The Republic and The Laws (Oxford World's Classics) (9 page)

Nevertheless, in monarchies the rest of the populace plays too small a part in the community’s legislation and debate; in aristocracies the masses can have hardly any share in liberty, since they are deprived of any participation in discussion and decision-making; and when the government is carried on entirely by the people (however moderate and orderly) their equality is itself unequal, since it acknowledges no degrees of merit. Hence, although Cyrus of Persia was an exceptionally just and wise monarch, that form of government was not, in my view, the most desirable; for the property of the public (which is, as I said, the definition of a republic) was managed by one man’s nod and wish.
*
Similarly, if it is true, as it is, that our clients, the Massilians, are governed with exemplary justice by a select group of leading citizens, yet even still the people are in a position somewhat akin to slavery. If at one period after the abolition of the Areopagus Athens discharged all its business through the resolutions and decrees of the people, that state failed to maintain its high reputation, for it did not observe different levels of merit.

I am speaking here about these three types of government, not when they have become mingled and blended, but when they retain their pure form. These types are each imperfect in the ways described above. They have also other potentially destructive defects. In fact each of these governments follows a kind of steep and slippery path which leads to a depraved version
*
of itself. Cyrus (to take the most conspicuous example) was a tolerable, even (I grant you) a likeable monarch. Yet below him stands the cruelly
capricious
*
Phalaris. His is the image into which, by a smooth and easy process, the rule of one man degenerates. The government of Massilia, which consists of a few leading citizens, has as its close counterpart the Thirty—that notorious junta which at one time ruled Athens. The supreme power exercised by the Athenian people (to take no other instance) was transformed into the mad and irresponsible caprice of the mob … [A
leaf is gone and there is something wrong with the opening words of
45;
they have been omitted from the translation. It is clear, however, that they referred to the process whereby one constitution arose from another
.]

… likewise, one of those types which I have just described usually bursts forth from it. The cycles
*
and, so to speak, revolutions through which governments pass in their successive changes are quite amazing. It is the business of the intelligent man to be aware of them; but to see them coming, to modify their effects, and to keep control of their course while governing the state—that calls for a great citizen and a man of almost superhuman powers. That is why, in my view, a fourth kind of government is to be judged the best; that is, a carefully proportioned mixture
*
of the first three described above.

LAELIUS
: I know that’s what you prefer, Africanus; I’ve often heard you say so. Still, if it’s not a nuisance, I’d like to know which of your three forms you consider the best. For it would help us to appreciate …

[One leaf is lost. Scipio is presenting the arguments for democracy.]

SCIPIO
: … and the nature of every state depends on the character and will of its ruling body. So liberty has no home in any state except a democracy. Nothing can be sweeter than liberty. Yet if it isn’t equal throughout, it isn’t liberty at all. For how can liberty be equal throughout, I will not say in a monarchy, where slavery is evident and unmistakable, but in those states where everyone is free in name only? They register their votes, they bestow military commands and political offices, they are canvassed, and asked to say yea or nay; but they confer what they
would have to confer even if they didn’t want to—things which they themselves don’t have, in spite of being asked for them by others. For they have no share in the supreme power, or in national policy-making, or in legal decisions (those are made by specially appointed judges). All such things are apportioned on the basis of one’s ancient lineage or wealth. But in a free community of the Rhodian
*
or Athenian kind there is no citizen who
… [A leaf is lost. Scipio is still speaking on the same topic]
… We are told that, when one or more exceptionally rich and prosperous men emerge from the populace, (a despotism or an oligarchy) comes into being as a result of their arrogance and contempt; for the faint-hearted and the weak give way and succumb to the haughtiness of wealth. But if the people would hold fast to their rights, nothing, they say, would be superior in power, liberty, or happiness, inasmuch as they would be in charge of laws, courts, war, peace, treaties, individual lives, and wealth. They maintain that this form of government is the only one that deserves the name of ‘republic’ (i.e. the property of the public); and that for this reason the republic tends to be restored to freedom from the domination of a king or a senate, whereas kings or rich and powerful aristocrats are not summoned to take over from free peoples. They insist that the whole concept of a free people should not be rejected because of the crimes committed by an undisciplined mob. When the people, in a spirit of unity, judge everything in the light of their own security and freedom, nothing, they say, is less liable to change or collapse. Harmony is readily maintained in a state where everyone has the same interests. It is from incompatible interests, when different policies suit different people, that discord arises. And so, when a senate held power, the stability of the state was never assured. Far less was it assured in the case of monarchy, which, as Ennius
*
says, possesses ‘no holy partnership or trust’. Since, then, law is the bond which holds together a community of citizens, and the justice embodied in the law is the same for everyone, by what right can a community of citizens be held together when their status is unequal? If the equalization of wealth is rejected, and the equalization of everybody’s abilities is impossible, legal rights at least must be equal among those who live as fellow-citizens in the same state. For what is a state other than an
equal partnership in justice? …
[One leaf is lost. The topic remains the same.]

