The Super Summary of World History (92 page)

Figure 82 F-86 Saber

This marked the first time extensive air combat had occurred between jet aircraft. The new air war was like something out of a 1940s science fiction novel. Superfast swept-wing rocket-propelled aircraft streaked through the sky with their indomitable pilots wearing silver pressure suits, oxygen masks, heavy helmets with dark visors, and using advanced sighting systems to shoot at other aircraft. It was the start of a new age in aircraft design and production. The race for the air control fighter still goes on today between the world’s major powers, because air superiority is so critical to success on the battlefield,
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especially for the normally outnumbered troops fighting for the Western Democracies.

UN
Forces
Move
North—Again

With new firepower and offensive schemes, the UN forces soon retook Seoul and were near the thirty-eighth parallel. The communist Chinese decided they must achieve a decisive victory. To this end, they assembled a new army of impressive numbers and prepared to strike the American and British positions just north of Seoul at the Imjin River and east at Kapyong.

The communist spring offensive began on April 22, 1951 and involved well over 750,000 men. In a series of human wave assaults supported by artillery and tanks, they rammed the UN forces south from the Imjin River and Kapyong, thereby threatening to retake the still-smoldering city of Seoul. Even though UN forces were thrust out of their positions by swarming shadows in the night, this was no rout. While the United Nations gave back blood-soaked ground amid hails of lead and Red Army bugle calls, the new firepower and defensive doctrines were exacting an unexpected levy of death and dismemberment on the aggressors. The immense Red Army was suffering incredible casualties. American air power pulverized roads and bridges needed by the Chinese to bring supplies through the mountainous Korean terrain. US artillery and air power lay waste to attacking communist units. Remarkable stands at the Imjin River by British troops, and UN and American troops
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at other locations, blunted Chinese attacks north of the capitol. The communist advance slowed and then stopped. The massive Chinese attack had literally bled to death.

Stalemate

July
1951
to
July
1953

The United Nations started advancing again and retook the lost ground, finally stabilizing the front near the thirty-eighth parallel. Here a decision was made by the UN forces to stop the advance. The Chinese and Americans began frustrating peace talks at
Panmunjom
in 1951, lasting for years. Meanwhile, a brutal war of taking and losing hills along the thirty-eighth parallel continued. Eisenhower was elected president of the United States in 1952, and he wanted to end the Korean War. The endless talks accomplished nothing, and the Chinese stalling tactics were unfathomable. What China gained from the prolonged twilight war can never be known, although they argued endlessly over the repatriation of prisoners. The Chinese wanted all prisoners of war returned to each side, but the Americans argued that only those who chose to go back should be returned. Had the Americans learned from their WWII experience (mistake) of returning Soviet prisoners of war knowing death awaited them? Why did the Chinese care if a few of their men did not want to return? Whatever the reasons, the talks went on from July 1951 to July 1953, and all the while men were dying along the thirty-eighth parallel for a few yards of well-shelled dirt.

The Korean War may have continued because Stalin wanted the fighting to go on. The murderer was losing nothing, except some equipment and a few pilots, and he probably counseled the Chinese to keep fighting. As long as they were taking the casualties what did he care? About four months after Stalin’s death the cease-fire was signed.

Use
the
Bomb—or
Not?

During the initial Chinese attack, as UN forces were overwhelmed, President Truman alluded to using the atomic bomb. It is questionable if he really considered its use, but a lot of preliminary moves were made that seemed to indicate its use was imminent.

The communist dictators had been correct in one assumption; the United States would not use the atomic bomb. Truman, the president in 1950, responded to the invasion with conventional forces thereby deciding the use of the A-bomb was inappropriate. Why Truman held back might be difficult to discover. An innocent nation was under attack and being overrun by a ruthless enemy. Thousands of innocent South Koreans were being murdered and the displacement of the South Korean population was an international tragedy
.
Why not use the A-bomb? Arguably, if Truman obliterated North Korea it might cause the USSR to obliterate South Korea, and who knew what would be obliterated next? Truman did not want this “small”
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war to escalate into another world war. In addition, England and several other US Allies cautioned Truman against the use of the A-bomb, thus, the president’s decision to forego using the A-bomb in Korea.

