The Savior Generals: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost—From Ancient Greece to Iraq (43 page)

17.
For discussion of the contradictory numbers in ancient sources, cf. Strauss,
Battle of Salamis,
42. Hignett,
Xerxes Invasion of Greece,
345–55, in detailed fashion, reviews the literary evidence, arriving at a low estimate of a Persian army of some 80,000, and a naval force of about 600 ships (that might require some 120,000 seamen).

18.
Herodotus (8.25.2) believed that there were 4,000 Greek dead left on the battlefield, which, if true, would mean that almost 60 percent of Leonidas’ original force perished at the pass. Apparently that figure would have had to include large numbers of dead on the first two days of battle from the original force of 7,000, together with the vast majority of those (the 400 Thebans, 700 Thespians, 300 Spartans, and some Phocians and helots) left behind with Leonidas.

19.
Themistocles at Artemisium, cf. Diodorus 11.12.5–6. There is a good account of the battle and its aftermath in Hale,
Lords of the Sea,
46–54.

20.
Cf. Plutarch,
Themistocles,
9.3; Herodotus 7.33–4.

21.
Cf. Herodotus 49–50. Lenardon,
The Saga of Themistocles,
64–65, discusses the various interpretations of the famous oracular reply.

22.
On Demaratus’ advice, see Herodotus 7.235.3. The historian wrote during the initial years of the later Peloponnesian War, and we do not know to what degree, if any, Herodotus put his own ideas about the strategies from a contemporary war into the mouths of his historical characters. For the evacuation and the circumstances around the decree, cf., again, Lenardon,
Saga of Themistocles,
69–72.

23.
For the few who stayed behind either in the Attic countryside or at Athens, see Green,
Graeco-Persian War,
156–60. A year after Salamis, the Greeks would win a glorious infantry victory at Plataea over Mardonius. But that battle came after careful preparation, was prompted in part by the retreat of King Xerxes and his fleet back to Asia after their defeat at Salamis, and was
waged with near equal numbers on both sides. Fifty years after Salamis, the Athenians were still claiming that the sea victory alone broke the Persians’ back (cf. Thucydides 1.73.2–5).

24.
On the Greeks’ desire to vacate Salamis, see the synopsis in Diodorus 11.15.4–5.

25.
Herodotus 8.62; cf. Plutarch,
Themistocles,
11. We have no reason to doubt this improbable threat, given that it seems to have been accepted by most ancient authorities.

26.
Green,
Graeco-Persian War,
159–60, discusses the operational authority among the Greek generals at Salamis. In general, Grundy over a century ago laid out the main controversies surrounding the numbers, tactics, and topography of the battle; cf. Grundy,
Great Persian War,
379–95.

27.
There were far more ships, and probably far more sailors, than at either the Roman-Carthaginian battle at Ecnomus (256 B.C.) or Lepanto (1571)—two similarly huge “clash of civilizations” sea battles that pitted the proverbial West against the non-West. On the numbers of Greek and Persian ships at both Artemisium and Salamis, see again the review in Hignett,
Xerxes’ Invasion of Greece,
345–50; cf. Green,
Graeco-Persian War,
162–63, who conjectures an allied fleet of about 311 triremes, corrected for probable losses from the retreat from Artemisium. Herodotus (8.66) implies that the Persian land and sea forces had made up all the prior losses at Thermopylae and Artemisium and were about the same size as when they had crossed into Europe the prior spring. Grote offered the best synopsis of the numbers in various ancient sources; cf.
Greece,
5.111–12.

28.
Herodotus—writing two generations after the battle—believed that the Greek ships were the “heavier.” Scholars usually interpret that he meant that they were either water-logged, built of unseasoned, denser timber, or simply larger and less elegant—and thus less maneuverable but sturdier—than the Persians’ triremes. Whatever the true case, it was clearly in the Greeks’ interest not to go out too far to sea, where they would be both outnumbered and outmaneuvered, but to stay inside the straits where their ramming in heavier ships would have far greater effect. In this regard, we should remember that almost no major Greek battle was ever fought in the open seas far from land.

