A History of the Middle East (25 page)

In 1903 the shah appointed his able but ultra-reactionary son-in-law Prince Ayn-u-Dula to assume control of government affairs. His actions provoked further opposition, and matters came to a head in 1905. A group of merchants, outraged by the extravagance and corruption of the court and the country’s increased indebtedness which had led the government to introduce an onerous new customs tariff, took
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or sanctuary in a Tehran mosque, in accordance with an ancient custom, in order to voice their protests. They were joined by some prominent mullahs. When the shah promised to meet some of their demands but then prevaricated and intensified the repression, a larger group combining many of the country’s notables – merchants, bankers and clerics – took
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in the grounds of the British legation to persist with their demand for the introduction
of a legal code and also, for the first time, a constitution. In October 1906, now in desperately bad health, the shah complied – with extreme reluctance. A Majlis or parliament was convened which drafted a Fundamental Law of the constitution.

The Constitutional Revolution, as it is known, received the support of virtually the whole nation and was a milestone in Persian history. Subsequent shahs attempted to reverse it, but none was wholly successful and some form of constitutional and representative government has survived to the present day.

The constitutionalists received some inspiration from the attempt by their Russian counterparts in 1905 to end the autocratic role of the tsar. A different kind of stimulus came from the Russo-Japanese War of the same year, in which for the first time a modernizing Asian state defeated one of the great European powers. (This was also an inspiration for the Egyptian nationalist leader Mustafa Kamel in the same period.) However, with its blend of the secular and clerical, the reform movement had a strongly Persian character.

Muzaffar al-Din was succeeded in 1907 by his son Mohammed Ali, who reigned for only two years, amid continuing unrest. Like his father, he repeatedly promised to accept reforms only then to ignore them. At one point he bombarded the Majlis, which he had attempted unsuccessfully to dissolve, and killed or wounded many deputies. This led to a serious uprising in Tabriz which his troops were unable to quell. Russian troops intervened, ostensibly to protect Russian nationals. The nationalist forces gathered strength and marched on Tehran. Unable to resist, the shah took refuge in the Russian legation. As he went into exile in Russia, the Majlis decided that his 11-year-old son Ahmed Mirza should succeed him.

Popular feeling had been stirred up not only by the shah’s action but also by the Anglo-Russian agreement of August 1907, which was designed to settle all outstanding differences concerning Persia and Afghanistan between Russia and Britain. The two powers were already expecting the coming struggle with imperial Germany, in which there were strong chances that Ottoman Turkey would be Germany’s ally. In effect the agreement divided
Persia into Russian and British spheres of interest, with Russia taking the north and centre, Britain the south-east, and the south-west remaining a ‘neutral’ zone. Persian opinion was dismayed and angry when the agreement was made known. Britain especially had been thought to have sympathized with the constitutionalist revolution. The European powers’ wider strategic interests did not concern the Persians: Russia and Britain were henceforth regarded as the two imperial powers which sought to destroy Persia’s independence.

Britain might be said to have had the worst of the 1907 agreement, because south-eastern Persia consists mainly of desert. However, British interests in Persia were about to receive a powerful boost. De Reuter had abandoned his mineral concession after two years, having failed to find oil, but in 1901 Shah Muzaffar al-Din granted an Englishman, William Knox D’Arcy, a sixty-year petroleum and gas concession covering the whole of the Persian Empire. The British government had lobbied strongly in D’Arcy’s favour through the legation in Tehran, and the Persian grand vizier, who had been won over, successfully kept the deal secret from the Russians until it was signed.

D’Arcy looked for oil for several years without success, until his funds were nearly exhausted and he began to look around the world for new investors. At this point the British Admiralty intervened. The First Sea Lord, the dynamic and independent-minded Admiral John Fisher, had long ago determined that the British navy should convert its ships from the use of coal to oil. This, he reckoned, would increase its fighting capacity by 50 per cent. But 90 per cent of the world’s oil was then produced in the United States and Russia, and the rest was already covered by concessions. The world market was dominated by Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell. It was urgently necessary to find an independent source under British control. In 1905 the Admiralty persuaded the British Burmah Oil Company to link up with D’Arcy and provide new funds. In 1908 D’Arcy’s engineers, at the point of abandoning the search in despair, drilled into one of the world’s largest oilfields at Masjid-i-Sulaiman in south-western
Persia. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed, and shares were sold to an enthusiastic public.