… The argument runs that the other types of state have no right to the names by which they themselves wish to be called. Take a man who is greedy for domination or absolute power, lording it over an oppressed people. Why should I call him ‘king’, using the title of Jupiter the Best, instead of ‘despot’? Despots can be benevolent, just as kings can be oppressive. So, as far as the people are concerned, the only question is whether they are the slaves of a kind or a harsh master. Either way, they must necessarily be slaves. When Sparta was thought to excel in its political organization, how could it be sure of enjoying good and just kings when it was obliged to accept as a king whoever was born into a royal family?
*
As for those ‘aristocrats’ who have not been granted the title by the people’s consent but have appropriated it through their own electoral assembly, who could endure them? For on what criteria is a man to be judged ‘the best’? Why, on the basis of his learning, his skills, his activities, I hear it said …
[Two leaves are lost.]

[Scipio continues]
… If (the state) leaves the process to chance, it will be overturned as quickly as a ship in which a man chosen by lot
*
from among the passengers has taken over the helm. If, however, a free people chooses the men to whom it will entrust itself, and if, with a genuine desire for security, it chooses only the best men, then without a doubt the security of such states depends on the policies of aristocrats, especially as nature has decreed not only that men of superior character and ability should be in charge of the less endowed, but also that the latter should willingly obey their superiors.

But they maintain that this ideal state has been ruined by people who cannot think straight—people who, knowing nothing about worth (which resides in a few, and is discerned and assessed by a few), imagine that aristocrats are those with large fortunes and possessions or those who belong to famous families. When, as a result of this vulgar misconception, a few with money, not worth,
have gained control of the state, those leaders seize the name of ‘aristocrats’ with their teeth, though lacking any right to it in fact. Money, name, and property, if divorced from good sense and skill in living one’s own life and directing the lives of others, lapse into total degradation and supercilious insolence. And indeed there is no more degenerate kind of state than that in which the richest are supposed to be the best. But what can be more splendid than a state governed by worth, where the man who gives orders to others is not the servant of greed, where the leader himself has embraced all the values which he preaches and recommends to his citizens, where he imposes no laws on the people which he does not obey himself, but rather presents his own life to his fellows as a code of conduct?

If one man alone could meet all these requirements there would be no need for more than one. If the whole populace could perceive what was best and reach agreement about it, no one would advocate appointing leaders. It is the difficulty of initiating policies that has transferred authority from kings to larger groups, and the bad judgement and recklessness of popular bodies that has transferred it from the masses to the few. Hence the aristocrats have taken over the middle ground between the inadequate autocrat and the reckless mob. Nothing could be more moderate than that. With such men protecting the state the people must be very fortunate; they are freed from all trouble and anxiety, having made others responsible for their carefree life. Those others must protect it and not give the people cause to complain that their interests are being ignored by the leaders. That is always a risk, for equality before the law, which free people so cherish, cannot be maintained indefinitely; for the people themselves, even when free from all restraint, give many special privileges to many persons, and even among the people there is much favouritism in regard to men and their status. So-called equality is most inequitable; for when the same respect is accorded to the highest and the lowest (who must be present in every nation), equity itself is most unequal. That cannot happen in states ruled by the best. Those, more or less, are the arguments, along with others of a similar kind, that are advanced by those who maintain that this is the most desirable form of government.

LAELIUS
: But what about yourself, Scipio?
*
Which of those three do
you
most approve of?

SCIPIO
: You are right to ask which of the three I
most
approve of, for I do not consider any one of them ideal by itself. Rather than any one of the separate types, I prefer a mixture of all three. But if one has to be preferred in its pure form, I would prefer monarchy …
[In the last few lines of this section the text is defective.}
The name of king is like that of father, in that a king takes thought for his subjects as if they were his children, and looks after them more conscientiously than … that they are supported by the dedication of one man, the best and most highly esteemed.

