The Trib (52 page)

Hoping the numbers don't lie, both sides have turned to stats. Not that you can stand either argument up too well on them. Spain have, predictably, played more passes per game – an average of 617 – than any side at a modern World Cup. But, remarkably, they've scored fewer goals – seven in six – than any previous finalist in history. That's not what people expect from potential champions with such an array of attacking talent. They expect Brazil 1958, Brazil 1970, France 1984, or, of course, Spain 2008.

Because, although the argument claiming Spain no longer excite isn't one completely without credence, it does require quite a lot of context. Two years ago, in terms of capturing the imagination, Spain were the Germany 2010 of Euro 2008. They didn't just control teams but caroused through them, scoring two a game and opening up opposition with some astoundingly sleek interchanges. The semi-final rout of Russia and final victory over Germany were two convincingly complete international displays.

One of the factors, however, that helped forge such a watershed win was that Spain effectively caught sides by surprise. They had actually been just as exquisite two years beforehand in the 2006 World Cup. But the fact they were still growing as a group meant the more experienced French side exposed a few remaining flaws. By Euro 2008 and the benefit of an extra two years together, they had a level of club-like fluidity few opposition sides expected. That so many players were brought up together at Barcelona undoubtedly eased that evolution. And, with Spain then on a high after claiming Euro 2008, they carried such form into that relentless winning run. In the qualifiers for the World Cup, it shouldn't be forgotten, they won all ten games and scored twenty-eight goals.

Passage to the World Cup, however, also brought six months to prepare and pore over videos for everyone else. As Xavi explained and his club side Barcelona have also found, the vast majority concluded that the only way to counter such a team and stand any chance of success was simply to cut out all space near goal and deny them the opportunity to make any kind of angled interchanges in behind a bank of ten. Indeed, it's a credit to Spain that Germany simply wouldn't break with their usual abandon on Wednesday because they were too wary of leaving entire areas unpatrolled. All any team, no matter how talented, can do against such an approach is probe and probe and probe until an opening eventually presents itself. Even Brazil 1970. Still held as the high priests of attacking football, when re-watching their magnum opus on ESPN Classic recently it beggared belief just how much space that Italian team – themselves regarded as the culmination of catenaccio – offered up. Thanks to much greater physical and mental preparation, football today is much more regimented and militaristic in approach. Yet one man who successfully bridged the eras as captain then coach has defended Spain to the point of almost defying his nationality.

‘Spain's football against a powerful Germany,' Johan Cruyff argued during the week, ‘demonstrates their quality. They are a copy of Barcelona, the best advertisement of football. They play well, wanting to please and champion an offensive style. I am Dutch but I will always defend the football Spain play. The fact is that if you try to outplay them, they will kill you.'

Cruyff's defence of Spain goes even deeper though. His Ajax and Netherlands teams were acclaimed as the next step in attacking-football after Brazil, yet Total Football was above all about total control. Of the ball and space. Many mostly remember the Cruyff turn, his flying volley against Argentina or the flowing attack against West Germany. Few recall the fact that – just like David Villa's solo strike against Honduras or Andres Iniesta's piercing run to break Paraguay – these were isolated instances of inspiration amid long periods of passing and patience. Just as Spain forced Germany to chase for an average of 1.2 km more than they did and wore them out to the point Miroslav Klose complained, ‘When we did eventually win the ball we were so exhausted we couldn't do anything with it.' Both Ajax and the Netherlands broke teams through possession. Neither side had particularly spectacular scoring stats at the top level – less than two a game in the European and World Cups – and Ajax's peak probably came in a 1-0 European Cup final win over Juventus that was only narrow in scoreline. Having commanded the same kind of lead in the 1974 World Cup final though, Cruyff's international side went too far. Rather than simply beat West Germany, the Netherlands were so convinced of their own superiority they sought the chance to completely humiliate their wartime oppressors and instead lost everything.

Ironically, it's the opposite of such an attitude that gives the argument against Spain most credibility. Rather than finish with a flourish, as they often – but not always – did at Euro 2008, they have attempted to close out games with relative caution. Late 1-0 leads against Portugal, Paraguay and Germany led to a lot of sideways passing but few surges. That, however, was down to insecurity rather than arrogance.

As Capdevila admitted at their camp on Friday, ‘The fact we'd never been to a World Cup semi-final and all that expectation of us had an effect. Against Paraguay it definitely interrupted us.' Iniesta's brilliant break in that game and their edge survival thereafter – think Iker Casillas's save from Roque Santa Cruz – calmed nerves to the point they produced their most complete display since the Euro 2008 final against Germany, but a slight element returned in the final minutes. Possession but with a few tell-tale signs of panic.

Into uncharted ground now, there wasn't even a hint of it at Potchefstroom on Friday though. Xavi – perhaps paradoxically – spoke of his ‘determination to enjoy the final', Xabi Alonso (or ‘big Xavi' as the press officer calls him) that he ‘simply feels' the best is yet to come and the team's most beautiful moment will arrive in Soccer City tonight. A lot of arguments would end if it did.

Alex Ferguson hates them even though they make the football world keep turning. In a special investigation, the
Tribune
looks at the roles and wrongs of agents.

