The Muslim Brotherhood (28 page)

Whilst one wouldn’t expect the Ikhwan to take any other stance, the great irony in its position on Iraq is of course that, as described in
Chapter Three
, the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood in the form of the Iraqi Islamic Party has been desperate to take part in the political process in Iraq, something other parts of the Brotherhood consider to be a sham. Clearly, for the Brotherhood, the propaganda opportunity presented by the Iraq war has been more important than the views of their own Iraqi Ikhwani in deciding what is best for the future of the country.

Just as jihad has always been a core tenet of the Ikhwan’s ideology, so too has anti-Westernism. In view of the fact that the Ikhwan was founded partly as a reaction to the colonial presence in Egypt, this is hardly surprising. Much of the Ikhwan’s support over the years has been founded upon a sense that Westernisation and modernisation were uprooting and degrading the very core traditions of Islamic society. Although not averse to Western ideas and intellectual traditions, al-Banna himself had a deep moral anxiety about the West and the impact of Westernisation on Egyptian society. From the
early days, the Ikhwan promoted the message that ‘Zionism aided by imperialism in the Arab world – the heart of Islam – and imperialism all over the Muslim world continue with impunity to act at will in the land of Islam.’
⁷⁰
Such views were reiterated by other key Ikhwani scholars such as Imam al-Ghazali who in the 1950s lamented, ‘the enemies of Islam had utterly wrecked the Islamic state’.
⁷¹
One of the reasons that some Ikhwani struggled to come to terms with Nasser’s Arab nationalist republic was that they were confused by his apparent acceptance of secularised ‘Western’ values. Haj Abu Sen has said that he initially supported Nasser but when he visited Egypt for the first time following the revolution, he began to have second thoughts about him after seeing an advertisement featuring a scantily clad woman in one of the main squares in Cairo.
⁷²

Sayyid Qutb was also famously repulsed by Western cultural values and Western attitudes towards Islam. In
Milestones
he wrote:

The Western ways of thought and all the sciences started … with an enmity towards all religion and in particular with greater hostility towards Islam. This enmity towards Islam is especially pronounced and many times is the result of a well-thought-out scheme, the object of which is to first shake the foundations of Islamic beliefs and then gradually to demolish the structure of Muslim society.
⁷³

Qutb also displayed his total disgust and contempt for those Muslims who were attracted by the West: ‘There are people – exponents of Islam – who are defeated before this filth in which
jahiliya
is steeped, even to the extent that they search for resemblances to Islam among this rubbish heap of the West, and also among the evil and dirty materialism of the East.’
⁷⁴

Although anti-Western rhetoric has softened somewhat over the years, and regardless of the fact that the Brotherhood allied itself with
Western powers against the communists in the war in Afghanistan, the essential beliefs underlying the discourse have not moved on very much. Pronouncements made by some members of the Ikhwan today are not that far removed from those issued by Hassan al-Banna. Mehdi Akef has allegedly referred to the United States as ‘a Satan that abuses the region, lacking all morality and law’.
⁷⁵
Abdul Moneim Abul Fotouh has said: ‘The Middle East now is a clear example of Western violence. Even today we hear the voices of religious fundamentalism, a political dogma believed in and cultivated by the kings and presidents of the West.’
⁷⁶

Even one of the most reformist-minded Ikhwani, the Egyptian MP Issam al-Ariyan, declared in 2004: ‘Throughout their history the Muslim Brotherhood have been an organisation or committee to resist the Western example through its different phases. This is the secret of the Ikhwan’s presence.’
⁷⁷

The Ikhwan continues to cite Western aggression as the cause of all the ills of Muslim society not only in a political sense, but also in a cultural context. Mehdi Akef remarked in 2005: ‘Our mission is immense, at the forefront of which is educating the lost youths on the streets and confronting the corruption that comes to us from the West to destroy our families and values.’
⁷⁸
Akef also told the Arab media that ‘the West desires to destroy the institution of family, whilst Islam strives to maintain the institution, because the family is what makes up, and is the essence of, the community’.
⁷⁹
In a similar vein Aboul Fotouh has asserted: ‘The West is preoccupied with material issues. Its democracy looks at the human being as a material entity. It overlooks the spiritual aspects that are there and cannot be denied.’
⁸⁰
Moreover, as described in
Chapter Four
, Ikhwani in Europe have deep-seated concerns about Western values and how they will impinge on their own children and traditions. Although the language is far less aggressive than it was in the past, underlying rejectionist sentiments have not disappeared.

