The End of Christianity (63 page)

36
. Someone may object that perhaps we ought to be irrational and uninformed, but still the conclusion would follow that
when
we are rational and informed we would want
x
. Only if
x
were then “to be irrational and/or uninformed in circumstance
z
would it then be true that we ought to be irrational and uninformed, and yet even that conclusion can only follow if we are rational and informed when we arrive at it. Because for an imperative to pursue
x
to be
true
, whatever we want most must
in fact
be best achieved by obeying
x
, yet it's unlikely that we will arrive at that conclusion by being irrational and uninformed. Such an approach is very unlikely to light upon the truth of what best achieves our desires (as if it could do so by accident). Therefore, any conclusion arrived at regarding what
x
is must be either rational and informed or probably false. Ergo, to achieve anything we desire, we ought to endeavor to be rational and informed.

37
. “Weakness of will” is therefore merely an irrational preference for one thing over another (e.g., preferring instant gratification to long-term well-being). That we call it a weakness simply expresses our acknowledgment that such a preference is irrational.

38
. For the formal proof of this, see Argument 3 in the appendix to this chapter (on pp. 361–62).

39
. I believe science has established a Humean account of motivation more than amply (Carrier,
Sense and Goodness
, 193–97, for discussion and scientific bibliography), and all philosophical objections to it have been ably dispatched by Neil Sinhababu, “The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended,”
Philosophical Review
118, no. 4 (2009): 465–500 (though he occasionally confuses the phenomenology of desire with the logical mechanics of desire, this only interferes with his ability to unify internalism and cognitivism, the rest of his argument remains correct even using my definition of desire in note 4). Nevertheless, my moral theory as stated here is compatible with either Humean or non-Humean accounts of moral motivation (e.g., “When rational and sufficiently informed, you will want
x
more than ~x” does not presuppose where this desire for
x
comes from, only that it will survive rational review).

40
. On innate and learned theories of mind and their role in autism, see Simon Baron-Cohen,
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

41
. See discussion and sources in Carrier,
Sense and Goodness
, 342–44; and in Sinnott-Armstrong,
Moral Pyschology
, 1:390, 3:119–296, 363–66, 381–82. Their insanity does not mean psychopaths have an excuse, however, because when they act immorally they usually still know what they are doing is wrong (see note 35). And even when they don't, like schizophrenics, we still have to contain them and protect ourselves from them.

42
. For the formal proof of what has just been argued see Argument 4 in the appendix to this chapter (on pp. 362–64); and for the formal proof that these moral facts are ascertainable scientifically see Argument 5 (on p. 364).

43
. Do not mistake me for saying that moral facts consist of evolutionary strategies for increasing differential reproductive success. Such strategies have evolved. But they carry no imperative authority when we want something else more. We (as persons making moral decisions) are minds, not genomes. We prefer things like happiness to differential reproductive success (and I predict this will be commonplace among civilized species). The latter can at best only be instrumental to the former—for us, that is; whereas for our genes, obviously, it was the other way around, which is how we got that way, but we're running the show now, not our genes: see Keith Stanovich,
The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), and related remarks in Victor Stenger's chapter in the present volume.

44
. This is a very important consequence of my analysis, as this being the case, we need to be extremely careful in any endeavor to develop AI of any kind, genetically or digitally, as its recognition of moral facts will be dependent on what nature we engineer it to have (or fail to engineer it to have). This danger has been aptly illustrated, for example, in the films
Dark Star
(1974) and
2010
(1984).

45
. There is no relevant difference here between propositional knowledge (“I know how to swim”) and nonpropositional knowledge (actually knowing how to swim). The same conclusions follow for either (the latter merely consisting of subconsciously assimilated information, like Trinity's “uploading” of piloting skills in
The Matrix
[1999]).

46
. Hence the conclusions of Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund in Sinnott-Armstrong,
Moral Psychology
, 2:213–16 (with 250–54).

47
. This has the added consequence of refuting the Moral Argument for God, e.g., Mark Linville, “The Moral Argument,” in
The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology
, ed. W. L. Craig and J. P. Moreland (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 391–448. If I'm wrong, of course, that still does not entail the moral argument succeeds (if there are no moral facts, then there are no moral facts—atheism is not thereby refuted). But as I have demonstrated that moral facts must necessarily exist regardless of whether God exists or any religion is true, the existence of moral facts cannot argue for the existence of God or the truth of any religion. Linville's counter-argument, that deriving moral facts from the evolved facts of human biology commits a genetic fallacy, is self-defeating if true, as then deriving moral facts from the creative acts of God commits a genetic fallacy, too (for we cannot conclude that what God wants is best except by appeal to the nature God already gave us, which becomes a circular argument). Either way, the question remains what we ought most to do, which is still entailed by what we want most to happen. It doesn't matter how we got that way (though it will matter when we become the creators of intelligent beings). Even if Linville were to argue that he wished he were different than evolution made him, he would be contradicting him-self—as he cannot have wished for anything but what (ultimately) evolution gave him the desire to wish for, and whether he can change to satisfy that desire will depend on his actual nature, which is a matter of fact that remains the same whether evolution made us or God, so if Linville wishes he were different but cannot satisfy that wish, then he is as much objecting to how God made him as evolution did—whereas if he can satisfy that wish, then his complaint is groundless, as he would then no longer have to be different than he wished to be.

