Ultimatum (15 page)

‘Good,’ said the telephone man. ‘I’ll start on this one.’ He opened the tool satchel, took out pliers and a screwdriver, lifted the handset, unscrewed the mouth and ear pieces. Within fifteen minutes he’d checked both handsets, carried out two imaginary conversations in Arabic with the faults supervisor at the central automatic exchange, re-packed the satchel and returned to the van.

The servant had watched him at first, then lost interest and disappeared. A Jordanian himself, he’d concluded from the telephone man’s accent and light skin that he was Lebanese. The Jordanians didn’t much care for the Lebanese. Not that he would have seen the telephone man insert the
ELX-Mk II Busch micro-transmitters in the handsets before replacing the mouth pieces. They were about half the size of the nail of an elegant woman’s little finger and easily concealed.

Back at the van the man in the blue overalls put the satchel into the boot and drove up the hill to the lay-by under the pines. Several cars were already there and he parked well clear of them. He estimated that he was no more than two hundred metres from the penthouse, though the distance by road was a good deal greater.

For some time he sat eating sandwiches, pretending to read a newspaper but watching the road beneath him. The Alfa would have to come up that way.

The sun set a few minutes after five o’clock. Twilight would end an hour later. At five-thirty he switched on the van’s radio. From it a concealed output fed a recorder in the dash-box. That, too, he switched on. The recorder had a four-hour cassette and there were others beneath the driving seat. Ten minutes later, through a gap in the pines, he saw the Alfa coming up the hill in the gathering dusk.

By eight o’clock on the night of Tuesday, November 9th, it was evident to members of the ad hoc Committee that little progress had been made in the first thirty-two hours of the ultimatum. This was not for want of action. A great deal had been and was being done but the results were singularly disappointing.

The Home Secretary reported that, notwithstanding searches taking place on an unprecedented scale, nothing positive had yet emerged. Promising leads had been pursued with energy but without avail. He apologized for the
negative
nature of his report, expressing the hope that the next twelve hours might bring results.

The DGSS and the Head of Special Branch reported in more detail but in much the same vein.

Sir Brian Parkes, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, said the appeal to the public for information had brought a flood of telephone calls, letters and callers. A large staff, reinforced by Army units, was dealing with these and useful leads were acted on immediately. So far nothing positive had emerged.

The Chairman of the Port of London Authority said that the systematic search of shipping in the London Docks and other parts of the Thames was proceeding well, the PLA’s resources having been considerably augmented by RN personnel, patrol craft, launches and divers. So far the search had not produced anything, nor had the scrutiny of cargo manifests, bills of lading, passenger lists and customs and
immigration
records. But the task was far from complete and he, too, hoped the action being taken might bear fruit before long.

The Home Secretary said that searches of the same sort at other major ports had yielded nothing so far.

The Director of Civil Aviation, co-opted to the Committee, gave details of the search at airports, the checking of passenger/freight records and customs and immigration entries. But here, too, he said nothing worth while had eventuated.

The Defence Secretary, reported on the steps being taken in the Ministry of Defence to deal with the situation which would arise if the warhead were detonated.

Contingency planning for this, in consultation with the GLC, the London Fire Brigade, Scotland Yard, the Port of London Authority, the Metropolitan Hospital Board, the London Transport Board, British Rail and other authorities was, he said, well advanced. Much of it was standard
procedure
already laid down in the MOD’s anti-nuclear defence measures for the Metropolitan area.

Sir Brian Wallace, Chairman of the GLC, commenting on public reaction, observed that the morale of Londoners remained remarkably high. He attributed this to the Prime Minister’s assurance that the threat to London would not be allowed to develop. This had been interpreted by the media as an admission that the Government, with the support of the United States, would accept the terms of the ultimatum unless the warhead was found and in some way neutralized within the time limit of seventy-two hours. With small exceptions the media had, he said, behaved well. There had been no panic, no interruption of the normal life of the metropolis, other than a certain measure of inconvenience arising from search operations. In these public co-operation had been admirable, notwithstanding the absence of search warrants.

He admitted and regretted that people were leaving London in greater numbers than usual for the time of year. It appeared that most of those concerned were in the higher income brackets.

At this juncture the Foreign Secretary was heard to remark in an aside to the Home Secretary, ‘That’s always been the jittery lot.’