29.
Plutarch,
Themistocles,
12.3–5; and cf. Diodorus 11.17.2. Many scholars doubt the veracity of the Sicinnus ruse. See the lively account of the trick in Holland,
Persian Fire,
312–16; but cf. Grote,
Greece,
5.128. The Persian redeployment of the Egyptian fleet is not found in Herodotus.

30.
Aeschylus,
Persians
371; 412–13; 425–26. Aeschylus, a veteran of the battle, may have meant as well that dozens of Persian ships in the middle of the fleet simply never were able to come into contact at all with the Greeks attacking at the periphery, a sort of naval Cannae in which thousands of combatants were not able to commit to battle for quite some time, if at all. Certainly
the idea that scores of Persian ships could not get at the enemy, or, in turn, fouled one another during battle as the winds and currents increased, seems a key component in the Greek success. On the sounds and confusion of the battle, see Strauss,
Salamis,
162–73, who has a graphic account of the battle based on ancient literary sources.

31.
Aeschylus,
Persians,
274–76, 282–83. On the losses, see Grundy,
Great Persian War,
404–5. Herodotus gives no exact figures. Diodorus (11.19.3) says forty Greek ships were lost (i.e., 8,000 men if all the crews were killed) and “more than” 200 Persian ships (in that case perhaps more than 40,000 drowned), not counting those captured. Given the enormous size of the Persian fleet and Herodotus’ view of utter destruction, Xerxes’ losses were probably far above 40,000, while far less than 8,000 were lost on the Greek side, given their rowers’ ability to swim and friendly troops on the shores of the island. As at Lepanto, there is a likelihood that few prisoners were taken, the Greek idea being that any killed in the waters of Salamis would not fight again the next year. See Hanson,
Carnage and Culture,
46–51, for the motif of
eleutheria
(freedom) that the poet Aeschylus celebrated at Salamis and the role it played in galvanizing the Greeks.

32.
On the allied weariness with the overly confident hero of Salamis, cf. Plutarch,
Themistocles,
22. Of course, we need to remember much of this animosity was elite-driven and did not reflect Themistocles’ continued popularity with the Athenian
dêmos
that would continue to invest in his leadership; cf. Aeschylus,
Persians,
591–94. Aeschylus records (402–5) that the Greeks rowed into battle chanting cries of “Free your children, your wives, the images of your fathers’ gods and the tombs of your ancestors.”

33.
On the virtual disappearance of Themistocles after Salamis, cf. Lazenby,
Defence of Greece,
209, and especially Grundy,
Great Persian War,
413–17, who discusses various charges of corruption and Medizing, as well as a general distaste for his imperiousness after Salamis—considerations that eventually led him to either cede or be fired from the allied post-Salamis fleet.

34.
The historian Thucydides (1.138) felt that Themistocles died of natural causes, most probably disease, despite the more sensational accounts of suicide alluded to in Aristophanes (
Knights,
83–84) and stated as fact in the much later account of Plutarch (
Themistocles,
3.1). We are still unsure why many in the ancient world believed that the rather harmless blood of a bull was lethal to humans; in general, cf. Diodorus 11.58; Nepos,
Themistocles,
2.10.

35.
For the complex itinerary of Themistocles seeking a secure refuge during his exile, see the discussions of Podlecki,
Life of Themistocles,
71; Lenardon,
Saga of Themistocles,
108–52; and cf. Diodorus 11.55–58.

36.
Plutarch,
Themistocles,
28.3. The dates of Themistocles’ exile and wandering are endlessly under dispute by modern scholars; cf. the review of the problems in Lewis,
Cambridge Ancient History,
vol. V, 66–67.

37.
Plutarch,
Themistocles,
21–22. Ostracism, exile, execution, and confiscation of property were the usual deserts for both politicians and generals throughout the Greek city-states.

