The Grand Alliance (21 page)

A Strategic Reserve in the Delta — The Moment
of Resolve — Our Freedom to Withdraw
—
Hopes
of a Balkan Front
—
Admiral Cunningham on the
Naval Risks to Be Run — My Telegram to General
Smuts of February
28
— Mr. Eden’s Discussions
with the Turks, February
28
— My Comment
Thereon — Yugoslavia the Key — The German
Army Moves into Bulgaria
—
Changed and
Disturbing Situation at Athens
—
Views of the
Chiefs of Staff — My Reflections upon It and My
Message to Mr. Eden, March
6
— Distress of Our
Ambassador at Athens
—
To Help or to Abandon
Greece?
—
A Measured Reply from Mr. Eden
—

Smuts and the Commanders-in-Chief Advise Us to
Go On — A Short Cabinet and a Final Decision,
March
7
— Response from New Zealand
—
And
from the Poles
—
My Telegram to Mr. Eden of
March
14
— My Message to President Roosevelt
of March
10.

H
ITHERTO we had not committed ourselves to the Greek adventure, except by continuous large-scale preparations in Egypt, and by the discussions and agreements at Athens which have been described. The preparations could be arrested by a single order, and anyhow the assembly of a strategic reserve of four divisions in the Delta was good in itself. The Greeks had departed in so many ways from the

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132

terms of the Athens Agreement that we could, had we so wished, have asked for release from it. Dangers approached from every quarter, but up to the early days of March I felt fairly comfortable and in essentials free, with a

“mass of manoeuvre” in hand.

Now the moment had come when the irrevocable decision must be taken whether or not to send the Army of the Nile to Greece. This grave step was required, not only to help Greece in her peril and torment, but to form against the impending German attack a Balkan Front comprising Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, with effects upon Soviet Russia which could not be measured by us. These would certainly have been all-important if the Soviet leaders had realised what was coming upon them. It was not what we could send ourselves that could decide the Balkan issue.

Our limited hope was to stir and organise united action. If at the wave of our wand Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey would all act together, it seemed to us that Hitler might either let the Balkans off for the time being or become so heavily engaged with our combined forces as to create a major front in that theatre. We did not then know that he was already deeply set upon his gigantic invasion of Russia. If we had, we should have felt more confidence in the success of our policy. We should have seen that he risked falling between two stools, and might easily impair his supreme undertaking for the sake of a Balkan preliminary. This is what actually happened, but we could not know at the time. Some may think we builded rightly; at least we builded better than we knew. It was our aim to animate and combine Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Our duty so far as possible was to aid the Greeks. For all these purposes our four divisions in the Delta were well placed.

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On March 4 Admiral Cunningham left us in no doubt as to the considerable naval risks in the Mediteranean which were involved in the move of the Army and the Royal Air Force to Greece. This meant continuous convoys of men, stores, and vehicles for the next two months. Destroyers in particular would have to be very heavily worked, and fighter and antiaircraft defence would be weak for some time to come. If the Germans started an air offensive from Bulgaria we must expect losses in the convoys both at sea and at their ports of disembarkation. Nor could we rule out surface action by the Italian Fleet. This could be met by our battleships based on Suda Bay in Crete, but only at the expense of weakening the destroyer escort for the convoys and leaving the supply line to Cyrenaica practically unprotected. All this in its turn would increase the strain on Malta. The vulnerability of the Suez Canal to magnetic and acoustic mines gave cause for much anxiety just when these big movements of troops and convoys were starting.

All offensive plans, including the combined operations against Rhodes, must, the Admiral said, be postponed. His resources would be taxed to the limit, but he was convinced that our policy was right and that the risks should be faced.

The shelving of Rhodes was to us all a serious disappointment. We recognised its commanding importance. Rhodes, and also Scarpanto, with their invaluable airfields so near to Crete, were key points. Many times in the years that followed did we plan to assault Rhodes. Never could we fit it in to the main course of events.

I now learned that General Smuts was going to Cairo at Mr.

Eden’s earnest request, and I cabled to him:

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28 Feb. 41

I am so glad you are going to meet Eden and Dill.

We have taken a grave and hazardous decision to
sustain the Greeks and try to make a Balkan Front. I
look forward to receiving your personal views upon this
after your conference. This decision makes it most
necessary to reinforce Egypt and Libya, and I hope you
will

arrange

with

Wavell

and

Dill

to

bring

“Acanthus” [the 1st South African Division] forward to
the Mediterranean at the earliest moment, asking me
about shipping difficulties, which are great. Our affairs
are helped by rapid successes gained in East Africa. It
is only a few weeks ago they were telling us they could
not move on Kismayu till May. Now we have Mogadishu and the whole place in our hands.

Mr. Eden’s account of his discussions with the Turks was not encouraging. They realised their own dangers as acutely as we did, but they, like the Greeks, were convinced that the forces we could offer would not be sufficient to make any real difference to an actual battle.

Mr. Eden to Prime

28 Feb. 41

Minister

C.I.G.S. and I this morning had discussion on
extremely frank and friendly basis with President of the
Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Marshal
Chakmak.

Our decision to send Greece the maximum assistance at the earliest possible moment was well
received. They reiterated Turkey’s determination to fight
if attacked by Germany, and stated their conviction that
German attack on Greece meant that Turkey’s turn
would come next. But since Turkey’s forces at present
had no offensive power they considered the common
cause would be better served by Turkey remaining out
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of the war until her deficiencies had been remedied and
she could be employed with the maximum effect.

If attacked, Turks felt confident that they could hold
the Germans for a time, though they would hope that
we should be able immediately to come to their assistance…. They stated their readiness to concert action
with Yugoslav Government, from whom, however, they
had so far only received an evasive reply to [their]

approach made at our instance. They felt concerned
lest Russians should attack [them] if Turkey became
involved in war with Germany.

The upshot of these discussions is that Turkey
undertakes in any event to enter the war at some
stage. She will, of course, do so immediately she is
attacked. But if she is given time by Germans to re-equip herself she will take advantage of it, and will then
make war at a moment favourable to the common
cause, when her weight can be used with real effect.

To this I replied:

Prime

Minister

to

1 March 41

Mr. Eden, Athens

Obvious German move is to overrun Bulgaria,
further to intimidate Turkey by threat of air attacks,
force Greece out of the war, and then turn on Yugoslavia, compelling her to obey; after which Turkey
can be attacked or not, at their hostile convenience.

Your main appeal should now be made to Yugoslavia. A sudden move south by Yugoslavia would
produce an Italian disaster of the first magnitude,
possibly decisive on whole Balkan situation.
1
If at the
same moment Turkey declared war the enemy could
not gather sufficient forces for many months, during
which our air strength will grow. I am absolutely ready
to go in on a serious hazard if there is reasonable
chance of success, at any rate for a few months, and all
preparations should go forward at fullest speed. But I
should like you so to handle matters in Greece that if
upon final consideration of all the factors, including
Rhodes possibilities, you feel that there is not even a