31 October 2010

I
t's time for a mid-level Premier League player to renegotiate his contract. He expects a wage-rise or maybe a specific clause to hold up negotiations. Neither does. There is one significant sticking point though. The club's manager has been speaking to his own representative. The boss then goes back to the player.

‘If you want a new contract with this club, then you've got to sign with my agent. That's the only way you're going to progress.'

Elsewhere, a group of businessmen take over a decently supported British side. They conclude the deal with the bank's money – investing none of their own – and then take salaries from the club. Throughout all the negotiations, they only deal with one favoured agent. Eagerly sitting on the cash merry-go-round, that representative is paid a huge figure in agent's fees only to then give the businessmen a backhander.

There are names attached to each of these individuals. Some well-known. Their identities can't be revealed for legal reasons but that's almost irrelevant due to the fact that the examples fit a number of different situations that are happening across the breadth of British football.

It's a convenient out, at the moment, for many managers and officials to blame the ‘agent culture'. And, as one agent working extensively in Britain told the
Sunday Tribune
, the generally negative image of his profession is ‘completely justified in a lot of cases'.

It's an image that also came into harsher light this week, however, with Alex Ferguson's comments in the aftermath of Wayne Rooney's contract saga. ‘You have to deal with the agents of this world today, which is difficult. The players are no problem ... some agents are difficult.'

Rooney's representative, Paul Stretford, was – whether rightly or wrongly – highlighted as an Iago
figure
, manipulating events to his own ends. That image was muddied further by some of the whispers that have appeared in the media over that time. One indicated that the timing of Rooney's disenchantment was interesting given that, only last season, Stretford received a half-million-pound bonus because Rooney had stayed at Old Trafford for five years. Another pointed out that FIFA plan to reduce a licensed agent's total commission from any deal to 3 per cent in 2011, meaning a representative might want to maximise his earnings under the current regulations. Then there's the financial magic Mino Raiola worked in Zlatan Ibrahimovic's convoluted move from the San Siro to Barcelona and back again.

With such stories, it becomes easy to apportion blame for football's river of greed. But, just as the Rooney situation had much more to it than the player supposedly nodding his head to each of Stretford's suggestions, the sport's very relationship with agents is a great deal more complicated than that. For a start, Ferguson himself was as selective with the truth when it came to his view of agents as he was with his view of the Rooney situation. He may not think much of Stretford but he didn't mention the manner in which other agents have helped him build his Old Trafford empire.

The spotless – in every sense – Jorge Mendes advised United on Cristiano Ronaldo, Nani, Anderson and Bebe. Much earlier, the more notorious Rune Hauge provided valued opinion on Peter Schmeichel, Andrei Kanchelskis and Ole Gunnar Solskjaer.

While it should be said that none of these transfers were suspicious or irregular, each of them illustrate how ingrained agents are in the infrastructure of the game. While many are indeed the parasites Ferguson indicates, some are simply products of the system.

And, when it comes to actual corruption in football, agents aren't exactly the cause many would otherwise claim. Instead, a very different impression emerges from those prepared to talk candidly.

There is definitely a space for agents in the sport, as shown by the many who go about their job ethically and the decent football people they deal with. The problem, however, is that the very nature of the job attracts opportunists. And their numbers are disproportionately boosted by the area of the job. As a number of individuals – from ex-players and agents to those currently involved – insisted to the
Sunday Tribune,
‘The industry is rotten at many levels from top to bottom.' In essence then, it's not just certain agents that are crooked. They only represent the crookedness of many areas of the game.

A series of stories illustrate this. One source said that managers have often told them, ‘Yes, I'll sign your player but, when we pay you an agent's fee of a 100 grand, you pay some of that back to me.'

The
United We Stand
fanzine recently printed an anecdote – corroborated elsewhere – of a Premier League manager turning to his bench towards the end of a game: ‘Right, which one of you is on the biggest appearance fee? OK, you go on so long as x percentage comes back to me.'

A different company was approached by an agent saying that he was in partnership with a Premier League manager. If the company gave him £10,000, the lone agent could provide any young players they put forward with a contract at the manager's club. The teenager would then be moved on at a profit because his CV had been greatly enhanced.

As one former player explained, ‘If you were to ask supporters who they think is on the take, they'd come out with the same names, “Oh, he looks dodgy,” this idea that there's only a few. There's a lot at it.'

Indeed, it shouldn't be forgotten that only four years ago Steve McLaren's agent Colin Gordon expressly stated that ‘English football is totally corrupt'.

‘We're not talking about the old brown-paper envelopes. We're talking about millions upon millions. It is a very, very sophisticated business. Are agents corrupt? Not all – but the majority. It's accepted abroad ... the English game is considered the “dirty man of Europe”.'

Back then, Gordon also claimed the system is so sophisticated that investigators will never trap the agents and managers who avail of it. But there's another reason, as a British-based agent told the
Sunday Tribune. ‘
There are a lot of dodgy agents and unethical people in football, but the only way you can do an unethical deal is if there are two parties to it. And it will never be flushed out of football, because it will be like turkeys voting for Christmas.

‘Even when they go and carry out a review, they'll go through that system for six months and, by the end, they'll very rarely nail someone. The reason is because, right from top to bottom, there are people who are prepared to compromise their ethics because there's so much involved. If they have to break the rules to get a player, they'll break the rules.'