War From the Ground Up (42 page)

11
. Sarah Chayes,
The Punishment of Virtue
.

12
. Antonio Giustozzi,
Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002–2007
(Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 60.

13
. Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, ‘No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics and Insurgency in Afghanistan' (Chatham House Paper, December 2010), p. 18.

14
. General Sir Peter Wall, evidence to House of Commons Defence Committee, Fourth Report,
Operations in Afghanistan
(17 July 2011), pp. Ev 145, Q 676.

15
. David Kilcullen,
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One
(London: Hurst, 2009).

16
. The district governor of Nad Ali in this case was Habibullah. I am grateful to Mike Martin for this observation.

17
. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report on Global Security, ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan' (21 July 2009), ch. 6, paragraph 230.

18
. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report,
The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan
(February 2011), paragraph 103.

19
. Anthony King, ‘A private war Britain must settle if it is to win in Helmand',
Parliamentary Brief Magazine
(28 April 2011).

20
. House of Commons Defence Committee, Fourth Report,
Operations in Afghanistan
(17 July 2011).

21
. Ibid., pp. Ev 144–5, Q 674.

22
. For narrative simplicity I have not mentioned the other international coalition partners who operated in Helmand in 2006, most notably US, Canadian, Danish, and Estonian troops.

23
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 3, ch. 12, Howard and Paret, p. 205.

24
. Ibid., Book1, ch. 1, p. 75. Andreas Herberg-Rothe has argued that: ‘This assumption of symmetry in the concept of the duel has far reaching consequences. Clausewitz's argument here reflects the political theory of the eighteenth century, according to which every state had the right to wage war. This concept differed from the medieval idea of ‘just war' by assuming that the right to wage war was an aspect of every state's sovereignty. This symmetry brings with it a tendency to justify wars, but it has other consequences as well. It includes a recognition in principle that one's opponent is
iustus hostis
—an equal—so the enemy is no longer considered a criminal.
This assumption that enemies in war are equal is the basic precondition of respect for the laws of war'. Andreas Herberg-Rothe,
Clausewitz's Puzzle
, p. 106. Herberg-Rothe cites Carl Schmitt,
Der Begriff des Politischen
, 6
^th
edn (Berlin, 1996), p. 29.

25
. Clausewitz had intended to write a separate chapter on the principle of polarity. In an article written shortly before he died, he stated that: ‘the whole of physical and intellectual nature' is kept in balance by means of antitheses. Clausewitz,
On War
, p. 83. On the article written before his death, see Andreas Herberg-Rothe,
Clausewitz's Puzzle
, p. 119. Herberg-Rothe cites Clausewitz,
Die Verhältnisse Europas seit der Teilung Polens
, in Karl Schwartz,
Leben des Generals Carl von Clausewitz und der Frau Marie von Clausewitz geb. Gräfin Brühl
, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1878), pp. 401–17.

26
. There is debate about the translation of
ganze Krieg
. Alternative translations have used total war, ideal war, or pure war. There are two tensions at play. First, does one mean absolute political goals or absolute use of violence? Second, is absolute war a theoretical pole which war in the abstract can be analysed by, or is it a real event? While both ideas are problematic, the definition I would use stresses the absoluteness of political goals over violence, although the latter is no doubt central to defining the quality of the conflict; it is hard to argue that combat in any context is not absolute for the individual. The key seems to be the correlation between political goals in terms of their proximity to absolute political objectives and the extent to which they remove qualitative restraints upon the means by which violence is applied. I also take absolute war to be a theoretical pole which has been closely approached, but not actually reached, because all wars have ultimately ended. (A full-scale nuclear exchange might well be absolute war in reality.)

27
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 6, ch. 28, pp. 488–9.

28
. Ibid., Book 6, ch. 7, p. 377.

29
. Ibid., Book 7, ch. 1, p. 523.

30
. Ibid., Book 7, ch. 7, pp. 530–31.

31
. Ibid., Book 1, ch. 1, p. 84.

32
. Ibid., Book 1, ch. 1, p. 83.

33
. What is meant by attack and defence here is ‘the attacker' and ‘the defender'. Ibid., Book 7, ch. 22, p. 566.

34
. J. C. Wylie,
Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control
(New York: Rutgers, 1967), p. 85.

35
. Tacitus,
Agricola
, ch. 30.

36
. Ibid., Book 1, ch. 2, p. 90.

37
.
Gladiator
(2000).

38
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 1, ch. 1, p. 77.

39
. Field Marshal Viscount William Slim,
Defeat into Victory
(London: Pan Books, 2009; first published by Cassell, 1956), pp. 609–10.

40
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 7, ch. 5, p. 528.

41
. Wolfgang Schivelbusch,
The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery
, trans. Jefferson Chase (London: Granta, 2003).

42
. Both Rifleman Padam and Corporal Basanta were awarded the UK Chief of Joint Operation's Commander's Commendation for their part in this action.

43
. Major Shaun Chandler was awarded a Mention in Dispatches as a Company Commander on this tour.

44
. Ibid., Book1, ch. 1, p. 88.

45
. General Raymond Odierno, quoted in Steven Lee Myers and Thom Shanker, ‘General Works to Salvage Iraq Legacy',
New York Times
(24 March 2010). Cited by Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War',
Survival
, 52:5, p. 176.

46
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 1, ch. 2, p. 95.

47
. Ibid., Book 1, ch. 2, p. 98.

