The Devil Wins: A History of Lying from the Garden of Eden to the Enlightenment (47 page)

63
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. I, ch. 2, 12.

64
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. III, ch. 2, 155.

65
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. III, ch. 1, 155.

66
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. VII, ch. 2, p. 221–22.

67
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. I, ch. 4, 23. Nederman, “Beyond Stoicism and Aristotelianism,” 187, makes this observation in somewhat different terms when he links John’s skepticism to his “praise of liberty of thought and speech.”

68
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. I, ch. 5, 27.

69
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. I, ch. 5, 28. Compare this with Michael Wilks’s very interesting essay “John of Salisbury and the Tyranny of Nonsense,” in
The World of John of Salisbury
, ed. Michael Wilks (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 263–86, here, 275–77, where he suggests the principle of the middle way guides John’s ethics, while making no reference to John’s skeptical and rhetorical leanings.

70
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. III, ch. 15, 211.

71
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. III, ch. 11, 186.

72
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. III, ch. 12, 190–91.

73
.   Both Garver,
Machiavelli
, 3–25, and Robert Harriman, “Theory without Modernity,” in
Prudence
, 1–32, here, 14–20, stress that prudence must never be reduced to a mere reactive, ends-justify-the-means form of reasoning.

74
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. III, ch. 12, 192.

75
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. VIII, ch. 14, 389–90, also bk. III, ch. 8, 172.

76
.   Gratian,
The Treaty on Laws with the Ordinary Gloss
, trans. Augustine Thompson and James Gordley (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), dist. 13, pt. 1, 49. For a recent discussion of Gratian, the glossators, and moral dilemmas, see M. V. Dougherty,
Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought from Gratian to Thomas Aquinas
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Anders Winroth,
The Making of Gratian’s
Decretum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), suggests the
Decretum
as we know it is an expansion subsequent lawyers made to Gratian’s initially much smaller treatise. I will simply refer to the work as Gratian’s for the sake of convenience.

77
.   Gratian,
Treaty on Laws
, dist. 13, pt. 1, c. 2.1, 50. Early thirteenth-century Scholastic thinkers, such as William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales, seem to have agreed with Gratian. See Doughtery,
Moral Dilemmas
, 41–84.

78
.   Gratian,
Treaty on Laws
, dist. 13, pt. 1, gloss, 49.

79
.   Gratian,
Treaty on Laws
, dist. 13, pt. 1, c. 2.3, 51. Dougherty,
Moral Dilemmas
, 6–8, notes that the difference between Gratian and the glossators can be captured in the different definitions of the word
perplexitas
itself, which has both epistemological and ontological connotations.

80
.   Dougherty,
Moral Dilemmas
, 22–25.

81
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. I, introduction, 9.

82
.   John of Salisbury,
Policraticus
, bk. I, introduction, 9–10. On Augustine’s prohibition against lying, see
chapter 4
.

83
.   John of Salisbury,
Entheticus
, 97–99. On John and the permissibility of lying, see Dallas G. Denery II, “Christine de Pizan against the Theologians: The Virtue of Lies in
The Book of Three Virtues
,”
Viator
39:1 (2008): 229–47, Marcia Colish, “Rethinking Lying in the Twelfth Century,” in
Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century
, ed. István P. Bejczy and Richard G. Newhauser (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2005), 155–74, and, especially, Cary J. Nederman and Tsae Lan Lee Dow, “The Road to Heaven Is Paved with Pious Deception: Medieval Speech Ethics and Deliberative Democracy,” in Benedetto Fontana,
ed.,
Talking Democracy: Historical Perspectives on Rhetoric and Democracy
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 187–212, who were the first to identify and stress this aspect of both John’s and Christine de Pizan’s ethics.

84
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 14–15.

85
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 28.

86
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 28. Karen Green, “On Translating Christine as a Philosopher,” in
Healing the Body Politic
, 117–37, here, 119, warns against anachronistic interpretations of prudence in Christine’s writings that equate it with something like “intelligent self-interest” and contrast it with morality. For a more purely pragmatic interpretation of prudence in Christine’s work, see Kate L. Forhan,
The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), 100–108.

87
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 29.

88
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 35.

89
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 30.

90
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 36.

91
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 38.

92
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 55.

93
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 4445.

94
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 45. On Christine’s advice concerning lies and deception, Sharon C. Mitchell, “Moral Posturing: Virtue in Christine de Pisan’s
Livre de Trois Vertus
,” in
The Inner Life of Women in Medieval Romance Literature: Grief, Guilt and Hypocrisy
, ed. Jeff Rider and Jamie Friedman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 85–106, Tracy Adams, “Appearing Virtuous: Christine de Pizan’s
Le Livre des trois vertus
and Anne de France’s
Les Enseignements d’Anne de France
,” in
Virtue Ethics for Women, 1250–1500
, ed. K. Green and C. J. Mews (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 115–31, and Linda Rouillard, “Faux semblant ou faire semblant? Christine de Pizan and Virtuous Artifice,”
Forum for Modern Language Studies
46:1 (2009): 1–13.

95
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 41.

96
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 39.

97
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 39.

98
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 43.

99
.   Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 23.

100
. Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 23–24. Liliane Dulac, “The Representation and Functions of Feminine Speech in Christine de Pizan’s
Livre des Trois Virtus
,” in
Reinterpreting Christine de Pizan
, ed. Earl Jeffrey Richards (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 13–22, stresses the “premeditated and cunning” nature of Christine’s advice.

101
. Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 46.

