The Super Summary of World History (53 page)

The word “saved” is in quotes because “salvation” meant a long cruel war for France. Millions of additional Frenchmen died due to the Miracle of the Marne. If the German plan had achieved success the war could have been mercifully short thereby saving millions of lives. Until the next war anyway.

Figure 49 The Schlieffen Plan

The German plan failed for many
tactical
reasons, including: lack of coordination between advancing German armies; stiff resistance by the small, but extremely professional, British Army; too few German troops on the critical right wing; too many German troops at their frontier; the swift repositioning of French frontier forces; the German High Command stripping troops from the right wing for the Eastern Front before concluding the critical encirclement of French forces; the Allied decision to immediately abort French Plan 17 and reposition the troops; the German field commanders allowing a gap to develop between their divisions; the Allies quickly locating the gap with air reconnaissance and immediately attacking into the gap.

The
strategic
cause of failure: the plan’s timetable proved far too ambitious. The timetable was the plan’s key feature, and if the timetable failed the plan failed. Foot soldiers could not hope to keep the plan’s timetable. After the Germans left their jump-off points they advanced on foot. Marching men trying to cover the given distances faced an impossible task. The heat of summer, the lack of supply transport, stiff resistance by British and French troops, and a lack of coordination made victory, for mere mortals, unattainable. The lack of radio communications made the problem of coordinating movement overwhelming. The plan could solve these concerns only by striking with such crushing force that all problems of coordination, timing, and distance fell before the sheer weight of the assault. If enough troops were available to stop counterattacks, keeping the momentum on the attacker’s side, it might have worked, although it would have taken more than the planned six weeks. Von Schlieffen designed in this extra strength; however, less skillful generals changed the equation by decreasing strength in the attacking armies while increasing defensive strength in the wrong places.
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After the Germans faltered, the French and English forces counterattacked effectively causing the Germans to withdraw. The Germans entrenched in defensive positions, blocking Allied counterattacks. The entrenchments then lengthened, soon extending from the English Channel to Switzerland, creating the ultimate front without a flank.

Momentarily think on this: if WWI caused WWII, then WWI becomes history’s most important war. Thus, the Schlieffen Plan is history’s most important plan, and the Battle of the Marne the most important battle. The reasoning is flawed due to numerous disconnects, but it is easy to argue the position.
[175]
By arguing against or for such propositions we gain a better understanding of history. Comparisons deepen understanding.

Stalemate
in
the
West

The Germans failed to destroy France and possessed no plans for this result in the west. The Allied problem was that Germany held a large part of France containing quality resources and many French citizens. The Western Allies reasoned that the Germans could just sit where they were. France could not allow such an outcome, so frontal attacks against well-fortified positions seemed to be a necessity (recall there was no flank). The Germans assumed the same and took pains to deepen and strengthen their positions. For three years, the power of these defenses proved impossible to overcome.
[176]

Figure 50 Trench System, from English Army Manual 1914

The Maxim gun, the first reliable machine gun, was a main instrument for trench defense. The machine guns of World War I, invented by H. Maxim (thus the name) in 1884, fired about six hundred rounds per minute (ten rounds per second), and were so heavy it took several men to move, maintain, and shoot them; however, they also decimated attacking troops. The Germans protected their machine guns until the Allied artillery stopped firing, then set up the guns to drench the advancing troops with bullets. The howitzer artillery piece, a defensive and offensive machine, fired a projectile at high angles while out of sight (behind a hill for example) for a long distance. New shells exploded in the air scattering great quantities of fast flying, hot, steel fragments (shrapnel) capable of killing numerous men in an instant. These new machines of war erased men’s lives by the millions as they advanced across the open, muddy, barbed wire covered ground of No Man’s Land.
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Following 1914, the Western Front settled into doomed and nightmarish Allied attacks against excellent defensive fortifications held by the Germans. During the next three years, the front hardly moved in spite of countless sacrifices by hundreds of thousands of troops. The
Battle
of
the
Somme,
a combined British and French attack on German trenches in July 1916, lasted four and one-half months. When the ordeal ended, British casualties totaled approximately
420,000
, French
205,000
, and German
500,000
; and,
the
attack
failed
to
reach
objectives
set
for
the
first
day
. At
Verdun
, a million men died, while positions hardly changed.
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These battles were typical for the Western Front.

