Read Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice Online
Authors: Naomi Roht-Arriaza
Two dimensions – national/international, or truth commission/trial – are no longer enough to map the universe of transitional justice efforts. Transitional justice now reaches down into the local village or neighborhood level, and makes use of a number of techniques drawn from or influenced by local customary law that combine elements of truth‐telling, amnesty, justice, reparations, and apology. In East Timor, the Truth Commission organized Community Reconciliation Procedures where low‐level perpetrators (none who had committed murder or crimes against humanity) were granted immunity from formal prosecution in exchange for appearing at a community‐level hearing, recounting their crimes, and carrying out a sanction imposed by the community itself. In Rwanda, the government is carrying out a large‐scale experiment in the use of village‐level
gacaca
courts to judge alleged perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. Local‐level justice processes can create a much tighter sense of community ownership than those that take place in far‐off capital cities or, worse still, foreign lands. They can provide a
more understandable process, one untainted by the perceived unfairness or remoteness of formal legal structures often inherited from a colonial power. They can also play a role, after “horizontal” conflicts involving ethnic‐ or territorially‐based armed groups, in allowing neighbors who have been on different sides of a conflict to re‐engage and to coexist. They can draw on indigenous and traditional ceremonies and authorities, tapping into profound spiritual and world‐visioning symbols that are often non‐Western, based on ideas of community harmony and well‐being. Because of the culture‐specific nature of these processes, it can be hoped that they will resist the tendency, so pronounced in the case of truth commissions, for politicians and negotiators to extrapolate a “formula” that can be applied, with few changes, to any and all situations.
These local‐level initiatives also give a new, more fulsome meaning to the concept of reconciliation. During the early wave of experiences, reconciliation was conceived of as either a code word for impunity (the Latin American experience) or as an automatic by‐product of other processes, especially of knowing the truth (the South African variant). However, a new understanding of reconciliation as a separate set of phenomena, with its own demands and time‐frames, has slowly emerged. Definitions of reconciliation are still contested and murky, and the individual, community and polity aspects of such processes are still not well understood. Theorists talk about “thick” and “thin” processes, of “coexistence”
[18]
or “normalcy”
[19]
as the goals. We, like others,
[20]
have always preferred the term “social (and moral) reconstruction”; some chapters use reconciliation instead. As Weinstein and Stover write:
And so, at a group level, reconciliation involves the reconfiguring of identity, the revisiting of prior social roles, the search for common identifications, agreement about unifying memories if not myths, and the development of collaborative relationships that allow for difference. At the individual level, reconciliation may mean personal reconnection with friends and acquaintances from a former life – a reconnection that raises questions about trust, forgiveness, and attachments in a very intimate way. Societal development necessitates the construction of networks that promote collaboration across social groups.
[21]
It is easier to visualize these multiple meanings once social reconstruction has been decoupled from other transitional justice processes, with which it is deeply interconnected, and once the community as mediating structure between the individual and the polity has become a key actor in at least some post‐conflict settings. Finally, a more complex temporal dimension exists as well. While transitional justice efforts focus on the
period shortly after a new government, committed to change, comes to power, it is now clear that ends to transitions cannot be decreed, and that certain aspects of the transitional justice agenda will endure for many years. Transitions may happen in bouts or waves, as new generations come of age and as the international context changes. A long‐term perspective is therefore essential.
This book brings together case studies that explore one or more of these dimensions. Together, they illustrate the interplay of different functions, levels, mechanisms and goals in the current transitional justice agenda, and they point to some directions for the future. The cases are organized into two parts: Part I involves Truth and justice: Combinations and coordination. Part II centers on Levels of justice: Local, national and international. The overlap between the sections is substantial. The chapter on the East Timorese Community Reconciliation Procedure, for example, is about both combining truth and justice and combining local, national and international levels of justice, while the chapter on emerging efforts in Colombia reflects both the combination of functions and the strong influence of international factors, especially the Inter‐American system and
ICC, on domestic debates. Several of the case studies in Part II also involve multiple mechanisms or proposed mechanisms, while those in Part I reflect different (and in the East Timor and Sierra Leone cases, extensive) international shaping and participation. A concluding chapter draws out the lessons learned.
We chose the case studies because they illustrated one or more of the trends we were interested in: other places could have illustrated many of these same points, and raised others. We also looked for a balance of regions, how far along these processes were, and varying kinds of international influence. We looked for a mix of the relatively well‐known, and of places much less‐known and analyzed, at least in the English‐speaking literature. We also looked for a mix of academics and practitioners, a combination of insiders describing the processes they helped establish and guide, and outsiders with intimate and long‐standing knowledge of those processes. We brought the team of authors together (with a number of additional experts) at a workshop held at Notre Dame University's Center for Civil and Human Rights in 2004. Seeking a balance between specificity and comparability, after discussion of all the papers, we jointly came up with a rough template of questions for the chapters: questions about effectiveness, buy‐in, constraints, continuity and sustainability, synergies and gaps. The chapters each reflect these concerns in their own way.
