The World Was Going Our Way (101 page)
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Authors: Christopher Andrew
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Afghanistan Part 1
1
. Mitrokhin wrote an account of KGB operations in Afghanistan, mostly on the period 1978 to 1983, based exclusively on material noted and copied by him from KGB files (vol. 1 of his archive). Most of this account (excluding appendices identifying numerous KGB agents) is now available as a Cold War International History Project working paper, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, in both the Russian original and English translation (details in the Bibliography). Page references in the notes which follow are to the English edition.
. Mitrokhin wrote an account of KGB operations in Afghanistan, mostly on the period 1978 to 1983, based exclusively on material noted and copied by him from KGB files (vol. 1 of his archive). Most of this account (excluding appendices identifying numerous KGB agents) is now available as a Cold War International History Project working paper, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, in both the Russian original and English translation (details in the Bibliography). Page references in the notes which follow are to the English edition.
2
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 24-6.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 24-6.
3
. vol. 1, ch. 1; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 16-21. On the origins of the PDPA and the early careers of Taraki and Karmal, see Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 1-10.
. vol. 1, ch. 1; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 16-21. On the origins of the PDPA and the early careers of Taraki and Karmal, see Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 1-10.
4
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 17, 21. It is unlikely that Babrak Karmal was recruited before or during his imprisonment from 1949 to 1952. He was, however, a KGB agent by 1957 at the latest.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 17, 21. It is unlikely that Babrak Karmal was recruited before or during his imprisonment from 1949 to 1952. He was, however, a KGB agent by 1957 at the latest.
5
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 18, 21-3.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 18, 21-3.
6
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 29-42.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 29-42.
7
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 39.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 39.
8
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 41-3.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 41-3.
9
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 36. The Muslim Brotherhood was a pan-Islamic society founded in Egypt in 1929 aimed at imposing Islamic law on the Muslim nation.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 36. The Muslim Brotherhood was a pan-Islamic society founded in Egypt in 1929 aimed at imposing Islamic law on the Muslim nation.
10
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 29-41.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 29-41.
11
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 43.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 43.
12
. vol. 1, ch. 8; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 154-7.
. vol. 1, ch. 8; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 154-7.
13
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 44.
. vol. 1, ch. 2; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 44.
14
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 48-51; Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, pp. 31-4.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 48-51; Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, pp. 31-4.
15
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 152-3.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 152-3.
16
. Ibid., p. 152.
. Ibid., p. 152.
17
. Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, pp. 31, 36-7.
. Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, pp. 31, 36-7.
18
. There is no indication in the files noted by Mitrokhin that Amin was recruited as a KGB agent. As usual, however, the absence of evidence does not amount to proof.
. There is no indication in the files noted by Mitrokhin that Amin was recruited as a KGB agent. As usual, however, the absence of evidence does not amount to proof.
19
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 46-7.
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 46-7.
20
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 577.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 577.
21
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 47. A senior Western diplomat who knew Popal dismisses KGB suspicions that he was a Western agent as ‘ridiculous’: ‘Popal was probably pleased with himself for dining with foreign diplomats and, in his view, fooling them.’
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 47. A senior Western diplomat who knew Popal dismisses KGB suspicions that he was a Western agent as ‘ridiculous’: ‘Popal was probably pleased with himself for dining with foreign diplomats and, in his view, fooling them.’
22
. Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’. These ‘investigations’ are probably best interpreted as a by-product of KGB conspiracy theories about Amin.
. Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’. These ‘investigations’ are probably best interpreted as a by-product of KGB conspiracy theories about Amin.
23
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 49-50.
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 49-50.
24
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 61-2.
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 61-2.
25
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 58-9.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 58-9.
26
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 63-81.
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 63-81.
27
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 67-71; Dobbs,
Down with Big Brother
, p. 11. From 1972 to 1977 Bogdanov had been resident in Tehran; vol. 2 misc., item 3.
. vol. 1, ch. 3; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 67-71; Dobbs,
Down with Big Brother
, p. 11. From 1972 to 1977 Bogdanov had been resident in Tehran; vol. 2 misc., item 3.
