Terminator and Philosophy: I'll Be Back, Therefore I Am (38 page)
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Authors: Richard Brown,William Irwin,Kevin S. Decker
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Given these two different uses of definite descriptions, we have to decide between two competing notions about their nature. On the one hand, we might say that definite descriptions are
ambiguous
: they genuinely have two separate kinds of meanings, a referential and an attributive one. Here, we’d be treating descriptions like “the phone book killer” the way that we treat words like “bank.” “Bank” has at least two different meanings. So, in this way of dealing with definite descriptions, the sentence “The phone book killer has no pity” will have two distinct meanings. In one of its meanings it will mean something like “The phone book killer,
whoever that is,
has no pity,” and in the other, it’ll mean something like “The phone book killer,
by which I mean that particular guy
, has no pity.”
ambiguous
: they genuinely have two separate kinds of meanings, a referential and an attributive one. Here, we’d be treating descriptions like “the phone book killer” the way that we treat words like “bank.” “Bank” has at least two different meanings. So, in this way of dealing with definite descriptions, the sentence “The phone book killer has no pity” will have two distinct meanings. In one of its meanings it will mean something like “The phone book killer,
whoever that is,
has no pity,” and in the other, it’ll mean something like “The phone book killer,
by which I mean that particular guy
, has no pity.”
On the other hand, we can say that what’s going on here makes sense in terms of what’s called the
semantic
vs. the
pragmatic
distinction. Semantics deals with the
meaning
of expressions or terms, whereas pragmatics deals with the way that people
use
an expression in communication. So, to take a simple example, suppose that I said, “This movie is
so
interesting” in a sarcastic way, as to make it clear that what I really meant was that this movie (hopefully not
Terminator: Salvation
!) was anything
but
interesting. The sentence that I speak in this case would have a different
meaning
from how I intended to
use
it.
semantic
vs. the
pragmatic
distinction. Semantics deals with the
meaning
of expressions or terms, whereas pragmatics deals with the way that people
use
an expression in communication. So, to take a simple example, suppose that I said, “This movie is
so
interesting” in a sarcastic way, as to make it clear that what I really meant was that this movie (hopefully not
Terminator: Salvation
!) was anything
but
interesting. The sentence that I speak in this case would have a different
meaning
from how I intended to
use
it.
Yet Paul Grice (1913-1988) argued that there’s no need to worry about this second meaning for the sentence I said, one in which it really means the opposite of what it literally means. This is an example of Grice’s “modified Ockham’s razor.” Ockham’ s razor helps us choose between two competing theories: all other things being equal, the simplest one is the best. Grice’s version tells us that we shouldn’t “multiply linguistic entities beyond necessity.” If we can find a way to explain what is going on in the above examples without having to come up with multiple meanings for the sentence, then we should do so.
Grice thinks we can distinguish between the meaning of the sentence itself (as spoken) and the
speaker’s
meaning in saying the sentence. The sentence’s standard meaning is that the movie holds my attention; but the speaker wants to convince us of the opposite. If Grice is right, then we can explain what’s going on with definite descriptions in this way: we can say that definite descriptions have their attributive meanings like Russell thought, and yet people sometimes use these in referential ways, as in the examples above. But “The phone book killer,
by which I mean that particular guy
, has no pity” isn’t a meaning of the sentence that I say. It is, rather, the thought that I am trying to express in saying what I did in just the same way as when I say that the movie is so interesting. The sentence will have its standard “whoever that is” meaning. What I say is not what I mean. So which is right? Do they have two meanings or just one meaning and different uses?
speaker’s
meaning in saying the sentence. The sentence’s standard meaning is that the movie holds my attention; but the speaker wants to convince us of the opposite. If Grice is right, then we can explain what’s going on with definite descriptions in this way: we can say that definite descriptions have their attributive meanings like Russell thought, and yet people sometimes use these in referential ways, as in the examples above. But “The phone book killer,
by which I mean that particular guy
, has no pity” isn’t a meaning of the sentence that I say. It is, rather, the thought that I am trying to express in saying what I did in just the same way as when I say that the movie is so interesting. The sentence will have its standard “whoever that is” meaning. What I say is not what I mean. So which is right? Do they have two meanings or just one meaning and different uses?
