A History of Korea (18 page)

China’s remapping of its ethnic frontiers, specifically the inclusion of Kogury
ŏ
in the annals of Chinese history, is not an isolated attempt by zealous Chinese researchers to make history conform to their beliefs about China’s centrality and omnipotence in the greater region. In the minds of Chinese historians and politicians, China’s borders know no limits. The Chinese Communist Party (
CCP
) has continuously changed its views of China’s territorial borders. In the first two decades of its existence (1921–1942), the
CCP
identified Taiwan as separate from China. In 1942 it suddenly changed its view without explanation or international challenge. Thereafter China declared Taiwan an integral part of its territory. In this light, China’s decision to include the Kogury
ŏ
kingdom in the
annals of Chinese history might not bode well for the long-term independence of the northern half of the Korean peninsula.

Koreans proudly declare that their country’s history dates back 5,000 years, as its first kingdom, Old Chos
ŏ
n, was established in 2333
BC
. That ancient kingdom is considered the root of the Korean nation, and many elementary schools in South Korea have statues of Tan’gun, Korea’s legendary founding father. Young Korean students learn that Old Chos
ŏ
n was founded in an area covering the northeastern part of present-day China and the Taedong River valley now in North Korea. Korean historians are uncertain, however, about when the first Korean kingdom was established, as little evidence exists to support their arguments.

Recently Koreans dispute China’s contentions arguing that Old Chos
ŏ
n was part of Chinese history, and they reject the conclusion of the Northeastern Project that all ancient Korean kingdoms had been under Chinese dominion. Under this project, Chinese historians claim that not only Kogury
ŏ
but also Old Chos
ŏ
n, Puy
ŏ
, and Parhae are part of China’s history. The Chinese argue that Korea began in the southern part of the Korean peninsula, below the Han River, with the Silla kingdom. They maintain that Silla later gave way to the Kory
ŏ
and Chos
ŏ
n kingdoms, which then invaded China to expand their territories and “stole the history of China.”

The Chinese argue that the roots of Old Chos
ŏ
n stem from the ethnic Chinese. In September 2006 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which is under the direct jurisdiction of the Chinese government, maintained that the history of Old Chos
ŏ
n, Puy
ŏ
, and Parhae all belonged to Chinese history, as did their territories. That month the Academy’s Center for Chinese Borderland History and Geography that had taken the lead in distorting Kogury
ŏ
history through the Northeastern Project since 2002 published 18 abstracts of research papers. One of them argued that descendants of China’s Shang (Yin) dynasty founded Kija Chos
ŏ
n on the Korean peninsula. A Chinese local government, Kija Chos
ŏ
n was, so to speak, an overseas tributary of the Chinese Zhou and Qin dynasties. Kija Chos
ŏ
n, which Korean historians regard as a myth, gave rise to the history of Kogury
ŏ
and Parhae, and was where the history of northeast China began. The Chinese seem to claim preemptive rights to North Korea by arguing that ancient China’s territory extended to the Han River valley in the central part of the Korean peninsula.

The Chinese also maintain that Parhae was not an independent state but a local government under the Tang dynasty and is inseparable from Chinese history. In 1980, when it tried to co-opt annexed Tibet and the Uyghur region into its history, China also claimed that these regions were “inseparable” from China. Chinese historians argue that at the time of its establishment Parhae was a nation of the Chinese Magya (or Mohe; Malgal in Korean) tribe. The Chinese say that South and North Korea claim Parhae as part of their own history to serve their own political purpose of claiming territorial rights. They argue that China never invaded nations on the Korean peninsula, whereas the Korean kingdoms of Silla, Paekche, Kory
ŏ
, and Chos
ŏ
n expanded their borders to the north and gradually eroded Chinese territory. The research organization posted three papers on Parhae alone. The Chinese also contend that even Puy
ŏ
, the ethnic foundation of Kogury
ŏ
and Paekche, was founded by a minority Chinese tribe in the northeastern region of China.
¹⁹

China’s recent attempts to distort ancient Korean history is potentially disturbing. These efforts constitute an open challenge to Koreans. Chinese distortions of ancient Korean history are designed mainly to deal with territorial issues, rather than history. The most likely explanation for China’s claims is that China has been preparing a case for a preemptive territorial claim questioning the current border in the case of a North Korean collapse. Preparations for the collapse of North Korea have been deemed necessary, and an advance into North Korea would require both psychological and cultural justification, at least within China. Presenting what is now North Korea as an ancient and integral part of China might create the political and psychological environment for supporting this plan.