28
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 59-60.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 59-60.
29
. Westad, ‘Concerning the Situation in “A” ’, p. 130.
. Westad, ‘Concerning the Situation in “A” ’, p. 130.
30
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 86.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 86.
31
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 230-31.
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 230-31.
32
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 86.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 86.
33
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, p. 233.
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, p. 233.
34
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 87. Petrov had been stationed in Kabul under cover as a Tass correspondent from 1972 to 1978, and had probably become well acquainted with Karmal during these years; vol. 2 to sort, item 6.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 87. Petrov had been stationed in Kabul under cover as a Tass correspondent from 1972 to 1978, and had probably become well acquainted with Karmal during these years; vol. 2 to sort, item 6.
35
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 87-8.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 87-8.
36
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 251-2, 255-7, 330.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 251-2, 255-7, 330.
37
. Andropov had similarly supplied the Politburo with misleading intelligence reports to gain their support, initially refused, for the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn in 1974. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 256-7, 317-18.
. Andropov had similarly supplied the Politburo with misleading intelligence reports to gain their support, initially refused, for the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn in 1974. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 256-7, 317-18.
38
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 87-9.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 87-9.
39
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 159.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 159.
40
. A photocopy of the Politburo memorandum, ‘Concerning the Situation in “A” ’, of 12 Dec. 1979, together with translation and commentary, appears in ‘More Documents from the Russian Archives’, pp. 75-6.
. A photocopy of the Politburo memorandum, ‘Concerning the Situation in “A” ’, of 12 Dec. 1979, together with translation and commentary, appears in ‘More Documents from the Russian Archives’, pp. 75-6.
41
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 90, 93-4. On the deceptions which preceded the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 248-9, 255-7.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 90, 93-4. On the deceptions which preceded the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 248-9, 255-7.
42
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 389.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 389.
43
. The main source for Talybov’s Afghan mission is information given by the KGB defector Vladimir Kuzichkin to John Barron and
Time
magazine (Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 15-16; Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’). In 1979 Kuzichkin was a Line N (illegal support) officer in the Tehran residency and was therefore informed about Talybov’s operations as an illegal in Iran operating with Iranian identity documents. He also learned about Talybov’s deployment to Afghanistan. The files noted by Mitrokhin contain no reference to Talybov’s operations after the mid- 1970s. (On his deployment to Chechnya-Ingushetiya, see above, pp. 376, 575 n. 29.) Mitrokhin’s notes do, however, corroborate two aspects of Kuzichkin’s account. First, they confirm the personal details given by Kuzichkin about Talybov, as well as adding others such as his codename and assumed Iranian identity (k-27, 400). Since the real identity of illegals was one of the KGB’s most closely guarded secrets, Kuzichkin’s accuracy on this point adds to the credibility of the rest of his account. Secondly, Mitrokhin’s brief note on Kuzichkin’s defection confirms that he had ‘a lot of information’ about illegals (vol. 2, ch. 1); Mitrokhin also confirms that at least one of Amin’s immediate entourage became seriously ill with food poisoning.
. The main source for Talybov’s Afghan mission is information given by the KGB defector Vladimir Kuzichkin to John Barron and
Time
magazine (Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 15-16; Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’). In 1979 Kuzichkin was a Line N (illegal support) officer in the Tehran residency and was therefore informed about Talybov’s operations as an illegal in Iran operating with Iranian identity documents. He also learned about Talybov’s deployment to Afghanistan. The files noted by Mitrokhin contain no reference to Talybov’s operations after the mid- 1970s. (On his deployment to Chechnya-Ingushetiya, see above, pp. 376, 575 n. 29.) Mitrokhin’s notes do, however, corroborate two aspects of Kuzichkin’s account. First, they confirm the personal details given by Kuzichkin about Talybov, as well as adding others such as his codename and assumed Iranian identity (k-27, 400). Since the real identity of illegals was one of the KGB’s most closely guarded secrets, Kuzichkin’s accuracy on this point adds to the credibility of the rest of his account. Secondly, Mitrokhin’s brief note on Kuzichkin’s defection confirms that he had ‘a lot of information’ about illegals (vol. 2, ch. 1); Mitrokhin also confirms that at least one of Amin’s immediate entourage became seriously ill with food poisoning.
