‘
Service crews cheered
the returning pilots, patted them on the shoulder and shouted words of encouragement,’ wrote the naval air commander Fuchida Mitsuo on the
Akagi
. Planes were rearmed and others hoisted from the hangar to the flight deck, to be ready for a counter-strike against the US carriers. Admiral Nagumo now decided to wait until the Nakajima torpedo bombers were rearmed with ground-attack bombs for another strike against Midway. Some historians argue that this caused a critical delay and was unnecessary. Others point out that it was standard practice not to launch until all types of planes were ready to operate together.
‘At 10.20, Admiral Nagumo gave the order to launch when ready,’ Fuchida continued. ‘On
Akagi
’s flight deck all planes were in position with engines warming up. The big ship began turning into the wind. Within five minutes all her planes would be launched… At 10.24 the order to start launching came from the bridge by voice-tube. The air officer flapped a white flag and the first Zero fighter gathered speed and whizzed off the deck. At that instant a look-out screamed, “Hell-divers!” I looked up to see three black enemy planes plummeting towards our ship. Some of our machineguns managed to fire a few frantic bursts at them, but it was too late. The plump silhouettes of the American Dauntless dive-bombers quickly grew larger, and then a number of black objects suddenly floated eerily from their wings.’
The Dauntless dive-bombers from the
Enterprise
and from Fletcher’s
Yorktown
had managed to conceal themselves in cloud at 3,000 metres, so surprise was complete and the flight deck of the
Akagi
presented the perfect target. Fully fuelled and armed aircraft exploded one after another. One bomb blew a huge hole in the flight deck, and another blasted the elevator for raising aircraft from the hangar below. Neither this hit nor the other on the rear port side of the flight deck would have been enough to sink the ship, but the exploding planes with their bombs and the torpedoes stacked near by reduced the
Akagi
to a blazing hulk. The Emperor’s portrait on board the
Akagi
was hastily transferred to a destroyer.
The
Kaga
near by was also mortally wounded, with black clouds billowing into the air. American dive-bombers then hit the
Soryu
. Gasoline spread, creating an inferno. Ammunition and bombs began to explode. Suddenly, an enormous blast hurled those on deck into the water. ‘
As soon as the fires
broke out aboard ship,’ Admiral Nagumo related, ‘the captain, Yanagimoto Ryusaku, appeared on the signal tower to the starboard of the bridge. He took command from this post and pleaded that his men seek shelter and safety. He would allow no man to approach him. Flames
surrounded him but he refused to give up his post. He was shouting “Banzai” over and over again when heroic death overtook him.’
Soon afterwards, the
Yorktown
was crippled by
Japanese torpedo bombers
. Her returning aircraft were diverted to Spruance’s carriers, replacing some of their earlier losses. And in a later strike, planes from the
Enterprise
hit the
Hiryu
, which also sank. ‘
At 23.50
,’ Admiral Nagumo reported, ‘Captain Kaki Tomeo and Squadron Commander Rear-Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon delivered messages to the crew. This was followed by expressions of reverence and respect to the Emperor, the shouting of Banzais, the lowering of the battle flag and command flag. At 00.15, all hands were ordered to abandon ship, His Imperial Highness’s portrait was removed, and the transfer of personnel to the destroyers
Kazagumo
and
Makigumo
put underway. The transfer of portrait and men was completed at 01.30. After completion of the transfer operations, the Division Commander and Captain remained aboard ship. They waved their caps to their men and with complete composure joined their fate with that of their ship.’
Yamamoto, unaware of the disaster which had overtaken his carriers, ordered further attacks. His reaction can well be imagined when he was informed of the true situation. He ordered his massive fleet of ten battleships, including the
Yamato
, the largest warship afloat, and two escort carriers, with a host of cruiser and destroyer escorts, to engage with all speed. Spruance, aware of Yamamoto’s force, changed course in the night back towards Midway to benefit from land-based air cover. The following day, his dive-bombers managed to sink one cruiser and severely damage another. But the damaged
Yorktown
, while salvage operations were proceeding on 6 June, was hit by torpedoes from a Japanese submarine and sank the following morning.
