The Sword And The Olive (11 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
CHAPTER 4
TOWARD STATEHOOD
T
HE SPRING OF 1940 was a dark period for the British war effort. Beginning on May 10, 1940, the Germans attacked in the west. By the end of the month Dunkirk was being evacuated, and on June 10, Italy, whose Mediterranean possessions at the time reached as far east as the Dodecanese, entered the conflict. In September 1940 the Italian army invaded Egypt from Libya, driving some sixty miles before halting at Sidi Barrani. These events were followed by the British advance to Tripoli in the winter of 1940-1941; the dispatch of a German corps to Libya in February 1941; the launching of a German counterattack that, in May and June, seemed about to drive the British from Egypt; and the abortive Greek campaign that ended with Axis occupation not only of the Greek mainland but of Crete as well. As a result, during late spring 1941 it appeared as if the British position in the Middle East was being threatened by a pincer movement coming from the south and north.
HE SPRING OF 1940 was a dark period for the British war effort. Beginning on May 10, 1940, the Germans attacked in the west. By the end of the month Dunkirk was being evacuated, and on June 10, Italy, whose Mediterranean possessions at the time reached as far east as the Dodecanese, entered the conflict. In September 1940 the Italian army invaded Egypt from Libya, driving some sixty miles before halting at Sidi Barrani. These events were followed by the British advance to Tripoli in the winter of 1940-1941; the dispatch of a German corps to Libya in February 1941; the launching of a German counterattack that, in May and June, seemed about to drive the British from Egypt; and the abortive Greek campaign that ended with Axis occupation not only of the Greek mainland but of Crete as well. As a result, during late spring 1941 it appeared as if the British position in the Middle East was being threatened by a pincer movement coming from the south and north.
Thus pressed, the British once again became willing to accept whatever Hagana had to offer—indeed it might almost be said that whenever there was trouble His Majesty’s government in Palestine turned to the Jews, only to bite the hand offered in friendship when the danger had passed. As already mentioned, Sadeh as commander of POUM (the special companies) had been providing the British with personnel—some of whom were German- or Arab-speaking—for carrying out commando raids against Axis targets. The largest of these was launched on May 18, when twenty-three men took to the sea in a boat with the objective of reaching the Vichy French-owned oil refineries in Tripoli, Lebanon, and sabotaging them. This operation was a complete failure as the boat, along with its crew, disappeared without a trace—possibly because some of the training had been carried out around Haifa Harbor, which was swarming with spies.
1
Refusing to be discouraged, Sadeh again sent his best men when the British set out to conquer Lebanon and Syria from the French early the next month. Thirty-five Jewish guides went ahead of Australian troops, their mission being to cut telephone wires, occupy bridges, and so on. The best known among them was Moshe Dayan, who along with his comrades had been released from jail and who lost an eye in the operation.
2
1
Refusing to be discouraged, Sadeh again sent his best men when the British set out to conquer Lebanon and Syria from the French early the next month. Thirty-five Jewish guides went ahead of Australian troops, their mission being to cut telephone wires, occupy bridges, and so on. The best known among them was Moshe Dayan, who along with his comrades had been released from jail and who lost an eye in the operation.
2
Toward Statehood: the wreckage of a bridge that was blown up by PALMACH, 1946.
These operations, though, only represented the cutting edge of a much greater organizational effort. In summer 1940, Hagana’s leaders met to start planning for the establishment of a regular Jewish force that would attempt to fight and delay an eventual Axis invader. Some nine months later preparations went into high gear. As usual, the greatest obstacle was financial; not being a state, the
Yishuv
did not yet have a regular taxation system at its disposal, and voluntary contributions were insufficient. It was surmounted by means of an extraordinary arrangement between Hagana and the
kibbuts
movement. In return for two weeks’ labor every month, the latter undertook to maintain the troops.
3
Yishuv
did not yet have a regular taxation system at its disposal, and voluntary contributions were insufficient. It was surmounted by means of an extraordinary arrangement between Hagana and the
kibbuts
movement. In return for two weeks’ labor every month, the latter undertook to maintain the troops.
3
Since few
kibbutsim
had housing to spare, the new force, known as PALMACH (for Plugot Machats, literally “shock companies,” possibly a translation of the German
stosstruppen
), was made to live in tents among the eucalyptus trees that surrounded many settlements; so spartan were living conditions that, as legend has it, only one person in the entire organization even possessed a bathrobe.
