The Sword And The Olive (28 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
With the plans taking shape, cooperation between the IDF and the French armed forces intensified. In return for the weapons they received, the Israelis provided their ally with aerial photographs of the Canal Zone as well as information on the IDF’s ability to support an operation against Egypt should France decide to launch it.
55
It remained to bring in the British, who had been secretly planning an operation for months but, faced with domestic opposition to the adventure, were inclined to be more cautious. After some diplomatic maneuvering they finally joined the bandwagon at a top-secret conference at Sevres, near Paris, October 22-24. To solve the question of responsibility, French General Maurice Challes hatched a plan whereby the French and British would be called in
after
the beginning of the Israeli attack in order to safeguard the Suez Canal against both the IDF and the Egyptian armed forces.
56
It was a highly unsavory plot that cast Israel in the role of the aggressor. In the end Ben Gurion, prodded by Dayan, accepted it only because the British refused to base their intervention on any other rationale—and without the British, the French would not move.
55
It remained to bring in the British, who had been secretly planning an operation for months but, faced with domestic opposition to the adventure, were inclined to be more cautious. After some diplomatic maneuvering they finally joined the bandwagon at a top-secret conference at Sevres, near Paris, October 22-24. To solve the question of responsibility, French General Maurice Challes hatched a plan whereby the French and British would be called in
after
the beginning of the Israeli attack in order to safeguard the Suez Canal against both the IDF and the Egyptian armed forces.
56
It was a highly unsavory plot that cast Israel in the role of the aggressor. In the end Ben Gurion, prodded by Dayan, accepted it only because the British refused to base their intervention on any other rationale—and without the British, the French would not move.
Militarily, too, the final form of “Operation Kadesh” (its Hebrew code name) was not exactly what the IDF had hoped for. Having no interest in the Sinai Peninsula per se, its objectives originally had been to occupy the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tyran. The former was a wasp nest of
fedayeen
; the latter had been closed to Israeli shipping since 1949 and to Israeli overflights since September 1955. However, the agreement with France and Britain dictated a different modus operandi
.
The original plan to cut off Egyptian communications with the Gaza Strip by means of a seaborne landing at Al Arish was canceled, as was another plan for a drive on Sharm al-Sheikh. Instead the IDF was obliged to conduct the campaign from west to east, dropping paratroopers in an undefended zone near the canal to provide London its much-needed pretext while also keeping open the option of withdrawing the force in case Israel’s allies failed to live up to their words. The plans now spoke of “collapsing” the Egyptian military organization in the Sinai rather than simply killing their troops or occupying territory.
57
This in turn was based on Dayan’s notion that Arab troops, unlike Western troops, would not fight but turn tail when their lines of communications came under threat—something that in fact did not happen.
fedayeen
; the latter had been closed to Israeli shipping since 1949 and to Israeli overflights since September 1955. However, the agreement with France and Britain dictated a different modus operandi
.
The original plan to cut off Egyptian communications with the Gaza Strip by means of a seaborne landing at Al Arish was canceled, as was another plan for a drive on Sharm al-Sheikh. Instead the IDF was obliged to conduct the campaign from west to east, dropping paratroopers in an undefended zone near the canal to provide London its much-needed pretext while also keeping open the option of withdrawing the force in case Israel’s allies failed to live up to their words. The plans now spoke of “collapsing” the Egyptian military organization in the Sinai rather than simply killing their troops or occupying territory.
57
This in turn was based on Dayan’s notion that Arab troops, unlike Western troops, would not fight but turn tail when their lines of communications came under threat—something that in fact did not happen.
MAP 9.1 THE SINAI CAMPAIGN, 1956
To ensure that the operation proceeded in the desired sequence it was decided to unleash Israel’s armored forces no earlier than thirty-six hours after H-Hour (see Map 9.1). The IAF too was compelled to violate its own doctrine—based, with the usual lack of acknowledgment, on the Luftwaffe’s operations in 1939-1941—and cancel its plans for attacking the Egyptian airfields (most of which were located west of the canal).
58
Instead its main mission was defensive—maintaining air superiority over Israel proper—and providing air cover to the paratroopers near the canal, dropping supplies, and mounting strikes against Egyptian forces on the ground.