With four Japanese carriers and a cruiser sunk, and a battleship severely damaged, to say nothing of 250 aircraft destroyed, and all for the loss of one American carrier, Midway represented a decisive victory, and a clear turning point in the Pacific war. Yamamoto’s hopes of smashing the US Pacific Fleet were completely dashed. But as Nimitz acknowledged in his report: ‘
Had we lacked early information
of the Japanese movement, and had we been caught with Carrier Task Forces dispersed, possibly as far away as the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway would have ended far differently.’
MARCH–SEPTEMBER 1942
A
fter the humiliating retreat across Cyrenaica in January and February 1942, the Rommel myth, so fervently propagated by Goebbels, was also promoted by the British. The legend of the ‘Desert Fox’ was a very misguided attempt to explain away their own failures. Hitler was amazed and delighted by such hero-worship. It encouraged his belief that the British, after all their defeats in the Far East, were close to collapse.
He was, however, prepared to rein in his favourite general to appease the Italians. Mussolini’s position was threatened by growing opposition within the Comando Supremo, whose members felt that the Duce was too much in Hitler’s pocket. And they had been affronted by Rommel’s arrogance and peremptory demands, to say nothing of his constant complaints about their failure to provide and protect the supply convoys he needed. In addition, Halder and the OKH were still resolutely opposed to reinforcing Rommel. They argued that the Suez Canal should be taken only after an advance through the Caucasus. The priority of the eastern front remained a powerful argument as they prepared their great offensive in southern Russia. Only the Kriegsmarine, which wanted a policy of defeating Britain first, supported Rommel’s ambitions.
The island of Malta was in a desperate position after a renewed Luftwaffe bombing offensive against the airfields and the main harbour of Valletta. All five ships in a convoy in March were sunk and the troops and civilian population faced starvation. But in May a reinforcement of sixty Spitfires flown off the aircraft carrier USS
Wasp
and the arrival of a minelayer with supplies saved the island. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the German commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, had made plans for an airborne invasion of Malta, Operation Hercules, but these had to be put aside. Not only was Hitler dubious of success, but X Fliegerkorps was needed further east. Also the Italians demanded excessive support before committing themselves.
Rommel once again ignored both his orders and his supply problems, and began to move the Panzer Army Afrika forward towards the Gazala Line. ‘
The fighting has none
of the horror, that indescribable misery of the Russian campaign,’ an Unteroffizier wrote home in April. ‘No villages and towns destroyed or laid waste.’ In another letter that evening, he wrote to
his mother: ‘The Tommy out here takes everything in a more sporting way… Onwards to a decisive victory.’ Although Rommel’s soldiers were also afflicted by the mass of flies and the intense heat which baked their bread hard, they soon expected a victory from ‘the great offensive in Russia, then the Tommies here will be crushed from both sides’. They looked forward to visiting Cairo.
The OKW then suddenly came round to the idea of Rommel’s dream of seizing Egypt and the Suez Canal. Hitler had begun to fear that American military support might arrive earlier than he had originally thought. Even an Allied attack across the Channel could not be ruled out. If Rommel could smash the Eighth Army, he reasoned, British morale would be shattered. Also the Japanese had indicated that they would advance westwards into the Indian Ocean only if the Germans took the Suez Canal.
The first stage of Rommel’s invasion of Egypt, codenamed Oper ation Theseus, was to outflank the British defensive line. This extended in defended boxes from Gazala on the coast, some eighty kilometres west of Tobruk, southwards to Bir Hakheim, an outpost in the desert defended by General Marie-Pierre Koenig’s 1st Free French Brigade. There were seven boxes, each defended by an infantry brigade group, with artillery, barbed wire and minefields which extended down to the next box. To the rear, Ritchie had placed his armoured formations ready to make a counter-attack. Rommel then intended to seize Tobruk. The capture of this port was regarded as essential for resupply, otherwise it would take his Opel Blitz trucks fourteen days for each round trip up from Tripoli and back again.
