The Long Game (28 page)

For Obama, the fact that the United States is fallible is not an excuse for inaction or a license to withdraw. Nor does it mean he is uncomfortable with the exercise of American power, or that he believes that since the US has flaws, it is just an average country with no special responsibilities in the world. Instead, understanding fallibility is one of the things that makes the US remarkable—and by remaining honest about our flaws and seeking to overcome them, American foreign policy can be more effective. Such self-scrutiny is not to discard idealism. Instead, it helps guard against, as Niebuhr urged, an idealism that is “too oblivious of the ironic perils to which human nature, wisdom, and power are subject.”
³²

Skepticism.
When making difficult policy decisions, Obama is suspicious of those with quick answers and easy justifications. He believes in thoroughly interrogating issues, looking at them from every angle, and testing assumptions with rigor. Like fallibility, Obama's skepticism has deeper intellectual roots. As Harvard philosopher James Kloppenberg explains, this outlook is in the tradition of philosophical pragmatists like William James and John Dewey, embracing uncertainty, focusing on consequences, and remaining dubious of absolutes. Such skeptical thinking is “not for true believers convinced they know the right course of action in advance of inquiry and experimentation.”
³³

Obama's skepticism is more than a philosophical disposition; it also shapes his view of Washington foreign policy expertise. He believes that on the issue that has mattered most since the end of the Cold War—whether to invade Iraq in 2003—most experts were wrong. At a more personal level, Obama and his core team always felt apart from—and never felt much respected by—the Washington
crowd, many of whom popped off in the press and griped about not being consulted enough.

This fueled his confidence to defy the professional foreign policy elites. In his 2002 speech against the Iraq War, Obama criticized the “armchair, weekend warriors” who try to “shove their own ideological agendas down our throats.” And as president, Obama derided the actions advocated by “somebody sitting in an office in Washington or New York [who] thinks it would look strong.” When commenting on whatever the foreign policy grandees were advocating, some senior White House officials would quip “too much college, not enough knowledge.”

This does not mean that Obama entirely discounts Washington experience—his administration has been well-stocked with Beltway veterans. But when listening to the Washington debate, he is troubled by the blending of policy and punditry, its obsession with symbolism and theater, and the lack of accountability. He concedes that the Long Game approach runs counter to the incentives that drive Washington. “It may not always be sexy,” he says, and it “may not always attract a lot of attention, and it doesn't make for good argument on Sunday morning shows…but [it] steadily advances the interests of the American people.”
³⁴

Again, it is Obama trying to be Warren Buffett in a foreign policy debate dominated by day traders.

Exceptionalism.
The engine that propels Obama's strategy is American exceptionalism. One pursues the Long Game by forging a policy that is balanced, sustainable, restrained, precise, and patient. Recognizing fallibility and embracing skepticism are key to avoiding arrogance, being thrown off-course, or making unforced errors. This is
how
it is done. But
why
one does things this way is to pursue the United States' mission abroad, which is unique.

Obama has said that American exceptionalism is an “essential truth.” His America is the strongest nation on earth (as he repeated
for emphasis three straight times in his final State of the Union address, “It's not even close”). It is a force of ingenuity and innovation, respect and inspiration. And he recognizes that exceptionalism brings tremendous responsibilities—that because of its distinct power, American leadership remains “indispensable.”

Exceptionalism is not the same as domination. What makes America different is that it can lead in multiple ways—it can be out front, or it can operate more behind the scenes. Obama believes that, in foreign policy as in life, just as there are times when you have to do most of the work, you sometimes get better outcomes when you let others take the credit. This is common sense. But it also is rooted in the idea of the paradox of American power—that while the US can do more than anyone else, it cannot do it all. That reality requires an exercise of power that is more nimble, clever, and persuasive.
³⁵

Nor is exceptionalism an assertion that the United States is flawless. Obama's America is not, in the words of Ronald Reagan's farewell address, a “shining city on a hill,” a delicate perfection that must be carefully preserved. Instead America is a restless country, one that is chronically dissatisfied with itself, always striving to be better, reaching for more, seeking renewal. It is not an exceptionalism rooted in warm nostalgia of the past, or fear that the future will be taken away from us. What makes America exceptional is its ability to seek perfection relentlessly, not to claim it hubristically.

