Warwick the Kingmaker (60 page)

Though the advantages of the agreement were so obvious to all, it was not concluded at once. Not all the parties were together at the same time. Warwick and Louis may have hoped to settle it at Amboise early in June, but Margaret had still not set off from Lorraine on the 7th, when an urgent summons was sent to her, and she was not to arrive until 22 June.37 She may have been considering other options. Warwick also may have had alternative plans, since there is a manifesto from him and Clarence that makes no mention of the Lancastrians and a rebellion was launched in Yorkshire ahead of any agreement. It seems that he hoped to be gone a month or more before he actually sailed. Queen Margaret, who had so much to give, wanted to assure herself of the benefits – a genuine and binding commitment from Warwick – and to minimize the risks. To avoid recriminations Louis settled the main terms with both parties, perhaps no easy task, before bringing them together at Angers, where queen and earl were reconciled immediately. If Margaret played hard to get, therefore, as stated in several quarters, it was probably earlier rather than, as depicted by Warwick’s propaganda tract
The Maner and Guyding
, at Angers itself. This presents Margaret arguing against this alliance on three grounds: an alliance with him could alienate some of her supporters, which was probably true; Edward IV was offering the hand of Elizabeth of York to Edward of Lancaster, which is unsubstantiated and if true was tentative and left open such major issues as what would happen should Edward IV bear a son; and that she could conquer England from Lancastrian resources alone, which was frankly incredible. These arguments were designed, perhaps, to strengthen her hand in negotiations and to give her the high moral ground. So too was her assertion that she could not in honour pardon Warwick, which both Basin and Chastellain elaborated: she had suffered great injuries, many at Warwick’s hands; the charge that she had conceived her son in adultery rankled most. Warwick was obliged to defend himself for his actions in 1459–61. Whilst admitting that he was prime mover in her sufferings, he claimed that he had acted under duress and ‘that thereinne he had not donne but that a noble man outraged and dispeired oughte to have doone’. He was required to sue on bended knee to the queen, who condescended to pardon him, King Louis acting as surety, and was bound also to the most solemn oaths of allegiance taken on the true cross in Notre Dame cathedral at Angers. She and Louis also had oaths to take.
The Maner and Guyding
also depicts her refusing to marry her son to Anne Neville, thus making her compliance into a bigger concession.38

The Maner and Guyding
portrays Warwick as the initiator of the treaty, who secured a good deal against the odds, and overriding an unreasonable queen; if his retainers were to follow him this time, it was important not to be seen as desperate, unprincipled and grasping at straws. Margaret, also, needed to show her supporters in France and at home that she had not given in too easily. Both parties needed as binding security for themselves and their followers as they could obtain. There were to be no recriminations: ‘for the deedis passed nevur here aftir to make reproche’. Complete trust remained impossible. It was for this reason, apparently, because she was unwilling to consign her son to Warwick’s care, that Margaret refused to allow him to join the invasion. Even Louis could not change her mind.39 Whilst this was clearly disappointing to Warwick, who had counted on the prince’s presence and had to explain away his absence, it was quite sensible. Prince Edward’s death would spell the end of the Lancastrian cause and was a risk that need not be taken. Similarly the agreement that the Lancastrians struck with Louis guaranteed that in the event of failure they and indeed King Henry could return to France; not that Louis could be expected to honour such promises.

What Margaret may well have been ‘right dificyle’ about were the details: of government and restorations, what Warwick’s men could keep and what they must give up, which were potentially explosive issues and which were set out ‘in thappoyntemente’, now lost.40 Just as Warwick had left the main terms to Louis, so now, it seems, he took no action to protect the interests of his retainers. How could he protect them against the restitution of forfeited property to new-found Lancastrian allies? Perhaps he also failed to obtain all he had wanted for himself. On future government,
The Maner and Guyding
states that ‘after the recovere of the reaume of Englande...[Warwick] holden and advouched for king and the prince for regente and gouvernour of the seid reaume’.41 For historians such as the present author this has been interpreted as meaning that Warwick would rule in their name. Though an adult, Henry VI was not to be allowed to rule and Warwick did indeed become king’s lieutenant.42 But that is not actually what it says. Might it not mean merely that immediately after the reconquest Warwick would rule until such time as the prince arrived? As we shall see, the prince did indeed supersede Warwick as lieutenant. Fortescue’s undated memorandum apparently spoke of Warwick living ‘in security’ and having ‘the principal role in government of the kingdom’, not necessarily the protectorship. The somewhat idealistic proposals by Fortescue forwarded to Warwick by Prince Edward envisage the king’s power being restrained by a council of twenty-four including a mere four lords temporal;43 no mention is made therein of a president, protector or lieutenant. If Warwick was unable to safeguard his adherents, it may be because he could not achieve rule himself. Perhaps the ambiguous sentence in
The Maner and Guyding
was intended to suggest to his supporters more than he had actually achieved.

