Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (36 page)

Notes

1
 I would like to acknowledge the support of the British Academy, through a Small Grant (SG100735) for the completion of this chapter. This chapter is based on fieldwork developed by the author in 2009 and 2011 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2010 in Serbia and Croatia.

2
 As with many conflicts, the figures are only estimates and have been open to manipulation. The latest research by the Research and Documentation Centre in Sarajevo is regarded to have established the most accurate account: RDC,
Population Losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina’92
–
95
, Sarajevo, 2007.

3
 The term Bosniak is used to refer to those who are, in terms of cultural-religious heritage, descendants of Muslim Slavs, regardless of whether or not they practice
Islam. Dina Francesca Haynes, “Introduction,”
Deconstructing the Reconstruction. Human Rights and Rule of Law in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. xv.

4
 See, for example, ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Mom
č
ilo Krajišnik
(IT-00-39-T), Trial Judgement, 27 September 2006 and
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadži
ć
(IT-95-5/18-PT), Third Amended Indictment, 29 February 2009.

5
 See Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,”
Human Rights Law Quarterly
, vol. 31, no. 2, 2009, pp. 321–67; Chandra Lekha Sriram,
Globalizing Justice for Mass Atrocities: A Revolution in Accountability
(London: Routledge, 2005).

6
 Haynes, “Introduction,” op. cit., p. xviii.

7
 Marie-Joelle Zahar, “Foreign Intervention and State Reconstruction: Bosnian Fragility in Comparative Perspective,” in Denisa Sostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic,
Persistent State Weakness in the Global Age
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), p. 118.

8
 Michael H. Doyle, “Too Little, Too Late? Justice and Security Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Charles T. Call (ed.),
Constructing Justice and Security After War
(Washington DC: USIP, 2007), p. 232.

9
 Communiqué of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, 25/6/ 2008 and Council Joint Action 2008/130/CFSP of 18 February 2008, Extending the Mandate of the EUSR in BiH, 19 February 2008.

10
 SFOR was replaced by EU forces (EUFOR-ALTHEA) in December 2004.

11
 Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC),
Turning Soldiers into a Work Force, Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina
, Brief 27, 2006, p. 9.

12
 Ibid.

13
 Jessica Alexander
et al
.,
From Barracks to Business. An Evaluation of IOM
’
s Transitional Assistance Program to Former Soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina
, Final Report, April 2004, Columbia University Press, pp. 20–21, available at <
www.iom.ba/Downloads/Projects/TADS/Final%20Report%20IOM%20TAFS%20Bosnia%20Columbia.pdf
>, accessed 19 August 2011.

14
 Massimo Moratti and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess,
Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina
, Research Brief, June 2009 (NY: ICTY, 2009), p. 10.

15
 World Bank,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project
, Report No. T-6947-BI1, Technical Annex, 28 June 1996, available at <
www-wds.world-bank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000009265_3961214125242&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679
>, accessed 19 August 2011.

16
 BICC,
Turning Soldiers into a Work Force
, op. cit., p. 9.

17
 Ibid.

18
 IOM,
Transitional Assistance for Former Soldiers Programme
(2003), available at <
www.iom.ba/TADS1.html
>, accessed 19 August 2011, and Alexander
et al
.,
From Barracks to Business
, op. cit.

19
 For the process, see Ric Bainter, “The Elephant in the Room: Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Haynes,
Deconstructing the Reconstruction
, op. cit., pp. 235–57.

20
 ICG,
Bosnia
’
s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU
(Brussels: ICG, 2005), p. 4.

21
 Even if the EU criteria were not fulfilled, the EU still signed the SAA; see ICG,
Bosnia
’
s Incomplete Transitions: Between Dayton and Europe
(Brussels: ICG, 2009), p. 11.

22
 Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess,
Transitional Justice and DDR
, op. cit., p. 4.

23
 Ibid., p. 1.

24
 Thomas Muehlmann, “Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Problems with Internationally-Led Security Sector Reform,”
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding
, vol. 1, special supplement 1, 2007, pp. 37–65; Gemma Collantes-Celador, “Civil Society and the Bosnian Police Certification Process: Challenging ‘the Guardians’,” in Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, James Ker-Lindsay, and Denisa Kostovicova (eds),
Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, forthcoming).

25
 ICG,
Bosnia
’
s Stalled Police Reform
, op. cit., pp. 2–4.

26
 Ibid., p. 29.

27
 Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, “Peace on Whose Terms? War Veterans’ Associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds),
Challenges to Peacebuilding. Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution
(New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), pp. 200–18.

28
 Ibid.

29
 OHR,
Property Law Implementation Plan
, available at <
www.ohr.int/plip
> accessed 19 August 2011 and UNHCR,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
, available at <
www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d766
. html
>, accessed 19 August 2011.

30
 Charles Philpott, “Though the Dog is Dead, the Pig Must be Killed: Finishing Property Restitution to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s IDPs and Refugees,”
Journal of Refugee Studies
, vol. 18, no. 1 (2005), p. 2.

31
 ICG,
The Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina
, Balkan Report no. 137 (Brussels: ICG, 2002), p. 1; Massimo Moratti, “Tackling Obstruction to Property Rights and Return: A Critical Assessment of the Practice of Removing Housing Officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Haynes,
Deconstructing the Reconstruction
, op. cit., pp. 185, 189.

32
 Philpott, “Though the Dog is Dead,” op. cit., p. 8.

33
 Ibid.

34
 Ibid., pp. 17–18.

35
 Lara Nettelfield,
Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Hague Tribunal
’
s Impact in a Postwar State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 93.