59
Ben Gurion did not yet feel fully confident in his pilots; he asked for and received the aid of four French squadrons (three fighter, one transport) as well as ten additional Dakota aircraft, which were simply put on loan.
60
58
Instead its main mission was defensive—maintaining air superiority over Israel proper—and providing air cover to the paratroopers near the canal, dropping supplies, and mounting strikes against Egyptian forces on the ground.
59
Ben Gurion did not yet feel fully confident in his pilots; he asked for and received the aid of four French squadrons (three fighter, one transport) as well as ten additional Dakota aircraft, which were simply put on loan.
60
All these events took place against a background of continual clashes along the Israel-Jordan border. Not wishing to obstruct France’s delivery of arms, Israel refrained from its usual punitive actions for most of the summer. In September, however, the paratroopers were unleashed no fewer than three times, killing dozens of Jordanian soldiers but also losing fairly heavily themselves as they tried to repeat their by now well understood tactics. Hostilities, fueled by diplomatic contacts that seemed to foreshadow the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan, culminated on the night of October 10-11, when the paratroopers stormed the Arab Legion’s strongholds at Kalkiliya on Israel’s narrow “waist.” A force that had been sent farther east to block eventual Jordanian reinforcements was itself ambushed and had to be extricated by means of heavy fighting.
61
Eventually the paratroopers, having killed some 70 Arab Legionaries, were able to return home before it became necessary to escalate by activating the IAF. They carried with them seventeen of their dead, however, causing Dayan to ask himself how long this kind of thing—to all appearances, useless as well as costly—could be carried on.
62
61
Eventually the paratroopers, having killed some 70 Arab Legionaries, were able to return home before it became necessary to escalate by activating the IAF. They carried with them seventeen of their dead, however, causing Dayan to ask himself how long this kind of thing—to all appearances, useless as well as costly—could be carried on.
62
In any event the troubles with Jordan proved instrumental in helping the IDF disguise its true designs against Egypt. Preparations for mobilization, in the form of registration exercises and the like, had been ongoing throughout the summer, and when the signal was given on October 24 the men and the units were ready. The first stage of the call-up was conducted on an individual basis, employing messengers who went around to “addresses” and without using the public media. Two days later, the masquerade was dropped and a public call-up went out by way of radio (there was as yet no television) and newspapers. As they would in 1967, the Israeli people, frustrated by years of border hostilities and believing themselves in imminent danger, responded enthusiastically. More than 100,000 men streamed to the colors, and some units actually got more troops than were authorized in their tables of organization
63
(the balance consisting of discharged personnel who nevertheless volunteered). As also in 1967, this overwhelming response—more than any particular strategic genius—was the secret to victory.
63
(the balance consisting of discharged personnel who nevertheless volunteered). As also in 1967, this overwhelming response—more than any particular strategic genius—was the secret to victory.
The Israeli mobilization caught the Egyptians at an inopportune moment, given that they had just withdrawn half of their forces from the Sinai in order to deal with the growing Anglo-French threat.
64
Against the 45,000 men deployed by the Israelis they had only 30,000, about a third being decidedly second-rate. From north to south, 8th Palestinian Division with two Palestinian brigades (86th and 87th) and one Egyptian National Guard brigade (6th) was stationed in the Gaza Strip. Behind it was 3rd Infantry Division with one brigade (5th) at the key position of Rafah, another at the equally important one of Umm Katef-Abu Ageila, and a third (4th) at Al Arish, standing in reserve to support the others. Thus the two northernmost roads leading into the Sinai, one running along the coast and the other from Nitsana to Bir Gafgafa, were effectively blocked. Farther south, however, the third road—which led from Nitsana southwest to Mitla Pass—was defended by only one battalion at Kusseima; even less well defended was the fourth road, in reality a desert track that ran from Elat to Mitla Pass. South of Elat, the terrain was so inhospitable that there were hardly any forces at all. Only Sharm al-Sheikh, forming the extreme southern tip of the peninsula, was occupied by two additional battalions.
