The Murder of Cleopatra (20 page)

Though the struggle was beginning to be at close range, the ships did not ram or crush one another at all, since Antony's, owing to their weight, had no impetus, which chiefly gives effect to the blows of the beaks, while [Octavian]'s not only avoided dashing front to front against rough and hard bronze armour, but did not even venture to ram the enemy's ships in the side. For their beaks would easily have been broken off by impact against vessels constructed of huge square timbers fastened together with iron. The
struggle was therefore like a land battle; or, to speak more truly, like the storming of a walled town. For three or four of [Octavian]'s vessels were engaged at the same time about one of Antony's, and the crews fought with wicker shields and spears and punting-poles and fiery missiles; the soldiers of Antony also shot with catapults from wooden towers. . . .
15

And now, as Agrippa was extending the left wing with a view to encircling the enemy, Publicola was forced to advance against him, and so was separated from the centre. The centre falling into confusion and engaging with Arruntius, although the sea-fight was still undecided and equally favourable to both sides, suddenly the sixty ships of Cleopatra were seen hoisting their sails for flight and making off through the midst of the combatants; for they had been posted in the rear of the large vessels, and threw them into confusion as they plunged through. The enemy looked on with amazement, seeing that they took advantage of the wind and made for Peloponnesus.
16

It is clear to Octavian that Cleopatra and Antony are going to make a run for it.

Cleopatra recognized him and raised a signal on her ship; so Antony came up and was taken on board. . . .
17

At this point, Liburnian ships were seen pursuing them from [Octavian]'s fleet; but Antony ordered the ship's prow turned to face them, and so kept them off.
18

Plutarch speaks of Antony being depressed and ashamed of leaving his men and escaping with Cleopatra.

He spent three days by himself at the prow, either because he was angry with Cleopatra, or ashamed to see her, and then put in at Taenarum. Here the women in Cleopatra's company at first brought them into a parley, and then persuaded them to eat and sleep together.
19

And, finally, Plutarch writes of the effect of Antony's decision to bolt with Cleopatra on his men, which had detrimental and long-term ramifications.

This, then, was the situation of Antony. But at Actium his fleet held out for a long time against [Octavian], and only after it had been most severely damaged by the high sea which rose against it did it reluctantly, and at the tenth hour, give up the struggle. There were not more than five thousand dead, but three hundred ships were captured, as [Octavian] himself has written. Only a few were aware that Antony had fled, and to those who heard of it the story was at first an incredible one, that he had gone off and left nineteen legions of undefeated men-at‑arms and twelve thousand horsemen, as if he had not many times experienced both kinds of fortune and were not exercised by the reverses of countless wars and fightings. His soldiers, too, had a great longing for him, and expected that he would presently make his appearance from some quarter or other; and they displayed so much fidelity and bravery that even after his flight had become evident they held together for seven days, paying no heed to the messages which [Octavian] sent them. But at last, after Canidius their general had run away by night and forsaken the camp, being now destitute of all things and betrayed by their commanders, they went over to the conqueror.
20

Now you have read what happened before, during, and after Actium from Plutarch's point of view (well, Plutarch's version on whatever story was passed on to him by the victor, Octavian, and those who wanted to portray Antony, and especially Cleopatra, in a less than favorable light). Sometimes it takes only a slightly different framing of a situation to cause people to come away confident they have a “true” understanding of what happened and, if enough people agree over time, it seems like it must be the proper view of history.

But let's view this account with a bit more of a jaundiced eye and look for possible alternate explanations for events, especially in light
of what Cleopatra and Antony were attempting to accomplish under the circumstances.

It is said that Octavian was quite worried when he saw that Antony had linked himself with Cleopatra and together they were amassing ships and soldiers to take him on. He rather broke into a sweat in the spring of 33 BCE when it became clear that, at some point, the twosome planned to bring the fight to him and stage an all-out fight for Italy and the Roman Empire. Yet, it is also said that Antony then became lazy, perhaps avoiding battle by not pushing the offensive until the fall of 32, when he finally gathered his fleet in Patras; and by winter, nineteen of his legions had arrived on the coast.