In this sense, one of the most important speeches Obama has delivered about America in the world actually doesn't say much explicitly about foreign policy.
³⁶
It is his March 2015 address in Selma, Alabama, on the fiftieth anniversary of the “Bloody Sunday March,” one of the pivotal events in the civil rights movement.

The speech was a sweeping paean to America's willingness to make itself better, and for how individuals can overcome powerful forces and do big things. Obama makes clear that America should be
confident enough to be honest about its flaws and its abilities to overcome them, arguing that the country is not “some fragile thing.” To Obama, the power of the Selma example is a key part of American strength—both at home and abroad.

So what presents the greatest threat to America's exceptionalism is not an outside force. It is from within. What's often missed about Obama's worldview is the fundamental optimism and deep confidence he has in the American people—the kinds of common citizens who, in the best traditions of Selma, have stood up to do the right thing time and again. But alongside this confidence is a substantial pessimism about American elites (which is ironic, given Obama is often accused of being elitist). His frustration about the state of the country's political debate—and how the US should respond to the changing world—runs just as deep. As he said in his final State of the Union address, one of the few regrets of his time in office is that the “rancor and suspicion” has only become worse. To remain exceptional, we must change our politics.
³⁷

Seen this way, Obama's effort to redefine America's role in the world remains incomplete. His Long Game approach has achieved some significant policy successes and avoided some grave mistakes. It has reoriented US foreign policy away from the “long war” and, in most of the world, restored the sense of admiration for America that was nearly squandered by 2008. And it has established a new center of gravity for Democrats on foreign policy—having avoided the disasters of LBJ and Jimmy Carter, or the frustrations of Bill Clinton. Future Democratic presidents will be measured by what Obama has done.

Y
ET WITH SO
many corners of the globe in flames, such a conclusion can seem hard to accept. The world of 2016 is indeed very complicated, and the next president will have her share of challenges to confront. But one must remember that, in fundamental ways, the
world is always troubling, often uniquely so. Recall 1968, when over half a million US troops were bogged down in Vietnam, Soviet tanks rolled into Prague, and the American political system seemed to be ripping itself apart. Or 1979, with Americans held hostage in Iran, a worldwide energy crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Or 2008, with the American economy on the cusp of the second Great Depression, the US military stretched to the breaking point through fighting two wars, and many parts of the world associating America with militarism, Guantanamo Bay, and torture.

History reminds us that the question is not whether the world presents challenges, but how best America can be positioned to deal with them. Considering the extent of today's global disorder, it is tempting to succumb to the narrative of grievance and fear—sharpening the divisions between “us” and “them,” building walls longer and higher, and lashing out at enemies with force. Or to think it better that, to reduce exposure to such geopolitical risk, the US should divest from its alliances and pursue leadership that is “offshore.” Despite all the talk of “strength,” what all of these impulses reflect is a core lack of confidence.

We cannot submit to such pessimism. As Obama's presidency nears its end, the state of the world is indeed tumultuous and ever changing, but we have good reason to be confident. America's global position is sound. It has restored a sense of strategic solvency. Countries look to the US for guidance, ideas, support, and protection. The US is again admired and inspiring, not just for what it can do abroad, but for its economic vitality and strong society at home.

As the scholar Joseph Nye has correctly observed, it remains the American Century, an era of US “preeminence in military, economic, and soft power that have made the US central to the workings of the global balance of power, and to the provision of global public goods.” Or as Warren Buffett declared in his more homespun way, “the babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.”
³⁸
When
it comes to being in a position to solve problems and give people an opportunity to improve their lives, the US is far better off than it was a decade ago. In 2016, America is great again.

This did not happen by accident; it is the result of policy choices. It is because of the Long Game. And as this story shows, it is not easy.

M
AKING THE
L
ONG
G
AME
the new Washington consensus is still unfinished business. To be sure, some of the reasons why are attributable to Obama's perceived missteps—such as the Syria red line—in which the process tarnished the outcome and offered critics an easy target to caricature. Arguably, these are the moments when he diverted most from his instincts (in the case of Syria, setting a self-made rhetorical trap). However, the bigger problem for shaping America's role in the world still remains the way we—experts, think tankers, journalists, politicos—think about these issues and talk about them. We are all grappling with the “foreign policy breakdown,” except today it is far bigger, much louder, and more corrosive than ever. Despite Obama's efforts, US foreign policy debate remains trapped in an endless loop of crisis. In fact, the debate is an inherent component of the crisis.

