The Grand Alliance (15 page)

Good news continued to reach us from the Desert. On February 6 Benghazi was entered, three weeks ahead of the expected date, by the 6th Australian Division. By daybreak on February 5 the 7th British Armoured Division (now at a tank strength of one brigade), had reached Msus after much rough going. The division was directed to cut the coastal road. That evening an enemy column of about five thousand ran into the road block at Beda Fomm and promptly surrendered. Early on February 6 the enemy main columns started to come down the road, and there was severe fighting throughout the day with successive groups, including a considerable number of tanks. By nightfall the enemy were in a desperate plight, with a confused mass of vehicles almost twenty miles in length, blocked in front and attacked in flank. Soon after dawn on February 7 they made a final attack with thirty tanks. When this, too, failed General Berganzoli surrendered with his army.

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Thus, in two months the Army of the Nile had advanced five hundred miles, had destroyed an Italian army of more than nine divisions, and had captured 130,000 prisoners, 400

tanks, and 1290 guns. The conquest of Cyrenaica was complete.

In spite of these victories, so grave and complex were the issues, both diplomatic and military, which were at stake in the Middle East, and General Wavell had so much on his hands, that at the meeting of the Defence Committee on February 11 it was proposed to send the Foreign Secretary and General Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to join him in Cairo.

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Prime

Minister

to

12 Feb. 41

General Wavell

Accept my heartfelt congratulations on this latest
admirable victory, and on the unexpected speed with
which Cyrenaica has been conquered. I have carried
out your wishes in mentioning Generals O’Connor and
Creagh.

2. Defence Committee considered whole situation
last night, comprising, first, the extremely favourable
developments in United States supplies; second,
increasingly menacing attitude of Japan and plain
possibility she may attack us in the near future; third,
undoubted serious probability of attempt at invasion
here. In this general setting we must settle Mediterranean plans.

3. We should have been content with making a safe
flank for Egypt at Tobruk, and we told you that thereafter Greece and/or Turkey must have priority, but that
if you could get Benghazi easily and without prejudice
to European calls so much the better. We are delighted
that you have got this prize three weeks ahead of
expectation, but this does not alter, indeed it rather
confirms, our previous directive, namely, that your
major effort must now be to aid Greece and/or Turkey.

This rules out any serious effort against Tripoli,
although minor demonstrations thitherwards would be a
useful feint. You should, therefore, make yourself
secure in Benghazi and concentrate all available forces
in the Delta in preparation for movement to Europe.

4. Both Greece and Turkey have hitherto refused
our offers of technical units, because they say these
are too small to solve their main problem, but conspicuous enough to provoke German intervention. However,
this intervention becomes more certain and imminent
every day, and may begin at any time now. If Turkey
and Yugoslavia would tell Bulgaria they will attack her
unless she joins them in resisting a German advance
southward, this might create a barrier requiring much
larger German forces than are now available in Rumania. But I fear they will not do this, and will fool away
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their chances of combined resistance, as was done in
the Low Countries.

5. Our first thoughts must be for our ally Greece,
who is actually fighting so well. If Greece is trampled
down or forced to make a separate peace with Italy,
yielding also air and naval strategic points against us to
Germany, effect on Turkey will be very bad. But if
Greece, with British aid, can hold up for some months
German advance, chances of Turkish intervention will
be favoured. Therefore, it would seem that we should
try to get in a position to offer the Greeks the transfer to
Greece of the fighting portion of the army which has
hitherto defended Egypt, and make every plan for
sending and reinforcing it to the limit with men and
material.

6. We do not know what Greece will say to a great
offer of this kind. We do not know what are her means
of resisting an invasion from Bulgaria by German
forces. It is reasonable to assume that they have a plan
to move troops from Albania to hold the passes and the
lines of defence already built along or near the Bulgarian frontier. They cannot surely have pursued their
advantage in Albania without any thought of this mortal
danger to their right and almost rear. If they have a
good plan it would be worth our while to back it with all
our strength and fight the Germans in Greece, hoping
thereby to draw in both Turks and Yugoslavs. You
should begin forthwith plans and time-tables, as well as
any preparatory movements of shipping.

