Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (50 page)

There is a dilemma, to be sure, but it is not between peacebuilding and transitional justice. It is between development and peacebuilding/transitional justice. At stake is what qualifies as legitimate country programming, in meeting the real needs of the people of Uganda, and what is taken seriously. The case of Uganda warns us against the incorporation of peacebuilding and transitional justice efforts into development programming. At the very least, development plans that entail such activities need to accord them more respect and support.

Notes

1
 Uganda Human Rights Commission,
11th Annual Report of the Uganda Human Rights Commission to the Parliament of the Republic of Uganda
(Kampala: UHRC, 2008), pp. 148–51. The Uganda Human Rights Commission is a government body whose chairperson and other members are appointed directly by the President. See Republic of Uganda, Cap. 24,
The Uganda Human Rights Act (2000)
.

2
 Republic of Uganda,
Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) 2007
–
2010
(Kampala: Government of Uganda, September 2007), p. 28.

3
 Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 20.

4
 Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 103.

5
 Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., pp. 103–05.

6
 International Monetary Fund, “Press Release No. 06/14: IMF Executive Board Completes Final Review of Uganda’s PRGF Arrangement and Approves 16-month Policy Support Instrument,” 24 January 2006 (press release online); available from <
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr0614.htm
> (accessed 6 February 2010).

7
 Museveni officially referred the situation to the ICC in December 2003. It has been commonly assumed that Museveni approached the Court first. Information has surfaced that the Chief Prosecutor actually approached Museveni to ask him to refer the situation. See Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark, eds,
Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa
(London: Royal African Society, March 2008), p. 43. There is a great deal of debate about what this discrepancy means.

8
 Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 103.

9
 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Government of Uganda,
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) (2004/5
–
2007/8)
, IMF Country Report No. 05/307 (Washington, DC: IMF, August 2005), p. 99.

10
 Geresome Latim, Secretary to the Paramount Chief of Acholi, interview by author, 22 November 2004, Gulu town, Uganda; also World Vision,
Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda
(Kampala: World Vision, 2004), p. 4.

11
 Darryl Robinson, presentation at the conference, “Cross-Purposes? International Law and Political Settlements,” held by the Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict Research Group, The University of Western Ontario, 9 June 2007.

12
 Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Rainer Siegler,
Political Stability and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 196.

13
 Nancy G. Wright, “Uganda: History From 1971,”
Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara
, ed. John Middleton (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1996), p. 306.

14
 Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, op. cit., p. 199; Edward Khiddu-Makubuya, “Para-militarism and Human Rights,” in
Conflict Resolution in Uganda
, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1989), pp. 141–57.

15
 Philip Briggs,
Uganda
(Old Saybrook, CT: The Globe Pequot Press, 1998), p. 23.

16
 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,
Sowing the Mustard Seed
(London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 41.

17
 Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, op. cit., p. 199; Khiddu-Makubuya, “Paramilitarism,” op. cit., p. 153.

18
 
Uganda
(Brooklyn, NY: Interlink Books, 1998), p. 53; Thomas P. Ofcansky,
Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 55.

19
 Abdul Nadduli, LC5 District Chairman, interview with author, 17 November 2004, Luweero town, Uganda.

20
 Museveni was returned to power in the first multi-party elections since his accession to power, on 23 February 2006, reportedly with 59 percent of the vote.

21
 These include rebellions by the Action Restore Peace, Allied Democratic Forces, Apac rebellion, Citizen Army for Multiparty Politics, Force Obote Back, Former Uganda National Army, Holy Spirit Movement, the Lord’s Army, Lord’s Resistance Army, National Federal Army, National Union for the Liberation of Uganda, Ninth October
Movement, People’s Redemption Army, Uganda Christian Democratic Army, Uganda Federal Democratic Front, Uganda Freedom Movement, Ugandan National Democratic Army, Uganda National Federal Army, Ugandan National Liberation Front, Ugandan National Rescue Fronts I and II, Ugandan People’s Army, Ugandan People’s Democratic Army, Uganda Salvation Army, and the West Nile Bank Front. Compiled from Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo,
Working Paper 11: Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda
(Kampala: Refugee Law Project, February 2004), p. 4; and Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo,
Working Paper 15: Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda
’
s Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential for Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation
(Kampala: Refugee Law Project, February 2005), p. 6.

22
 Catherine Barnes and Okello Lucima, “Introduction,”
Accord
(2002) 11, p. 1.

23
 This is a common euphemism for a sex slave.

24
 Lucy Hovil and Joanna Quinn,
Working Paper 17: Peace First, Justice Later
(Kampala: Refugee Law Project, July 2005), p. 3.

25
 Tim Allen,
War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court
’
s Intervention
(London: Crisis States Research Centre, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, February 2005), p. 24.

26
 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Uganda: War-ravaged North Rues Museveni Win,”
IRINnews.org
(1 March 2006); available from <
www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=51960
> (accessed 10 March 2006).

27
 Tim Allen points out that “the scale of abduction is a matter of speculation” due to insufficient monitoring. See Allen,
War and Justice in Northern Uganda
, op. cit., p. iii.

28
 “
When the Sun Sets, We Start To Worry
…”
: An Account of Life in Northern Uganda
, OCHA/IRIN, November 2003, p. 8.

29
 Geresome Latim, Secretary to the Paramount Chief of Acholi, interview by author, 22 November 2004, Gulu town, Uganda; also World Vision,
Pawns of Politics
, op. cit., p. 4.

30
 Allen,
War and Justice in Northern Uganda
, op. cit., p. 23.

31
 Moses Odokonyero, “Acholi’s Political ‘Elephant Breed’ Fails,”
The Monitor
(Kampala), 10 March 2006.

32
 Betty Bigombe and John Prendergast, “Stop the Crisis in Northern Uganda,”
The Philadelphia Inquirer
, 21 February 2006.

