Uncommon Valour (11 page)

Lieutenant W.T. Cosgrave was sentenced to death for his involvement in the South Dublin Union; later that sentence was commuted to imprisonment. He was sent to a series of prisons in England and was released in 1917. He returned to a changed Ireland and entered the political fray that preceded the Irish War of Independence. Having accepted the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922, his decision brought him into direct conflict with old friends and colleagues. After the deaths of Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins in 1922, William T. Cosgrave became chairman of the Provisional Government in July and president of the Dáil in August of that year. As the Civil War raged throughout the country, Cosgrave was considered by many to be ruthless in his defence of the state against his former republican colleagues. In 1923 a new political party called Cumann na nGaedheal was established with Cosgrave as its leader. He remained in power for a decade and later became leader of Fine Gael until he retired from politics in 1944. Cosgrave died peacefully in November 1965 aged eighty-five and is buried in Goldenbridge cemetery, Dublin.

Having survived his wounds, Cathal Brugha was appointed chief-of-staff of the Irish Republican Army in 1917. On 21 January 1919, at the first sitting of the Dáil, Brugha was elected as acting president because Éamonn de Valera and other Sinn Féin delegates were in prison. When Éamonn de Valera took over the position in April 1919, Brugha was appointed minister for defence as the war for Irish independence erupted. He opposed the Anglo-Irish Treaty and joined the anti-Treaty forces as Civil War broke out. In July 1922, Brugha and a number of anti-Treaty forces were surrounded by members of the new Free State army in Hammon's Hotel on O'Connell Street, Dublin. On 3 July the commander of the Irish Free State forces in the area demanded the surrender of the hotel and its garrison. Brugha replied in Gaelic: ‘Níl aon chuimhneamh agam ar a leithéid a dhéanamh' (I have no such intention). By 5 July the position had become untenable and as the building became engulfed in flames he ordered the remainder of his men to evacuate the hotel. With his pistol drawn, he calmly walked out the front door towards the waiting Free State soldiers. He was shot and seriously wounded, the bullet severing his femoral artery. Though he received immediate medical attention, he died from his wound two days later on 7 July in the Mater hospital, eleven days before his forty-eighth birthday. Controversy surrounds his death, as many believe his pistol was not loaded and he made no pretence of firing it. He is buried in Glasnevin cemetery. His death, like many others during the Civil War, left a void that would affect the political future of the country for decades to come.

Many of those who survived the 1916 Rising, the Irish War for Independence and the Civil War returned to a normal life despite having taken part in and witnessed the greatest of events – that of a country achieving its independence and taking its place amongst the other nations of the world.

Chapter 14

April 1916:
Military Success & Military Failure

Apart from its general ultimate futility, the conduct of the insurrection showed great organisational ability and more military skill than had been attributed to the Volunteers.
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Urban warfare is a modern type of warfare conducted in towns and cities. Before the twentieth century wars were won or lost on open battlefields such as Waterloo and Omdurman. Urban combat is very different from combat in the open at operational and tactical levels.

The planning of the insurrection and the occupation of the South Dublin Union is accredited to James Connolly and Joseph Plunkett, but many questions have arisen in relation to whether or not the plan was militarily sound. Why was the South Dublin Union chosen as a strong point and was it viable to occupy a complex of buildings that contained so many civilians?