Stepping back from dissecting the separate issues that have dominated Obama's foreign policy—Syria and Iraq, Libya and Iran, Russia and China—it is hard to see a debate that is rising to the challenge. As Destler, Gelb, and Lake argued over thirty years ago, we continue to be our own worst enemy. Liberals and conservatives seek to out-shout the other, with “each side seeking our salvation largely through the elimination of the other.” Congress and the news media make debates more “noisy, partisan, and doctrinaire.” And the professional foreign policy elite “deepens rather than bridges divisions.”

Today's speed of communications, predominance of spin over fact, and splintering of the media environment make things exponentially worse—the answers have to be quicker, the stories more dramatic, the opinions sharper. Attention is fleeting. Memories are shorter. Everything
gets packaged as “Breaking News” or subjected to a cable channel's countdown clock. While we chase around shiny objects, we tend to lose sight of the future. What all this creates, they wrote, is even truer today: “An American incapacity to conduct a steady and sensible foreign policy.”
³⁹

So just as Eisenhower left office over a half century ago warning of the “unwarranted influence” of the military-industrial complex and its powers to distort policy, as the Obama era ends, we've seen the apogee of a different kind of ill, a “media-political-industrial complex” that exerts an influence over the making of national security policy that can be similarly damaging.

Because of this predicament, I conclude with a mix of regret and hope. Having been part of the foreign policy community both in and out of government for over two decades, I cannot claim to be above some of the ills that have caused this breakdown. But I am convinced that now, more than ever, America must continue to pursue a strategy that enables future presidents to operate sensibly and pragmatically in a difficult world. Barack Obama's Long Game points the way. Our challenge is to be confident enough to play it forward.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1
. George F. Kennan,
Memoirs 1925–1950
(New York: Pantheon, 1967), p. 322.

2
. Hal Brands,
What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 3.

3
. Hal Brands, “Breaking Down Obama's Grand Strategy,”
The National Interest
(June 23, 2014).

4
. Brands,
What Good Is Grand Strategy?
p. 192.

5
. The best example of this argument is Bret Stephens,
America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming Global Disorder
(New York: Sentinel, 2014); on retrenchment, see Stephen Sestanovich,
Maximalist: America in the World From Truman to Obama
(New York: Knopf, 2014).

6
. Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist,”
The New Yorker,
May 2, 2011.

7
. See Atul Gawande,
The Checklist Manifesto
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009).

8
. See David Milne,
Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2015), p 16.

9
. See interview with Marc Maron, Podcast, Episode 613, available at
http://www.wtfpod.com/podcast/episodes/episode_613_-_president_barack_obama

10
. David Remnick, “Going the Distance,”
The New Yorker
(January 27, 2014).

11
. Robert Kaplan,
The Revenge of Geography
(New York: Random House, 2012), p. 20.

12
. Quote from Robert Draper, “Between Iraq and a Hawk Base,”
New York Times Magazine,
September 1, 2015.

13
. Richard Holbrooke,
To End A War
(New York: Random House, 1998), p xvii.

14
. Henry Kissinger,
White House Years
(New York: Little, Brown, 1979), p 54.

CHAPTER 1

1
. See “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013,” White House Press Release.

2
. See Thom Shanker, C.J. Chivers, and Michael R. Gordon, “Obama Weighs ‘Limited' Strikes Against Syrian Forces,”
New York Times,
August 27, 2013; Karen DeYoung, “After Syria Chemical Allegations, Obama Considering Limited Military Strike,”
Washington Post,
August 26, 2013.

3
. See Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,”
The Atlantic
(April 2016); “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria,” White House, September 10, 2013.

4
. Quote from Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

5
. See, for example, Charlie Savage, “Barack Obama's Q&A,”
Boston Globe
(December 20, 2007). Obama said: “As Commander-in-Chief, the President does have a duty to protect and defend the United States. In instances of self-defense, the President would be within his constitutional authority to act before advising Congress or seeking its consent. History has shown us time and again, however, that military action is most successful when it is authorized and supported by the Legislative branch. It is always preferable to have the informed consent of Congress prior to any military action.”