This was not a treaty between two principal parties, but three. King Louis, as honest broker and paymaster, maximized his own benefits, which earl and queen were desperate enough to concede. His course was smoothed by their honourable treatment: thus the young prince of Wales stood sponsor to Louis’s own son and heir the future Charles VIII at his christening on 30 June. The key element, an offensive alliance against Burgundy, was probably settled by 30 July, when a more limited entente was confirmed by Louis’s brother Charles Duke of Guienne.44 Even as Louis sought to appease the Burgundians’ immediate grievances, the necessary price of peace should Warwick fail, he was reassuring Francis II of his good intentions towards Brittany and was planning the immediate attack by land and sea that he did indeed launch as soon as Warwick was successful. For Louis, Warwick’s conquest of England became merely part of his struggle against Burgundy, albeit the crucial prerequisite.

For such a policy to succeed, the expedition had to be properly prepared, as Warwick perceived and Louis did not. Warwick was in no hurry. Ultimately he knew that Louis possessed the resources necessary and used the additional costs of delay to extract the necessary funds. He wanted to go when the time was ripe. That meant when his treaties with Margaret and Louis had been finalized and formalized. Whatever was proposed in May and roughed out in June and however soon he may originally have hoped to complete them, it was not until 22 July that Warwick and Margaret were formally accorded at Angers and 25 July that their offspring were betrothed in the cathedral; after that Warwick need not wait for the marriage which ran into short-term (but superable) problems of consanguinity.45 The time was also ripe when it was safe to sail. That was not until 9 September. That a storm had scattered the Anglo-Burgundian blockaders was not mere luck, for no fifteenth-century fleet could remain at sea indefinitely, but it was nevertheless essential. A third necessity was that his allies in England had been primed to rebel as he invaded. They were prepared. It was more likely the continuing blockade and delays in finalizing the Lancastrian alliance rather than contrary winds that delayed the earl’s departure beyond ‘the appointed day’ and caused the Richmondshire uprising led by Lord FitzHugh to occur prematurely and to be easily repressed. That ‘appointed day’, we may deduce, was before 5 August 1470,46 probably late in July.

What had been achieved was a diplomatic revolution which duly delivered a dynastic revolution. Warwick could justifiably claim the principal credit and was certainly a principal beneficiary. He was to return to England, to be restored to his titles, estates and offices, and was apparently to take command of a government committed to his own policies. His future was assured by the marriage of his youngest daughter to the crown prince, who could be expected to make her queen. Not that this was without cost. Warwick had to swallow his pride, renounce his principal achievement in dethroning Henry VI, and publicly apologize and submit to Queen Margaret. Though he had made a very similar public commitment to King Edward only six months before, Warwick was later to recognize this one as binding with fatal consequences for himself.47 He was never to experience Margaret’s superiority in practice as she never returned to reign in his lifetime. Lands unspecified would also have to be surrendered. These concessions pale beside the losses to be expected by his son-in-law Clarence, who must renounce his immediate pretensions to the crown and abandon his siblings, and those allies and retainers including Clarence who had benefited from Lancastrian forfeitures. Understandably
The Maner and Guyding
made no specific reference to these. Clarence was to have the duchy of York. If he was recognized as heir in reversion to the crown failing Henry’s issue, as Warkworth says, nobody else thought it worthy of remark.48 Warwick’s restoration and favour at court, the principal gains to be anticipated, were less substantial. It was their former enemies, the Lancastrians, who were to benefit. In other areas, too, Warwick had focused on essentials and made concessions less important to him. Neither he nor Louis bothered much with the commercial treaty that Fortescue thought so important.49 It was agreed to delay Prince Edward’s passage to England until after victory was achieved; he came too late. A thirty-year alliance with France without abandoning the English claim to the crown or possession of Calais may have been sensible, though Warwick wisely concealed it from English eyes. His own proclamations made much of Edward’s dependence on foreigners. But it was Warwick’s concession to Louis that war with Burgundy should begin at once that precipitated Edward IV’s own invasion. If far from inevitable, the collapse of the new regime was foreshadowed in its origins.