38.
On the famous Themistoclean ruse of deceiving the Spartans while his countrymen fortified the city, see Thucydides 1.90–91; Diodorus 11.40. While it could take a week to reach Athens and another to return home, it seems incredible that the Spartans had no information concerning Athens’s massive wall building while Themistocles conducted his deceptive diplomacy. On Themistocles and Athens’s various fortifications, cf. Nepos,
Themistocles,
2.6–8.

39.
For ancient conservative outrage at the nexus between sea power, walls, radical democracy, and evacuation, see the critique of the so-called Old Oligarch, 2.2–14, an anonymous conservative who wrote a near-contemporary treatise on the insidious nature of Athenian democracy.

40.
Plato,
Laws,
4.706; cf. Plutarch,
Themistocles,
4. To conservatives, Marathon was the last time that Athenian infantrymen fought gloriously in Attica for their own land—in part thanks to scoundrels like Themistocles.

41.
Plato,
Laws,
4.706. Much of Plato’s criticism of democracy assumes insidious efforts of lowborn demagogues to emasculate the wellborn militarily, economically, and politically.

42.
Plutarch,
Themistocles,
19.3–4. Almost all extant Greek literature is antidemocratic, in the sense of emphasizing the dangers of allowing a majority of citizens in Athens to set policy by simple majority vote without either constitutional restraints, the checks and balances of parallel but more oligarchial bodies, or the influential presence of senior landowning conservatives.

43.
For the bust of Themistocles, see J. Boardman,
Cambridge Ancient History: Plates to volumes V and VI
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), vol. VI, 25, 26a.

44.
On the Spartan effort to have the Athenians ostracize Themistocles, see Diodorus 11.55–56.

45.
Thucydides 1.138.3; Plutarch,
Themistocles,
1.1–3, 2.3. “Serpentine”: Holland,
Persian Fire,
165. The ancient notion that Themistocles was as much a political partisan as a patriot makes it hard even today to offer an accurate assessment of his strategic vision in the context of the times.

46.
On the “good” battle at Marathon versus the rabble’s victory at Salamis, see Plato,
Laws,
707c; and in general, Hanson,
Stillborn West,
83–84. For the complicated lineage and status of Themistocles, see the discussion in Davies,
Athenian Propertied Families,
217–20. Reasons for his exile: cf. Lewis,
Cambridge Ancient History,
vol. V, 66; Diodorus 11.55–56.

47.
On the discrediting of Themistocles in the postwar period, cf. Aristotle,
Politics
5.1304a17–24.

48.
Plutarch,
Themistocles,
2–6.

49.
On the assessment of the role of Themistocles, the value of his deceptions, and the tactics at Salamis, cf. Diodorus 11.18–19.

50.
Herodotus 8.109–11; Diodorus 11.19. Salamis also ensured that Plataea was an existential battle: Without a fleet to allow a maritime retreat, a defeated Persian army would be trapped deep within Greek territory with the only avenue of escape a march through hundreds of miles of suddenly hostile Greek territory.

51.
For ancient generalizations of Themistocles’ gifts, see Diodorus 11.59.4, and especially the blanket encomium of Thucydides, 1.138.3–4.

52.
Herodotus 60–61. Note that Themistocles himself engaged in “what if” hypotheticals to persuade his fellow generals to accept his strategic plan.

53.
Herodotus 8.57. After the battle, there was widespread criticism of the Persians’ unexpected disastrous defeat—rich material for the storyteller Herodotus to put into the mouths of sympathetic characters like the ignored advisers Artemesia and Demaratus, who both had supposedly advocated quite different Persian strategies.

54.
Aeschylus,
Persians,
792.

55.
Plutarch,
Themistocles,
18.2.

56.
Aeschylus,
Persians,
242.

57.
Diodorus extols Themistocles to such a degree that he concludes by apologizing for his effusive portrait, cf. 11.59.4.

58.
Again, see the long assessment of Thucydides (1.138.3–4), which concludes (Crawley translation): “To sum up, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency.” And for an in-depth modern appreciation of Themistocles as the father of the Athenian navy and the architect of Athenian maritime hegemony, see Hale,
Lords of the Sea,
3–14.