The international community, however, would never allow China to assert sovereignty over any part of the Korean peninsula. It is not because the world does not want to see a strong and dangerous China. More simply, it is because such a claim must be regarded as nonsense. Most Japanese, for example, accept Kogury
ŏ
as part of Korean history and find South Korea’s strong rebuttal of China’s claims entirely understandable.

The historically flawed Chinese distortions of the Korean past are closely related to China’s territorial concerns elsewhere. China, with its more than 100 different ethnic groups, needs to suppress restive minorities such as the Tibetans and their histories, or else its ethnic minorities will try to form their own independent states if China’s rule is loosened. There may be some concerns among some Chinese scholars and officials that a North Korean collapse
might result in a change in the borders, but to China’s disadvantage. The Chinese do not have any particular fear that ethnic Koreans in China’s Northeast might want to break away. More important, they fear that any admission that Koreans might have a valid historical claim to some Chinese territories might incite unrest among other border groups, particularly in the Southwest and Northwest.

China’s distortions of ancient Korean history are also related to rising nationalism among the Chinese. China intends to include the histories of all the ethnic minorities in its present territory into Chinese history to confirm China’s greatness. Historically the Chinese have wanted to place their country at the center of the world. They have been taught that their culture radiated far and wide over the centuries, embracing great historical events, ranging from Genghis Khan’s empire to the invention of spaghetti and meatballs. In the background of the recent distortions of ancient Korean history lies a “great power” consciousness. According to Chinese history, not only the ancient Korean kingdoms of Old Chos
ŏ
n, Puy
ŏ
, Kogury
ŏ
, and Parhae began as ethnic minority states in the Chinese fold, but neighboring Japanese civilization began when 1,000 Chinese boys and girls sailed over in 219
BC
to colonize the islands in the hope of finding pills that would ensure immortality. China’s recently rising power gives its historians the opportunity to again rethink their history and try to restore past greatness by absorbing the histories of neighboring countries. Over the last 150 years, as China suffered from foreign occupation, civil war, and extremist ideology, modern advances largely passed the country by. Only in recent years has China begun to regain its role in the world. For most Chinese, the idea that their culture is a source of past greatness and future strength has never faded. But China has failed to realize that it has nothing to gain by promoting its greatness without supporting evidence, especially when dealing with ancient times.

The Three Kingdoms period is traditionally dated from 57
BC
to
AD
676, but it actually covered no more than three to four centuries in terms of the actions, reactions, and interactions of Kogury
ŏ
, Paekche, and Silla. Along with the three major kingdoms, Kaya was another important actor in this era. With all four states sharing a similar language and culture, this age could in fact be called the “Four Kingdoms period.” The era of the Three Kingdoms came to an end with Silla’s unification of its rival kingdoms. Silla thus accomplished the unification of Korea for the first time in Korean history and laid the foundation for the development of a Korean national culture.

In becoming centralized states, the Three Kingdoms established a principle of centralization for subsequent Korean dynasties that was not modified until recent years. They also created an aristocratic, stratified social order that was inherited by the following Korean kingdoms and survived for centuries. In all these ways the Three Kingdoms served as a model for the political culture of future Korean states.