6
. For example, see Peter Baker, Mark Landler, David Sanger and Anne Barnard, “Off-the-Cuff Obama Line Put US in Bind on Syria,”
New York Times,
May 4, 2013.

7
. See Chuck Todd,
The Stranger
(New York: Little, Brown, 2014), p 431.

8
. See Glenn Kessler, “President Obama and the ‘Red Line' on Syria's chemical weapons,”
Washington Post,
September 6, 2013.

9
. Stuart Weiner and Lazar Berman, “Netanyahu to spend another $350 million so every Israeli has gas mask,”
Times of Israel,
May 30, 2013.

10
. Mark Landler and Eric Schmitt, “White House Says It Believes Syria Has Used Chemical Arms,”
New York Times,
April 25, 2013.

11
. “Senators McCain and Levin urge the President to Take ‘More Active Steps' in Syria,” March 21, 2013.

12
. “Message from the ruins of Qusair,”
Washington Post,
June 6, 2013.

13
. “Obama should remember Rwanda as he weighs action in Syria,”
Washington Post,
April 26, 2013.

14
. Quoted in Dexter Filkins, “The Thin Red Line,”
The New Yorker,
May 13, 2013.

15
. “Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Airstrikes,” Pew Research Center, September 3, 2013.

16
. See Michael Crowley, “Marco Rubio: The Hawk Turned Dovish on Syria in 2013,”
Politico,
May 26, 2015.

17
. Ted Cruz, “Why I'll vote no on Syria strike,”
Washington Post,
September 9, 2013.

18
. Rand Paul, “Why I'm Voting No on Syria,”
Time,
September 4, 2013.

19
. Peter Baker and Michael R. Gordon, “An Unlikely Evolution, From Casual Proposal to Possible Resolution,”
New York Times,
September 10, 2013.

20
. Adam Entous, Janet Hook and Carol E. Lee, “Inside the White House, a Head-Spinning Reversal on Chemical Weapons,”
Wall Street Journal,
September 15, 2013; Anne Barnard, “In Shift, Syrian Official Admits Government Has Chemical Arms,”
New York Times,
September 10, 2013.

21
. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria's Chemical Arms,”
New York Times,
September 14, 2013.

22
. Karen DeYoung, “Removal of Syrian chemical arsenal was result of unprecedented collaboration,”
Washington Post,
June 29, 2014.

23
. For the definitive academic treatment of this concept, see Alexander L. George and William E. Simons,
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

24
. Peter Baker, “A Rare Public View of Obama's Pivots on Policy in Syria Confrontation,”
New York Times,
September 11, 2013.

25
. Richard Betts,
American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security
(New York: Columbia University Press), p 271; quote from Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

26
. Quoted in Todd, p 447.

27
. Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

28
. Quotes from Obama interview with ABC's George Stephanopoulos, September 15, 2013; and Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

29
. See Jeffrey Goldberg, “Netanyahu Says Obama Got Syria Right,”
Bloomberg View,
May 22, 2014; Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israeli DM Cites Drop in Syrian Chem Threat,”
Defense News,
June 1, 2015; and J.J. Goldberg, “Israel's Top General Praises Iran Deal as ‘Strategic Turning Point' in Slap at Bibi,”
The Forward,
January 26, 2016.

CHAPTER 2

1
. Obama speech at DePaul University, October 2, 2007.

2
. Quote from James Mann,
The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power
(New York: Viking, 2012), p 87.

3
. Zbiginew Brzezisnki,
Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower
(New York: Basic Books, 2007), p 154.

4
.
The Audacity of Hope,
p 290.

5
.
The Audacity of Hope,
p 290; also see Derek Chollet “A Real Alternative”
The National Interest
(September/October 2007).

6
. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier,
America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11
(New York: PublicAffairs), pp 288-289.

7
. Ibid., pp 294-295.

8
. Ibid., p 327.

9
. Quote from Milne,
World-making,
p 469.

10
.
The Audacity of Hope,
p 293.

11
. See Kevin Baron, “Revenge of the Liberal Foreign Policy Wonks,”
National Journal,
June 5, 2014; and Mann,
The Obamians,
pp 45-65.

12
. Derek Chollet, “A Consensus Shattered,”
The National Interest
(Spring 2006).