48
. I present the formal deductive proof of these conclusions in an appendix to this chapter (pp. 359–64), such that you cannot rationally disagree unless you can rationally reject one of the premises therein; as otherwise my conclusions necessarily follow from them, and it is irrational to disagree with a conclusion that necessarily follows from premises you cannot rationally reject. I note this because my arguments are rejected by some atheists of my acquaintance, but for no rational reason I can ascertain. They consistently fail to identify any premise that they can rationally reject in the formal arguments in this appendix. Thus their rejection of the conclusions is simply irrational.

H
ECTOR
A
VALOS
, P
H
D
, is professor of religious studies, Iowa State University, and author of
Slavery, Abolitionism, and the Ethics of Biblical Scholarship
(Sheffield, England: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2011),
Fighting Words: The Origin of Religious Violence
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005),
The End of Biblical Studies
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), and a chapter in
The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails
, edited by John W. Loftus (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010).

R
ICHARD
C
ARRIER
, P
H
D
, is a published philosopher and historian of antiquity and author of
Sense and Goodness without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism
(Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2005);
Not the Impossible Faith: Why Christianity Didn't Need a Miracle to Succeed
(Raleigh, NC: Lulu, 2009);
Why I Am Not a Christian: Four Conclusive Reasons to Reject the Faith
(Richmond, CA: Philosophy Press, 2011); of three chapters for the book
The Empty Tomb: Jesus beyond the Grave
, edited by Robert Price and Jeffery Lowder (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005); and two chapters in
The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails
, edited by John W. Loftus (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010). You can find his website at
http://www.richardcarrier.info
.

D
AVID
E
LLER
, P
H
D
, is assistant professor of anthropology at the Community College of Denver. He has written the books
Natural Atheism
(Cranford, NJ: American Atheist, 2004);
Atheism Advanced: Further Thoughts of a Freethinker
(Cranford, NJ: American Atheist, 2007); a college textbook,
Introducing Anthropology of Religion: Culture to the Ultimate
(New York: Routledge, 2007);
Cruel Creeds, Virtuous Violence: Religious Violence across Culture and History
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010), and two chapters in
The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails
, edited by John W. Loftus (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010).

J
ACO
G
ERICKE
, P
H
D
, is an Old Testament biblical scholar and philosopher of religion, North-West University, South Africa.

J
OHN
W. L
OFTUS
, MA, MD
IV
, T
H
M
, is the author of the book
Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008); editor of
The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010); and founder of
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com
.

M
ATT
M
C
C
ORMICK
, P
H
D
, professor of philosophy, California State University, Sacramento, California.

K
EITH
P
ARSONS
, P
H
D
, professor of philosophy, University of Houston, and author of the books
God and the Burden of Proof
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989) and
Rational Episodes: Logic for the Intermittently Reasonable
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009).

R
OBERT
P
RICE
, P
H
D
, is a member of the Jesus Seminar and author of several books including
Deconstructing Jesus
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000);
The Incredible Shrinking Son of Man: How Reliable Is the Gospel Tradition?
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003); coeditor of
The Empty Tomb: Jesus beyond the Grave
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005);
Inerrant the Wind: The Evangelical Crisis of Biblical Authority
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009); and a chapter in
The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010), edited by John W. Loftus.

K
EN
P
ULLIAM
, P
H
D
, earned his doctorate from Bob Jones University in 1986. Then, for nine years, Ken taught New Testament Greek, systematic theology, and apologetics at the International Baptist College in Tempe, Arizona, before becoming an agnostic atheist. At the time of his untimely death in October of 2010, he was writing a book that would surely have been a tour de force on the various atonement theories. His story can be read here:
http://www.bibkinterp.com/articles/funding357924.shtml
.

V
ICTOR
S
TENGER
, P
H
D
, is adjunct professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado and emeritus professor of physics at the University of Hawaii. He spent forty years doing research in elementary particle physics and astrophysics before retiring in 2000. He is the author of ten books including the 2007
New York Times
bestseller
God: The Failed Hypothesis
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), and
The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe Is Not Designed for Us
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2011).

V
ALERIE
T
ARICO
, P
H
D
, is a psychologist and former director of the Children's Behavior and Learning Clinic in Bellevue, Washington. She is the author of the book
The Dark Side: How Evangelical Teachings Corrupt Love and Truth
(Seattle: Dea, 2006), revised and republished as
Trusting Doubt: A Former Evangelical Looks at Old Beliefs in a New Light
(Hamilton, VA: Oracle Institute, 2010); and a chapter in
The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails
, edited by John W. Loftus (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010). Her website can be found at
http://www.valerietarico.com
.