36
 Ibid.

37
 UNCHR,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
, available at <
www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d766.html
>, accessed 19 August 2011.

38
 UNDP and Oxford Research International (ORI),
The Silent Majority Speaks
(2007), pp. 14–16.

39
 See, in general, Diane Orentlicher,
That Someone Guilty Be Punished. The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia
(New York: OSI and ICTJ, 2010); Eric Stover,
The Witness
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 110.

40
 UN Security Council Resolution 827, UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993.

41
 Ibid., “Preamble.”

42
 Payan Akhavan, “Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,”
Human Rights Quarterly
, vol. 20 (1998), pp. 737–816.

43
 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, “‘A World unto Itself?’ The Application of International Justice in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein (eds),
My Neighbour, My Enemy. Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Atrocity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 34.

44
 
Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
, UN Doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007, II (29 August 1994), para. 16–17; the same view is expressed latter in Antonio Cassese, “Reflections on International Criminal Justice,”
The Modern Law Review
, vol. 61, 1998, pp. 1–10.

45
 Akhavan, “Justice in The Hague,” op. cit., pp. 766–67; Antonio Cassese, “The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality,” in Cesare Romano, André Nollkaemper, and Jann Kleffner,
Internationalised Courts. Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 4.

46
 Payan Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?”
American Journal of International Law
, vol. 95, no. 7 (2001), p. 2.

47
 Orentlicher,
That Someone Guilty Be Punished
, op. cit., p. 79 and Nettelfield,
Courting Democracy
, op. cit., p. 93.

48
 See Laurel Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation,”
Human Rights Quarterly
, vol. 24, 2002, pp. 573–639.

49
 See, for example, Mirklos Briro
et al
., “Attitudes Towards Justice and Social Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia,” in Stover and Weinstein,
My Neighbour, My Enemy
, op. cit., pp. 183–206; Jame Meernik, “Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia,”
Journal of Peace Research
, vol. 42, 2005, pp. 271–89; Janine Natalya Clark, “The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina,”
Journal of International Criminal Justice
, vol. 7, 2009, pp. 463–87; Mirko Klarin, “The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia,”
Journal of International Criminal Justice
, vol. 9 (2009), pp. 89–96; Stephan Parmentier, Marta Valiñas, and Elmar Weitekamp, “How to Repair the Harm After Violent Conflict in Bosnia? Results of a Population-Based Survey,”
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights
, vol. 21, 2009, pp. 27–44; Sanja Kutnja Ivkovi
ć
and John Hagan,
Reclaiming Justice. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Local Courts
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Orentlicher,
That Someone Guilty Be Punished
, op. cit.; and the following UNDP in BiH surveys:
Justice and Truth in BiH: Public Perceptions
(EWS Special Report, 2006), pp. 15–16;
Transitional Justice Guidebook for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Executive Summary
(2009);
Facing the Past and Access to Justice From a Public Perspective
(2011).

50
 Janine Natalya Clark, “International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach,”
International Criminal Law Review
, vol. 9 (2009), pp. 99–116. On outreach in general see Clara Ramirez-Barrat,
Making an Impact: Guidelines on Designing and Implementing Outreach Programmes for Transitional Justice
(New York: ICTJ, 2011).

51
 Fletcher and Weinstein, “‘A World unto Itself?’” op. cit., p. 37; David Tolbert, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings,”
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs
, vol. 26, 2002, pp. 5–17.

52
 In general on the manipulative discourses in the region see Jelena Suboti
ć
,
Hijacked Justice. Dealing with the Past in the Balkans
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), and for a focus on Bosnia, see pp. 122–65.

53
 Nettelfield,
Courting Democracy
, op. cit., p. 171.

54
 UNDP,
Justice and Truth in BiH
, op. cit., pp. 15–16. According to the survey 24.9 percent of those surveyed in the Federation and 20.1 percent in Republika Srpska considered that the ICTY has done a good job and justified its existence, whilst 44.1 percent in the Federation and 25.6 percent in Republika Srpska considered that it has not done a good job, but that it is necessary.

55
 Nettelfield,
Courting Democracy
, op. cit., p. 273.

56
 Ibid., p. 271.

57
 Orentlicher,
That Someone Guilty Be Punished
, op. cit., p. 42. Author’s interview with members of Documenta and Humanitarian Law Centre, Zagreb and Belgrade, July 2010.

58
 Author’s interview with members of Documenta and Humanitarian Law Centre, Zagreb and Belgrade, July 2010.

59
 OSCE,
War Crimes Trials before the Domestic Courts in BiH. Progress and Obstacles
, March 2005, p. 4; see, generally, Human Rights Watch,
Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro
(New York: HRW, 2004).

60
 OHR,
Jobs and Justice: Our Agenda
, May 2002.

61
 Within the State Court, Sections I and II of the Criminal Division (the WCC and the Organised Crimes, Economic Crimes, and Corruption Chamber), the SDWC, and the Special Department for Economic Crimes of the Office of the Prosecutor, the Registry, and the Defence Office, were hybrid. So were the High Judiciary and Prosecutorial Council, the Constitutional Court, and the Human Rights Chamber.

62
 UNDP and ORI,
The Silent Majority Speaks
, op. cit., pp. 14–16.

63
 For the process, see Dominic Raab, “Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy. Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and Their Tribunals,”
Journal of International Criminal Justice
, vol. 3 (2005), pp. 94–95, and Olga Martin-Ortega, “Hybrid Tribunals and the Rule of Law: The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in H. F. Carey and S. G. Mitchell,
Trials and Tribulations of International Prosecution
(Lexington Books, forthcoming 2011).