There was, continued the Chairman of the GLC, a
considerable demand for hotel accommodation in the provinces, in Scotland and Wales, and in France and the Low Countries.

‘Foreign Secretary,’ said the Prime Minister, ‘may we hear from you?’

The Foreign Secretary adjusted his glasses, looked at the faces round the table and shuffled his notes. ‘This morning I concluded discussions with our Ambassadors from the Middle East. They return to their posts today fully briefed on the task now confronting them. I have in the last twelve hours been in touch with the ambassadors and foreign secretaries of France, West Germany and Italy, and the secretaries-general of UNO and NATO.

‘There is agreement among them on the diplomatic strategy to be pursued in the time available. These countries, and soon I hope UNO and NATO, will exert diplomatic pressure upon the Arab states – including the PLO – to persuade those responsible to extend the time limit of the ultimatum and to meet representatives of the United States and United Kingdom to discuss and negotiate its terms.

‘The French and Germans – and of course ourselves – are hopeful that the United States will persuade Israel to announce immediate and meaningful territorial concessions. Not necessarily to the extent set out in the ultimatum but enough to make Soukour-al-Sahra’ feel they have in the main achieved their objective. If this sounds like capitulation let me remind you of two facts – somewhere in London at this moment there is a nuclear warhead to be detonated at noon on Thursday, November 11th – that is in forty hours – unless we accept the terms of the ultimatum. That is one fact. The other is that the Palestinians – and by that I mean the whole Palestine Liberation movement and not the gang of thugs behind this ultimatum – have a claim which the world regards as morally justifiable. They are and long have been a stateless, homeless people, and for that the United Kingdom must accept some measure of
responsibility
.

‘This afternoon I was also in touch with the Israeli
Ambassador and Foreign Secretary. I’m sorry to say their attitude is predictably tough and unyielding. Their Foreign Secretary believes that this is a bluff. That the SAS will not risk detonation. Firstly, because to do so would make a nonsense of their objective, and secondly because the
warhead
is their most powerful bargaining weapon. With it they are a force to be reckoned with, even by powerful nations. Without it they are no more than a nuisance. They will not, he believes, destroy that weapon.

‘It is the Israeli view that if we make no move to meet the ultimatum’s demands, the Soukour-al-Sahra’ will – towards the end of the seventy-two hour period – offer to negotiate. The Israelis may be right.
They
are in a position to gamble with the fate of London.
We
are not.’

The Defence Secretary said, ‘May I, Prime Minister, come in again?’

‘Please do.’

‘It does not require much imagination to understand the situation in which the Israelis find themselves. The Foreign Secretary says they are ready to gamble with the fate of London. Are we not, Prime Minister, ready to gamble with the fate of Israel? Seen as a moral issue, I doubt if there is much difference. Seen as a diplomatic one, of course there is. Nevertheless, I would not like us to fall into the easy but entirely false position of regarding Israel as the guilty party, and not the terrorists.’

The Chief of the General Staff intervened to say that the Committee seemed already to have accepted that the issue was a clear-cut one between acceptance and rejection. ‘With respect, I suggest it is not. There is an area of manoeuvre between these two extremes. We may still find the warhead. I would remind the Committee that, if we do, there is more than a fair chance of rendering it safe if we use the resources available to us.

‘I agree with the Israeli view that Soukour-al-Sahra’ are unlikely to risk detonation. Our task is to find the warhead. Should we succeed, we will not be powerless even if they do intend to detonate on the expiry of the time limit. It is to be
detonated by means of a pre-set timing device. In other words, the terrorists will leave the warhead before it is due to explode. We must assume they will give themselves sufficient time to get well clear of London. Say an hour or two. During that time our boffins can go in and make the warhead safe.’

The Prime Minister’s face showed clearly enough his disagreement with the CGS’s contribution which he
proceeded
to ignore. ‘I must now inform you,’ he said, ‘of my talk by hot-line with the President of the United States. In doing so I shall refer also to his discussions with the Chairman of the Soviet Union.

‘I spoke to the President at six o’clock this evening. This was our second talk, for I had been in touch with him at
midday
. In the intervening period he’d had an opportunity for in-depth consultations with his advisers, particularly with Dr Kissinger and the Chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee. The President’s views have changed. He now suggests we ignore the ultimatum altogether, but take certain other action without delay. He thinks our search programme should be abandoned or, at most, carried forward with a low profile. He considers the risk of
pre-detonation
to be as real as it is unacceptable.

