Thirteen Days (16 page)

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to dis
cuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

(s) J
OHN
F. K
ENNEDY

A
DDRESS BY
P
RESIDENT
K
ENNEDY ON
C
UBA
N
OVEMBER
2, 1962

My fellow citizens: I want to take this opportunity to report on the conclusions which this Government has reached on the basis of yesterday's aerial photographs which will be made available tomorrow, as well as other indications, namely, that the Soviet missile bases in Cuba are being dismantled, their missiles and related equipment are being crated, and the fixed installations at these sites are being destroyed.

The United States intends to follow closely the completion of this work through a variety of means, including aerial surveillance, until such time as an equally satisfactory international means of verification is effected.

While the quarantine remains in effect, we are hopeful that adequate procedures can be developed for international inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes. The International Committee of the Red Cross, in our view, would be an appropriate agent in this matter.

The continuation of these measures in air and sea, until the threat to peace posed by these offensive weapons is gone, is in keeping with our pledge to secure their withdrawal or elimination from this hemisphere. It is in keeping with the resolution of the Organization of American States, and it is in keeping with the exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev of October 27th and 28th.

Progress is now being made toward the restoration of peace in the Caribbean, and it is our firm hope and purpose that this progress shall go forward. We will continue to keep the American people informed on this vital matter.

P
RESIDENT
K
ENNEDY'S
S
TATEMENT ON
C
UBA
N
OVEMBER
20, 1962

I have today been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers now in Cuba will be withdrawn in thirty days. He also agrees that these planes can be observed and counted as they leave. Inasmuch as this goes a long way toward reducing the danger which faced this Hemisphere four weeks ago, I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine.

In view of this action I want to take this opportunity to bring the American people up to date on the Cuban crisis and to review the progress made thus far in fulfilling the understandings between Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and myself as set forth in our letters of October 27 and 28. Chairman Khrushchev, it will be recalled, agreed to remove from Cuba all weapons systems capable of offensive use, to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba, and to permit appropriate United Nations observation and supervision to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments. We on our part agreed that, once these adequate arrangements for verification had been established, we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurances against invasion of Cuba.

The evidence to date indicates that all known offensive missile sites in Cuba have been dismantled. The missiles and their associated equipment have been loaded on Soviet ships. And our inspection at sea of these departing ships has confirmed that the number of missiles reported by the Soviet Union as having been brought into Cuba, which closely corresponded to our own information, has now been removed. In addition the Soviet Government has stated that all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Cuba and no offensive weapons will be reintroduced.

Nevertheless, important parts of the understanding of October 27th and 28th remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to verify whether all
offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba.

Consequently, if the Western Hemisphere is to continue to be protected against offensive weapons, this Government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by our identification in recent days of a number of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and will also be withdrawn in due course.

I repeat, we would like nothing better than adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba, and we are prepared to continue our efforts to achieve such arrangements. Until that is done, difficult problems remain. As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this Hemisphere.

We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic, and other efforts of this Hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.

In short, the record of recent weeks shows real progress, and we are hopeful that further progress can be made. The completion of the commitment on both sides and the achievement of a peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis might well open the door to the solution of other outstanding problems.

May I add this final thought. In this week of Thanksgiving there is much for which we can be grateful as we look back to where we stood only four weeks ago—the unity of this Hemisphere, the sup
port of our allies, and the calm determination of the American people. These qualities may be tested many more times in this decade, but we have increased reason to be confident that those qualities will continue to serve the cause of freedom with distinction in the years to come.

In preparing the Afterword we have reviewed all the published material on the Cuban missile crisis.
Thirteen Days
stands alone, both in its authority as a primary source and in the extent to which its author conveys what it felt like to be there. But a number of other accounts offer supplementary perspectives and additional details.

Students interested in pursuing the missile crisis further are advised to start with Theodore Sorensen's account in
Kennedy
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965). It is the most careful and complete version produced by a central participant. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s
A Thousand Days
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) contains additional detail by a professional historian who observed some of the events from a position on the White House staff. Roger Hilsman's
To Move
a Nation
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967) includes an account of the missile crisis from the perspective of a second-level actor in the Department of State. Elie Abel's
The Missile Crisis
(New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1966) offers a more comprehensive chronology of the events, based on extensive interviews with most of the participants, especially in the State Department.

For those who wish to go further, additional references include:

 

Acheson, Dean, “Homage to Plain Dumb Luck,”
Esquire
, February, 1969.

Allison, Graham,
Essence of Decision
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

Horelick, Arnold, and Rush, Myron,
Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

Khrushchev Remembers
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

Larson, David, ed.,
The Cuban Crisis of 1962
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963).