7. It is not intended that you should delay [the
capture of] Rhodes, which we regard as most urgent.

8. In order to give the very best chance to concerting
all possible measures, both diplomatic and military,
against the Germans in the Balkans, we are sending
the Foreign Secretary and General Dill to join you in
Cairo. They will leave on February 12, and should
reach you 14th or 15th February. Having surveyed the
whole position in Cairo and got all preparatory measures on the move, you will no doubt go to Athens with
them, and thereafter, if convenient, to Angora. It is
hoped that at least four divisions, including one armoured division, and whatever additional air forces the

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Greek airfields are ready for, together with all available
munitions, may be offered in the best possible way and
in the shortest time.

9. We can form no opinion here as to what ports of
Greece we should use or what front we should try to
hold or try to get them to hold. That can only be settled
on the spot with the Greek Command.

10. In the event of its proving impossible to reach
any good agreement with the Greeks and work out a
practical military plan, then we must try to save as
much from the wreck as possible. We must at all costs
keep Crete and take any Greek islands which are of
use as air bases. We could also reconsider the
advance on Tripoli. But these will only be consolation
prizes after the classic race has been lost. There will
always remain the support of Turkey.

General Wavell replied on February 12, returning me compliments for my congratulations. He had naturally been considering the problem of assistance to Greece and Turkey for some time. He hoped he might be able to improve on his earlier estimate of available reserves, especially if the Australian Government would give him a certain latitude. He had already spoken to Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, who was in Cairo on his way to London, about this, and found him very ready to agree to what he suggested. He welcomed the visit of the Foreign Secretary and General Dill. “We will do our best,” he said,

“to frustrate German plans in the Balkans, but Greek and Turkish hesitations and Yugoslav timidity have made our task very difficult. Owing to difficulties of shipping and ports our arrival is bound to be somewhat piecemeal.”

I drafted and obtained formal Cabinet approval for the instructions to the Foreign Secretary on his mission.

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12 Feb. 41

During his visit to the Mediterranean theatre the
Foreign Secretary will represent His Majesty’s Government in all matters diplomatic and military. He will report
whenever necessary to the War Cabinet through the
Prime Minister.

2. His principal object will be the sending of speedy
succour to Greece. For this purpose he will initiate any
action he may think necessary with the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East, with the Egyptian Government, and with the Governments of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. He will of course keep the
Foreign Office informed, and he will himself be informed
by the Foreign Office or the Prime Minister of all
changes of plan or view occurring at home.

3. The C.I.G.S. will advise on the military aspect,
and the Foreign Secretary will make sure that in case of
any difference his views are also placed before His
Majesty’s Government.

4. The following points require particular attention:
(a) What is the minimum garrison that can hold the
western frontier of Libya and Benghazi, and what
measures should be taken to make Benghazi a
principal garrison and air base? The extreme importance is emphasised of dropping the overland communications at the earliest moment. (b) The régime and
policy to be enforced in Cyrenaica, having regard to our
desire to separate the Italian nation from the Mussolini
system.

(c)

The

execution

of

the

operation

“Mandibles” [Rhodes] at the earliest moment, including,
if necessary, repacking of the commandos at Capetown

[for an opposed landing], having regard, however, to its
not becoming an impediment to the main issue. (d) The
formation in the Delta of the strongest and best-equipped force in divisional or brigade organisations
which can be dispatched to Greece at the earliest
moment. (e)The drain to be made upon our resources
for the purpose of finishing up in Eritrea and breaking
down the Italian positions in Abyssinia. The former is
urgent; the latter, though desirable, must not conflict
with major issues. It may be necessary to leave it to rot
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