‘That is the negative side of his policy. More positively he suggests that both Britain and the United States should issue communiqués announcing their determination to secure the early establishment of an independent Palestine. The communiqués should, he argues, ignore the ultimatum.

‘If this is done the Soukour-al-Sahra’ will, he believes, have the carpet pulled from under their feet. To proceed with their threat once such communiqués have been issued – in the form and with the guarantees the President has in mind – would destroy the chances of an independent Palestine at the very moment of its birth. This is something Ka’ed would certainly not want to do.

‘He went on to make it clear that it would well suit United States diplomacy at this juncture – he is much influenced by the US débacles in Vietnam, Cyprus and
Turkey, and is bent on doing something to restore the prestige of the United States – as I was saying, it would well suit US policy if the present situation could be used as a valid reason for acceding to the Arabs’ long-standing demand for the return of the conquered territories and the establishment of an independent Palestine.

‘In the President’s view world opinion would accept that the demands themselves were morally well-founded, though the methods of the SAS were abhorrent. I find myself in agreement with his view that, since the October War, world opinion has swung in favour of the Arabs. It is now generally recognized that the balance of power in the Middle East lies with them, and there is a growing feeling that Israel should return the conquered territories – or a substantial part of them – since, only in that way, can the heat be taken out of the Middle East situation.

‘The President felt that these considerations would effectively counter accusations by Israel that we have, to use his phrase, “sold her down the river”. He had, he said, sounded out the Soviet Chairman on this strategy in the course of a hot-line conversation this afternoon. Not
surprisingly
Mr Brezhnev assured him that the Soviet Union regarded such a course of action as sensible and indeed inevitable. The Soviet Chairman stressed that, but for Israeli intransigence over the return of the conquered territories, peace in the Middle East would long since have been restored.

‘Mr Brezhnev said it was the intention of the Soviet Government to issue a communiqué deploring the methods used by the SAS but offering financial, logistical and technological support for the immediate establishment of a Palestine State. To placate Israel, the Soviet Chairman said the communiqué would contain firm guarantees by the Soviet Union for the continuance of Israel as an independent State.

‘In conclusion Mr Brezhnev told the President that the Soviet Union was motivated solely by a desire to see peace in the Middle East. Peace on a basis which would do justice to
the conflicting interests of Israel, the Arab States and the Palestinians, and in this way neutralize the most dangerous area of confrontation between the super-powers. This, said Brezhnev, would strengthen USSR-USA détente.

‘The President has no doubt that the Soviet Union’s real motives are to strengthen its ties with the Arab States, and to be seen to play a central rôle in achieving a Middle East settlement where the United States has failed. As to the West, the President said he believed that if we follow the policies he advocates the OPEC countries will adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the supply and pricing of oil to consuming countries, thus contributing to a solution of the energy crisis and to correcting the disastrous imbalance of western economies.

‘The President said that with these considerations in mind the United States and West Germany would be prepared to put up six billion dollars of the ten billion required. There would in addition be the Soviet contribution, and he felt sure the Arab States, overburdened with petro-dollars, would want to help. Finance, he emphasized, would not be an obstacle.

‘He conceded that the main stumbling block to making rapid progress along these lines was the question of the return by Israel of the conquered territories, but he thought ways and means of imposing the necessary decisions upon Israel could be found, particularly in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union. I found the President philosophic on the morality of this issue. “The Israelis,” he said, “cannot expect the United Kingdom to accept mass destruction of a
substantial
part of London and the killing and maiming of tens of thousands of its citizens to resist what at the end of the day the world will regard as a morally justifiable claim, notwithstanding the barbaric manner in which it has been preferred.”

‘The President ended with remarkable frankness. “It’s going to be tough for the Israelis”, he said, “but their military and economic viability is heavily dependent on the United States. They’ll have no option if we squeeze. And
we will – as hard and fast as the situation demands. Time is the essence of the situation. If we don’t move quickly, London may be filed away along with Pompeii and
Hiroshima
.”

‘Needless to say I told the President that, while his views would receive the most careful consideration, I felt certain Her Majesty’s Government would not wish to appear to be yielding to the demands of the ultimatum with indecent haste. I added that, while I could give no firm undertaking, it was probable we would pursue the policy he advised, but nearer the time the ultimatum was due to expire.’