Pachter, Henry,
Collision Course
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).

Tatu, Michel,
Power in the Kremlin
(New York: Viking Press, 1969).

Taylor, Maxwell D.,
Swords and Ploughshares
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1972).

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Subcommittee,
Interim Report on Cuban Military Build-up
, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations,
Hearings
, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963.

Weintal, Edward, and Bartlett, Charles,
Facing the Brink
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967).

Wohlstetter, Albert and Roberta, “Controlling the Risks in Cuba,” Adelphia Papers, No. 17, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1965.

 

Students interested in the Korean analogue may wish to read Glenn D. Paige's
The Korean Decision
(New York: Free Press, 1968).

R. E. N. and G. A.

Acheson, Dean

as advocate of military action

air strike advocated by

as member of Ex Comm

Aden

Adenauer, Konrad, support by

Africa

Agency for International Development (AID)

Air Force

crashing of U-2 of

deployment of

special hearing for

Air Force Reserve, activation of

Allison, Graham T., “Afterword” by

Anderson, Major Rudolf, Jr.

Anderson, Mrs. Rudolf, Jr.

Army

deployment of First Armored Division of

deployment of 101st Airborne Division of

 

Ball, George

decision on blockade and

Ex Comm meetings and

as member of Ex Comm

Bay of Pigs

decision-making apparatus for

fiasco of

J. F. Kennedy and

unanimity at time of

Berlin (Germany)

blockade of

possible threat to

preparations against blockade of

threat to (1961)

Bohlen, Charles (Chip)

Bucharest
(tanker)

Bülow, Prince von

Bundy, McGeorge

air strike favored by

diplomatic approach favored by

J. F. Kennedy informed of crisis by

as member of Ex Comm

 

Cabinet, advised of blockade (Oct. 22)

Cambodia, invasion of

Capehart, Homer E.

Castro, Fidel

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

involvement in foreign affairs of

missile placement analysis of

Check and balance system

between Congress and Presidency

in Constitution

in Missile Age

proposed devices for “redressing the constitutional balance,”

Civil War

Cleveland, Grover

Congo

Congress

criticism by members of (Oct. 22)

isolationism in

role of

war making as prime-example of incompatibility between Presidency and,
see also specific presidents

Constitution

checks and balances of

between congressional and presidential roles

proposed devices for
“redressing the constitutional balance,”

distinctive features of

as product of eighteenth century

 

Defense Department

De Gaulle, Gen. Charles,
see
Gaulle, Gen. Charles de

Diefenbaker, John

Dillon, Douglas

as advocate of military action

as member of Ex Comm

Dobrynin, Anatoly

advised of blockade (Oct. 22)

military buildup and

October 23 meeting with

October 27 meeting with

“Doves,” coining of

 

Eisenhower, Dwight D.

Essex
(carrier)

Ex Comm,
see
Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm)

alternatives considered by

blockade favored by

disbanding of

instructions to

invention of

J. F. Kennedy's attendance at meetings of

members of

October 16 meeting of

October 24 meeting of

October 27 meeting of

officialdom and

spirit of lightness in (Oct. 23)

start of blockade and

uses and shortcomings of

as vehicle for satisfying needs of top officials

Export-Import Bank

 

Federal Bureau of Investigation

First Armored Division

Foreign Office (Soviet), October 27 letter from

Forrestal, James

Fulbright, J. William

action advocated by

 

Gagarin
(ship)

Gaulle, Gen. Charles de, support by

Gilpatric, Roswell

Governance, dilemma of

Great Britain, skepticism of U.S. position in

“Great Society,”

Gromyko, Andrei, misleading statements of

Guantanamo Bay

strengthening forces in

Guinea

 

“Hawks,” coining of

Hoover, J. Edgar

 

Indonesia

Intelligence Community,
see also
Central Intelligence Agency

Italy, missile deployment in

 

Jefferson, Thomas

John Pierce
(destroyer)

Johnson, U. Alexis

decision on blockade and

as member of Ex Comm

Johnson, Lyndon B.

as member of Ex Comm

Vietnam War and

Joint Chiefs of Staff

invasion recommended by (Oct. 27)

military attack recommended by (Oct. 17)

opinion on air strike

preventive attack on Soviet Union and

use of nuclear weapons and

Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.
(destroyer)

Jupiter missiles

 

Kaiser, Philip M.