From his positions within the Union and the outlying posts, Ceannt's task was to prevent troops from Richmond and Islandbridge barracks from entering the city. It is possible that Ceannt was also ordered to take and hold Kingsbridge Station. However, due to Eoin MacNeill's countermanding order, the 4th Battalion was seriously under strength and Ceannt could only deploy the men he had to the best of his ability. MacNeill's decision to countermand the order for a general mobilisation had a detrimental effect on the entire Rising, but especially on Ceannt's orders to hold the area in the vicinity of the Union. The area was vast and was impossible to hold with the small force that he had under his command, but he had the advantage of having a detailed knowledge of the grounds. In the weeks before the Rising the 4th Battalion had carried out manoeuvres that covered the exact positions occupied in the South Dublin Union.
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Ceannt also reconnoitred the Union only days before his force occupied the position. He possessed drawings of the area and had pre-planned the defence.
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The South Dublin Union was a small city within a city and therefore provided a battleground that was favourable to the Irish Volunteers. Fighting in a built-up area such as the Union favoured the defenders who were the weaker force. Therefore, the complex was suitable for defence even though it covered over fifty acres. It was protected on two sides by part of the Grand Canal that has since been filled in and now carries part of Dublin's Luas or light rail network, and the complex was enclosed by a stone wall. It was well equipped with provisions and had its own bakery. The buildings offered cover and concealment to Ceannt's small force and, as a military commander, he knew his enemy must attack through the labyrinth of streets and alleyways that offered his men unlimited opportunities of killing grounds. His men occupied excellent vantage points throughout the battle, defending and attacking within their designated defensive zone. Ceannt and Brugha clearly defined areas of responsibility to their men on Easter Monday and these positions were mutually supporting to the their main headquarters at the Nurses' Home. Tunnelling through the buildings enabled a means of communication and escape to be established that resulted in a retreating force being able to regroup and fight again from a new strong-point. This form of action continued throughout the week.

Tactically, the siting of the defended Volunteer positions in relation to British barracks and points of advance was excellent.
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The attacking force within this environment faced complications as they were entering a three-dimensional battle zone, where the buildings limited fields of view and fields of fire. Opportunities for concealment for the defending force were limitless even if they were inferior in number.
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Ceannt's outposts were at Jameson's Distillery in Marrowbone Lane, Watkins' Brewery at Ardee Street and Roe's Distillery in Mount Brown.

Though the Volunteers were familiar with their area of operation, for a successful defence they would have needed a much larger force than was available on Monday 24 April, 1916. The military skill of the Irish Volunteers has often been overlooked in favour of their courage and sacrifice. Many Volunteers had been in training since the formation of the Irish Volunteers in 1913 and these dedicated young men and women were far superior soldiers to the raw recruits that arrived from England in the ranks of the 59th North Midland Division. The Volunteer officers, many of whom were ex-Fianna officers, were excellent marksmen, who had specialised training in the subject of street fighting in preparation for a rising in Dublin city. They were a dedicated force who believed in the cause of a republic. Volunteer Seamus Murphy recalls that in order to acquire rifles a scheme was introduced whereby each man contributed one shilling a week towards the purchase of a weapon. There was no difficulty in getting these subscriptions. The men gave up their little luxury of a pint or some other amenity in order to acquire arms.
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The standard of leadership was high and this is reflected in the way the Volunteers fought with discipline, courage and determination. Excellent leadership greatly contributed to the morale of the Volunteers.

The ability of the Irish Volunteers to deceive the British into thinking that their force was numerous was perhaps the most important tactical plan contrived by Commandant Ceannt. Though the British had superior firepower, the Irish Volunteers utilised their limited resources to force the enemy to withdraw from battle on Monday and again on Thursday. The result of this tactic was that the South Dublin Union was not taken by force but was forced to surrender on orders from Patrick Pearse, the officer in command of the Irish Volunteers.

Controversy surrounds the order that was issued to retreat from the Nurses' Home, an order that left Brugha to defend the building on his own. Ceannt did not issue the order and though various people are named in witness statements, it still remains a mystery who ordered it.

Officers and men from both sides found the battle for the South Dublin Union a difficult experience:

I found a bullet in Dublin every bit as dangerous as a bullet in No-Man's Land. In some ways the fighting in Dublin was worse. In France you generally had a fair idea where the enemy was and where the bullets were going to come from. In Dublin you never knew when or from where you were going to be hit.
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Neither side knew exactly where the enemy was located and the battle lines were never fixed. Shots rang out in front, behind and on your flanks. British soldiers with battle experience found the network of narrow streets within the Union and the deadly guerrilla tactics of the Volunteers mentally exhausting.