64
Against the 45,000 men deployed by the Israelis they had only 30,000, about a third being decidedly second-rate. From north to south, 8th Palestinian Division with two Palestinian brigades (86th and 87th) and one Egyptian National Guard brigade (6th) was stationed in the Gaza Strip. Behind it was 3rd Infantry Division with one brigade (5th) at the key position of Rafah, another at the equally important one of Umm Katef-Abu Ageila, and a third (4th) at Al Arish, standing in reserve to support the others. Thus the two northernmost roads leading into the Sinai, one running along the coast and the other from Nitsana to Bir Gafgafa, were effectively blocked. Farther south, however, the third road—which led from Nitsana southwest to Mitla Pass—was defended by only one battalion at Kusseima; even less well defended was the fourth road, in reality a desert track that ran from Elat to Mitla Pass. South of Elat, the terrain was so inhospitable that there were hardly any forces at all. Only Sharm al-Sheikh, forming the extreme southern tip of the peninsula, was occupied by two additional battalions.
The rationale behind the Egyptians’ deployment was probably their troops’ peculiar weakness in maneuver warfare. As one Israeli officer later wrote, fighting them was like playing chess against an opponent who could only make one move against each two of one’s own.
65
Based on a thorough study of all avenues of approach, their defenses were designed to block the roads; the fortifications were probably as good as could be made. They were, however, located too close to the Israeli border—none more than fifteen miles or so away—and, particularly south of the main defensive perimeter at Umm Katef-Abu Ageila, incapable of receiving support either from each other or from the rear. In fact the main Egyptian reserves, two infantry divisions plus an armored brigade, were stationed west of the canal. At best it would take forward units two days to reach the battlefield.
65
Based on a thorough study of all avenues of approach, their defenses were designed to block the roads; the fortifications were probably as good as could be made. They were, however, located too close to the Israeli border—none more than fifteen miles or so away—and, particularly south of the main defensive perimeter at Umm Katef-Abu Ageila, incapable of receiving support either from each other or from the rear. In fact the main Egyptian reserves, two infantry divisions plus an armored brigade, were stationed west of the canal. At best it would take forward units two days to reach the battlefield.
In the event the initial Israeli offensive bypassed the main Egyptian fortifications completely—with the result, however, that it led them nowhere in particular. During late afternoon on October 29 sixteen Dakota transport aircraft took off. Escorted by IAF fighters, they carried a paratrooper battalion of 395 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eytan. They dropped in an undefended area 120 miles inside Egyptian territory east of Mitla Pass. So remote was the area selected—upon hearing of it, Nasser exclaimed that the Israelis were “attacking sand”
66
—that the landing itself went unopposed and even unobserved by the Egyptians. However, later on the same day the paratroopers fired at three Egyptian vehicles, two of which got away and alerted superiors.
66
—that the landing itself went unopposed and even unobserved by the Egyptians. However, later on the same day the paratroopers fired at three Egyptian vehicles, two of which got away and alerted superiors.
Reacting swiftly that evening, the Egyptian high command took countermeasures. Starting from Fayid, 1st Armored Brigade took the road by way of Giddi Pass toward Bir Gafgafa; once there it would have been able either to proceed toward the Israeli border or, turning south, take Eytan’s paratroopers opposite Mitla Pass in the flank. The 2nd Infantry Brigade was sent directly from Suez toward Mitla Pass. In spite of being slowed by Nasser’s insistence that commercial traffic through the canal not be halted,
67
this brigade made good progress, and early next morning its leading forces, having driven all night, debouched from the eastern end of Mitla Pass. There they were met by wave after wave of strafing IAF fighters that together with the paratroopers halted the Egyptian counterattack.
67
this brigade made good progress, and early next morning its leading forces, having driven all night, debouched from the eastern end of Mitla Pass. There they were met by wave after wave of strafing IAF fighters that together with the paratroopers halted the Egyptian counterattack.
