Supreme Commander (57 page)

None of Eisenhower’s arguments for ANVIL were original; they all came from Marshall. Eisenhower would sometimes stress different points than Marshall had emphasized, but there was no doubt that throughout the ANVIL debate he followed the Chief of Staff’s lead. Breaking away from the verbiage and incidental arguments, Marshall insisted on mounting ANVIL primarily because of his determination to prevent the British from extending operations in Italy and to the east. Marshall’s determination, a reflection of a complex set of factors outside the scope of this study, was so intense that he was willing to make ANVIL a test case in the alliance. Eisenhower had not given much thought to the strategic parameters involved, for they were not a part of his responsibilities, but during his two weeks in the United States he had talked about ANVIL with Marshall and learned how deeply the Chief felt about the operation. Thus although ANVIL was not Eisenhower’s child, and although the military arguments in favor of it were weak, he fought for it to the bitter end. Marshall wanted ANVIL, and that was enough.

Eisenhower spent the first two months of 1944 trying to mount a simultaneous OVERLORD and ANVIL. Since there was nothing he could do to speed up production of landing craft in time for D-Day, or get the U. S. Navy to give up the craft it had in the Pacific, he had to find the resources within the European-Mediterranean theater. Much of the effort would involve narrow, specialized technical work, which could only be accomplished by the staff. To the problem of building up an efficient staff, therefore, Eisenhower turned his attention.

Shortly after arriving in London, Eisenhower wrote an old friend, “Right now we are busy getting settled and going through the business of ramming our feet in the stirrups.”
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He had his first meeting with the SHAEF staff on January 19. Part of the staff came from COSSAC, while Smith had stolen the bulk from AFHQ. For the benefit of newcomers, Eisenhower began by covering familiar ground—he emphasized the need for Allied unity, and said that all problems should be approached from an objective, as opposed to a nationalistic, point of view. He said his door was always open and he preferred to do business informally
rather than formally. If he failed to understand a given phase of operations, especially technical aspects, he begged their indulgence; their job, as the experts, was to explain and make the subject understandable. If he advanced an idea which had already been considered and accepted or rejected, he wanted to be told, not humored. Eisenhower pointed out that no commander could know everything; this was the very reason he had a staff.

On the more general subject of attitude, the Supreme Commander ordered his staff to exude confidence. He would not allow the officers even to consider failure. After the plan had been formulated, he wanted everyone to express faith in it, no matter what misgivings he had about it during its formative stages.
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The speech, coupled with Eisenhower’s own constant example, set the tone at SHAEF for the remainder of the war.

As at AFHQ, Eisenhower insisted that the SHAEF staff be a team. Officers had to be carefully selected to fit into such a staff; some highly capable men from COSSAC had to be transferred when it was found that they could not work closely with officers of a different nationality. As Tedder later testified, the task involved “getting the right people and being ruthless … and you must be ruthless.… If a man does not fit he will never learn the language and you will never make a team; that is the guts of the whole thing, the team.…”
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Smith did most of the dirty work in firing officers and finding their replacements. He had already raided AFHQ to what the British considered an alarming degree, but when he needed men he naturally turned to those he already knew and respected. Smith usually got on with the British quite well, especially with Brooke, who thought more of Smith than he did of Eisenhower, but Brooke and Smith did have a shouting argument over personnel for the SHAEF staff. In the middle of January Smith went to Brooke with a request for the services of Generals Gale, Whiteley, and Strong, respectively the chief administrative officer, the deputy chief of staff, and the G-2 at AFHQ. Brooke grumbled that Eisenhower was stealing AFHQ’s best talent. Smith snapped that Brooke was not being “helpful” and started for the door. What Butcher later called “a bit of frank talk” ensued. Eisenhower apologized to Brooke for Smith and explained that Smith “fights for what he wants” but meant no disrespect.
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At the same time Eisenhower made it clear to Smith that he still wanted the three British officers, and by April Smith had managed to pry them loose from AFHQ.