Saul Kripke (1940- ) argues against treating descriptions as ambiguous in his paper “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,” where he calls positing an ambiguity “the lazy man’s approach.”
6
If referential uses of descriptions occurred in a language that was stipulated to be as Russell says, then it cannot be an argument against Russell that such uses occur in English. So let us imagine a fictional language, call it “Russell English,” in which we stipulate that definite descriptions work in the way that Russell says that they do. In Russell English, “The Terminator has no pity” has only its attributive meaning, which is that there is some object or other that is the one and only Terminator and that object has no pity. In such a language, Kripke argues, people could still use “The Terminator has no pity” to refer to the Terminator, and so the existence of referential uses in actual English cannot be an argument against Russell. In this fictional language, there is no referential meaning for definite descriptions. This is true simply because we have stipulated it to be so. So there is no question about whether the descriptions in Russell English are ambiguous; they are not. But even so, the speakers of Russell English could still use those descriptions to refer to people and objects in spite of the lack of referential meaning. If this is the case, and it seems as though it is, it can’t be a problem for Russell’s theory that people use descriptions to refer. How could it? We could, for all we know, be speaking Russell English, and if that were so, we would still be able to use descriptions referentially. Kripke suggests that Grice’s way of handling these kinds of cases is all that we need. Why multiply linguistic entities that do not work for us?
7
6
If referential uses of descriptions occurred in a language that was stipulated to be as Russell says, then it cannot be an argument against Russell that such uses occur in English. So let us imagine a fictional language, call it “Russell English,” in which we stipulate that definite descriptions work in the way that Russell says that they do. In Russell English, “The Terminator has no pity” has only its attributive meaning, which is that there is some object or other that is the one and only Terminator and that object has no pity. In such a language, Kripke argues, people could still use “The Terminator has no pity” to refer to the Terminator, and so the existence of referential uses in actual English cannot be an argument against Russell. In this fictional language, there is no referential meaning for definite descriptions. This is true simply because we have stipulated it to be so. So there is no question about whether the descriptions in Russell English are ambiguous; they are not. But even so, the speakers of Russell English could still use those descriptions to refer to people and objects in spite of the lack of referential meaning. If this is the case, and it seems as though it is, it can’t be a problem for Russell’s theory that people use descriptions to refer. How could it? We could, for all we know, be speaking Russell English, and if that were so, we would still be able to use descriptions referentially. Kripke suggests that Grice’s way of handling these kinds of cases is all that we need. Why multiply linguistic entities that do not work for us?
7
Kripke also argues against treating descriptions as ambiguous by drawing our attention to
anaphor
. When we use pronouns to refer to an object that we previously referred to by name, we are using anaphor. So, in the sentences “The Terminator has no pity. It cannot be bargained with,” the word “it” is anaphoric. Kripke thinks this gives us good reasons not to treat definite descriptions as ambiguous. Suppose that we are watching John having lunch with someone (who is not the Terminator) and who is acting sympathetically toward John. Kripke asks us to “consider the two following dialogues,” modified for our context:
anaphor
. When we use pronouns to refer to an object that we previously referred to by name, we are using anaphor. So, in the sentences “The Terminator has no pity. It cannot be bargained with,” the word “it” is anaphoric. Kripke thinks this gives us good reasons not to treat definite descriptions as ambiguous. Suppose that we are watching John having lunch with someone (who is not the Terminator) and who is acting sympathetically toward John. Kripke asks us to “consider the two following dialogues,” modified for our context:
Dialogue 1Albert: The Terminator is kind to him.Barbara: No, he isn’t. The man you’re referring to isn’t the Terminator.Dialogue 2Albert: The Terminator is kind to him.Barbara: He is kind to him, but he isn’t the Terminator.
In the first dialogue, Barbara uses the word “he” to refer to the Terminator (and not to refer to the person having lunch with John), while in the second dialogue, Barbara uses “he” to refer to the person having lunch with John (and not the Terminator). However, Albert is using “The Terminator is kind to him” in the referential sense and so is referring to the person that John is having lunch with. Whether or not that person is the Terminator, the sentence depends for its truth on that person and only on that person.