4
These arrangements may explain why, then and later, PALMACH looked and felt much like a youth movement complete with campfires, singsong, pranks played among the members, and the like. They also fostered an extremely strong team spirit that, as outsiders thought, was not always compatible with loyalty to Hagana as a whole.
5
kibbutsim
had housing to spare, the new force, known as PALMACH (for Plugot Machats, literally “shock companies,” possibly a translation of the German
stosstruppen
), was made to live in tents among the eucalyptus trees that surrounded many settlements; so spartan were living conditions that, as legend has it, only one person in the entire organization even possessed a bathrobe.
4
These arrangements may explain why, then and later, PALMACH looked and felt much like a youth movement complete with campfires, singsong, pranks played among the members, and the like. They also fostered an extremely strong team spirit that, as outsiders thought, was not always compatible with loyalty to Hagana as a whole.
5
PALMACH’s commander in chief (CIC) was once again Yitschak Sadeh, now fifty-one years old, bald, and, though with a heavy paunch and suffering from a heart condition, apparently the only senior Hagana member qualified for the task. He selected his company commanders from among former
nodedot
, SNS, and FOSH personnel, including above all Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan. Six companies were established, including both male and female; though no precise figures are available, something about the relative size of the two groups may be gathered from the fact that when the first class of recruits completed its training in May 1942, the passing-out parade included 427 men but only six (some say eight) women.
6
Later the organization expanded until it could muster 1,000 troops in 1943 and around 1,500 in 1944. Operating with British permission, they engaged in intensive training, including sniping, reconnaissance, and demolition work. After two years the recruits were released, and others took their place; some of the veterans, instead of going home, organized in so-called
hachsharot
(preparatory groups) and set out to found new
kibbutsim
where, of course, they remained active as Hagana members. In time PALMACH, an enterprising lot if ever there was one, was even able to maintain a naval company (PALYAM) and a handful of aircrews who operated under the guise of an aerial sports club.
nodedot
, SNS, and FOSH personnel, including above all Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan. Six companies were established, including both male and female; though no precise figures are available, something about the relative size of the two groups may be gathered from the fact that when the first class of recruits completed its training in May 1942, the passing-out parade included 427 men but only six (some say eight) women.
6
Later the organization expanded until it could muster 1,000 troops in 1943 and around 1,500 in 1944. Operating with British permission, they engaged in intensive training, including sniping, reconnaissance, and demolition work. After two years the recruits were released, and others took their place; some of the veterans, instead of going home, organized in so-called
hachsharot
(preparatory groups) and set out to found new
kibbutsim
where, of course, they remained active as Hagana members. In time PALMACH, an enterprising lot if ever there was one, was even able to maintain a naval company (PALYAM) and a handful of aircrews who operated under the guise of an aerial sports club.
Originally PALMACH was intended to fight the Germans in case Palestine should be evacuated by the British, leaving the Jewish population unprotected. According to a plan coordinated with British military intelligence, known as the Palestine Post Occupation Scheme, the area around Mount Carmel was to be turned into a sort of national redoubt and used as a base for guerrilla operations. The topography appeared favorable and included, besides the cover provided by the woods, a large number of hillside caves, some of which had already served as hideouts in prehistoric times. Now plans were laid for storing arms and ammunition, destroying roads and communications, blowing up bridges, sowing mines, laying booby traps, and the like, all in order to delay the Wehrmacht for as long as possible while allowing the British to make good their escape.
In the next year, heartened by Germany’s failure to seize the Libyan port of Tobruk, the leaders of Hagana became more ambitious. They even negotiated with the British for the construction of a four-division force (thirty-six battalions) that would try to hold the entire northern part of the country, including Haifa with its modicum of industry, heavy earth-moving equipment, airstrip, and port.
7
Apparently the fact that the loss of Egypt would effectively bring about the end of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean was overlooked; ever the optimist, Sadeh at one point believed—or pretended to believe—that his well-trained men could take on 500 German tanks with Molotov cocktails.
8
This, of course, was a gross exaggeration. Yet it also overestimated the size of the force that the Wehrmacht, now fully occupied in grinding its way toward Stalingrad, could deploy in the Middle East. When the Afrika Korps arrived at El Alamein in late July 1942, it was down to exactly nineteen operational tanks.
7
Apparently the fact that the loss of Egypt would effectively bring about the end of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean was overlooked; ever the optimist, Sadeh at one point believed—or pretended to believe—that his well-trained men could take on 500 German tanks with Molotov cocktails.