The Israelis quickly brought up the remainder of the paratrooper brigade from its assembly area at En Chatseva on the Israel-Jordan border, a location deliberately selected in order to mislead the Arab intelligence services concerning the true direction of the attack. In the event its progress was governed more by the shortage of transport than by enemy resistance. The brigade did not have enough military trucks to carry all the troops; the rest had to be packed into civilian lorries unsuitable for driving over the atrocious roads. Having crossed into the Sinai during late afternoon on October 29, 202nd Brigade overran Kuntilla, far south of the main Egyptian positions, without undue difficulty (its garrison had run away). Then it was the turn of Thamed where two companies barred the way; once that position fell, however, the third Egyptian position, at Nakhl, was captured without loss. At 2200 hours on October 30, Eytan’s men could see the headlights of the approaching column; shortly afterwards Sharon and his men linked up with them. The paratroopers had not yet fought their fill, however, which would cost them dearly the next day.
These events had little impact on the Egyptian main defenses, which as noted were located in several different fortified perimeters not far from the Israeli border. Made wise by the War of Independence, Ben Gurion, fearing heavy casualties, had instructed Dayan that the IDF attack these perimeters only
after
England and France had issued their ultimatum, were refused, and started military operations against the Egyptians. Israel’s allies did not prove true to their words, however, and everything proceeded much more slowly than expected. In the end they opened their campaign during late afternoon on October 31, which meant that during the first two days Israel was on its own.
after
England and France had issued their ultimatum, were refused, and started military operations against the Egyptians. Israel’s allies did not prove true to their words, however, and everything proceeded much more slowly than expected. In the end they opened their campaign during late afternoon on October 31, which meant that during the first two days Israel was on its own.
To the north of Sharon’s little expedition, breaking through the main Egyptian defensive positions (the Abu Ageila-Umm Katef-Kusseima complex), was the task of 38th
Ugda
(division-sized task force). It had under its command one armored brigade (in reality mechanized, since the unit in question, the 37th, had only one armored battalion) and two infantry brigades plus a reserve (7th Armored Brigade with its full complement of two armored battalions). Against this force (approximately 12,000 men) the combined Egyptian force mounted a single brigade (6th); the Israeli advantage in armor was much greater still since the Egyptians had no tanks, relying on artillery and antitank guns to stop opponents.
68
Even so, the Israelis were prevented from concentrating all of their forces owing to the need to capture Kusseima, at the southern edge of the Egyptian perimeter, so as to open up another road to Mitla Pass in case Sharon and his paratroopers failed to link up with their comrades. In addition Dayan, heeding Ben Gurion’s instructions to delay, insisted on
not
using his armored brigades for the initial attack, thus depriving 38th
Ugda
from what might have constituted its main striking force.
Ugda
(division-sized task force). It had under its command one armored brigade (in reality mechanized, since the unit in question, the 37th, had only one armored battalion) and two infantry brigades plus a reserve (7th Armored Brigade with its full complement of two armored battalions). Against this force (approximately 12,000 men) the combined Egyptian force mounted a single brigade (6th); the Israeli advantage in armor was much greater still since the Egyptians had no tanks, relying on artillery and antitank guns to stop opponents.
68
Even so, the Israelis were prevented from concentrating all of their forces owing to the need to capture Kusseima, at the southern edge of the Egyptian perimeter, so as to open up another road to Mitla Pass in case Sharon and his paratroopers failed to link up with their comrades. In addition Dayan, heeding Ben Gurion’s instructions to delay, insisted on
not
using his armored brigades for the initial attack, thus depriving 38th
Ugda
from what might have constituted its main striking force.
One of the infantry brigades, the 4th, opened the attack against the southern edge of the Egyptian perimeter at Kusseima when it was suddenly joined by the tanks of 7th Armored Brigade. The latter had been thrown into the battle by the commander of the southern front, Brig. Gen. Asaf Simchoni, who, knowing nothing of political considerations at the top, acted against Dayan’s explicit instructions in sending out his armor on October 30. Kusseima fell to 4th Brigade even before the tanks arrived; still, Simchoni’s decision proved fortunate, because the main attack, launched simultaneously by 10th Brigade against the principal defenses farther northwest, had stalled. As had also happened, for example, to the Germans during their 1944 Ardennes offensive, when Gen. Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel’s attack on the south suddenly found itself getting ahead of Dietrich’s 6th S.S. Panzer Army to its right, what had originally been planned as an auxiliary thrust was suddenly turned into the main thrust. The difference being that the Israelis proved sufficiently flexible to recognize what was happening and change their plans and also had another card up their sleeve.
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