WikiLeaks (43 page)

10. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov is following orders from the Kremlin to not go after Moscow’s criminal groups. For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that it was only a public relations stunt from Putin to close gambling. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he did not see the sense in suitcases of money going into the Kremlin since it would be easier to open a secret account in Cyprus. He speculated that the Moscow police heads have a secret war chest of money. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that this money is likely used to solve problems that the Kremlin decides, such as rigging elections. It can be accessed as a resource for when orders come from above, for example, for bribes or to pay off people when necessary. XXXXXXXXXXXX postulated that the Kremlin might say to a governor that he can rule a certain territory but in exchange he must do what the Kremlin says.

11. (C) Notwithstanding Luzhkov’s solid position, some of our contacts believe that cracks have appeared in his armor, due

MOSCOW 00000317 003 OF 003

to his corrupt activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov has many enemies because his wife has the most lucrative business deals in Moscow and many people think Luzhkov has received too much money. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that Luzhkov is “on his way out,” although he acknowledged that the Kremlin has not identified a suitable replacement yet. Issues such as corruption and traffic congestion have, to a certain degree, eroded Luzhkov’s popularity. Putin, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, will likely pick the quietest and least expected person to replace Luzhkov.

In Moscow, Everyone Needs a “Krysha”

12. (C) According to many observers, the lawless criminal climate in Russia makes it difficult for businesses to survive without being defended by some type of protection. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained how bribes work in Moscow: a cafe owner pays the local police chief via cash through a courier. He needs to pay a certain negotiated amount over a certain profit. The high prices of goods in Moscow cover these hidden costs. Sometimes people receive “bad protection” in the sense that the “krysha” extorts an excessive amount of money. As a result, they cannot make enough of a profit to maintain their businesses. If people attempt to forgo protection, they will instantly be shut down. For example, officials from the fire or sanitation service will appear at the business and invent a violation. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, everyone has bought into the idea of protection in Moscow, so it has become a norm. In general, Muscovites have little freedom to speak out against corrupt activities and are afraid of their leaders.

13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that Moscow business owners understand that it is best to get protection from the MVD and FSB (rather than organized crime groups) since they not only have more guns, resources, and power than criminal groups, but they are also protected by the law. For this reason, protection from criminal gangs is no longer so high in demand. Police and MVD collect money from small businesses while the FSB collects from big businesses. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the FSB “krysha” is allegedly the best protection. He told us that, while the MVD and FSB both have close links to Solntsevo, the FSB is the real “krysha” for Solntsevo. This system is not an incentive for smaller businesses and nobody is immune; even rich people who think they are protected get arrested. According to Transparency International’s 2009 survey, bribery costs Russia USD 300 billion a year, or about 18 percent of its gross domestic product.
XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the “krysha” system has led to an erosion of police internal discipline. For instance, young police officers spend their money buying luxury vehicles that a normal worker could never afford.

Comment

14. (S)
Despite Medvedev’s stated anti-corruption campaign, the extent of corruption in Moscow remains pervasive with Mayor Luzhkov at the top of the pyramid. Luzhkov oversees a system in which it appears that almost everyone at every level is involved in some form of corruption or criminal behavior.
Putin and Medvedev’s dilemma is deciding when Luzhkov becomes a bigger liability than asset. While public sentiment against Luzhkov has grown since the “tainted” elections in October 2009, United Russia’s leadership knows that he has been a loyal supporter who can deliver voter support. Ousting Luzhkov before he is ready to go could create major difficulties because he could link others in the government to the corruption. While reforming Luzhkov’s questionable activities might seem like the right thing to do, for now keeping him in place, efficiently running the city, is United Russia’s best option. Ultimately, the tandem will put Luzhkov out to pasture, like it has done with fellow long-term regional leaders like Sverdlovsk oblast governor Edward Rossel and Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaymiyev.