8
This, of course, was a gross exaggeration. Yet it also overestimated the size of the force that the Wehrmacht, now fully occupied in grinding its way toward Stalingrad, could deploy in the Middle East. When the Afrika Korps arrived at El Alamein in late July 1942, it was down to exactly nineteen operational tanks.
As usual, British connivance with Hagana’s activities did not survive the period of greatest danger. The Battle of El Alamein opened on October 23, 1942, and ended with mostly British forces driving the Germans out of Egypt. The invasion of French North Africa followed in November, and by the end of 1942, at the latest, it was clear that any danger from that quarter had definitely passed. The British Foreign Office, as well as the military and intelligence authorities deployed in Palestine itself, started contemplating the possibility of a Jewish revolt after the war.
9
They were aware of Ben Gurion’s growing power and the “activist” line that he took. They also consistently overestimated the forces of Hagana and occasionally invented Jewish paramilitary organizations when in fact there were none.
9
They were aware of Ben Gurion’s growing power and the “activist” line that he took. They also consistently overestimated the forces of Hagana and occasionally invented Jewish paramilitary organizations when in fact there were none.
As part of this policy, plans were made to reinforce the British military presence in Palestine. Raids and searches were resumed but rarely yielded considerable results. For example, in October 1943
kibbuts
Chulda was surrounded and searched. More than eighty mortar rounds were unearthed, a loss by the standards of those days but one that did not affect the operations of Hagana countrywide.
10
Meanwhile PALMACH in its camps defied the British and continued to train. In 1941 a platoon commanders course was held at Juara, a remote hilly district south of Esdraelon; it became the first in a long series of courses that produced a number of future IDF chiefs of staff. Three years later Sadeh already felt sufficiently confident in his commanders’ ability to consolidate his eleven companies, plus a headquarters company, into four battalions.
kibbuts
Chulda was surrounded and searched. More than eighty mortar rounds were unearthed, a loss by the standards of those days but one that did not affect the operations of Hagana countrywide.
10
Meanwhile PALMACH in its camps defied the British and continued to train. In 1941 a platoon commanders course was held at Juara, a remote hilly district south of Esdraelon; it became the first in a long series of courses that produced a number of future IDF chiefs of staff. Three years later Sadeh already felt sufficiently confident in his commanders’ ability to consolidate his eleven companies, plus a headquarters company, into four battalions.
Nor were PALMACH and Hagana the only organizations that provided Jewish soldiers with training during those years. Given the horrible rumors that were beginning to reach the
Yishuv
from Nazi-occupied Europe, many of the
Yishuv
’s members felt they could do better than to spend their time raising cucumbers for the
kibbutsim
and playing with pistols when no British troops were nearby. With or without permission from the Jewish Agency—the latter, fearing that its own forces would become depleted, initially attempted to resist the movement—they volunteered for the British armed forces. Eventually the number of volunteers approached 30,000, a little more than 10 percent being women. Numerically speaking and relative to its size, the
Yishuv
’s contribution to fighting the Axis was thus as great as that of any other country at the time.
Yishuv
from Nazi-occupied Europe, many of the
Yishuv
’s members felt they could do better than to spend their time raising cucumbers for the
kibbutsim
and playing with pistols when no British troops were nearby. With or without permission from the Jewish Agency—the latter, fearing that its own forces would become depleted, initially attempted to resist the movement—they volunteered for the British armed forces. Eventually the number of volunteers approached 30,000, a little more than 10 percent being women. Numerically speaking and relative to its size, the
Yishuv
’s contribution to fighting the Axis was thus as great as that of any other country at the time.
Almost all the volunteers served in various second-line units—in particular, women from Palestine were used to drive trucks along the endless supply routes of the 8th Army across the Sinai, Egypt, and Libya. Others spent their careers digging trenches, guarding bases, or carrying out quartermaster duties far in the rear. Some 500 were even organized into a Palestinian Coast Guard and positioned in a chain of watch stations; initially without arms, their job was to alert the authorities in case German or Italian ships presented themselves.
11
Still, a select few found their way into combat forces, including signals, engineers, sappers, and artillery, as well as the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.
12
By pressing the British to set up a Jewish brigade on the model of the World War I battalions, Ben Gurion and his “foreign minister” at the Jewish Agency, Moshe Shertok (later, Sharet), hoped to derive the maximum benefit from the volunteer movement. The authorities dragged their feet, and it was not until the winter of 1944-1945 that a Jewish brigade, with the Star of David as its symbol, was formed. By the time it reached the front in northern Italy (March 1945) the war was all but over.