102
. As Tracy Adams notes, “
Moyennerresse de traictié de paix
: Christine de Pizan’s Mediators,” in
Healing the Body Politic
, 186–88 and 198–99, Christine herself recognizes the princess will almost inevitably fail as an intermediary, hence her advice on how to deal with adversity. “Christine’s motive,” Adams
adds, 188, “in exposing the limitations of female intervention seems to be to make a moral point: that the problems of the world … are the fault of men. On the other hand, even if they are deprived of political authority, women possess tremendous moral authority.” Also, Forhan,
The Political Theory
, 62–64.

103
. Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 47.

104
. Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 48.

105
. Scotus,
In librum tertium sententiarum
, dist. 38, quaest. 1.

106
. Christine de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 48.

107
. Christine, de Pizan,
The Treasure
, 48. Barry Collett, “The Three Mirrors of Christine de Pizan,” in
Healing the Body Politic
, 1–18, here, 13, places Christine’s union of moral, practical, and political advice as part of a larger fourteenth-century transformation in the style and content of mirrors for princes.

108
. Philibert de Vienne,
Le Philosophe de court
, ed. Pauline M. Smith (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1990), 81–82. On sixteenth-century critiques of the court, see Pauline M. Smith,
The Anti-courtier Trend in Sixteenth Century French Literature
(Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1966).

109
. Philibert,
Le Philosophe
, 86–87.

110
. For a notable precursor to Philibert’s discussion of courtly musical ability, Gottfried von Strassburg,
Tristan: With the Tristan of Thomas
, trans. A. T. Hatto (London: Penguin Books, 1967, rev.), 89–91.

111
. Philibert,
Le Philosophe
, 168–70.

112
. Daniel Javitch, “The Philosopher of the Court: A French Satire Misunderstood,”
Comparative Literature
23:2 (Spring 1971): 97–124.

113
. Nathaniel Walker,
The Refin’d Courtier or, A Correction of Several Indecencies crept in Civil Conversation: Written originally in Italian by John Casa, from thence in Latin by Nathan Chytroeus, and from both by way of Paraphrase, made English, by N.W
. (London: Matthew Gilliflower, 1681), 2. On the English reception of della Casa’s treatise, see John R. Woodhouse, “The Tradition of Della Casa’s
Galateo
in English,” in
The Crisis of Courtesy: Studies in the Conduct-Book in Britain, 1600–1900
, ed. Jacques Carré (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 11–26, on Walker in particular, 18. Woodhouse contends, 11–12, that while clearly a conduct manual, della Casa’s treatise was also satirical, though none of his English readers, nor anyone else for that matter, seems to have recognized it.

114
. Walker,
The Refin’d Courtier
, 7.

115
. Walker,
The Refin’d Courtier
, 126.

116
. Stephano Guazzo,
The Art of Conversation
(London: J. Brett, 1738), 59.

117
. Guazzo,
The Art of Conversation
, 64. Javitch, “Rival Arts of Conduct in Elizabethan England: Guazzo’s
Civile Conversation
and Castiglione’s
Courtier
,”
Yearbook of Italian Studies
1 (1971): 171–98, stresses the differences between Guazzo’s and Castiglione’s depiction of the ideal courtier and how the English overlooked them.

118
. Torquato Accetto,
De l’honnête dissimulation
, ed. Salvatore S. Nigro and trans. Mireille Blanc-Sanchez (Paris: Éditions Verdier, 1990), 31. On the courtly practice of dissimulation, see Snyder,
Dissimulation
, 68–105.

119
. Accetto,
De l’honnête dissimulation
, 41–42. Cavaillé,
Dis/simulations
, 333–39, offers helpful context for Accetto’s treatise.

120
. Accetto,
De l’honnête dissimulation
, 51.

121
. On Thomas see
chapter 4
, and on Christ and the Devil see
chapter 1
. Francis Bacon, “Of Simulation and Dissimulation,” in
The Major Works
, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 349–51, here, 350, offers a more or less standard definition: “There be three degrees of this hiding and veiling of a man’s self. The first, closeness, reservation, and secrecy; when a man leaveth himself without observation, or without hold to be taken, what he is. The second, dissimulation, in the negative; when a man lets fall signs and arguments, that he is not, that he is. And the third, simulation, in the affirmative; when a man industriously and expressly feigns and pretends to be, that he is not.” On the various distinctions between simulation and dissimulation, see Cavaillé,
Dis/simulations
, 11–31.

122
. Accetto,
De l’honnête dissimulation
, 51–55.

123
. Accetto,
De l’honnête dissimulation
, 26–27.

124
. Jean de Sponde,
Homeri quae extant omnia: Ilias, Odyssea, Batrachomyomachia, Hymni, Poematia aliquot
(Basil: E. Episcopii, 1583), 275: “Dixit, mendacia multa dicens veris similia.” In his commentary to Accetto’s
De l’honnête dissimulation
, 54, n. 6, Nigro suggests that Accetto used Sponde’s translation of Homer. On scars in Accetto, Cavaillé,
Dis/simulations
, 340–44, although he does not discuss this particular scar.

125
. Accetto,
De l’honnête dissimulation
, 41. Here I agree with Cavaillé,
Dis/simulations
, 351–54, who argues for the dependence of dissimulation on simulation. Contrast this reading with Snyder,
Dissimulation
, 59–67, who argues that Accetto clearly distinguishes “honest dissimulation” from all forms of deceit and lying.

126
. Guazzo,
The Art of Conversation
, 48. Snyder,
Dissimulation
, 33–36, discusses these passages.

127
. Guazzo,
The Art of Conversation
, 57.

128
. Guazzo,
The Art of Conversation
, 67.

129
. Guazzo,
The Art of Conversation
, 74–75.

130
. Walker,
The Refin’d Courtier
, 90.

131
. Walker,
The Refin’d Courtier
, 95.

132
. Walker,
The Refin’d Courtier
, 8.