Katzenbach, Nicholas

Kennedy, Jacqueline

Kennedy, John F.

acceptance of Khrushchev proposal by (Oct. 27)

advice sought by, conflicting opinions

Ex Comm and decisions of

from officialdom

basis for action of

alternatives

Khrushchev

most difficult decision

opinion on miscalculations

prevention of war

purposefulness

Bay of Pigs and

blockade and

decision on blockade (Oct. 20)

line of interception

on start of blockade

speech announcing blockade (Oct. 22)

support by allies

boarding of ships and

boarding of
Bucharest

boarding of
Marucla

congressional criticism of

deployment of Air Force and

initial reaction to missiles in Cuba by

invasion and

implications of invasion

increase in overflights ordered (Oct. 26)

military attack and

on readiness for invasion

retaliation for attack on U-2s and

U-2 crash and (Oct. 27)

Khrushchev and

comparison of Khrushchev to himself

decision to give Khrushchev time

J. F. Kennedy's basis for action

Khrushchev's deception of

Khrushchev's liking for

as partners in preventing mutual disaster

question of Khrushchev's respect for

relations between

Macmillan and

McNamara and

meeting with Gromyko (Oct. 17)

military and

failures of military

strengths of military

missiles in Turkey and

“rules of the precarious status quo” of

secrecy kept by

shying away from Congress by, reasons for

Soviet deception and

Stevenson and

warning by, on use of SAMs

Khrushchev, Nikita S.

acceptance of proposal by (Oct. 27)

allowing time for reactions of

assurances on SAMs by

confusion in Soviet Union and

J. F. Kennedy and,
see
Kennedy, John F., Khrushchev and

memoirs attributed to

October 22 letter to

October 23 letter from

October 23 letter to

October 25 letter to

October 26 letter from

October 27 letter from

October 27 letter to

peaceful intentions of

proposed communications to

B. Russell and

summit meeting with

support by Latin America as surprise to

Komiles
(ship)

Korean War

 

Laos

Latin America

support by

LeMay, Gen. Curtis, military attack recommended by

Liberty
(ship)

Lincoln, Abraham

Lovett, Robert

 

McCloy, John

McCone, John

as advocate of military action

on invasion

as member of Ex Comm

report on Soviet deployments by

on turning of Russian ships

Macmillan, Harold

support by

McNamara, Robert S.

as advocate of blockade

interception of ships and submarines and

J. F. Kennedy and

lack of control over Navy by

as member of Ex Comm

military deployment for attack and

Navy's line of interception and

nuclear war and

report on casualties expected in invasion

report on increased activity in Cuba (Oct. 27)

requirements for military action reported by

retaliation for attack on U-2s and

Martin, Edward

decision on blockade and

as member of Ex Comm

Marucla
(Liberty ship)

“Munich,”

 

National Security Act of

National security complex

National Security Council

Berlin threat and (1961)

creation of

formal meeting of (Oct. 20), and decision on blockade

See also
Executive Committee of the National Security Council

NATO,
see
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Navy

blockade rules for

deployment of

forces in Caribbean (Oct. 25)

line of interception for

McNamara's lack of control of

report on submarine movements by

tracking of submarines by

turning of Soviet ships and

See also specific ships

Neustadt, Richard E. “Afterword” by

New York Times

Nigeria

Nitze, Paul

as advocate of military action

as member of Ex Comm

Nixon, Richard M.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

implications of invasion for

support by

Nuclear war

morality of

possibility and implications of

 

OAS,
see
Organization of American States

O'Donnell, Kenneth

as member of Ex Comm

Officialdom

Ex Comm

Executive bureaucracy and

mutual dependence and conflict of Presidency and

101st Airborne Division

Operations Coordinating Board (under Eisenhower)

Organization of American States (OAS)

blockade and

decision to blockade and

unanimous support by (Oct. 23)

Ormsby-Gore, David

 

Pathet Lao

Peace Corps

Pearl Harbor

Planning Board (under Eisenhower)

Poland

Polaris submarines

Polk, James

Presidency

as Final Arbiter

mutual dependency and conflict of officialdom and

problems of

role of

war making as prime example of incompatibility between Congress and

See also specific presidents

 

“Quemoy-Matsu” formula

 

Rayburn, Sam

Republicans, security threats and

Reston, James

Roosevelt, Franklin D.

Rusk, Dean

advises Dobrynin of blockade (Oct. 22)

Jupiter missiles and

as member of Ex Comm

Russell, Bertrand

Russell, Richard B.

 

Salinger, Pierre

Scali, John

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr.

Foreword by

Senegal

Senghor, Leopold

Shoup, Gen. David M.

Sorensen, Theodore

as member of Ex Comm

as opponent of air strike

Soviet Union

alert of forces of

Berlin blockade as reciprocal act of

confrontation in U.N. and