Eisenhower had no intention of cleaning house completely at COSSAC.
Morgan had been promised the position of chief of staff to the Supreme Commander, but when Eisenhower insisted on Smith for that job the British decided to offer Morgan a corps command. Morgan, however, asked to serve in some capacity in SHAEF, and Eisenhower made him Smith’s deputy. His responsibilities in that post were great and his functions broad; after the war Smith described him as his British alter ego, “a man I wouldn’t willingly have dispensed with.”
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Major General Ray W. Barker, an American and Morgan’s deputy at COSSAC, became G-l at SHAEF, and other key members of the COSSAC staff who proved able to work with the newcomers from AFHQ were retained in their positions.

Eisenhower commanded ETO as well as SHAEF, so he was primarily responsible for the selection of the American field commanders of OVERLORD. Here, as with his staff, he wanted men he had worked with successfully in the past, which again meant taking them from AFHQ. When Smith set out to do this, however, Devers—now commanding the American forces in the Mediterranean—raised a storm. Like Brooke, he resented the raid and assigned an officer to investigate so that he could present the facts in a complaint to Marshall. Smith went over the list of proposed transfers in detail with one of Devers’ representatives and convinced him that all were appropriate, but Devers himself was not satisfied and would not give in. For Eisenhower, the loss that hurt the most was Lucian Truscott. Eisenhower wanted him badly but Devers simply would not let him go. Eisenhower complained that Devers was “obstinate” and would not co-operate and later regretted that he had not ordered Truscott to England before December 1943, when he still commanded AFHQ.
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At one point Devers wired to say, “We have tried to meet your requests for personnel to the utmost possible limit. Sorry we could not do it 100 per cent.” Referring to ANVIL, he added, “You may count on me to be in there pitching with one idea, to assist you.” Smith sarcastically noted on the bottom of the cable form, “This is just swell. I love this ‘One idea to assist you’ stuff.”
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Devers was difficult, but even had he been more co-operative the basic problems would have remained. Eisenhower needed one army group commander, three army commanders, over a dozen corps commanders and, eventually, nearly half a hundred division commanders. This made personnel selection much more involved, intricate and larger in scope than anything Eisenhower had faced in North Africa or Italy and meant that he had to spend much of his time exchanging cables
with Devers and Marshall to get the men he wanted. Almost all the generals he picked, or took on Marshall’s recommendation, were Regular Army soldiers, many of whom he had come to know during his prewar career. Old friendships counted for much. He insisted on having Gerow lead a corps in the invasion, even though Gerow had no combat experience. He had wanted Truscott, with whom he had served before the war, for the other assault corps; when Devers would not let Truscott go, Eisenhower took Major General J. Lawton Collins. Eisenhower and Collins had been together at West Point. The commander of one of the follow-up corps, Major General Troy H. Middleton, had been with Eisenhower in the Philippines. Even at the division level, Eisenhower was personally acquainted with most of the leaders. His usual practice was to talk with Bradley and Smith about any prospective commander; in every case one of the three generals knew the man in question well. In a letter to Marshall about a proposed infantry division commander, Eisenhower made a remark that illustrated the way he worked: “This happens to be one man that I don’t know personally, but Bradley thinks he is tops. So does Smith.”
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As far as possible, Eisenhower did want men with combat experience. Obtaining them was not easy, however, because the bulk of the American Army had not yet been engaged in battle. Most of those divisions and generals who had experience were still in the Mediterranean, and as Eisenhower reported to Marshall, “Devers has constantly reported it is impossible to let any of his people come up here.” Eisenhower realized that because he and Smith had organized AFHQ and “tested and placed the field commanders, we are quite likely to feel an unjustified proprietary interest in them and therefore exhibit a natural tendency to think that we are entitled to anything for which we ask.” Eisenhower lamely remarked that he knew this was wrong, but he continued to try to get his subordinates from the Mediterranean. His justification was that OVERLORD was so much more important than the Italian campaign that he should have the best men for it.
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The shifting of officers could become complex. In January the general idea was that if Lucas was successful at Anzio he could then move up to take command of Fifth Army, with Clark taking command of ANVIL. Eisenhower approved of this, but thought that if ANVIL had to be reduced to a threat Patton should be put in charge of the southern France operation because his reputation, which was respected by the Germans, would increase the value of the threat. One objection to this proposal was that Devers and Patton were not congenial. Another was that it
might lead to Patton having no role in the final campaign. On that basis Eisenhower decided to bring Patton to England and give him command of the U. S. Third Army.
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Then, on January 22, Lucas launched the attack on Anzio. It quickly bogged down. Alexander put the blame on Lucas and sent a stinging complaint about the American general to Brooke. Lucas, Alexander said, was depressed and negative. Alexander had a meeting with Wilson, Devers, and Clark to try to solve the problem, but was unsuccessful. He asked Eisenhower what the reaction would be if he replaced Lucas with a British officer. If Eisenhower thought that solution impossible, Alexander asked if he could send down an American to take Lucas’ place.

