The Shining Sea (16 page)

Even though the weather was poor at the moment, St. Catherine's was otherwise an attractive place, blessed with a temperate climate and ideal conditions for growing food. Ten thousand people lived on the island in comfortable houses and lovely villages. The peasants looked well fed and well clad, and the women were handsome. Don Luis Maurice da Silvia, the Portuguese governor, assigned Sergeant-Major Sabine to attend to Porter's needs, which he did with consummate diplomatic skill. Even so, Porter continued to have trouble obtaining all the provisions he wanted.

While work on resupply went forward, a remarkable visitor appeared from the ocean. Some rotten beef had got on board, and Porter threw it over the side, which drew the attention of an enormous shark. Porter thought it measured twenty-five feet. At one point the fish was thrashing in the water with a quarter of a bullock in its mouth—in the exact place where the previous evening some of the crew and a few officers had been swimming. Porter thought that a man would be only a mouthful for the giant.

The island's principal industry, besides supplying ships sailing to and from the Pacific, was the whale fishery. About 500 whales were taken annually from the bay where the
Essex
was anchored. They came to calve
and were defenseless. Their oil was deposited in an immense rock tank and shipped to Portugal.

While the
Essex
was being loaded, Porter spoke to the captain of a small Portuguese trader that had left Rio four days earlier. He was told that the
Montague
had captured a 22-gun American warship, which Porter assumed was the
Hornet
, and that the
Montague
was in pursuit of a large American frigate, which Porter thought had to be the
Constitution
. None of this was true. The Portuguese captain went on to tell Porter that a British frigate and two brigs of war had arrived at Rio and more reinforcements were expected. With them, Admiral Dixon could now make a more determined search for the
Essex
. The captain also told Porter that Buenos Aires, then in a state of starvation, was to be avoided, while Montevideo (the future capital of Uruguay) was closed to the
Essex.
Its government was still in the hands of Spaniards loyal to the deposed King of Spain, Ferdinand VII, who was allied with Great Britain. Porter had no way of knowing if the information was true or not, but he had to assume that Dixon was looking for him, and for that reason Buenos Aires and Montevideo where good places to avoid.

All of the enemy activity along the Brazilian coast made Porter anxious to get back to sea. He feared the British would blockade him, or worse, attack the
Essex
in St. Catharine's supposedly neutral harbor. Thus, in spite of the island's temptations, he remained determined to leave as quickly as possible. On January 25, after spending only five days in what all hands (including the captain) thought was a delightful place, Porter fired signal guns for everyone to repair on board. After waiting what he thought was a sufficient amount of time, he hove up and dropped down below the fort, where he anchored to give the officers time to retrieve their clothes, which were on shore being washed. At eight o'clock that evening, he pulled anchor. By dawn the
Essex
was at sea. Two men were left behind. For one reason or another, when the signal was given, they did not return to the ship. Porter waited for a time, assumed that they preferred to stay, and left.

Once out in the South Atlantic, Porter faced the most important decision of his life—where to go from here? Before leaving St. Catharine's he had given Sergeant-Major Sabine a note for Bainbridge should he appear. There was little likelihood that he would, but on the off-chance
that he might, Porter wanted him to receive this letter. It read in part: “Should we not meet by the 1st of April, be assured that by pursuing
my own course
, I shall have been actuated by views to the good of the service, and that there will have been an absolute necessity for my doing so.” The letter was dated January 20, 1813.

It is hard to imagine that Porter did not have an overwhelming preference for sailing to the Pacific. He had been advocating doing so for years. The possibility must have been on his mind since he left Chester. Everything he had done since the war began indicated how fixated he was on distinguishing himself in some heroic action, and here was his opportunity; there might never be another. Sailing the first American warship into the eastern Pacific was his path to everlasting fame. He could destroy the British whaling fleet there—a great accomplishment in itself—and also have an excellent chance of engaging in a one-on-one battle with an enemy frigate, which was always his main objective.

As far back as 1809, Porter had written to former president Jefferson proposing a voyage to the Pacific. He had visions of being the Lewis and Clark of the sea, highlighting to America the importance of the vast Pacific.
Porter sent a copy of the letter to Charles Goldsborough, chief clerk of the navy, who passed it on to President Madison, but like his predecessor, Madison never replied. Porter wrote again to Madison on October 31, 1810, explaining the importance of the Pacific, but again, he was ignored.
Still not deterred, Porter wrote on February 7, 1811, to Secretary of the Navy Hamilton that should war break out he wished to be appointed commander of a squadron whose object would be to sail into the eastern Pacific and attack British whalers and merchantmen. Hamilton liked the idea but never followed up on it.

Porter had also urged his plan on Bainbridge. Before the
Essex
left the Delaware River in October 1812, Bainbridge had solicited Porter's opinion on the best mode of attacking the enemy, and Porter had laid before him his plan of sailing into the Pacific. He received a positive response, but in the end Bainbridge decided that patrolling the waters around St. Helena was a better idea. Nonetheless, Porter was convinced that going to the South Pacific would have Bainbridge's approval.