So why did Antony wait so long to go after Octavian if Octavian was gaining political power and momentum by the week? It is quite possible that it was just this fact that made Cleopatra and Antony very aware that this battle was going to be extremely decisive. Antony was on the ropes, and he had to come back with a massive barrage to overcome Octavian; otherwise, Octavian would grow so powerful politically and militarily that it would be unlikely Antony could pick himself off the mat, even with Cleopatra in his corner, and come back for a win. Actium was going to be the proving ground, winner takes all; and Cleopatra and Antony, with everything riding on this fight, no doubt wanted to go in with the most massive force possible. Indeed, this they did accomplish, and Plutarch admits it.

Antony had six squadrons, five hundred ships in all (but the number is in question and it is possible he had even more, or if one believes Plutarch, just half that), and he had spent that time during 33/32 not twiddling his thumbs, but building the biggest ships he could. He constructed ships that would outweigh Octavian's and have strong reinforcement to interfere with ramming, tough bows that do ramming quite nicely themselves, and sound catapults on the decks of the ships. Cleopatra's wealth and logistics were in place to fund and feed this large military force, and no doubt Octavian had a number of sleepless nights considering what he was up against, even if Plutarch downplayed his concerns. There was also the weather to
consider as autumn and winter could be treacherous times to attempt battle on either sea or land. It would seem Cleopatra and Antony decided it was far wiser to spend the time of tricky weather increasing their fleet and then going to war later, at a better time of the year and with the strongest military possible.

No, Antony did not come to Italy to fight his enemy nor did he attack at sea when he had the chance of confronting Octavian as the latter was forced out into the waters while making his way around the peninsula toward Antony's encampments. Instead, Antony preferred to meet his adversary on land (where he was most comfortable) and in Greece (which would make it a civil war between two Roman factions and not an invasion by an Eastern enemy—Egypt) with a Roman as its leader. Also, by forcing Octavian out of Italy to make his way to Greece served two additional purposes: (1) it would take him time and effort to reach the location of battle, during which time Antony hoped Octavian's resources would dwindle along the way; and (2) fighting at Actium would leave open an escape route back to Egypt, which clearly would make Cleopatra a lot more comfortable. Even though losing the battle at Actium would be a disaster, an escape to Egypt at least would allow some hope of survival for the duo. I think this Plan B escape route was hardly a foolish addition to their military strategy.

Was allowing Cleopatra to accompany him at the battle a highly damaging move for Antony? I do not see this. It was not unusual to be accompanied by leaders of countries that provided military support, and with so many of the troops not being Antony's but Cleopatra's, if she were not with him, he would likely have had difficulties controlling these men; and if the battle turned against them in any way, would these Egyptian warriors support a Roman general? Perhaps not, but with Cleopatra in command of the men, their willingness to fight would be much stronger.

Octavian's propaganda took what was the norm for such massive military campaigns and twisted it into something perverted: Antony being handled by a woman, a wicked Egyptian queen, an eastern
poison that was about to spread into Italy. Emotions would run wild among the Roman population, and this could set the entire country against Antony. Hence, Antony decided not to invade Italy but to force the fight in neutral territory
with
Cleopatra at his side, a perfectly reasonable strategy.

Of Antony's two-pronged strategy, one can say that the first did not work out but the latter did. It turned out not to be Octavian who ran out of resources, but Antony, which then caused the rout that did indeed send Cleopatra and Antony scurrying back to Alexandria. What went wrong? I believe an analysis will show there was actually nothing terribly wrong with Cleopatra and Antony's plan; in fact it was really a pretty good one, and, if Octavian hadn't ended up the victor, we might easily believe today that it was brilliant (because if Cleopatra and Antony had won, they would be the victors and would have written history to favor themselves). Antony and Cleopatra amassed greater forces, had the stronger support system, and were to have fought on neutral ground on both land and sea. They should have won. Only they didn't.