Eisenhower was upset because Alexander had not consulted Clark, the American army commander, about his proposal, and even more by the implication that in the whole of the Mediterranean Theater Alexander could not find an American general capable of taking over at Anzio. An aide had awakened Eisenhower from a sound sleep to give him the message; “although I had to shake the sleep out of my head in order to make an answer,” Eisenhower told Marshall, he thought his answer was correct. He told Alexander that all American matters in Italy were the exclusive business of Devers and Clark, and that he should not have been consulted. Since he was, however, he did comment that it was “absolutely impossible” in an Allied force to shift command of a unit from one nationality to another. Alexander had indicated that the man he wanted was Patton; Eisenhower said that if Devers would ask for Patton he would be willing to send him to Italy immediately, although he could only spare him for one month.
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Expecting that this solution would be accepted, Eisenhower then started Patton on his way. Clark, however, solved the problem locally by offering Truscott to Alexander, and on February 17 Truscott took over from Lucas. This one illustration should suffice to describe the complexities involved in officer transfer that took place while OVERLORD was being planned.

Patton returned to his headquarters and resumed the training of Third Army. On April 25 he attended a meeting of some sixty people near his headquarters to inaugurate a club for American servicemen. Persuaded to say a few words, Patton spoke on Anglo-American unity. He thought it an important subject, “since it is the evident destiny of the British and Americans to rule the world, [and] the better we know each other the better job we will do.” A reporter was present, the statement went out over the wire services, and the next morning the British press featured Patton’s remark. Some editorial writers were indignant because Patton had
omitted Russia from the list of ruling powers, others because of the implicit insult to smaller nations. By April 27 Patton’s remarks were widely circulated in the United States, where he was denounced by both liberal and conservative congressmen.
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Patton, in short, had again put his foot in his mouth. Marshall, much upset, wired Eisenhower. The Chief had just sent a list of “permanent makes,” that is, permanent Regular Army promotions, to the Senate, and Patton’s name was on the list. Marshall sadly noted, “This I fear has killed them all.” He asked Eisenhower to investigate.
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Eisenhower was out observing a training exercise; Smith got him on the telephone and read Marshall’s message to him. Eisenhower dictated a reply. “Apparently he is unable to use reasonably good sense,” he said of Patton. “I have grown so weary of the trouble he constantly causes you and the War Department to say nothing of myself, that I am seriously contemplating the most drastic action.” Eisenhower asked Marshall to wait a few days and gauge the public reaction to the story. If it turned out that Patton’s retention would diminish confidence in the War Department, Eisenhower was ready to relieve him.
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Instead of waiting, Marshall replied the same day. After quoting an extremely hostile editorial from the Washington
Post
, he pointed out that Patton had actual experience in fighting Rommel, who commanded the German coastal defenses in Normandy. Marshall said this advantage had to be kept in mind and left the decision up to Eisenhower. “You carry the burden of responsibility as to the success of OVERLORD.” If Eisenhower thought the operation would work without Patton, “all well and good.” If Eisenhower thought not, “then between us we can bear the burden …” of keeping Patton on the job.
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