Before making a final decision, Porter asked purser John R. Shaw for an accounting of the provisions on board. They had not been able to obtain
all the supplies they needed at St. Catharine's. They did procure wood and water and some refreshments but found it impossible to obtain any sea stock except rum and a few bags of flour. Shaw reported that only three months worth of bread at half allowance were aboard, and this was indicative of the state of the other provisions. Porter talked himself into the idea that only in the eastern Pacific could he resupply the
Essex
. He insisted that no port on the east coast of South America could fulfill his needs without running the risk of blockade, or capture. He also maintained that returning to the United States was out of the question. The American coast would be swarming with British warships, and returning empty handed was diametrically opposite to his instructions to annoy the enemy. He did not seriously consider sailing to the waters around St. Helena, rejecting the idea on the grounds that the state of his provisions would not allow it.

Porter's imagination soared when he thought of what he could accomplish in the Pacific. Wreaking havoc on Britain's whaling fleet would significantly impact her economy. Whalers were so important that the Royal Navy was forbidden to impress men out of them. The British were not expecting the
Essex
in the Pacific. Porter could surprise their whaling fleet before word of his presence reached Admiral Dixon.

Given all these factors, Porter made the final decision to proceed to the Pacific.
He wrote later to Bainbridge explaining his thinking:

[At St. Catherine's] I obtained intelligence of your action with a British frigate, and of the capture of the
Hornet
, of a considerable augmentation of the British force on the coasts of Brazil, and so no hopes of being able to join you except at the last appointed rendezvous and there my stock of provisions would not admit of my going to cruise . . . , to go elsewhere than to the places appointed would be a departure from your instructions and as it now became necessary for me to act discretionary I determined to proceed to the nearest port that would render my supplies certain and at the same time put it out of the power of the enemy to blockade me and thus be enabled to extend my cruise.

Porter claimed that he had no idea where to find Bainbridge at this point. The only realistic way to extend his cruise, he insisted, was to go
into the Pacific. Supplies could be obtained at the Chilean ports of Concepción and Valparaiso, and conceivably from enemy whalers, or from privateers—or even from warships. No other course was open to him, he argued, but doubling the Horn. “There appeared no other choice left for me,” he wrote, “except capture, starvation, or blockade.”

Porter understood well the disadvantages he was operating under. The possible disasters were innumerable, but instead of deterring him, the challenge only stirred his ambition. He ignored for the moment the
Essex
's battery of carronades and how inadequate they would be in a fight with a British frigate. He knew the Admiralty would be coming after him, especially if he had any success. He welcomed London's attention, but would the
Essex
be up to the task he was assigning her? The remarkable victories of American warships in the early months of the war had been due in large part to their superior gunnery. Porter would not have that advantage. He could only be successful if he closed with an enemy, blasted away with his carronades, and boarded. To do this he would have to rely on the witless behavior of British captains, something they were not noted for, although, of course, the Royal Navy had its incompetents. Nothing was going to deter Porter, however. He was too close to realizing his dream. So he put aside the risks, thought only of what might be accomplished, and pressed on.

He convinced himself that the
Essex
could reach Concepción in no more than two and a half months. He could buy jerk beef, fish, fowl, and wine there—and probably a lot more. He also thought there was a good chance of obtaining supplies from captured whalers and privateers, which would allow him to avoid Concepción or any other Spanish port and keep his presence in the eastern Pacific a secret for as long as possible.

CHAPTER

8

D
OUBLING
C
APE
H
ORN

A
ND SO THE FATEFUL DECISION TO DOUBLE
C
APE
H
ORN
(2,500 miles south of St. Catharine's) and sail into the Pacific was made. Porter did not reveal his intentions to the crew right away, but some of the men had been around the Horn before, and when they saw the ship heading south, they sensed where the captain was going. Word got around quickly. Dreams of fat prizes and Polynesian women aroused every imagination.

The rigors of Cape Horn still lay ahead, however. The
Essex
would be the first American warship to double the Horn. Of course, it was a little ridiculous bragging about being the first American warship when European—especially Spanish—ships had been plying the Pacific for centuries. And American whalers and sealers had been in the eastern Pacific for years, going back to the 1780's.
It was an American sealer, the
Topaz
(Captain Mayhew Folger), for instance, that rediscovered Pitcairn Island in February 1808 and answered the question of what had happened to Fletcher Christian, his mutinous comrades, and HMS
Bounty
.

As the
Essex
plowed south, the temperature dropped steadily. Storms and generally poor weather plagued the crew. The cold began to be a
problem. Woolen clothing that Porter had thoughtfully brought aboard was now a necessity, and blankets were needed at night.

On January 28, the
Essex
reached latitude 34° 58' 09” south and longitude 51° 11' 37” west. Porter began preparing for the passage around the Horn. He unbent and put below all the light sails (sky-sails, royal studding-sails, and other sails that were fit only for tropical weather). He also ordered the royal-masts and rigging sent down; unreaved all the running rigging that was not absolutely necessary; sent every heavy article out of the tops; and diminished the weight aloft in every way he could. All the shot went below, except for six to each gun on the gun deck, and he removed the guns from the extremities to amidships, set up the main rigging, and bent the storm-stay-sails.

From January 28 to February 2, 1813, the weather was unsettled and wintry, but the crew remained in good spirits. Porter was more than a little pleased with their health. His strict health regimen was working exceptionally well. The ship was now three months into her voyage, and the crew had had but seven days in port, yet no sign of the dreaded scurvy had appeared.