44
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 77.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 77.
45
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 102. The date of, though not the explanation for, Asadullah Amin’s transfer to a Soviet hospital is given in Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 78. In 1980 Asadullah Amin was returned to Afghanistan by the Russians and executed by the Karmal regime; ibid., p. 129.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 102. The date of, though not the explanation for, Asadullah Amin’s transfer to a Soviet hospital is given in Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 78. In 1980 Asadullah Amin was returned to Afghanistan by the Russians and executed by the Karmal regime; ibid., p. 129.
46
. Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’.
. Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’.
47
. For three days before Amin’s move, the Darulaman Palace had been protected by Soviet security personnel; vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 96.
. For three days before Amin’s move, the Darulaman Palace had been protected by Soviet security personnel; vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 96.
48
. Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, p. 46.
. Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, p. 46.
49
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 96-9.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 96-9.
50
. Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, p. 46.
. Urban,
War in Afghanistan
, p. 46.
51
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 99-100. Mitrokhin noted that over 100 of the special forces were ‘killed’. Andrew sent him a written query on this point in the autumn of 2003, asking whether he had meant to write ‘killed and injured’. His usually robust health, however, had begun to decline rapidly and he died a few months later without responding to the query. It seems likely that Mitrokhin’s statistic refers to the numbers injured as well as killed.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 99-100. Mitrokhin noted that over 100 of the special forces were ‘killed’. Andrew sent him a written query on this point in the autumn of 2003, asking whether he had meant to write ‘killed and injured’. His usually robust health, however, had begun to decline rapidly and he died a few months later without responding to the query. It seems likely that Mitrokhin’s statistic refers to the numbers injured as well as killed.
Afghanistan Part 2
1
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 103-6; ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 160.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 103-6; ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 160.
2
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 118-19.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 118-19.
3
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 106; ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 160.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 106; ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 160.
4
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 162-3.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 162-3.
5
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 100.
. vol. 1, ch. 4; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 100.
6
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 163.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 163.
7
. Ibid., pp. 165-6.
. Ibid., pp. 165-6.
8
. vol. 1, ch. 5; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 116.
. vol. 1, ch. 5; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 116.
9
. Grau (ed.),
The Bear Went over the Mountain
, p. xxxi.
. Grau (ed.),
The Bear Went over the Mountain
, p. xxxi.
10
. vol. 1, ch. 5; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 116.
. vol. 1, ch. 5; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 116.
11
. Grau (ed.),
The Bear Went over the Mountain
, ch. 7; Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 200-202, 211.
. Grau (ed.),
The Bear Went over the Mountain
, ch. 7; Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 200-202, 211.
12
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 170-72. As before, the report was signed by Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko. On this occasion, however, Ponomarev’s signature was missing; the report was signed instead by Vadim Zagladin, one of his deputies on the International Department of the Central Committee.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 170-72. As before, the report was signed by Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko. On this occasion, however, Ponomarev’s signature was missing; the report was signed instead by Vadim Zagladin, one of his deputies on the International Department of the Central Committee.
13
. vol. 1, ch. 6; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 128-30, 135-6.
. vol. 1, ch. 6; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 128-30, 135-6.
14
. In 1981, for example, the Centre provided 250 million convertible rubles to pay KHAD salaries; vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 147.
. In 1981, for example, the Centre provided 250 million convertible rubles to pay KHAD salaries; vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 147.
15
. Najibullah appears on a list which Mitrokhin compiled from KGB files of Afghan ‘agents and confidential contacts’; vol. 1, app. 1. Unusually, however, the list fails to distinguish between the two categories.
. Najibullah appears on a list which Mitrokhin compiled from KGB files of Afghan ‘agents and confidential contacts’; vol. 1, app. 1. Unusually, however, the list fails to distinguish between the two categories.