There were still difficulties. The oilfields were situated not in the British sphere of influence but in the neutral zone. The semi-independent Arab shaikh of Mohammereh regarded the area as his territory. Marauding tribes threatened the pipeline needed to export the oil to the Gulf. Accordingly Britain signed an agreement recognizing the shaikh and his successors as the lawful rulers of Mohammereh in return for an annual rental. The shaikh undertook to protect the oil installations.

In 1911 the young Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in Britain’s Liberal government, and a huge and expensive three-year development programme for the navy was launched. In addition to Persia’s vital strategic significance for the British Empire, Persian oil was of crucial military importance. In June 1914, just two months before the outbreak of the First World War, Churchill presented the House of Commons with an agreement under which Anglo-Persian would guarantee oil supplies for twenty years while the British government would buy a controlling interest in the company (later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and ultimately British Petroleum) for £2.2 million. Despite a few members’ misgivings that this would provoke the Russians and further weaken the Persian government, the agreement was overwhelmingly approved. Churchill later estimated that the investment brought savings of £40 million and paid for the gigantic expansion of the British navy without any cost to the British taxpayer.

With the 11-year-old Ahmed Mirza on the throne, Persia’s internal situation became more chaotic. The victorious nationalists split into two parties – revolutionaries and moderates. The Russians sent troops to Kazvin in Tehran province, against British protests, on the familiar pretext of protecting their nationals. The lack of administrative experience of the new regime showed the urgent need of foreign advisers but, since neither Britain nor Russia would agree to the appointment of the other’s nationals, it was necessary to look elsewhere for these. Belgians were placed in charge of the customs.
An appeal was made to the United States, and President Taft recommended an experienced lawyer and civil servant William Shuster, who in 1911 was placed in charge of Persia’s finances with full powers for a three-year period. Although the United States was in no way an imperial power in the Middle East at that period, the Russians vigorously protested, and persisted with their opposition to the point of threatening to occupy Tehran. The regent Nasir al-Mulk thereupon carried out a
coup d’état
, dissolved the Majlis and acceded to the Russian demands by expelling Shuster and his colleagues in January 1912. Shuster’s efforts had just begun to show results, but the country was now left in even greater confusion.

Protests from the US government and liberal opinion in Britain were in vain – the need to accommodate Russia in the face of the expected war with Germany was paramount for Britain’s Liberal government. When the war did break out and Turkey allied itself with Germany, the Turkish threat to Russian territory and to the oilfields in the south caused Russia and Britain to occupy part of Persia in spite of its declaration of neutrality.

In November 1914 the fate of the Ottoman Empire was sealed when Turkey joined Christian Europe’s civil war in alliance with the Central Powers of Germany and Austro-Hungary against Britain, France and Russia. As we have seen, the powers of Europe, with the intermittent exception of Russia, had preferred to maintain the integrity of Asiatic Turkey and its Arab dominions. They interfered to bring pressure on successive sultans to further their interests, but they did not consider partitioning the empire. Britain’s single-handed occupation of Egypt in 1882 was reluctant and almost accidental – the restoration of Ottoman authority in Egypt would have been preferable but was impractical. However, once the action was taken, Egypt became a vital link in Britain’s world-wide imperial system which could not be abandoned.

Apart from their war strategy, all three Allies had to consider the reactions of the millions of Muslim subjects in their empires – Arabs in French North Africa and Muslim peoples in British India and in Russian central Asia. Would they be willing to fight for their Christian rulers against the sultan/caliph? It was a popular belief that any Muslim was only waiting for the call to
jihad
or holy war to slaughter the infidel. The triumvirate who ruled Turkey hastened to issue such a call.

