The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (140 page)

The government, though there may have been some waverers up to this moment, could not be less courageous than the King, and it quickly rallied behind him. By the time Brauer got to Eidsvold, halfway back to
Oslo,
Koht was on the telephone line to him with the Norwegian reply. The German minister telephoned it immediately to the legation in Oslo, where it was sped to Berlin.

That evening from a feeble little rural radio station nearby, the only means of communication to the outside world available, the Norwegian government flung down the gauntlet to the mighty Third Reich. It announced its decision not to accept the German demands and called upon the people—there were only three million of them—to resist the invaders. The King formally associated himself with the appeal.

But the Nazi conquerors could not quite bring themselves to believe that the Norwegians meant what they said. Two more attempts were made to dissuade the King. On the morning of April 11 an emissary of Quisling, a
Captain Irgens
, arrived to urge the monarch to return to the capital. He promised that Quisling would serve him loyally. His proposal was dismissed with silent contempt.

In the afternoon an urgent message came from Bräuer, requesting a further audience with the King to talk over “certain proposals.” The hard-pressed German envoy had been instructed by Ribbentrop to tell the monarch that he “wanted to give the Norwegian people one last chance of a reasonable agreement.”
*
This time Dr.
Koht
, after consulting the King, replied that if the German minister had “certain proposals” he could communicate them to the Foreign Minister.

The Nazi reaction to this rebuff by such a small and now helpless country was immediate and in character. The Germans had failed, first, to capture the King and the members of the government and, then, to persuade them to surrender. Now the Germans tried to kill them. Late on April 11, the Luftwaffe was sent out to give the village of
Nybergsund
the full treatment. The Nazi flyers demolished it with explosive and incendiary bombs and then machine-gunned those who tried to escape the burning ruins. The Germans apparently believed at first that they had succeeded in massacring the King and the members of the government. The diary of a German airman, later captured in northern Norway, had this entry for April 11: “Nybergsund.
Oslo Regierung. Alles vernichtet.
” (Oslo government. Completely wiped out.)

The village had been, but not the King and the government. With the approach of the Nazi bombers they had taken refuge in a nearby wood. Standing in snow up to their knees, they had watched the Luftwaffe reduce the modest cottages of the hamlet to ruins. They now faced a choice of either moving on to the nearby Swedish border and asylum in neutral Sweden or pushing north into their own mountains, still deep in the spring snow. They decided to move on up the rugged Gudbrands Valley, which led past
Hamar
and
Lillehammer
and through the mountains to
Åndalsnes
on the northwest coast, a hundred miles southwest of
Trondheim
. Along the route they might organize the still dazed and scattered Norwegian forces for further resistance. And there was some hope that British troops might eventually arrive to help them.

In the far north at
Narvik
the
British Navy
already had reacted sharply to the surprise German occupation. It had been, as Churchill, who was in charge of it, admitted, “completely outwitted” by the Germans. Now in the north at least, out of range of the German land-based bombers, it went over to the offensive. On the morning of April 10, twenty-four hours after ten German destroyers had taken Narvik and disembarked Dietl’s troops, a force of five British destroyers entered Narvik harbor, sank two of the five German destroyers then in the port, damaged the other three and sank all the German cargo vessels except one. In this action the German naval commander, Rear Admiral
Bonte
, was killed. On leaving the harbor, however, the British ships ran into the five remaining German destroyers emerging from nearby fjords. The German craft were heavier gunned and sank one British destroyer, forced the beaching of another on which the British commander, Captain Warburton-Lee, was mortally wounded, and damaged a third. Three of the five British destroyers managed to make the open sea where, in retiring, they sank a large German freighter, laden with ammunition, which was approaching the port.

At noon on April 13 the British, this time with the battleship
Warspite
, a survivor of the First World War
Battle of Jutland
, leading a flotilla of destroyers, returned to Narvik and wiped out the remaining German war vessels. Vice-Admiral W. J. Whitworth, the commanding officer, in wirelessing the Admiralty of his action urged that since the German troops on shore had been stunned and disorganized—Dietl and his men had in fact taken to the hills—Narvik be occupied at once “by the main landing force.” Unfortunately for the Allies, the British Army commander, Major General P. J. Mackesy, was an exceedingly cautious officer and, arriving the very next day with an advance contingent of three infantry battalions, decided not to risk a landing at Narvik but to disembark his troops at
Harstad
, thirty-five miles to the north, which was in the hands of the Norwegians. This was a costly error.

In the light of the fact that they had prepared a small expeditionary corps for Norway, the British were unaccountably slow in getting their troops under way. On the afternoon of April 8, after news was received of the movement of German fleet units up the Norwegian coast, the British Navy hurriedly
disembarked
the troops that had already been loaded on shipboard for the possible occupation of
Stavanger
,
Bergen
, Trondheim and Narvik, on the ground that every ship would be needed for naval action. By the time the British land forces were re-embarked all those port
cities were in German hands. And by the time they reached central Norway they were doomed, as were the British naval ships which were to cover them, by the Luftwaffe’s control of the air.

By April 20, one British brigade, reinforced by three battalions of French Chasseurs Alpins, had been landed at
Namsos
, a small port eighty miles northeast of
Trondheim
, and a second British brigade had been put ashore at
Åndalsnes
, a hundred miles to the southwest of Trondheim, which was thus to be attacked from north and south. But lacking field artillery, antiaircraft guns and air support, their bases pounded night and day by German bombers which blocked the further landing of supplies or reinforcements, neither force ever seriously threatened Trondheim. The Åndalsnes brigade, after meeting a Norwegian unit at Dombas, a rail junction sixty miles to the east, abandoned the proposed attack northward toward Trondheim and pushed southeast down the Gudbrandsdal in order to aid the Norwegian troops which, under the energetic command of Colonel Ruge, had been slowing up the main German drive coming up the valley from Oslo.