After Silla pushed Tang China off the Korean peninsula in 676, it asserted authority over the Korean peninsula south of the Taedong River-W
ŏ
nsan Bay line and thus unified Korea south of the peninsula’s narrow waist. The old domain of Kogury
ŏ
above that line on the Korean peninsula and in Manchuria then came under the rule of Tang, which, to govern that vast territory, established the “Protectorate-General to Pacify the East.” But Tang’s rule met with stiff resistance from those displaced from Kogury
ŏ
. To placate them Tang invested Pojang, the last king of Kogury
ŏ
, with a fiefdom, giving him the title “King of Chaoxian (Chos
ŏ
n),” and in 677 it appointed him governor of Liaodong. His descendants succeeded him in that position and gradually secured virtual autonomy for the region they governed. This “state,” which remained in existence until the early ninth century, was often referred to by historians as “Lesser Kogury
ŏ
.” In 698 Tang was forced to abolish the Protectorate-General to Pacify the East.

Meanwhile, in that same year in the vast plains of eastern Manchuria, the new state of Parhae was established by a former Kogury
ŏ
general, Tae Cho-y
ŏ
ng.
Tang China, which had exerted great power when the dynasty first started to rule, began to wane by this time. Empress Wu (685–705), the one-time consort of Tang emperor Gaozong, was unable to pay much attention to the affairs of Northeast Asia, as she was busy consolidating her own power through bloody struggles in which, on two occasions, she even removed her own sons from the imperial throne. Seizing upon this opportunity, Tae Cho-y
ŏ
ng led a band of followers, from both Kogury
ŏ
and Malgal, eastward to Dongmushan (near present-day Dunhua in Jilin province, China), where he proclaimed himself king of “Chin” (literally, “eastern land,” “dawn,” or “morning,” and interpreted as “state of sunrise”). He took the name King Ko (698–719). The name “Parhae,” from the name of the sea surrounding the Liaodong and Shandong peninsulas, dates from 713 and was bestowed by Tang China, when the state of Parhae paid tribute to Tang as a formality. Parhae soon gained control of most of the former Kogury
ŏ
territory.

Chinese historians have claimed that the Parhae kingdom was historically part of China, arguing that Parhae was a state of the Malgal people rather than a successor kingdom of Kogury
ŏ
. They have also maintained that, Parhae, like Kogury
ŏ
, was one of China’s provincial governments for several reasons. First, the territory was named “Parhae” by Tang. Second, its kings continued to pay tribute to Tang and remained invested in the kingship of the Chinese dynasty. Third, Parhae embraced Chinese culture, including the use of Chinese characters and Chinese writing.

But old Chinese historical records clearly indicate that Tae Cho-y
ŏ
ng was from Kogury
ŏ
. That Parhae maintained a system of tribute and investiture with the Tang dynasty was merely for diplomatic purposes. Further, Parhae’s use of Chinese characters and Chinese writing only reflects its willingness to accept more advanced Chinese culture. Parhae’s kings called themselves “emperor” or “great king” and declared the names of their own era. Finally, Parhae was a sovereign state independent of Chinese suzerainty or influence and styled itself as Kogury
ŏ
’s successor state. The text of an official communication conveyed by a Parhae envoy to Japan in 727 emphasized that Parhae “has recovered the lost land of Kogury
ŏ
and inherited the old traditions of Puy
ŏ
.” In its return message Japan referred to Parhae as the “state of Ko[gu]ry
ŏ
.” Thus it is evident that Parhae was indeed a revival of Kogury
ŏ
. The state, in fact, was inhabited by people displaced from Kogury
ŏ
. With the establishment of Parhae, Korea entered the era of the Northern (Parhae) and Southern (Silla) States.
¹

Parhae’s rule extended not only over Kogury
ŏ
’s ethnic inhabitants but also included the large Malgal population, then living mainly in eastern Manchuria. Although the king and aristocracy were descendants of the Kogury
ŏ
people, the people of Malgal formed the general populace. A semi-nomadic Tungusic people, the Malgal were organized into tribes scattered over a wide expanse of Manchuria, southern Siberia, and the northeastern Korean peninsula.