Britain had two immediate strategic concerns in the Middle East – the protection of the Suez Canal and the protection of the Gulf. Both were vital links with India: the Canal had to be kept open for the transport of Indian troops to Europe, and the Gulf region now had the additional value of the oil installations at Abadan.

Jemal Pasha was the member of the Ottoman triumvirate who took command in Syria. As he stepped onto the train in Istanbul he declared, ‘I shall not return until I have entered Cairo.’ Jemal was
an able general and he was assisted by a brilliant German chief of staff, von Kressenstein. Egypt was denuded of British troops, who had been sent to France, and was defended only by hastily assembled Australian and Indian units supported by Egyptian artillery and two French cruisers which happened to be in the Canal. Jemal’s first assault on the Canal, in January 1915, was repelled. His hopes that the Egyptian populace would rise against the British occupiers were belied. However, with the help of Sinai beduin tribesmen, von Kressenstein kept British forces tied to the Canal for two years. The Germans also succeeded in stirring up the warlike Senussi tribesmen in Cyrenaica and, although they posed no serious military threat, these also kept substantial British forces tied to the frontier.

As soon as the war with Turkey broke out, an Indian brigade was landed at Basra, which it took without difficulty, and began the advance towards Baghdad. Britain suffered a dangerous setback when a large Anglo-Indian force was surrounded at Kut and was forced to surrender, but Baghdad fell in March 1917 and by the end of the war British troops were in control of most of modern Iraq.

The war began disastrously for the Turks as, contrary to German advice, Enver Pasha, who was both commander-in-chief and minister of war, launched his troops against Russia in the Caucasus in the hope of raising a revolt among the Muslims of central Asia to help fulfil his pan-Turanian dreams. The Russians recovered from the initial onslaught and the Turkish troops suffered from the fearsome cold. Moreover, throughout eastern Anatolia the Turks were threatened by the insurrection of their embittered Armenian subjects, who disrupted communications and formed volunteer groups to help the Russians. Others joined the Russian Armenian forces. The Turks took a terrible revenge by ordering the deportation of the entire Armenian population from eastern Anatolia to northern Syria. Hundreds of thousands were killed, and many more died of hunger, exposure and disease. Between one and a quarter and one and a half million perished. Armenian nationalists still seek revenge against representatives of the Turkish state.

Despite the reverses on the Caucasus front, Turkey was far from
defeated. With the war bogged down in France and the Russian advance held by Germany and Austria, Britain attempted to eliminate Turkey from the war by landing a large force (including Australasian contingents) on the Gallipoli peninsula to threaten Istanbul. The German inspector-general Liman von Sanders was in command of the Turkish defences, and his second in command was Mustafa Kemal (the future Kemal Atatürk). Despite a munitions shortage, the Turks fought tenaciously and neither side succeeded in dislodging the other. But by the winter it was Britain which accepted failure and withdrew its forces. Turkey’s morale improved; by a huge recruitment drive, its forces were increased to fifty-two divisions or 800,000 men. However, successes against Britain in Mesopotamia were offset by continued advances of the Russians into eastern Anatolia. The Turkish forces were widely spread over several fronts.

The role of Egypt in the Gallipoli campaign was as a vast military camp and hospital for the Allies. The Egyptian people responded with their customary stoical friendliness to the invasion of tens of thousands of uninhibited Allied troops, even though the troops provoked a crippling rise in prices. An auxiliary labour corps of some three thousand Egyptians was sent to the Dardanelles, where they proved an outstanding success at digging trenches.

In the summer of 1916, von Kressenstein launched his final offensive against the Suez Canal. He was beaten back, and the British forces under General Murray were then in a position to sweep the Turks out of Sinai. By December 1916 they had reached El Arish before Gaza.

The Egyptian people were forced into political quiescence by the vast weight of British military power. The
fellahin
could show only passive resistance to increasingly insistent demands by the military government that they should surrender their firearms and volunteer for camel transport or the auxiliary labour corps. Several thousand did eventually serve in Palestine and France and suffered casualties.