Operation Theseus should not have taken the British unawares since Bletchley had passed the relevant Ultra decrypts to GHQ Middle East. But the chain of command was reluctant to pass the information down, except to say that an attack was probable in May and that it might well take the form of a right hook from the south. The attack began on 26 May, with Italian infantry divisions advancing against the northern half of the line in a feint. To the south the Trieste Motorized Division and Ariete Armoured Division, together with the three German panzer divisions, moved deep into the desert. A sandstorm concealed their 10,000 vehicles from the eyes of the British. Then, during the night, Rommel’s main striking force outflanked the Gazala Line from the south.
Rommel led his divisions rapidly round in a wide sweep, making use of the bright moon once the
khamsin
dropped. They were in position before dawn, ready to attack. Some thirty kilometres north-east of Bir Hakeim, the 15th Panzer Division clashed with the 4th Armoured Brigade, inflicting heavy losses on the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment and the 8th Hussars. Soon afterwards eighty British tanks counter-attacked the 21st Panzer Division.
The Eighth Army now had 167 American Grant tanks. These were heavy, unusually tall and not very manoeuvrable when it came to firing, but their 75mm guns were far more effective than the pathetic two-pounders on the Crusaders.
The 3rd Indian Motorized Brigade, to the south-east of Bir Hakeim, had meanwhile been hit at 06.30 hours on 27 May. Their commander radioed back that they were facing ‘
a whole bloody German
armoured division’, when in fact it was the Italian Ariete Division. The Indian troops destroyed fifty-two tanks, but they were overwhelmed once all their anti-tank guns had been knocked out.
Koenig’s Free French brigade in their equally lonely position at Bir Hakeim knew what awaited them, having heard the sound of tank engines out in the desert during the night. In the morning, a patrol confirmed that the enemy was behind them and had cut them off from their supply depot. Koenig’s force of some 4,000 men included a half-brigade of the Foreign Legion, two battalions of colonial troops and marine infantry. They also had their own artillery support, with fifty-four French 75mm field guns and Bofors guns. Like the other boxes, their first line of defence consisted of minefields and barbed wire.
The tanks of the Ariete Division now turned against them and attacked in a mass. French gunners knocked out thirty-two. Only six Italian tanks managed to break through the mines and wire, but French legionnaires destroyed them at close range. Some even climbed on to the Italian tanks and fired through slits and hatches. The attack was unsupported by infantry, and the French bravely fought off every wave, inflicting heavy losses and taking ninety-one prisoners, including a regimental commander. Skirmishes were also fought against the German 90th Light Division. ‘
For the first time since
June 1940,’ General de Gaulle later wrote proudly, ‘French and Germans were in action against each other.’
To the north-east, the rest of the 90th Light Division attacked the 7th Motorized Brigade and forced the outnumbered British to withdraw. Its units then overran the 7th Armoured Division headquarters and took various supply dumps. Although the 90th Light advanced rapidly, Rommel’s two panzer divisions were hampered by counter-attacks and heavy artillery fire on their advance north towards the airfield at El Adem, which had been the scene of such heavy fighting the year before.
Rommel’s daring plan had not succeeded as he had hoped. His forces were in a vulnerable position between the Gazala Line boxes and the remainder of the British armour to the west. Rommel had also expected the French at Bir Hakeim to be rapidly crushed, but they still held out. He was deeply worried and many of his officers thought that the offensive had failed. His chief of staff even suggested telling the OKW that the operation
had merely been a reconnaissance in strength in an attempt to protect the Panzerarmee Afrika’s reputation. But they need not have worried. Once again the British had failed to concentrate their tanks sufficiently to make an impact.
Rommel wanted to forge on north to the coastal road and break the British line there, so as to re-establish his supply line back to Tripoli. But from 28 May fighting became chaotic inside the centre of the Gazala Line. Rommel’s divisions were hampered by fuel and ammunition shortages, but again he was saved by the slowness of British commanders to exploit their considerable advantage. Ritchie wanted to send in a major night attack, but his corps and divisional commanders argued that they needed more time. They thought that the Germans were trapped, but Axis troops had been making a gap in the minefield to the west and supplies began to come through. However, this passage was close to the 150th Brigade’s box, whose Yorkshire battalions suddenly provided Rommel with a major problem.