10.3 FROM TRIUMPH TO DISASTER 1470–1

The success of the invasion was astonishing. Without any fighting, Henry VI was re-placed on his throne and Edward IV himself was exiled. Seapower once again gave Warwick the strategic initiative, supported this time by a range of support, real and potential, that King Edward found baffling and against which he was unable to guard. ‘Seeing that almost all his partisans were deserting him and joining up with his enemies’, observed Thomas Basin, Edward ‘could not tell with certainty whom he must guard against’ and ‘judged it most opportune to take flight.’...50 He could not distinguish his friends from his enemies. It was a supposed ally, Warwick’s brother John Marquis Montagu, with troops recruited on Edward’s behalf, whose defection was the decisive blow.

This was the supreme achievement of Warwick’s life, though unintended. A gradual escalation carried him far beyond his objectives in 1469. To be a Kingmaker was a remarkable distinction, though one reluctantly attained and aspired to never.

A vital change in the autumn of 1470 from the spring was that Warwick could rely on his retainers. Not to support the earl’s treason was very different from condoning his dispossession. Edward adamantly declined to treat. Worcester’s executions and impalements may have offended contemporaries other than chroniclers. More important, the rebels’ estates were seized as forfeit, the revenues paid to the crown, annuities granted out of them, and some new appointments were made, most notably to Lord Treasurer and Constable Worcester himself as lieutenant of Ireland in succession to Clarence, as Warwick chamberlain of the exchequer, and as weigher of Southampton. Worcester was conspicuously acquisitive. In the short run it appears that Edward was to use these forfeitures to re-endow the crown, as had been tried in 1459–61 and was to be again from 1478. Some disputed properties were conceded to loyal rivals, such as Barnard Castle (Dur.) to Bishop Bothe, 100-marks jointure in four of Clarence’s manors to the Dowager-Countess of Wiltshire, and property of Sir Edward Grey and Sir George Vere to the Lisle coheirs. Hastings’s brother Richard was allowed to become Baron Welles. George Neville of Abergavenny was again licensed to enter his Despenser inheritance. Notably missing from this list was Warwick’s brother John Marquis Montagu, male heir of the Neville patrimony. Not only had he been deprived of the earldom of Northumberland in return for a marquisate and Courtenay lands of equal value in the far west, an exchange that he compared to a ‘[mag]pies nest’, but he was apparently to be deprived of what he doubtless regarded as the hereditary expectations of himself and his son, his Neville patrimony.51 Edward learnt from his error: in 1471 Clarence was granted admission to Warwick’s lands immediately after his father-in-law’s death. If Montagu’s defection was therefore predictable, if unsuspected by the king, the invocation of Henry VI’s authority gave a moral legitimacy to the earl’s cause that had been lacking in the spring.

Warwick’s Lincolnshire campaign had failed to achieve the coalition of interests and areas that had been so successful in 1460 and 1469. No use was made of the military and maritime resources of Calais and Kent, any genuinely popular support was confined to Lincolnshire itself, and his own retainers failed him. As in 1459, they doubted his loyalty. Without them, he could not exploit Edward’s initial misdiagnosis of the uprising. Warwick’s second campaign of 1470 remedied these deficiencies. Seapower enabled him to strike anywhere; his point of disembarkation was unpredictable. Moreover the substantial range of places where Warwick, Clarence and Oxford could look for support – Kent, Essex, south Wales, the West Midlands and the North – was complemented by others in the West Country, north Wales and Cheshire where Lancastrians such as Margaret herself, Pembroke, Somerset and Devon had been strong. Was there any district without concealed Lancastrians? After a decade of repression how could their numbers be gauged? The substantial size of the expeditionary force made it immune to immediate defeat from mere local levies. Add to this Warwick’s appeal for popular support and Edward could only wait and see. Having guarded against obvious dangers, such as a landing in Kent or a renewed uprising in Yorkshire, it was sensible to wait at York and then Nottingham with his field army until the invasion had occurred and events clar-ified themselves.