33
 James Otto quoted in UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Uganda: War-ravaged North Rues Museveni Win,” op. cit.

34
 “UNDMT Technical Group Status Report: Preparatory Planning for Displaced Persons” as cited in Chris Dolan, “Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda” (PhD diss., University of London, 2005), p. 167.

35
 Hovil and Quinn,
Peace First, Justice Later
, op. cit., p. 9.

36
 The exact number of abductees in the conflict is unknown. One study estimates that “the LRA abducted 54,000 to 75,000 people, including 25,000 to 38,000 children, into their ranks between 1986 and 2006.” Phong N. Pham, Patrick Vinck, and Eric Stover, “The Lord’s Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda,”
Human Rights Quarterly
, 30.2 (May 2008), p. 404. “The scale of abduction is a matter of speculation” due to insufficient monitoring. Allen,
War and Justice in Northern Uganda
, op. cit., p. iii. Forced conscription has been reported in many of the conflicts that have taken place since 1962, into both Government of Uganda and rebel ranks. Dennis Pain,
The Bending of Spears
:
Producing Consensus for Peace and Development in Northern Uganda
(London: International Alert, 1997), p. 29.

37
 Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 20.

38
 Ibid., p. vi.

39
 Museveni’s 14 points are the following: “1. elimination of the terrorist threat to stability; 2. building of security and access roads; 3. provision of water; 4. revival and re-enhancement of education; 5. provision of emergency relief; 6. health, immunisation and educational outreach, including an all-out war against HIV/AIDS; 7. farming with oxen and ploughs for food security and income generation among the poor; 8. provision of light processing facilities such as rice hurlers and maize millers; 9. enhanced micro-finance for micro-business by ex-LRA; 10. re-education and re-orientation of the minds and hearts of the population towards peace and development rather than war, and psychosocial counselling for children and others rescued from LRA fighting ranks; 11. vocational/skills training, especially for young people; 12. outreach to the local population; 13. beginning with industrialisation in Northern Uganda by, for instance, helping the sugar industry … and a biofuel industry … and a fruit processing factory … ; 14. hydro-power development …”; Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., pp. 18–19.

40
 Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., pp. vii–viii.

41
 Ministry of Finance,
PEAP
, op. cit., p. i.

42
 Ministry of Finance,
PEAP
, op. cit., p. ii.

43
 Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., pp. 16–17.

44
 Agness Nandutu, “Museveni Blames Donors Over Funds,”
The Monitor
(Kampala), 10 March 2006.

45
 Ministry of Finance,
PEAP
, op. cit., p. xv.

46
 As discussed below, extensive cattle rustling has affected many parts of Northern and North-Eastern Uganda, particularly in areas including Karamoja, but also across the Greater North. It is symptomatic of endemic problems including widespread famine, the proliferation of small arms, modernization, and the disappearance of traditional modes of livelihood.

47
 The Republic of Uganda,
Amnesty Act 2000
, Part II.3(1).

48
 Moses Draku, Principal Public Relations Officer, Amnesty Commission, interview by author, 7 July 2008, Kampala, Uganda.

49
 Hovil and Lomo,
Working Paper 15: Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda
’
s Amnesty Act 2000
, op. cit., p. 6.

50
 Hovil and Lomo,
Working Paper 15: Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda
’
s Amnesty Act 2000
, op. cit., p. 18.

51
 In April 2010, the Minister of State for Internal Affairs, Matia Kasaija, requested that Parliament agree not to grant amnesty to Kony, Dominic Ongwen, Okot Odhiambo, and Thomas Kwoyelo, and then withdrew his request. See Parliament of Uganda,
Parliament of Uganda eNewsletter
3.35 (April 12–16, 2010), p. 1.

52
 
Listen to the People: Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda
(Kampala: HURIPEC, 3 May 2004), pp. 92–93.

53
 Refugees International,
Bulletin: Uganda: Challenges of Peace and Justice
(Washington: Refugees International, 19 February 2008), p. 1.

54
 The agreements were as follows:
Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities
(26 August 2006);
Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions
(2 May 2007);
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation
(29 June 2007) and the subsequent
Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation
(19 February 2008);
Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire
(23 February 2008);
Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(29 February 2008);
Agreement on Implementing and Monitoring Mechanisms
(29 February 2008).

55
 In this chapter, these two agreements are hereafter referred to as the “Principal Agreement” and the “Annexure,” respectively. Together, they are referred to as the “Accountability Agreements.”

56
 Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation” (Juba, 19 February 2008), Art. 2.0.

57
 Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Annexure,” Art. 4.0.

58
 Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation” (Juba, 29 June 2007), Art. 4.4.

59
 Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Annexure,” Art. 10.0.

60
 
Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Principal Agreement,” Art. 3.2.

61
 Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Principal Agreement,” Art. 14.4.

62
 Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Annexure,” Art. 16.0.

63
 Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Annexure,” Art. 20.0.

64
 Government of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, “Principal Agreement,” Art. 3.1.

65
 See note 7, above.

66
 Appointed by Principal Jus. James Ogoola, these are Jus. Dan Akiiki-Kiiza, Head Justice, who served at Sierra Leone’s Special Court for Sierra Leone (2004–06), Jus. Eldad Mwangusya, Deputy Head, and Justice Faith Ibanda Nahamya, who also served at Sierra Leone’s SCSL. See also Bill Oketch, “Uganda Set for First War Crimes Trial,”
IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting
, 14 July 2010; available from <
http://iwpr.net/print/report-news/uganda-set-first-war-crimes-trial
>; accessed 29 November 2010.