Here now are the aristocrats, who claim to perform this function more effectively, claiming that there is more good sense in a group than in an individual, and yet also the same degree of fairness and reliability. But here come the people, shouting at the top of their voices that they will obey neither an autocrat nor an oligarchy; that nothing is sweeter than liberty, even to wild animals; and that this blessing is denied to anyone who serves a king or an aristocracy. Accordingly, kings attract us by affection, aristocracies by good sense, and democracies by freedom. So in comparing them it is hard to choose which one likes best.

LAELIUS
: I’m sure you’re right; but the problems ahead can hardly be cleared up if you leave this one unresolved.

SCIPIO
: Well then, let’s follow the example of Aratus,
*
who at the opening of his great exposition thinks it right to begin with Jove.

LAELIUS
: Why with Jove? And what has your talk in common with his poem?

SCIPIO
: It just seems right that we should begin our discussion with that being who is acknowledged by everyone, learned and unlearned alike, to be the sole king of all gods and men.

LAELIUS
: Why?

SCIPIO
: Why do you think? The reason’s obvious. One answer is that rulers of states have, for reasons of practical expediency,
promoted the belief that there is one king in heaven who, in Homer’s words,
*
‘shakes the whole of Olympus with his nod’; and that he should be regarded as king and father of all. In that case there is weighty authority and many witnesses (if universal testimony may be so described) that, in obedience to their rulers’ decrees, countries have agreed that there is nothing superior to a king, in the belief that all the gods are ruled by one divine power. If, however, we have been brought up to think that this belief is a kind of fable, founded on the misconceptions of the ignorant, let us listen to people who may be described as the common teachers of educated men—those who have, as it were, seen with their eyes things which we barely take in through our ears.

LAELIUS
: And who, may I ask, are they?

SCIPIO
: Those who have studied the nature of reality as a whole, and have realized that this entire world (is controlled) by (one) mind … [57
Two leaves are missing. Scipio continues to argue in favour of monarchy.] …
But if you like, Laelius, I will present witnesses who are not excessively ancient nor in any sense barbarous.

LAELIUS
: I’d like to hear them.

SCIPIO
: Well, do you realize that this city has been without a king for less than four hundred years?

LAELIUS
: Of course.

SCIPIO
: Well then, this period of four hundred years is not particularly long, is it, for a city or a state?

LAELIUS: NO. The place has barely grown up.

SCIPIO
: So four hundred years ago there was a king in Rome.

LAELIUS
: Yes, and a proud one
*
too.

SCIPIO
: And before that?

LAELIUS
: A very just one;
*
and from him they reach right back to Romulus, who lived six hundred years before our time.

SCIPIO:
SO
even he didn’t live all that long ago, did he?

LAELIUS
: By no means. Greece was already growing old.
*

SCIPIO
: Tell me, then: were Romulus’ subjects barbarians?

LAELIUS
: If, as the Greeks say, all people other than Greeks are barbarians, I’m afraid his subjects
were
barbarians. But if the name should be applied to character rather than language, then the Romans, in my view, were no more barbarous than the Greeks.

SCIPIO
: Yet in this discussion of ours we are not concerned with nationality but with nature. If sensible men, not very long ago, wanted to have kings, then my witnesses are not so very ancient; nor are they wild and uncivilized.

LAELIUS
: I grant, Scipio, that you have an ample supply of witnesses! But with me, as with any good judge, arguments have greater force than witnesses.

SCIPIO
: Very well, Laelius; you can employ an argument based on your own self-awareness.

LAELIUS
: What awareness?

SCIPIO
: Whenever—or
if
ever—you are aware of being angry with someone.

LAELIUS:
1 have had that experience more often that I could wish!

SCIPIO
: Ah. So, when you are angry, do you allow anger to take control of your mind?

LAELIUS
: Certainly not. I take my cue from Archytas of Tarentum. Once, on arriving at his country house, he found that all his instructions had been ignored. ‘Why, you worthless wretch!’ he said to his agent, ‘if I weren’t angry I would have beaten you to death on the spot!’

SCIPIO:
Very good! So evidently Archytas rightly looked on anger (that is, when it was at variance with his judgement) as a kind of revolt within the mind, and he was anxious to quell it by rational reflection. Bring in greed, bring in lust, bring in the desire for power and glory; then you realize that if there is to be a ruling power in the human mind, it will be the sovereignty of a single element, namely reason (for that is the best part of the mind). As long as reason is supreme there is no room for lust, anger, or irresponsible behaviour.