16
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 578-9.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 578-9.
17
. Amnesty International,
Afghanistan: Torture of Political Prisoners
.
. Amnesty International,
Afghanistan: Torture of Political Prisoners
.
18
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 161.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 161.
19
. In setting up the Cascade units, the Centre drew on the precedent of operations against the Basmachi rebels in central Asia who were finally defeated in the early 1930s. vol. 5 isl., ch. 2; vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 148.
. In setting up the Cascade units, the Centre drew on the precedent of operations against the Basmachi rebels in central Asia who were finally defeated in the early 1930s. vol. 5 isl., ch. 2; vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 148.
20
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 145-9.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 145-9.
21
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 141.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 141.
22
. vol. 1, app. 3; k-24, 87, 89; k-8, 590.
. vol. 1, app. 3; k-24, 87, 89; k-8, 590.
23
. On KHAD/KGB agent penetration of Pakistan, see above, pp. 357, 360, 363-4.
. On KHAD/KGB agent penetration of Pakistan, see above, pp. 357, 360, 363-4.
24
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 144.
. vol. 1, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, p. 144.
25
. Steve Coll, ‘Spies, Lies and the Distortion of History’,
Washington Post
, 23 Feb. 2002.
. Steve Coll, ‘Spies, Lies and the Distortion of History’,
Washington Post
, 23 Feb. 2002.
26
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 185.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 185.
27
. vol. 1, ch. 5; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 125-6.
. vol. 1, ch. 5; Mitrokhin, ‘The KGB in Afghanistan’, pp. 125-6.
28
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 361-2.
. Kirpichenko,
Razvedka
, pp. 361-2.
29
. Leonov,
Likholet’e
, pp. 269-70. A GRU report described Najibullah as intelligent, vicious, vain and ambitious, and noted his habit of surrounding himself with yes-men chosen ‘not for their professional qualities but for their personal devotion to him’; ‘More East-Bloc Sources on Afghanistan’, p. 250.
. Leonov,
Likholet’e
, pp. 269-70. A GRU report described Najibullah as intelligent, vicious, vain and ambitious, and noted his habit of surrounding himself with yes-men chosen ‘not for their professional qualities but for their personal devotion to him’; ‘More East-Bloc Sources on Afghanistan’, p. 250.
30
. Rogers,
The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
, p. 8.
. Rogers,
The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
, p. 8.
31
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 180.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 180.
32
. Ibid., p. 177.
. Ibid., p. 177.
33
. See above, pp. 400, 405.
. See above, pp. 400, 405.
34
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 177.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 177.
35
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 251-2, 319-21.
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 251-2, 319-21.
36
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 271.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 271.
37
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 177.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 177.
38
. See above, pp. 131-2.
. See above, pp. 131-2.
39
. See below, p. 474.
. See below, p. 474.
40
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 178-9; Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, pp. 231-2.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 178-9; Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, pp. 231-2.
41
. ‘More East-Bloc Sources on Afghanistan’, p. 249.
. ‘More East-Bloc Sources on Afghanistan’, p. 249.
42
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 179-80. Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, pp. 232-3, 534.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 179-80. Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, pp. 232-3, 534.
43
. Chernyaev,
My Six Years with Gorbachev
, p. 25.
. Chernyaev,
My Six Years with Gorbachev
, p. 25.
44
. Galeotti,
Afghanistan
, p. 142.
. Galeotti,
Afghanistan
, p. 142.
45
. Chernyaev,
My Six Years with Gorbachev
, pp. 42-3.
. Chernyaev,
My Six Years with Gorbachev
, pp. 42-3.
46
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 251-2, 428-30.
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 251-2, 428-30.
47
. Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, pp. 258-9; Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 185-6, 196. There were a number of occasions on which KGB and other Soviet special forces intercepted rebel caravans bringing arms from their supply bases in Pakistan and captured Stingers
en route
to the
mujahideen
. KGB and KHAD agents also succeeded in obtaining a number of Stingers by bribery; Galeotti,
Afghanistan
, p. 196.
. Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, pp. 258-9; Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 185-6, 196. There were a number of occasions on which KGB and other Soviet special forces intercepted rebel caravans bringing arms from their supply bases in Pakistan and captured Stingers
en route
to the
mujahideen
. KGB and KHAD agents also succeeded in obtaining a number of Stingers by bribery; Galeotti,
Afghanistan
, p. 196.
48
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 225-6. As head of foreign intelligence from 1991 to 1996, Primakov was taken in by a woefully inaccurate intelligence report that ‘the idea of deploying the Stingers was supplied by Osama bin Laden, who had been co-operating closely with the CIA at the time’ (Primakov,
Russian Crossroads
, p. 34). This report may well have been an example of ‘blow-back’ - a story which began as SVR disinformation deceiving an agent who then presented it as authentic intelligence. There is no support in the Mitrokhin material (or any other reliable source) for the claim that the CIA funded bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteeers who came to support the
mujahideen
. Most were funded through charities and mosques in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and were frequently viewed with suspicion by the Afghan
mujahideen
.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 225-6. As head of foreign intelligence from 1991 to 1996, Primakov was taken in by a woefully inaccurate intelligence report that ‘the idea of deploying the Stingers was supplied by Osama bin Laden, who had been co-operating closely with the CIA at the time’ (Primakov,
Russian Crossroads
, p. 34). This report may well have been an example of ‘blow-back’ - a story which began as SVR disinformation deceiving an agent who then presented it as authentic intelligence. There is no support in the Mitrokhin material (or any other reliable source) for the claim that the CIA funded bin Laden or any of the other Arab volunteeers who came to support the
mujahideen
. Most were funded through charities and mosques in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and were frequently viewed with suspicion by the Afghan
mujahideen
.
49
. Most of the mules used to transport arms and other supplies to the
mujahideen
came from China over the Kunjerab Pass; Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, p. 312.
. Most of the mules used to transport arms and other supplies to the
mujahideen
came from China over the Kunjerab Pass; Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, p. 312.
50
. Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, pp. 442-3.
. Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, pp. 442-3.
51
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 158.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 158.
52
. Ibid., pp. 158-60; ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 178-81.
. Ibid., pp. 158-60; ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 178-81.
53
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 178-81.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, pp. 178-81.
54
. Chernyaev,
My Six Years with Gorbachev
, p. 90.
. Chernyaev,
My Six Years with Gorbachev
, p. 90.
55
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 181.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 181.
56
. Ostermann (ed.), ‘Gorbachev and Afghanistan’, pp. 144-5.
. Ostermann (ed.), ‘Gorbachev and Afghanistan’, pp. 144-5.
57
. Ibid., p. 144.
. Ibid., p. 144.
58
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 281, 283, 290.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, pp. 281, 283, 290.
59
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 181. The Committee was still chaired by the Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. Its other most influential members were KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov and Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov, who had succeeded Chebrikov and Sokolov.
. ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents’, p. 181. The Committee was still chaired by the Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. Its other most influential members were KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov and Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov, who had succeeded Chebrikov and Sokolov.
60
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 331. There was, however, a later CIA attempt on Hekmatyar’s life. Having been expelled from Afghanistan by the Taleban in 1995, he returned in 2001 to fight the Americans, and a year later survived attack by a Hellfire missile fired from an unmanned CIA Predator drone; Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, p. 535.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 331. There was, however, a later CIA attempt on Hekmatyar’s life. Having been expelled from Afghanistan by the Taleban in 1995, he returned in 2001 to fight the Americans, and a year later survived attack by a Hellfire missile fired from an unmanned CIA Predator drone; Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy
, p. 535.
61
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 378.
. Bradsher,
Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention
, p. 378.
62
. Steve Coll, ‘Spies, Lies and the Distortion of History’,
Washington Post
, 23 Feb. 2002.
. Steve Coll, ‘Spies, Lies and the Distortion of History’,
Washington Post
, 23 Feb. 2002.
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