BEYRLE

ALCOHOL-SODDEN LUNCH HELPED
US-TAJIK MILITARY RELATIONS

Tuesday, 01 August 2006, 12:12

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001464

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/CARC, PM, S/P

EO 12958 DECL: 8/1/2016

TAGS PGOV, PREL, MARR, GG, RS”>RS, TI

SUBJECT: OLD-GUARD TAJIK MINISTER OF DEFENSE OBSESSES ON NATO, GEORGIA

DUSHANBE 00001464 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, Embassy Dushanbe, State Department. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador endured a three-hour-plus one-on-one lunch August 1 with Tajikistan’s Minister of Defense Sherali Khairulloyev. Apart from the general conversation, the minister apologized for previous mil-mil relations that didn’t meet expectations; harped repeatedly on NATO, Georgia, and Saakashvili; and asserted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization must become a military bloc to face down NATO. By the end of the alcohol-sodden lunch, the minister was slurring and unsteady on his feet. We suspect President Rahmonov ordered the minister to host this farewell lunch. While it was rather unusual in many respects, we believe it helped place another brick in the wall of U.S.-Tajikistan military relations. END SUMMARY

2. (C) Defense Minister Khairulloyev apologized several times for “misunderstandings and missed opportunities” in the past in U.S.-Tajik military relations. He asserted repeatedly that he expects an increasingly smooth and productive relationship. He said he has come to understand Tajikistan must have a number of equal partners, not just one [Russia], if it is to propser.

3. (C) Minister Khairulloyev returned several times to NATO and Georgia. He repeatedly asked, “Why does NATO want a country like Georgia? Even the Warsaw Pact didn’t subsume losers!” He asked if NATO will improve Georgia’s “hopeless” economy. He asked why the United States “indulges the adolescent” President Saakashvili. The only possibly explanation, he asserted, is to “stick your finger in Moscow’s eye.” He added, “When Stalin created the Georgian Socialist Republic, he threw in Abkhazia and South Ossetia because Georgians on their own were a ‘fly speck.’ Without Abhkazia and South Ossetia,” he alleged, “Georgia has no hope of existing.”

4. (C) Khairulloyev volunteered that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has to develop to become a military bloc “with one-third of the world’s population” to face down NATO. The Ambassador asked why Russia and the former Soviet republics view NATO as an enemy. Khairulloyev hoisted himself up and declared, “When the Warsaw Bloc disintergrated, of course a new bloc emerged for world domination. That’s the historical dialectic. It’s now time to confront NATO.”

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5. (C) This lunch took place in Minister Khairulloyev’s private dining room off his recently renovated private office. He emphasized that he seldom receives guests in his private office and, especially, that only one other ambassador had ever dined in his private dining room - former Russian Ambassador Maksim Peshkov.

6. (C)
The Ambassador lost track of the toasts after the tenth. His shot-glass held vodka. The minister’s high-ball glass was kept filled with un-cut Scotch. Late into the lunch, the minister was slurring badly and was not walking a straight line.
Nevertheless, as the Ambassador kept attempting a gracious retreat, the Minister insisted on showing him “secret rooms” in the ministry. Each
“secret room” was merely another public conference room with a large fresh flower display and - again and again - another round of toasts set out.

COMMENT

6. (C) This bizarre event was curious, because U.S.-Tajik military relations have incrementally been improving, especially with the National Guard, but also with the Russia-centric Ministry of Defense. Khairulloyev continues to make clear he serves at the pleasure of President Rahmonov and may be replaced after the November presidential election. Although this drunk-fest is how many old-guard former Soviets do mutual business, it was most unusual for an American guest. It was, to a degree, a mark of respect. We would not be surprised if President Rahmonov had ordered Khairulloyev to “do something for the departing Ambassador,” and we rather wonder if this may have been a sort of valedictory by an old-guard security minister who suspects his days of service are numbered. Whatever, we were pleased to have drunk Khairulloyev well under the table. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND

The authors would like to thank:

James Ball

Ian Black

Julian Borger

Heather Brooke

Jon Casson

Lisa Darnell

Alastair Dant

Rob Evans

Harold Frayman

Paul Galbally

Janine Gibson

John Goetz

Ian Katz

Bill Keller

Francois Kunc

Gavin MacFadyen

Ewen MacAskill

Toby Manhire

Georg Mascolo

James Meek

Richard Norton-Taylor

Daithí Ó Crualaoich

Aron Pilhofer

Gill Phillips

Geraldine Proudler

Mark Rice-Oxley

Simon Rogers

Marcel Rosenbach

Alison Rourke

Paul Scruton

Eric Schmitt

Vaughan Smith

Holger Stark

Jonathan Steele

Oliver Taplin

Simon Tisdall

Jan Thompson

Declan Walsh

Helen Walmsley-Johnson