LAELIUS
: That’s right.

SCIPIO
: So you approve of a mind which is ordered in that way?

LAELIUS
: Certainly; there’s nothing better.

SCIPIO
: So you would not approve of one where reason had been ousted, and where lust in its countless forms and anger held total sway?

LAELIUS
: In my opinion that sort of mind, and the person who possessed it, would be the vilest thing in creation.

SCIPIO
: So you agree, then, that every activity of the mind
should be under the rule of one element, that element being reason?

LAELIUS
: I do.

SCIPIO
: Why, then, do you have any doubt regarding your opinion of the body politic? There, if the thing is put in the hands of more than one person, clearly there will be no power in charge; for if power is not a unity it may well be nothing at all.

LAELIUS
: What, pray, is the difference between one and more than one being in charge, if the latter are inspired by justice?

SCIPIO
: I notice, Laelius, that you are not much impressed by my witnesses! But I shan’t give up. I shall continue to use
you
as a witness to confirm what I’m saying.

LAELIUS
: Me? And how do you propose to do that?

SCIPIO
: Recently, when we were at your villa in Formiae, I observed that you gave the staff strict instructions to take orders from one person only.

LAELIUS
: Quite; my agent.

SCIPIO:
What about your house in town? Do several people run your affairs?

LAELIUS:
NO
indeed; just one.

SCIPIO
: What of the whole establishment? Is anyone else in charge of it apart from you?

LAELIUS
: Certainly not.

SCIPIO
: So why don’t you admit that in a state, too, the rule of one man is best, provided he is just?

LAELIUS
: I’m almost persuaded to agree with you.

SCIPIO
: You’ll agree more readily, Laelius, if I leave aside the analogies of the ship’s captain and the doctor
*
(which show that, provided they are qualified in their respective professions, a ship should be entrusted to the former alone and an invalid to the latter alone) and move on to more striking instances.

LAELIUS
: What have you in mind?

SCIPIO
: Well, I take it you’re aware that it was because of the overbearing and arrogant nature of Tarquin alone that the name of king has become anathema to our people.

LAELIUS
: I am, indeed.

SCIPIO
: In that case you are also aware of another fact, on which I shall probably enlarge in the course of my talk, namely that after Tarquin’s expulsion the populace revelled in an extraordinary
excess of liberty. That was when innocent people were driven into exile, when many had their property seized as plunder, when two consuls were elected each year, when the rods of authority were lowered in the presence of the people, when appeals of all kinds became possible, when secessions of the common people took place, when, in fact, most of the measures enacted ensured that everything should be in the hands of the people.

LAELIUS
: Yes; that’s what happened.

SCIPIO
: And that’s what tends to happen in periods of peace and security. For you can act irresponsibly when you have nothing to be afraid of. The same is true on board ship, and often in the case of a mild illness. But as the seafarer and the invalid beg the help of one individual when the sea suddenly grows rough and the illness more serious, so our people, which at home in peacetime gives orders, threatens the actual magistrates, refuses to obey them, appeals against them, and challenges their decisions, in wartime defers to each magistrate as though he were king; for then safety takes precedence over personal desires. In times of more serious conflict, our countrymen have decreed that the supreme power should not be shared, even with one colleague, but should rest in the hands of an individual whose very name reflects the nature of his power. For a dictator
*
is so called in virtue of the fact that his appointment is dictated (though in our augurs’ books,
*
Laelius, you will remember that he is called ‘master of the people’).

LAELIUS
: Yes, I do.

SCIPIO
: And so those men of old wisely …
[One leaf is lost.]
… When the people are deprived of a just king, they are like orphans. A sense of loss lingers within their hearts. As Ennius says
*
in the lines following the death of that excellent king:

And all the time they say among themselves
‘O Romulus, O Romulus divine,
Sent down from heaven as guardian of our land,
O sire, O father, offspring of the gods!’

They did not give the name ‘lords’ or ‘masters’ or even ‘kings’ to those whose just rule they obeyed, but ‘guardians of our land’, ‘fathers’ and ‘gods’—with good reason; for what do they say next?

You brought us forth into the realms of light.

Life, honour, glory—these were the blessings they thought they had received from their just king. The same goodwill would have continued in later generations if the character of the king had remained the same. But, as you know, owing to the wickedness of one individual that whole form of government collapsed.