The Watergate Scandal in United States History (9 page)

A Cross Section

Carl Albert, as speaker of the House, had determined which committee would handle impeachment matters. He chose the Judiciary Committee, chaired by Peter Rodino. Judiciary had handled the vice-presidential confirmation of Gerald Ford. Albert thought Rodino had done a good job. Rodino was no household name, but he had a reputation for being fair and impartial.

Rodino’s committee was a cross section of America. John Conyers and Charles Rangel represented inner-city neighborhoods of Detroit and New York City. William Cohen served coastal areas of Maine. Californian Charles Wiggins represented Whittier, Richard Nixon’s old district. Hamilton Fish, from affluent upstate New York, also served on the committee.

The committee also contained people with a variety of demeanors. Calm, polite Rodino contrasted with sharp-tongued Texas Democrat Jack Brooks and New Jersey’s Charles Sandman. Barbara Jordan, a Texan known for her political and verbal skills, served on the committee. So did Harold Donohue, a Massachusetts congressman who occasionally fell asleep during committee sessions.

The group also covered the political spectrum. Robert Kastenmeier of Madison, Wisconsin, was an outspoken liberal. Conyers and Rangel, along with other African Americans, appeared on the “enemies list.” All appeared to be unquestionable votes for impeachment.

Nixon, however, had his allies. The committee’s ranking Republican, Edward Hutchinson, said impeachment should only be charged on criminal grounds. Delbert Latta of Ohio and Trent Lott of Mississippi were both solid Nixon supporters.

The Judiciary Committee had twenty-one Democrats and seventeen Republicans. To avoid impeachment, the president would need two Democrats in his favor. Three Southern Democrats seemed most likely to provide these votes: Walter Flowers of Alabama, Ray Thornton of Arkansas, and James Mann of South Carolina. All represented districts won by Nixon in 1972.

However, Nixon would have to keep all seventeen Republicans on his side. There was no certainty he could do so. Maine’s William Cohen, Robert McClory and Thomas Railsback both of Illinois, and Caldwell Butler of Virginia were moderate Republicans who could go either way. Butler and Cohen had already shown independence by seeking subpoenas of the presidential tapes.

The committee met in public for about twenty minutes, then went into closed session. Unlike the Senate Watergate Committee, the House Judiciary Committee hearings would not be open to the public. Two hundred million Americans, including Richard Milhous Nixon of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., would have to wait for the results.

“Deliberate . . . Deception”

While the Judiciary Committee heard testimony, other dramas took place. All of them meant bad news for Richard Nixon. On June 6 the
Los Angeles Times
disclosed Nixon’s unindicted co-conspirator status. Many people still might not have known what an unindicted co-conspirator was. But they knew they did not want a president who was one.

The Senate Watergate Committee concluded its work on June 30. It released a final report a few days later. The report denounced the misuse of power by the president and his aides. It cited the Plumbers’ break-in of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office and abuse of the FBI, CIA, and Justice Department.

The Judiciary Committee made public nearly four thousand pages of evidence in early July. It also released its own transcripts of eight Nixon tapes. These accounts differed greatly from the transcripts Nixon had offered. In every case, the committee’s version put the president in a worse light. The committee printed conversations omitted by the president. For example, on March 22, 1973, Nixon had told Mitchell, in reference to the Watergate burglars, “I want you all to stonewall it, let them plead the Fifth Amendment, cover up, or anything else.”
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Doar presented his closing argument to the committee on July 19, 1974. He spoke about Nixon’s “deliberate, contrived, continued, and continuing deception of the American people.”
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He claimed Nixon obstructed justice, abused the powers of the presidency, refused to honor subpoenas from the Judiciary Committee, and violated tax laws.

On July 23, Lawrence Hogan said he would vote for impeachment. This announcement worried Nixon. He expected defections from the liberals, but not from this conservative Maryland Republican. Now Nixon needed Democratic support more than ever. Nixon called George Wallace and asked him to influence Walter Flowers’s vote. Wallace answered that he could not do so. Nixon turned to Haig. “Well, Al, there goes the presidency,” he sighed.
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Disarming Decision

Battles still raged for control of Richard Nixon’s tapes. Rodino and the Judiciary Committee still wanted the tapes they had subpoenaed from Nixon. He refused to produce them. Nixon held to his claim of executive privilege. He also said, without proof, that some tapes were so sensitive that he could not release them under any circumstances.

Rodino did not want to go to court over the tapes. The legislative branch of government, Rodino believed, was equal to the executive branch.
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It should not need a court to have its orders obeyed. Besides, if Richard Nixon refused to hand over evidence, that lack of cooperation could be grounds for impeachment.

Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski had no reservations about seeking the tapes. Nixon’s arguments about separation of powers meant nothing to him. Both he and Nixon were from the executive branch of government.

Jaworski had tried negotiating with the Nixon team. If Nixon would turn over only eighteen tapes, Jaworski would forget about the rest. One of those tapes requested was the one from June 23. Nixon turned down all compromises.

With that refusal, Jaworski continued his pursuit. Nixon realized that Jaworski would mount a court challenge over the material. He hoped that the case would proceed through the Court of Appeals. If so, a decision before the Supreme Court might be delayed weeks or months.

Jaworski had no intention of waiting that long. On May 24 he appealed directly to the Supreme Court for a decision on the tapes case. A week later the Court agreed to hear the case.

Nixon had confidence in the Supreme Court. After all, he had appointed four of its members. Nixon appointee William Rehnquist, who had worked in Nixon’s Justice Department, excused himself from the case. Yet Lewis Powell, Harry Blackmun, and Chief Justice Warren Burger were on the High Court because of Nixon. If the president could get a split opinion among the justices, he could argue that there was no consensus of opinion against him.