Though the British military were taken by surprise by the insurrection, they reacted quickly and vigorously to the situation. The South Dublin Union garrison were one of the first Volunteer battalions to make contact with the enemy and there was no time to evacuate the staff and patients of the complex. However, provisions were made, such as moving them to safer quarters and identifying the buildings where they were quartered by draping Red Cross flags from the windows. This action by the staff of the Union, the Irish Volunteers and the British army greatly reduced the number of civilian casualties during the battle. Aware of the large number of civilians within the Union, Lowe did not deploy artillery there, instead concentrating his artillery forces nearer the centre of the city.

After their initial contact with the Irish Volunteers in the South Dublin Union on Monday 24 April, 1916, British crown forces attempted to storm the complex. Having gained entry to the Union at considerable loss, they failed to press home the attack, which resulted in the Volunteers regrouping and holding their positions. The decision to withdraw the Royal Irish Regiment at this early stage was to have a detrimental effect later in the week. Machine-gun and sniper fire from the Royal Hospital, Kilmainham, enabled the British to contain the Volunteer force within the Union. The method of utilising covering fire was textbook, as it provided cover for attacking infantry and kept down flanking fire. British tactics within the Union consisted of taking and occupying a block or building, clearing and securing it, and then moving onto the next one. This often involved fighting at close quarters, resulting in a heavy consumption of ammunition and also heavy casualties.
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When Brigadier General W.H.M. Lowe ascertained that the rebels had established themselves in various centres throughout the city, the first phase of operations he conducted was to attempt to isolate each group by forming a cordon of troops around their position. Having organised reinforcements from camps throughout Ireland, Brigadier General Lowe sent to England for the 59th North Midland Division. Lowe set a number of primary tasks that included the relief of Dublin Castle and the securing of the magazine fort and the vice-regal lodge, which ensured that the military contained and effectively bypassed the South Dublin Union. He concentrated his main force of action on taking the Volunteer headquarters at the General Post Office in Sackville Street, in order to destroy the control point of the Rising. To achieve this a line of posts was established from Kingsbridge Station (Heuston Station) along Thomas Street and Dame Street to Trinity College. The latter post was to become the main headquarters for the retaking of the city. Having secured this highway, British troops were able to enter the heart of the city and crown forces were in a strong position to launch their attack on the General Post Office.

Crushing the Rising in a built-up area within one week with new recruits and poorly trained soldiers was an impressive military achievement. Brigadier General Lowe's plans were successful and resulted in the unconditional surrender of the Irish Volunteers. However, while the general plan worked well, the British attack on the South Dublin Union on Thursday afternoon was a tactical error that had nothing to do with their overall strategy. Superior officers who failed to reconnoitre the area threw the inexperienced battalions of the Sherwood Forester Regiment into the fray. The use of fighting patrols and experienced officers and men from other regiments greatly reduced British casualties in this engagement, but there were alternative routes available which bypassed the Union and these should have been considered. The attack on the Union was a mistake that could have resulted in similar casualties as were suffered in the battle for Mount Street Bridge.

Some of the most bloody and decisive battles in recent times have been fought in towns and cities throughout the world. Today many military forces utilise the tactics and strategies that were deployed by both sides during the 1916 Rising. Many major battles were fought in the streets, houses and factories of Stalingrad in 1942, Warsaw in 1944 and Berlin in 1945. During the Korean War in 1950 there was severe fighting in Seoul. Between 1975 and 1982 Beirut became a battleground. In recent years as Yugoslavia descended into civil war, Sarajevo became a city of death as its streets came under fire from Serb forces. More recently, armies of occupation and civil power have been faced with the challenges of insurgency. This has been highlighted with the British and American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fighting in a built-up area is favoured by insurgent groups who can even the odds by drawing conventional infantry into a battlefield of high-rise buildings, sewers, houses and streets, thus reducing the disparity in combat power. The soldiers fighting in such an environment are under considerable stress and need special training for urban operations. The tactics of fighting and defence in a built-up area are still in their infancy, having only been developed in the early twentieth century. This form of warfare results in high civilian casualties and an increase in refugees. Fighting in a built-up area will continue to be a form of combat favoured by weaker forces.