Of course some brothers do have a much more nuanced view of
the West. This is especially true of the reformist current within the Brotherhood. Aboul Fotouh for example observed that in Europe ‘freedom of expression is guaranteed, in general. Human rights are respected. There is also a genuine respect for the opinion and will of the people. In most cases, the people elect the government they want to represent them. And they can hold that government accountable.’
⁸¹
Similarly, former deputy leader Mohamed Habib issued a statement in January 2008: ‘There is a huge difference between our vision of the US administration, and the American people. A significant number of Americans oppose George Bush’s policies, and millions of them took part in anti-Iraq war demonstrations.’
⁸²
However, one has to wonder about the extent to which this statement was intended for a Western audience, given that it was issued in response to criticisms in the West that the Ikhwan was anti-American. Moreover, in spite of these more accepting comments, the Brotherhood continues to use this anti-Western discourse as a means of tapping into existing grievances and of presenting itself as the means whereby Islamic societies can save themselves from degradation.

Although anti-Western sentiment does not in any way equate with support for violence, such attitudes arguably create an environment in which a more militant mentality can flourish. Whilst the Brotherhood has broadly maintained its moderate stance, it has been accused repeatedly of being an incubator for terrorist ideology. As former Kuwaiti Education Minister, Dr. Ahmad al-Rab’i, has declared:

The Muslim Brotherhood’s problem is that it has no shame. The beginnings of all of the religious terrorism that we are witnessing today were in the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology of takfir. Sayyid Qutb’s book
Milestones
was the inspiration and the guide for all of the takfir movements that came afterwards … The founders of the violent groups were raised on the Muslim Brotherhood, and those who worked with
Bin Laden and al-Qa‘ida went out under the mantle of the Muslim Brotherhood.
⁸³

This opinion may be exaggerated but one cannot deny the fact that Qutb’s ideas inspired a generation of militants and it was through his writings that the concept of
takfir
became more prominent. It is also true that some of those who ended up joining more extreme groups did pass through the ranks of the Ikhwan and that a number of militant groups such as Marwan Hadeed’s Fighting Vanguard and Mustafa Shukri’s al-Takfir wal-Hijra sprang directly out of the Ikhwan.

More importantly, there has been a kind of tacit acceptance by the Ikhwan of those with a more militant outlook and an unwillingness to condemn or to expel them from the party ranks. In the Syrian case, whilst the Ikhwan made it clear that it disagreed with the more violent tactics of those of the Fighting Vanguard, it continued to fund the group and to work with it when it suited it. Similarly, although Hassan al-Banna criticised the Nizam al-Khass for engaging in acts of political violence such as the killing of Judge Ahmed al-Khazindar Bey in 1948, he did not take steps to dismantle the unit. The Brotherhood has been more than willing to absorb those of a more militant bent within its ranks, even displaying a tolerance of violence in some circumstances. Murshid Maimoun al-Hodeibi is alleged to have welcomed the assassination of Egyptian intellectual Faraj Foda, who was killed for apostasy. Another key Ikhwani-oriented Egyptian, Mohamed al-Ghazali, is alleged to have stated: ‘The killing of Faraj Foda was, in fact, the implementation of the punishment against an apostate, which the State has failed to implement.’
⁸⁴

Given that the political and cultural goals and grievances of the Ikhwan and the more militant groups are similar, it is easy to see how someone within the Ikhwan could become frustrated by the Brotherhood’s slow approach and seek a faster, more proactive way to achieve these goals. Yet to ascertain the extent to which the
Brotherhood influenced those who went on to take up more militant ideologies, or whether these individuals would have found their way to such ideological extremes regardless, is a near impossible task. To blame the Ikhwan for the actions of those who moved away from it is also somewhat unfair. Dr Kamal Helbawy has defended the Ikhwan on this issue:

The impious and virtuous sons and fathers emerge from the same womb; the mothers and fathers are not responsible for this crime. This is why when the MB found out that there were youth in prisons and detention centres who had radical extremist thoughts and
takfir
tendencies, Brotherhood members who were also imprisoned clarified that they were not part of that movement.
⁸⁵

Yet it is reasonable to assert that the Ikhwan contributed to the general radicalisation that enveloped the Islamic world in the 1970s and 1980s. It is also true that prior to 9/11 there was less interest or differentiation between ‘moderates’ and ‘militants’ and there was a sense within the Brotherhood and the wider Islamist community that displaying the face of unity was of paramount importance. This was especially the case in Europe where in view of the small size of the Muslim community, radicals and moderates tended to mix and co-operate with each other and to do their utmost to conceal internal disputes within their own circles. However, since 9/11, when the world has been focusing intently on extremist elements, Ikhwani-oriented organisations have had to differentiate themselves more explicitly and publicly from those of a more radical bent. Therefore whilst the Brotherhood’s flexible approach and apparent ambiguity towards violence may have meant that in the past they could be accused of unintentionally fostering more militant interpretations of Islam, in the present day such accusations would appear to be largely unfounded.

However, whilst the Brotherhood is clearly largely pacific, there are a number of issues in the movement’s own past that it needs to take in hand. The Ikhwan’s continued refusal to come to terms with the violence that the movement has supported or on occasions perpetrated throughout its long history needs to be addressed if it is to convince others that it has truly moved on. The opportunism that it has displayed over the years and the willingness that it has shown to resort to violence when expedient cannot simply be explained away as ‘a response to repression’. The seeming desire to sweep these elements of the past under the carpet only serves to give the impression that the Brotherhood still believes its actions to have been somehow justified. Moreover its ideological ambivalence towards figures such Qutb, whose works are still part of the Brotherhood’s educational curriculum, also needs to be tackled. Therefore whilst the Ikhwani have largely proved their pacific credentials in terms of their actions, a more robust ideological coming to terms with their own history would go a long way to convincing their detractors that they are truly a moderate and trustworthy movement that can carry the future of the Middle East in its hands.

On 17 December 2011, Mohamed al-Bouazizi, a young Tunisian street vendor from the little known town of Sidi Bouzid, was to change the course of history. Al-Bouazizi had become so utterly frustrated by his repeated harassment at the hands of the local security services and by his dire personal circumstances that he set himself alight in protest. The young man’s desperate act of defiance prompted the inhabitants of Sidi Bouzid to take to the streets to demand change. It wasn’t long before the protests spread. Indeed, what started as a protest by Tunisia’s long forgotten and underdeveloped interior soon reached the capital. Here Tunisians from all walks of life thronged into the streets to demand an end to the regime that had marginalised them both politically and economically for decades and that had left them feeling utterly disenfranchised. In the face of such profound and unprecedented public action, Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had no choice but to step down from power. On 14 January, the ageing president and his family fled to Saudi Arabia in disgrace and Tunisia turned a new page in its history.

The relative ease with which Ben Ali had been pushed out of power served as the spark to ignite the region. The fear of decades had
suddenly been broken and people across the Arab world found it in themselves to take to the streets and to make their voices heard. Even in Libya where Colonel Qadhafi had maintained an iron grip for over four decades, it wasn’t long before the east of the country had risen up to demand change. Although Libya’s revolution turned out to be a much longer and bloodier process than that of Tunisia, people power finally won out, culminating in Qadhafi’s grisly death in October 2011.

In Egypt, meanwhile, the events in Tunisia prompted young Egyptians to organise themselves and to take to the streets. Despite initially putting up resistance, President Mubarak soon saw that the tide of public anger had turned so thoroughly against him that he had no choice but to step aside. Although the Egyptian regime managed to hold on to power beyond Mubarak through the still powerful Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF), in time even this body had to relinquish control to the forces that had emerged strongest out of the Arab Spring.