But this presents a problem. The second dialogue is easy to explain: Barbara’s use of “he” is anaphoric and depends on Albert’s referential use of “the Terminator.” It refers to the person that John is having lunch with. But this isn’t the case in the first dialogue. If “he” is anaphoric in this dialogue, depending on “the Terminator,” then it has to have the same reference. If it’s true that Albert’s line has a referential meaning, then Barbara’s use of “he” must refer to the person that John is having lunch with. But this is clearly not what’s going on. Barbara is obviously using “he” to refer to the Terminator and not to the person John is having lunch with. Since it’s clear that Barbara means to use “he” to refer to the actual Terminator and
not
to the person who is having lunch with John, we can explain this only by either denying that “he” is anaphoric
or
by giving up the idea that “the Terminator is kind to him” has a referential meaning.
not
to the person who is having lunch with John, we can explain this only by either denying that “he” is anaphoric
or
by giving up the idea that “the Terminator is kind to him” has a referential meaning.
Michael Devitt (1938- ) takes the first option, suggesting that “he” in the first dialogue is in fact not anaphoric but rather a
pronoun of laziness
. Let’ s look at the way these things normally work. If I say, “John Connor has his paycheck directly deposited, but Miles Dyson has to take it to the bank,” the occurrence of “it” here can’t be anaphoric. That is, it can’t be taken as referring to John’s check but must be taken as referring to Miles’s check. Maybe I should have said, “Miles Dyson has to take his paycheck to the bank,” repeating “his paycheck,” but being lazy, I use “it” instead. If “he” was Devitt’s pronoun of laziness in the first dialogue, then the dialogue should be read in the following way:
pronoun of laziness
. Let’ s look at the way these things normally work. If I say, “John Connor has his paycheck directly deposited, but Miles Dyson has to take it to the bank,” the occurrence of “it” here can’t be anaphoric. That is, it can’t be taken as referring to John’s check but must be taken as referring to Miles’s check. Maybe I should have said, “Miles Dyson has to take his paycheck to the bank,” repeating “his paycheck,” but being lazy, I use “it” instead. If “he” was Devitt’s pronoun of laziness in the first dialogue, then the dialogue should be read in the following way:
Albert: The Terminator (in-the-referential-sense-referring-to-that-guy-over-there) is kind to him.Barbara: No, the Terminator (in-the-referential-sense-referring-to-the-actual Terminator) isn’t. The man you’re referring to isn’t the Terminator.
Originally, Barbara simply used “he” as a replacement for the description “the Terminator,” but we take it to be the referential meaning that refers to the actual Terminator.
Kripke objects to this because “[Barbara] may well be in no position to use [‘the Terminator’] referentially. She may have merely heard that [the Terminator has no pity].” If this were the case, then Barbara could not be using “he” as a pronoun of laziness, and it would have to be taken as anaphoric on Albert’s use of “the Terminator.” Devitt responds that it “might be a pronoun of laziness for [‘the Terminator’] taken attributively, even though Albert’s use of [‘the Terminator’] is referential.”
8
So for Devitt, we should understand Barbara as saying, “No, the Terminator (in-the-attributive-sense-whoever-that-is) isn’t. The man you’re referring to isn’t the Terminator.” This would be possible if Barbara knew the person who John was having lunch with and knew that he wasn’t the Terminator.
8
So for Devitt, we should understand Barbara as saying, “No, the Terminator (in-the-attributive-sense-whoever-that-is) isn’t. The man you’re referring to isn’t the Terminator.” This would be possible if Barbara knew the person who John was having lunch with and knew that he wasn’t the Terminator.
At first glance, it does seem that we might be able to switch between the meanings of ambiguous words when using these kinds of pronouns. For instance, consider the recent DVD release of a movie called
Paycheck
.
9
Now suppose that I say, “I put my paycheck in the bank, John put it in the DVD player.” Can “my paycheck” be taken as referring to my paycheck from work while the “it” is used as a pronoun of laziness that refers to his rented copy of the movie
Paycheck
? I could do this if I wanted to make a joke through a play on words, but as Devitt says, this depends on “how much laziness is acceptable,” and there are limits!