Let's break it down further.

It was in the winter of 33/32 BCE that Cleopatra and Antony made their preparations for battle by assembling their fleet and forces in Ephesus. The fleet was quite impressive—huge, in fact—and Antony may well have felt the spirit of Alexander the Great with him (Macedonian though he was) since he now controlled the entire sea power of the east. Three hundred transport ships were at Antony's disposal, ships that were to bring food from Egypt and also carry the troops from Ephesus over to Actium across the Aegean Sea (preparations which took place in the spring and summer of 32).

There is another important issue to understand concerning Cleopatra and Antony's decision not to invade Italy. This action would not be a winner-take-all battle but would require a number of assaults to win the war. While each of these assaults was occurring, the weather could switch up, the convoys could be attacked, and then everything could fall apart. And, again, we must remember that with
Cleopatra by his side during an invasion, the Roman citizenry may well have come out en mass to support Octavian and thereby increase his military force.

So the decision was made to have the showdown in Greece. In May of 32, Cleopatra and Antony were stationed in Athens with their troops. By September, they had moved the base of operations to Patras, and their fleet was moored in more than a dozen locations along the western Grecian coast, from Actium in the north to Methone in the south. The plan was to force the encounter at Actium, at which Antony and Cleopatra had built two towers with artillery covering the mouth that connected the Ionian Sea and the Gulf of Ambracia, where Antony had the ships waiting in protected waters. There Cleopatra and Antony waited comfortably enough through the winter, until Octavian made his move.

But when Octavian did make his move, just as winter ended in 31 BCE, it was not at all what Antony had expected. He had thought, quite reasonably, that Octavian would push off Italy, straight over to Greece in relatively protected coastal waters, and then work his way down to Actium. But Octavian, with his brilliant General Agrippa, made a very daring move. Agrippa took his fleet straight across open water, away from the coast and the prying eyes of enemy messengers who would carry word of their progress down the coast. They risked dangerous storms at sea; took the long route down the Italian peninsula and over to the southernmost outpost of Antony's land force, Methone; surprised their adversaries; overran the isolated garrison; burned all the ships stationed there; established Octavian's forces in Greece; and cut off Antony's supply route to Egypt all in one fell swoop.

Brilliant and risky, Octavian's move paid off. Again, had the weather not cooperated, the maneuver might have spelled the end of Octavian's campaign. But he got lucky, and if you are both smart and lucky, you will find yourself in a fine position to win a war. By the time Cleopatra and Antony knew what had hit them, Octavian had moved his forces northward and brought them to Actium.

All was not lost yet, however. Even though Octavian and Agrippa
were inflicting a good bit of damage, Antony and Cleopatra could still continue the fight at sea and on land, and there was still a plausible chance of victory. In truth, they had the larger number of men and so they may well have felt that once Octavian attacked, they could win the battle.

But then more things went wrong. Octavian perched his camp up on a very defensible hill overlooking the bay while Antony's camp was on a low-lying mosquito-infested sandy bit of land, an acceptable location for a few days, but not the place to be positioned for a protracted period of time. As Antony waited for Octavian to make a move, his men became sick from malaria and dysentery and mental fatigue, and since so many of them were mercenaries and not all that dedicated to the mission, desertions dramatically increased.

There Antony's troops remained trapped into the summer. He tried to block the water supply to Octavian's camp but failed. Desertions continued along with deaths in his own camp, and then Agrippa captured the island of Leucas to the south of Actium, which is where Egyptian ships had been bringing in supplies and reinforcements. Then he went on to capture Patras and Corinth, wiping out more supply routes in addition to barricading the harbor. Antony and Cleopatra found themselves in a pretty dire position. By August, I believe Antony and Cleopatra knew that they were, to put it bluntly, in a hopeless situation.