48
. Daniel Moran has argued that this was very much Clausewitz's view. There is a strong argument that eighteenth-century wars were just as vicious, and were by no means a game, but that commanders were logistically constrained from the exploitation of a victory to crush the enemy completely. In the Seven Years War (1756–63), for example, all of the great battles took place in the first four years, but the war dragged on and ultimately ended not on the battlefield but through mutual exhaustion. By comparison, Moran points out that the Austerlitz campaign of 1806, which was a decisive and massive victory for Napoleon, was over in three weeks. See Daniel Moran,
Strategic Theory and the History of War
(US Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), p. 6.

49
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 8, ch. 8, trans. O. J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, 1943), p. 570.

50
. Hew Strachan,
Clausewitz's On War: A Biography
(London: Atlantic Books, 2007), p. 61.

51
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 8, ch. 8A, Howard and Paret, p. 593.

52
. Ibid., Book 8, ch. 8A, pp. 583–4; Book 8, ch. 2, p. 581.

53
. Ibid., Book 8, ch.3A, pp. 583–4.

1
. Rupert Smith,
The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World
(London: Allen Lane, 2005), p. 1.

2
. Patrick Porter,
Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes
(Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2009), pp. 173–4.

3
. Patrick Porter,
Military Orientalism
, p. 174.

4
. Ibid., p. 174.

5
. Dan Halutz, ‘Airpower as a Variable of Hachraah', in ‘Ben Hachra'ah L'nitzachon (Between Decision and Victory)': A Joint Seminar between the Center for Study of National Defense, Haifa University and the National Defense College, IDF, 28 January 2001 (Haifa: University of Haifa, 2001), p. 96.

6
. Dan Halutz, ‘Airpower as a Variable of Hachraah', p. 98.

7
. Patrick Porter,
Military Orientalism
, p. 184.

8
. US Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3–24,
Counter-Insurgency
.

9
. Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Graeme Lamb, direction issued as Commander Field Army,
Counter-Insurgency Commander's Guidance
, May 2009.

10
. Such as Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-i Tayyiba (LT), Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM), Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), the Qari Zia Group (QZG), Lashkar-i-Islami (LI), Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). See Gretchen Peters, ‘Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan', The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2010; Peters' list at p. 5 is particularly helpful.

11
. This is well encapsulated by the term ‘accidental guerrilla', coined by David Kilcullen and referred to in
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One
(London: Hurst, 2009).

12
. Martine van Bijlert, ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan', ch. 7 in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.),
Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field
, (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 160–61.

13
. Ibid., p. 160. Bernt Glatzer as cited in Robert D. Crews, ‘Moderate Taliban?', in Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (eds),
The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 242.

14
. Adam Holloway,
In Blood Stepp'd In Too Far
:
Towards A Realistic Policy for Afghanistan
(Centre for Policy Studies, October 2009), p. 14.

15
. Daniel Marston, ‘Realizing the Extent of Our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead: Afghanistan 2001–10', in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds),
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare
, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010).

16
. Ahmed Rashid, ‘The Way Out of Afghanistan',
New York Review of Books
(13 January 2011), quoted in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report,
The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan
(February 2011), paragraph 85.

17
. The Revolutionary United Front, for instance, were heavily involved in the
destabilisation of Sierra Leone that led to the successful British intervention 2000. They were a ‘franchise' of different militia groups held together by their commander. He kept control over them through a number of methods that resembled a franchise, such as retaining control over the distribution of logistics, especially ammunition. He would personally hold the key to the ammunition store and distribute it. Brigadier Richard Iron,
Expert Military Witness Report into the Revolutionary United Front
, written for the Special Court of Sierra Leone. Note on relationship between logistics and command at p.C-51; report dated 15 April 2005.

18
. Patrick Porter,
Military Orientalism
, p. 156.

19
. Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Armed Politics and Political Competition in Afghanistan', Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) Working Paper, 2011.

20
. Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Armed Politics and Political Competition in Afghanistan', p. 19. Giustozzi cites as his sources: local notables, administration staff, Afghan intellectuals, UN officials. Map by Sebastian Ballard.

21
. Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Armed Politics and Political Competition in Afghanistan', p. 22. Giustozzi notes that MPs with a past in
Hizb-i Islami
, but currently affiliated with other groups, have been excluded. He cites as his sources interviews with former and current members of
Hizb-i Islami
, Kabul, London, Jalalabad 2006–7; his personal communications with UN and diplomatic staff. Map by Sebastian Ballard.

22
. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book 1, ch. 1, Howard and Paret, p. 89. It has been argued that association of policy with ‘government' in the state at war can be understood more broadly than ‘government'. Clausewitz uses the word
der Regierung
which can imply regimen, or governing authority, as well as government. In this reading reason, or policy, can be associated with the ‘cohesive' element which provides the unifying rationale within any ‘political community' (the state in the broad sense). This reading would imply that Clausewitz's intention was to resist tying his theory exclusively to the nation-state, or at least that Clausewitz's theory of war has legitimacy beyond the nation-state. See Andreas Herberg-Rothe,
Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War
, (London: OUP, 2007). pp. 99, 141–2 and 164. Moreover, the term ‘state' has been understood more metaphorically in terms of the representative parts of an individual, or a ‘body' of men more generally: the rational mind (reason/policy); one's emotions (passion); the ability to fight (to deal with violence). Whether Clausewitz himself allowed for the possibility of his paradigm being literally, rather than metaphorically, applied to political communities that were not nation-states is debatable. Clausewitz,
On War
, Book1, ch. 1, p. 88; Book 8, ch. 6, pp. 606–7.