Paycheck
.
9
Now suppose that I say, “I put my paycheck in the bank, John put it in the DVD player.” Can “my paycheck” be taken as referring to my paycheck from work while the “it” is used as a pronoun of laziness that refers to his rented copy of the movie
Paycheck
? I could do this if I wanted to make a joke through a play on words, but as Devitt says, this depends on “how much laziness is acceptable,” and there are limits!
So far, all of these arguments have been inconclusive, which is always a possibility in philosophy. Kripke, however, makes another suggestion that seems to me to be decisive, if we modify it for our
Terminator
context:
Terminator
context:
There is no reason to suppose that in making an indirect discourse report on what someone else has said I myself must have similar intentions, or be engaged in the same kind of speech act; in fact it is clear that I am not. If I say “[John Connor says all of the police are here]” [John] may have meant it as a warning but I need not say it as a warning. If the referential-attributive distinction is neither syntactic nor semantic, there is no reason, without further argument, to suppose that my usage, in indirect discourse, should match the man on whom I report, as referential or attributive. The case is quite different for a genuine semantic ambiguity. If Jones says, “I have never been to a bank,” and I report this, saying, “Jones denied that he was ever at a bank,” the sense I give to “bank” must match Jones’ if my report is to be accurate.
10
If I say, “The Terminator has no pity,” and I am using the description referentially, and then you report to someone else that “Richard said that the Terminator has no pity,” you don’t have to be using the description referentially. In fact you may not even be able to use it referentially, as you may not know who “the Terminator” is. If the referential use were
semantic,
this would pose a problem, because we can only resolve genuine semantic ambiguities if we use words with the same sense (“paycheck” has two senses above). Since descriptions are more pragmatic than semantic, there is no ambiguity.
semantic,
this would pose a problem, because we can only resolve genuine semantic ambiguities if we use words with the same sense (“paycheck” has two senses above). Since descriptions are more pragmatic than semantic, there is no ambiguity.
Devitt has tentatively responded
11
that whether or not you know who the Terminator is, this would not prevent you from using “the Terminator” referentially. This is due to Devitt’s notion of
reference borrowing
. This is easiest to illustrate in the case of names. Suppose that you have never seen any of the
Terminator
movies (for shame!), and I tell you that the movie is about a guy named John Connor who will eventually lead the human resistance against an army of cyborgs created by Skynet. You then acquire
from me
the ability to refer to John Connor. Devitt thinks that our ability to reference-borrow doesn’t take much. All you have to do is to hear the name from someone who is in a position to refer to the person in question, and you then acquire the ability to refer to that person as well, whether you know anything about them or not.
11
that whether or not you know who the Terminator is, this would not prevent you from using “the Terminator” referentially. This is due to Devitt’s notion of
reference borrowing
. This is easiest to illustrate in the case of names. Suppose that you have never seen any of the
Terminator
movies (for shame!), and I tell you that the movie is about a guy named John Connor who will eventually lead the human resistance against an army of cyborgs created by Skynet. You then acquire
from me
the ability to refer to John Connor. Devitt thinks that our ability to reference-borrow doesn’t take much. All you have to do is to hear the name from someone who is in a position to refer to the person in question, and you then acquire the ability to refer to that person as well, whether you know anything about them or not.
But even if you were able to use “the Terminator” referentially, Kripke’s point is that you don’t have to. You could be using the description in an attributive sense when you report what I said. Nothing forces you to use the description in the same sense that I did in order to successfully report what I said. But this is very different from the case of actual semantic ambiguities. In the case of an actual semantic ambiguity, if you do not use the word with the same sense that I used it, then you are not accurately reporting what I said. So if I say, “I like dogs,” meaning
hot dogs
, and you report, “Richard said that he likes dogs,” meaning the animal
Canis familiaris
, you haven’t accurately reported what I said.
hot dogs
, and you report, “Richard said that he likes dogs,” meaning the animal
Canis familiaris
, you haven’t accurately reported what I said.
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