At
Lillehammer
, north of
Hamar
, the first engagement of the war between British and German troops took place on April 21, but it was no match. The ship laden with the British brigade’s artillery had been sunk and there were only rifles and machine guns with which to oppose a strong German force armed with artillery and light tanks. Even worse, the British infantry, lacking air support, was incessantly pounded by Luftwaffe planes operating from nearby Norwegian airfields. Lillehammer fell after a twenty-four-hour battle and the British and Norwegian forces began a retreat of 140 miles up the valley railway to Åndalsnes, halting here and there to fight a rear-guard action-which slowed the Germans but never stopped them. On the nights of April 30 and May 1 the British forces were evacuated from Åndalsnes and on May 2 the Anglo–French contingent from Namsos, considerable feats in themselves, for both harbors were blazing shambles from continuous German bombing. On the night of April 29 the King of Norway and the members of his government were taken aboard the British cruiser
Glasgow
at
Molde
, across the Romsdals-fjord from Åndalsnes, itself also a shambles from Luftwaffe bombing, and conveyed to
Tromsö
, far above the Arctic Circle and north of
Narvik
, where on May Day the provisional capital was set up.

By then the southern half of Norway, comprising all the cities and main towns, had been irretrievably lost. But northern Norway seemed secure. On May 28 an Allied force of 25,000 men, including two brigades of Norwegians, a brigade of Poles and two battalions of the French Foreign Legion, had driven the greatly outnumbered Germans out of Narvik. There seemed no reason to doubt that Hitler would be deprived of both his iron ore and his objective of occupying all of Norway and making the Norwegian government capitulate. But by this time the Wehrmacht had struck with stunning force on the Western front and every Allied soldier was needed to plug the gap. Narvik was abandoned, the Allied troops
were hastily re-embarked, and General Died, who had held out in a wild mountainous tract near the Swedish border, reoccupied the port on June 8 and four days later accepted the surrender of the persevering and gallant Colonel Ruge and his bewildered, resentful Norwegian troops, who felt they had been left in the lurch by the British. King Haakon and his government were taken aboard the cruiser
Devonshire
at
Tromsö
on June 7 and departed for London and five years of bitter exile.
*
In Berlin Dietl was promoted to Major General, awarded the Ritterkreuz and hailed by Hitler as the
Sieger von
Narvik
.

   Despite his amazing successes the Fuehrer had had his bad moments during the Norwegian campaign. General Jodl’s diary is crammed with terse entries recounting a succession of the warlord’s nervous crises. “Terrible excitement,” he noted on April 14 after news had been received of the wiping out of the German naval forces at Narvik. On April 17 Hitler had a fit of hysteria about the loss of Narvik; he demanded that General Dietl’s troops there be evacuated by air—an impossibility. “Each piece of bad news,” Jodl scribbled that day in his diary, “leads to the worst fears.” And two days later: “Renewed crisis. Political action has failed. Envoy
Bräuer
is recalled. According to the Fuehrer, force has to be used …
†
The conferences at the Chancellery in Berlin that day, April 19, became so embittered, with the heads of the three services blaming each other for
the delays, that even the lackey Keitel stalked out of the room. “Chaos of leadership is again threatening,” Jodl noted. And on April 22 he added: “Fuehrer is increasingly worried about the English landings.”

On April 23 the slow progress of the German forces moving up from Oslo toward
Trondheim
and
Åndalsnes
caused the “excitement to grow,” as Jodl put it, but the next day the news was better and from that day it continued to grow more rosy. By the twenty-sixth the warlord was in such fine fettle that at 3:30 in the morning, during an all-night session with his military advisers, he told them he intended to start “Yellow” between May 1 and 7. “Yellow” was the code name for the attack in the West across Holland and Belgium. Though on April 29 Hitler was again “worried about Trondheim,” the next day he was “happy with joy” at the news that a battle group from Oslo had reached the city. He could at last turn his attention back to the West. On May 1 he ordered that preparations for the big attack there be ready by May 5.

The Wehrmacht commanders—Goering,
Brauchitsch
, Halder, Keitel, Jodl, Raeder and the rest—had for the first time had a foretaste during the Norwegian campaign of how their demonic Leader cracked under the strain of even minor setbacks in battle. It was a weakness which would grow on him when, after a series of further astonishing military successes, the tide of war changed, and it would contribute mightily to the eventual debacle of the Third Reich.

Still, any way one looked at it, the quick conquest of Denmark and Norway had been an important victory for Hitler and a discouraging defeat for the British. It secured the winter iron ore route, gave added protection to the entrance to the Baltic, allowed the daring German Navy to break out into the North Atlantic and provided them with excellent port facilities there for submarines and surface ships in the sea war against Britain. It brought Hitler air bases hundreds of miles closer to the main enemy. And perhaps most important of all it immensely enhanced the military prestige of the Third Reich and correspondingly diminished that of the Western Allies. Nazi Germany seemed invincible. Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland
and now Denmark and Norway had succumbed easily to Hitler’s force, or threat of force, and not even the help of two major allies in the West had been, in the latter cases, of the slightest avail. The wave of the future, as an eminent American woman wrote, seemed to belong to Hitler and Nazism.

For the remaining neutral states Hitler’s latest conquest was also a terrifying lesson. Obviously neutrality no longer offered protection to the little democratic nations trying to survive in a totalitarian-dominated world. Finland had just found that out, and now
Norway and Denmark
. They had themselves to blame for being so blind, for declining to accept in good time—before the actual aggression—the help of friendly world powers.

He was obviously thinking of Holland and Belgium, but even in their case, though there would be a month of grace, no such meditation began.
*