13
11
Still, a select few found their way into combat forces, including signals, engineers, sappers, and artillery, as well as the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.
12
By pressing the British to set up a Jewish brigade on the model of the World War I battalions, Ben Gurion and his “foreign minister” at the Jewish Agency, Moshe Shertok (later, Sharet), hoped to derive the maximum benefit from the volunteer movement. The authorities dragged their feet, and it was not until the winter of 1944-1945 that a Jewish brigade, with the Star of David as its symbol, was formed. By the time it reached the front in northern Italy (March 1945) the war was all but over.
13
When members of the British and Jewish forces reencountered one another in Hagana after 1945, they discovered that their differences could not be greater.
14
From “Chinese” Gordon to T. E. Lawrence the British military has always had a sprinkling of brilliant eccentrics; Wingate himself used to conclude each SNS operation by sitting stark naked in the dining room and munching an onion.
15
In the main, however, they consisted of regular soldiers with a powerful bureaucratic structure and an emphasis on uniforms, hierarchy, drill, punctiliousness, ornamental swords, and swagger sticks. Like all good soldiers (their own favorite term was
lochem
or “fighter”) PALMACHniks also liked to swagger; but
their
idea of doing so was to wear carefully cultivated forelocks, formless home-knit headgear known as “socks,” wide-open shirts, and so-called palm-length khaki shorts with the whites of their pockets dangling out below. Their “stumpy, dumpy” women also wore shorts, making for an interesting anatomical display that did not escape foreign observers.
16
Young, ingenious, and independent-minded, they were a disorderly lot and proud of it. Informality reached the point where subordinates addressed commanders by their nicknames; thus Rechabam Zeevi (who was to command the central front in 1970-1973) became “Ghandi,” David (Elazar) “Dado,” Mordechai (Gur) “Motta,” Refael (Eytan) “Raful,” and one particularly tall officer “Guliver.” All of this not seldom degenerated into simple sloppiness.
14
From “Chinese” Gordon to T. E. Lawrence the British military has always had a sprinkling of brilliant eccentrics; Wingate himself used to conclude each SNS operation by sitting stark naked in the dining room and munching an onion.
15
In the main, however, they consisted of regular soldiers with a powerful bureaucratic structure and an emphasis on uniforms, hierarchy, drill, punctiliousness, ornamental swords, and swagger sticks. Like all good soldiers (their own favorite term was
lochem
or “fighter”) PALMACHniks also liked to swagger; but
their
idea of doing so was to wear carefully cultivated forelocks, formless home-knit headgear known as “socks,” wide-open shirts, and so-called palm-length khaki shorts with the whites of their pockets dangling out below. Their “stumpy, dumpy” women also wore shorts, making for an interesting anatomical display that did not escape foreign observers.
16
Young, ingenious, and independent-minded, they were a disorderly lot and proud of it. Informality reached the point where subordinates addressed commanders by their nicknames; thus Rechabam Zeevi (who was to command the central front in 1970-1973) became “Ghandi,” David (Elazar) “Dado,” Mordechai (Gur) “Motta,” Refael (Eytan) “Raful,” and one particularly tall officer “Guliver.” All of this not seldom degenerated into simple sloppiness.
Both traditions were carried into the IDF, where they competed for decades thereafter, particularly in regard to questions of organization, training, and the amount of drill required of troops. PALMACH commanders rejected formal discipline, salutes, and even the insignia of rank; to their former British rivals such attitudes bordered on sacrilege. As the
Yishuv
’s leader and the highest civilian authority in charge of defense matters, Ben Gurion was inclined to favor the members of the British school—the more so because, not being associated with the
kibbuts
movement, they were considered politically neutral and more amenable to discipline. It is true that few of them had gained much command experience; Laskov, who was the highest-ranking, had been a major in charge of two platoons.
17
Still, to Ben Gurion’s mind it was they and not the PALMACH rabble who knew how to run an army and thus represented “real” soldiers.
Yishuv
’s leader and the highest civilian authority in charge of defense matters, Ben Gurion was inclined to favor the members of the British school—the more so because, not being associated with the
kibbuts
movement, they were considered politically neutral and more amenable to discipline. It is true that few of them had gained much command experience; Laskov, who was the highest-ranking, had been a major in charge of two platoons.
17
Still, to Ben Gurion’s mind it was they and not the PALMACH rabble who knew how to run an army and thus represented “real” soldiers.
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