the
Western
Front

The French and British generals, such as Nivelle for France and Haig for Britain, kept frontally attacking the perfectly dug-in Germans. After achieving nothing, and scratching their heads for a moment or two, they demanded more men and attacked just as before, notwithstanding some minor adjustments (more men, more artillery). The next attack will do it, they promised their political overlords; nevertheless, the only difference was higher piles of dismembered dead. Alarmingly similar results hardly worried the military leaders. As shredded bodies and splintered bones piled up civilian governments in England and France began asking their generals embarrassing questions. The responding generals said the Germans were suffering many more casualties than the attacking allies; thus, with each offensive victory grew closer. Liars. If insanity is doing the same thing over and over while expecting different results, these generals qualify as insane. And the political leaders were stupid and timid. Of course, the politicians were being lied to, but they needed to dig out the truth. Widespread incompetence is verified by the politicians accepting the general’s statements without analysis while the grim reaper prospered.

Figure 51 Lack of Movement on Western Front
(Shaded Areas with arrows Show Changes in the Front)

This view of the war is not universal. Numerous historians now take a new view, saying the Allied generals did a good job of trying to cope with a new military situation. They point out the generals changed tactics, increased the bombardment by artillery, fielded new weapons, and perfected new artillery techniques. One technique, the walking barrage, involves falling artillery shells creating a literal moving box of explosions around the advancing troops, protecting them all the way to the enemy trenches. New weapons, like aircraft, helped in observation to better assess enemy capabilities. The invention of tanks, pushed by Winston Churchill, tested by the Royal Navy’s Landships Committee, and fielded in 1916 helped break the stalemate. Meanwhile, by 1918 the Germans invented a new assault technique called
infiltration,
which entailed the first attackers bypassing enemy strongholds for reduction by follow-on troops. In the last German offensives of the war these methods proved effective, but not war winning. By 1918, the British developed
combined
arms
tactics
which coordinated tanks, artillery, aircraft, and infantry into a team that crashed in unison through the defensive trench networks. Thereafter, they effectively followed up the assault with reserves, achieving deep penetrations into enemy territory. The British tactics were war winning. These combined arms assaults moved the front miles each day instead of yards. Unfortunately, the new techniques were discovered in 1918, which was far too late for most of the men.

There was a collective condemnation of the war at the time, even before the fighting ended. “We saved the world,” proclaimed the Allied generals; however, the surviving troops and grieving families thought otherwise. WWI destroyed the world rather than saved it, and the public knew it. Civilian governments discovered the generals had lied about casualties and the effects of the Allied frontal assaults on Germany. When the war’s trivial causes surfaced an antiwar movement arose condemning the diplomats, government leaders, and generals directing the Western Democracies into such a futile, murderous, and destructive war, and then refusing to end it.

This historical survey adopts the old view that Europe’s leadership was hollow. In defense of this older view, please take note of
one
fact
:
On
the
very
last
day
of
the
war,
after
the
armistice
was
signed,
with
fewer
than
three
hours
to
go
before
the
war’s
end,
the
Allied
generals
ordered
an
attack
on
German
positions
causing
casualties
in
excess
of
ten
thousand
men.
The generals, and the men, knew the war was ending at eleven o’clock that day, but the Allied leaders ordered the assaults to begin at 9:00 AM. German positions scheduled for
surrender
to
the
Allies
the
next
day
were the targets. The men went forward, as ordered, dying for nothing. The explanation given? Germany’s utter defeat must be proven to them; thus, the large scale assaults had to be made to prove to them they were totally defeated. This is irrational to say the least. The tired, battered, hungry Germans on the front lines needed no additional proof of defeat. Why attack them? Some Germans at home, far beyond the reach of Allied guns, thought defeat came through traitors at home. How was this attack going to convince those Germans of defeat? The fact that a general even contemplated such an assault, much less carried it out, is mind boggling. Of course, the generals safely relaxed miles away as bullets ruptured their soldier’s bodies. This is the proof that the historians new view of the generals is mistaken in the extreme.