On July 24 the Court heard the case. Jaworski took an hour to make his opening argument. Nixon lawyer St. Clair had made the argument that the right to executive privilege was absolute. Therefore, the president did not have to answer subpoenas. Jaworski disagreed. “Shall the evidence from the White House be confined to what a single person, highly interested in the outcome, is willing to make available?” he asked.
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The Court’s verdict was solid, and it devastated the president. All eight judges ruled that Nixon must turn over the subpoenaed tapes to Jaworski and the Watergate grand jury. “The unanimous decision had completely disarmed Nixon of whatever plans he had to disobey and circumvent the Court,” Jaworski commented.
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Articles of Impeachment

That same day, the House Judiciary Committee began its impeachment debate. Five articles of impeachment would be discussed. “I as chairman have been guided by a simple principle, the principle that the law must deal fairly with every man,” Rodino began.
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Few argued that the chairman tried to be anything but fair. Republicans Butler, Cohen, Railsback, and Fish were considered swing votes. So were Democrats Mann, Thornton, and Flowers. All seven moderates agreed that the evidence required impeachment. Rodino had them write the articles.

Americans sat gripped with suspense as the representatives helped decide the nation’s fate. They heard serious heartfelt, and sometimes eloquent, comments from the thirty-eight men and women. Flowers noted that the Constitution’s preamble read “We the People,” not “We the public officials.”
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Railsback’s emotional speech showed the unhappiness he felt in voting against a president who had helped him. Wiggins and Sandman angrily claimed that there was no specific evidence to prove Nixon’s wrongdoing.

On July 27 committee members voted on Article I. This article claimed that Nixon had obstructed justice. It charged that Nixon “used the powers of his office both personally and through subordinates to cover up and conceal responsibility” for the Watergate break-in.
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“I [had] the absolute feeling of sadness about the whole thing,” Butler said.
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He and five other Republicans joined all Democrats in voting for the article. This vote ensured that an impeachment resolution would go to the entire House.

The committee also voted on four other items. Article II charged that Nixon directed a “pattern of massive and persistent abuse of power for political purposes involving unlawful and unconstitutional invasion of the rights and privacy of individual citizens of the United States.”
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This article covered the wiretaps, the Ellsberg break-in, and attempts to block the FBI investigation of White House crimes. This resolution passed 28–10. The third article stated that Nixon “refused without cause to comply with the House for subpoenas issued by the House of Representatives.”
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It passed 21–17. Two other articles, dealing with Nixon’s income taxes and the secret bombing of Cambodia, failed.

Debate in the full House of Representatives would begin in a few weeks. Preparations began even beyond the House. Republican and Democratic Senate leaders met on July 29 to discuss procedures for a trial. What ground rules were needed? Where should television cameras be placed? How should tickets be distributed? A year or even six months ago, such preparations seemed unthinkable. Now they appeared inevitable.

“My President Is a Liar!”

On the day of the Supreme Court decision, Nixon called J. Fred Buzhardt. “There might be a problem with the June 23 tape, Fred,” the president told him.
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A puzzled Buzhardt wondered what was wrong. Did the tape contain national security information? Were there additional gaps or erasures? It was worse, far worse. Buzhardt listened to the tape, then murmured, “It’s over, it’s all over now.”
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Buzhardt had heard a conversation between H. R. Haldeman and Nixon. Haldeman explained the Watergate break-in to the president. He mentioned the laundered checks and said the problem originated with Mitchell. Haldeman suggested that the CIA persuade the FBI to drop its investigation. Then Nixon agreed with Haldeman’s idea.

For months Richard Nixon had claimed that he knew nothing of Watergate before March 1973. This tape proved he knew about it six days after the break-in. Not only did he know about it, but he was planning to hide its details from the public. Buzhardt called Haig. “We’ve found the smoking pistol,” he said.
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St. Clair heard the tape a few days later. As a lawyer, he knew what he must do. He could tell the Supreme Court what the June 23 tape contained, or he could persuade his client to change his plea. In Nixon’s case that meant agreeing to resign.

Nixon could quit, or he could be fired. Impeachment was certain from the Democrat-controlled House. On July 31 former Republican Party Chairman Bob Dole told Nixon that fifty-eight to sixty senators appeared ready to convict Nixon.

More than honor lay at stake. If Nixon resigned before removal, he could receive an annual $60,000 pension plus $96,000 for staff salaries. If removed, he would lose that money.

On Thursday, August 1, Nixon told Haig he would resign. Haig then told Ford about Nixon’s legal problems and offered various solutions. Nixon could stay in office. He could step aside until the impeachment issue was resolved. He could pardon himself, then resign. He could pardon himself and all Watergate defendants, then resign. He could agree to resign in exchange for a pardon from his successor. Ford and Haig discussed options but made no deals during this meeting.

The following day Nixon changed his mind. He was no quitter; he would fight his way out of the mess. Daughter Julie urged him to hang tough. So did his friend Bebe Rebozo.

His June 23 tape would be made public; this he knew. Yet maybe reaction would not be harsh. Maybe he could survive this crisis as he had survived so many others.

Several key Congress members received sealed envelopes on Monday, August 5. These included Republican leaders, Nixon defenders on the Judiciary Committee, and Democrats believed loyal to the president. The envelopes contained transcripts of the tape from June 23, 1972. A few hours later members of the press received the transcript.

The president went on television that night to minimize the damage. “I am firmly convinced that the record, in its entirety, does not justify the extreme step of impeachment and removal of a President,” he said.
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