The study of how to come to terms with the past, to reconstruct the social and moral fiber of a society, is one of the most complex and
daunting human endeavors. It is not just a rational intellectual exercise, but one that engages our deepest and most cherished notions of what it means to define ourselves and our memory, and to live in community and society. In all these stories, determined people, faced with a window of opportunity, looked to other places for ideas, borrowed from their successes and learned from their failures, taking outside constraints into account. And then, if they had the minimal security and leeway to do so, applied their own wisdom, ingenuity, imagination and traditions to create something unique to their particular time and place. We celebrate that creativity, determination, and drive, and we dedicate this book to those, in all the countries where we work, who act to make justice, in the largest sense of the word, a reality.
[1]
Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” (2003)
Harvard Human Rights Journal
, 16, p. 69.
[2]
On the roles of education and culture, see Sarah Warshauer Freedman et. al., “Public Education and Social Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia”, in Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein, eds.,
My Neighbor, My Enemy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). On distributional justice, see Rama Mani,
Beyond Retribution
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
[3]
See Jane Alexander, “A Scoping Study of Transitional Justice and Poverty Reduction” (January 2003), available at
http://www.grc-exchange.org/docs/SSAJ56.pdf
.
[4]
Reparations merits its own book, and in the initial design of this project the Notre Dame Center for Civil and Human Rights proposed two books, one on trials and truth commissions, and one on reparations. The International Center for Transitional Justice is also publishing a large study on reparations.
[5]
See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Post‐Conflict Justice
(Transnational Publishers, 2002) for early efforts; for the 1970s, see Alexandra Barahona de Brito et al., eds.,
The Politics of Memory
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); for Spain's efforts, starting in the early 2000s, to finally confront the legacy of Francoism, see Equipo Nizkor's website,
www.derechos.org/nizkor/spain
.
[6]
Priscilla Hayner,
Unspeakable Truths
(Routledge, 2001), at p. 5.
[7]
Thomas Nagel made this point at an early conference on transitional justice sponsored by the Aspen Institute.
[8]
See, for instance,
Carmen Aguiar de Lapaco
v.
Argentina
, Inter‐American Commission Case 12.059, Report 21/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 Doc. 3 rev. at 340 (1999).
[9]
See Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair”, (2002)
Human Rights Quarterly
, 24, pp. 573–639; Jaime Malamud,
War Without End
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996).
[10]
See, e.g., Richard Wilson,
The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[11]
Aryeh Neier,
War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice
(New York: Times Books/Random House, 1998).
[12]
Figures derived from indictments listed on the website of the ICTY,
http://www.icty.org
. ICTR data in letter dated 5 December, 2005, from the President of the ICTR to the President of the Security Council, available at
http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/completionstrat/S-2005-782e.pdf
.
[13]
Stover and Weinstein,
My Neighbor, My Enemy
, especially chs. 1,2, 9 and 10.
[14]
In the case of the ICTY, the Tribunal served a gatekeeper function in relation to national courts: for a local court to take up a war‐crimes case, the Tribunal had to first find the case meritorious (the “rules of the road” agreement). In Rwanda, national courts proceeded to try several thousand defendants (and to arrest over 120,000) but the relationship with the ICTR was not one of close cooperation.
[15]
Fletcher and Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair”.
[16]
The UN is also pursuing a hybrid court process in Cambodia as well, where, under the proposal insisted upon by the Cambodian government, a majority of judges and senior officers of the Extraordinary Chambers will be Cambodian nationals. For further discussion of hybrid courts in these countries, see Suzannah Linton, “Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice”
2001 Criminal Law Forum
, 12:185; relevant information is also available at
http://www.cij.org
. In 1999, the United Nations established a program of International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo. By the end of 2000, the Kosovo IJP program had evolved into a system of special international‐majority trial and appellate panels, which could hear all war crimes cases, as well as all significant cases of organized crime and “power vacuum” and “payback” crimes, including terrorism, inter‐ethnic violence, political assassinations, and corruption. See Michael E. Hartmann,
International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New Model for Post‐Conflict Peacekeeping
(USIP, 2003), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr112.html
.
[17]
The Security Council has since at least 2000 supported the idea that the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda should focus on civilian, military and paramilitary leaders and should, as part of their completion strategy, “concentrat[e] on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes” while transferring cases involving lesser offenders to the national courts. Security Council Res. 1329, UN Doc. S/RES/1329, Nov. 30, 2000; Security Council Res. 1503, UN Doc. S/RES/1503, Aug. 28, 2003; also S/RES/1534 (2004). The Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court has similarly expressed his office's intention to focus on the leaders who bear most responsibility. “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor” (Sept. 2003), available at
http://icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_policy_paper.pdf
. National laws, e.g. in Argentina or Rwanda, sometimes make the same distinction, as does the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
[18]
See, e.g., Antonia Chayes and Martha Minow, eds.,
Imagine Coexistence: Restoring Humanity After Violent Ethnic Conflict
(San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass Publ., 2003).