse of Krim, the last of the
neuf historiques
; the influence of Boumedienne and the General Staff in no way diminished; the influence of Ben Bella increased; the hard-liners ascendant. It was also abundantly clear that the struggle for power within the F.L.N. was still by no means resolved; that the internal conflicts were more acute than they had been at any time since 1954, with the moderates deeply disenchanted by the summary eviction of Abbas and Francis, and with the Wilayas of the “interior” continuing to feel abandoned by both the General Staff of the “exterior” and the G.P.R.A. Indeed, the closer the prospects of peace came, so the G.P.R.A. found itself clutched in the ever tighter throes of internal dissent and self-division. At the same time, the battle-lines were now beginning to be drawn for the power struggle that would inevitably follow independence.

Further discouragement for de Gaulle

The communiqué of 28 August, announcing to the world the G.P.R.A. reshuffle, was couched in words which reinforced the discouragement the French peace-seekers already felt at the disappearance of Abbas and his replacement by Ben Khedda. It stressed the F.L.N.’s determination to continue the struggle, and was adamant about preserving the total integrity of Algerian territory — specifically the Sahara. For de Gaulle this seemed to mean the vanishing of any last hope of a meaningful solution of “association” with an independent Algeria, which he had always felt — dating back to his wartime acquaintance — might be possible with Abbas in charge. With Ben Khedda and the new F.L.N. direction appearing to represent the continuance of revolution, of agrarian reform, expropriation and left-wing Socialism, the prospect of any valid “guarantees” for the
pieds noirs
also looked increasingly bleak. What was the alternative? To continue a war to which the majority of metropolitan Frenchmen, not to mention the outside world, was now becoming resolutely hostile, and which was increasingly profitless to France in every sense?

By the autumn of 1961 de Gaulle’s pessimism, nay, despair, over Algeria had reached a peak, and was bringing about in him a fundamental change of heart. Everything seemed to conspire to make impossible his policy of withdrawal from Algeria “with honour”. The F.L.N. appeared bent on leaving him with nothing, not even honour; while the news from Algeria itself was utterly depressing. Revisiting the country in August and September, Bernard Tricot noted with disquiet the rise of terrorism by both F.L.N. and O.A.S., and the resultant, ever-widening chasm between the two communities.

As if this were not enough, Tricot found a new threat to the European community in the form of economic competition; which, no doubt unintentionally and with the best of motives, French aid schemes bracketed under the Constantine Plan may have played their part in fomenting. As an example of what was happening, Tricot recalls being struck by the fate of two old French spinsters in the rural centre of Lafayette (in Kabylia) whose small general store had long held a monopoly; now Muslims had set up an identical one (probably financed by French Constantine Plan funds), which was solidly patronised by other Muslims, leaving the two old ladies deprived of custom and confronted with bankruptcy. Robert Buron, revisiting an Algiers that had left him few agreeable memories that April, confirmed Tricot’s pessimism; the Europeans could “see nothing in the immediate future for themselves but the worst”, while the mass of Muslims were displaying “a tendency to ‘melt into the background’, waiting for their future to become definite”. Back in Paris in December, Buron found de Gaulle sunk in deeper gloom than ever. The Russians were being particularly “ominous”; the log-jam of the Algerian peace-talks looked as hopelessly solid as it ever had; de Gaulle’s own life seemed grimly at risk; finally, there was a fresh factor which had manifested itself with increasing menace towards the end of 1961 — the O.A.S.