13
. See Matt Bai,
The Argument: Inside the Battle to Remake Democratic Politics
(New York: Penguin Books, 2008), pp 257-281; and Chollet and Goldgeier,
America Between the Wars,
p 322.

14
.
The Audacity of Hope,
p 304.

15
. See J. Peter Scoblic,
U.S. vs. Them: How Conservatism Has Undermined America's Security
(Viking, 2008); and Richard Betts, “U.S. National Security Strategy: Lenses and Landmarks,” paper presented for the launch conference of the Princeton Project, November 2004.

16
. See Chollet and Goldgeier,
America Between the Wars,
p 318.

17
. Peter Beinart,
The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris
(New York: HarperCollins, 2010), p 385.

18
. Quote from Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

19
.
The Audacity of Hope,
p 282.

20
. Jonathan Schell,
The Time of Illusion
(New York: Random House, 1975), p 353.

21
. George Packer, “Coming Apart,”
The New Yorker,
September 12, 2011.

22
.
The Audacity of Hope,
p126.

23
. Quotes from I.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake,
Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy
(Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp 12, 25-26.

24
. Quote from Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

CHAPTER 3

1
. Robert Gates,
Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War
(New York: Knopf, 2014) p 322.

2
. Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Hard Choices
(Simon and Schuster, 2014) p 79.

3
. See Geoff Dyer,
The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China
—
and how America Can Win
(New York: Knopf, 2014).

4
. Milne,
Worldmaking,
p 508.

5
. Clinton, “America's Pacific Century,”
Foreign Policy,
October 11, 2011.

6
. Ibid.

7
. David Plouffe,
The Audacity to Win
(New York: Penguin, 2010), p 273.

8
. Presidential debate transcript, September 26, 2008
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/debates/transcripts/first-presidential-debate.html
.

9
. Clinton,
Hard Choices,
p 230.

10
. James Traub, “When Did Obama Give Up?”
Foreign Policy,
February 26, 2015.

11
. Ibid; and Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

12
. Clinton,
Hard Choices,
p148.

13
. Gates,
Duty,
p 571.

14
. Quote from “Who Lost Iraq?”
Politico Magazine,
July/August 2015.

15
. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor,
The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama
(New York: Random House, 2012), p 693.

16
. Obama press conference, December 18, 2015.

17
. Gates,
Duty,
pp 572-573.

18
. This is the core argument of Robert Kagan, “Not Fade Away,”
New Republic
(January 11, 2012), an article Obama read at the time and cited favorably.

19
. Chollet and Goldgeier,
America Between the Wars,
pp 64-65.

20
. Quote from Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

21
. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Hillary Clinton: ‘Failure' to Help Syrian Rebels Led to the Rise of ISIS,”
The Atlantic,
August 10, 2014.

22
. See Mann,
The Obamians,
pp 241-254.

CHAPTER 4

1
. Fred Kaplan, “Obama's Way,”
Foreign Affairs
(January/February, 2016).

2
. Marc Lynch, “Obama and the Middle East,”
Foreign Affairs
(September/October 2015), p 23.

3
. This section draws on Derek Chollet and Ben Fishman, “Who Lost Libya?”
Foreign Affairs
(May/June 2015).

4
. An excellent depiction of these meetings is in David Sanger,
Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power
(New York: Random House, 2012) pp 345-347.

5
. See Michael Lewis, “Obama's Way,”
Vanity Fair
(October 2012).

6
. Gates,
Duty,
p 512.

7
. Quote from Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

8
. Quote from Lewis, “Obama's Way.”

9
. Gideon Rose, “What Obama Gets Right,”
Foreign Affairs
(September/October 2015).

10
. Quote from Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

11
. See Alan Kuperman, “Obama's Libya Debacle,”
Foreign Affairs,
(March/April 2015).

12
. Obama,
The Audacity of Hope,
pp 309-311; quote from Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.”

13
. Quote from Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Hillary Clinton, ‘Smart Power,' and a Dictator's Fall,”
New York Times
(February 27, 2016).

14
. See Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis, “NATO's Victory in Libya,”
Foreign Affairs
(March/April 2012).

15
. See Charlie Savage,
Power Wars: Inside Obama's Post-9/11 Presidency
(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015) pp 638-649.

16
. Quote from Becker and Shane, “Hillary Clinton, ‘Smart Power,” and a Dictator's Fall.”