This
decision
became
precedent
, and the United States has not used the atomic or hydrogen bomb in any situation. It should be noted that the USSR under Stalin, or China under Mao, would have used the atomic bomb without hesitation if the roles had been reversed. Because the United States has not used its nuclear weapons, thousands of US soldiers have died in combat to preserve friendly regimes under communist or terrorist attack, and those struggles have not been universally successful. The notion that using the bomb increases the chance of a wider war should be balanced against the idea that abandoning the bomb encourages despots to start wars with the United States because of its refusal to use all its available combat power. The thought of a nation failing to use a decisive weapon because of
unilateral
moral reasons would have dumbfounded Clausewitz and other philosophers of war. Remember, the precedent for abandoning the A-bomb was set in Korea when Truman decided to forgo the use of America’s most powerful instrument of war. This shows the importance of history on decision making. Decisions made long ago, and for different reasons, can impact the decisions of today.
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President Eisenhower, wanting to end the stalemate in Korea, decided to up the pressure on the Chinese and moved the bomber group armed with the atomic bomb to Okinawa which is near Korea. In addition, he leaked information to the Chinese that the atomic cannon would be sent to Korea. All this made it appear the Americans might launch offensives using nuclear weapons to blow holes in the Chinese lines or destroy vital rail lines and bridges over the Yalu River. Following these moves, the Chinese and North Koreans agreed to a cease-fire which stopped the fighting on
July
27,
1953
. A peace treaty was never signed, so from the original invasion in 1950 until today (2010) the two Koreas have technically been at war.
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Analysis

The political fallout from the Korean War was minimal considering its cost. About
33,746
Americans died or were missing in action during the conflict (The New York Times Almanac, 2008), and the United States still has troops there to protect the South from another attack. Communist losses are unknown; however, it is estimated that the Chinese lost almost
1
million
men in the war (official US estimate is over five hundred thousand), the North Koreans
215,000
, and the USSR
300
plus. The South Korean civilians suffered the most from the war in that millions were killed or wounded, and their homeland was destroyed.

America was glad to be out of the war, but the failure to win was hard on many in the United States. Fighting to a draw was not the kind of war Americans liked to fight. It was a good start for the United Nations as it had successfully intervened and saved a small nation from conquest; however, this was tempered with the realization that the USSR had allowed it to happen by being absent on the day of the critical vote. This must have been a blunder by the Soviets, but we may never know. Since the Soviets had calculated the United States would not react to the invasion militarily, they might have assumed that the United Nations would play no part in actively resisting the invasion.

Eisenhower’s sub-rosa threat to use atomic bombs to defeat the Chinese, unknown for years, was one of the high points of his administration. At least he ended the fighting. A book entitled
This
Kind
of
War
by Fehrenbach
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warned America that Korea was the type of war it would face for the remainder of the twentieth century. The author meant amorphous and brutal wars seemingly without end and lacking traditional winners or losers. He was a prophet, correctly predicting the remainder of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first.

Americans cannot get used to the concept that they do not have to “win” these wars, they only have to “not lose.” This is one lesson the United States needed to learn from Korea. Winning was going to be so costly in Korea the United States decided to leave it a stalemate and live with it. The US rejected this concept, however, if the United States can achieve a stalemate in a faraway nation and prevent totalitarians from taking over the government, America has achieved “victory.” Not victory in a WWII sense, but victory by keeping a friendly government in power without committing thousands of troops and millions of dollars for an indefinite time.

Korea has faded badly into history; nevertheless, it was a clash of giants in which the stage was set for the rest of the 50 year Cold War conflict. Millions died, but millions are now free because the United States, the United Nations, and freedom’s allies acted. No Munich here. No appeasement. Korea was a victory in thwarting aggressors out to conquer the world one piece at a time. The lessons of World War II were learned . . . for awhile.

In 2010, the two Koreas are still a fact. The contrasts between the two should be studied. After the War, the South was devastated, but by 1965 the economy had recovered and the nation was thriving.
By
the
year
2008,
South
Korea
was
one
of
the
top
15
economies
of
the
world
. The North is a repressive, vacuous prison where people starve unless given international aid. It seems the only export of the North is terror. They have spent their tiny gross domestic product acquiring nuclear technology to build and sell atomic bombs to terrorists and rogue states. Red China keeps an army on its border with the North just to keep North Koreans out of China.

In South Korea,
democracy
and
capitalism
built a vibrant economy with a gross national product on a par with the most economically successful nations in the world just a few years after total devastation. In North Korea,
communism
and
dictatorship
imprisoned its people in a trash-filled wasteland with an economy that cannot feed its own population. Both these peoples were, and are, the same in every way except for their governments.
One
side
thrives,
the
other
starves.
This
is
the
most
realistic
comparison
of
communism
and
capitalism
ever
devised.
The two Koreas are the ultimate experiment in the true outcomes of governmental choices. Few talk about it, but here is the reality of the choice between capitalism plus democracy plus freedom, and communism plus the inevitable communist dictatorship plus a controlled economy. For some unfathomable reason, many people in the United States and around the world still think the choice of communism and a controlled economy is best. All they have to do to learn the truth is look at the two Koreas.

 
Chapter 18

The Vietnam War

1945
to
1975
(United
States
involved
1964
to
1973)