Spy Princess (20 page)

If Noor changed her cachette she had to advise London again. If she needed to do this by postcard she would have to use the word ‘deux’ in it and the code name Madeleine. If she had to hide, she had to send a message saying ‘Have gone to cachette’. If she had to send a postcard to Lisbon then she would have to use the word ‘trois’ in the text and also the code name Madeleine.

If an SOE agent went to see her in the cachette he was to ask the owner ‘
Puis-je voir Jeanne-Marie, la fille d’Ora?
’ (Can I see Jeanne-Marie, the daughter of Ora?) The cachette owner should reply ‘
Vous voulez dire Babs
?’ (Don’t you mean Babs?)

Noor was also given an emergency address in Paris, that of a bookseller, Mme Rose, at 101 rue de Passy, Paris 16e. The password she was to use if she had to call on this address was ‘
Avez-vous des exemplaires neufs?
’ (Have you got new copies?), to which the reply would be ‘
Non, que des exemplaires d’occasion
’ (No, only second-hand).

If Noor was in trouble and there was no other way out, she would have to escape through Spain. In this case, she was to send a postcard to Lisbon with the word ‘quatre’ in it and the code name Madeleine. On arrival in Spain, she had to try and reach the British Consulate at Barcelona and there give her name as Inayat Khan. Her cover story would be that she was a BOAC officer who had got stranded in the Dieppe raid.

Along with these incredibly detailed instructions were Noor’s radio transmission timings, other instructions and her codes. Instead of a poem, Noor had been given a phrase and the numbering had been done for her. She was given the worked-out key by which she would have to start at the top of her list of keys and work down. She would have to use the key on her left for her first transposition and the key on her right for her second. Decoding would be exactly the same. She would have to write her message first under the key on the left-hand side and then on the right-hand side. She was asked to remember to use each indicator in sequence and, in order to make the messages 100 per cent safe, to cut off each key after she had finished using it.
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On her first night in France, Noor was clearly nervous. Her escort Rémy Clément, who travelled with her to Paris, but on a different coach for security reasons, saw her at Angers station poring over maps and looking thoroughly lost. He said her nervousness affected him. However, Noor made it to Paris and called that evening at 40 rue Erlanger.

For some reason Noor thought that her contact was an old lady and so she brought a posy of flowers for her. When the door of the flat was opened by the young and flamboyant Garry, she was surprised.
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Finally she managed to stammer, ‘I think I am expected’. An equally surprised Garry, who was waiting for her to give the password, decided to ask her in. His fiancée, Marguerite Nadaud, was sitting in the living room. Not quite sure what to do, Garry introduced her to Noor. Noor had still not introduced herself as she was waiting for the old lady. Meanwhile Garry and his fiancée were puzzled as to whether Noor was the agent they were expecting from London. They could not understand why she was not saying the password. Since Garry’s password was the reply to hers he could not use it first.

This farce carried on for a while. Garry asked Noor to sit down and offered her cigarettes, which she took and then he casually asked if she was his contact from London. Noor answered in a measured way trying to test Garry. But Noor was still waiting for the old lady to present herself, thinking that the young couple must be her friends with connections in the Resistance.

Finally Marguerite excused herself to make some coffee, thinking maybe it was her presence that was stopping Noor from giving her password. While she was in the kitchen, she heard a peal of laughter and realised that the passwords must have been exchanged.

Noor had studied Garry for a while, decided to trust him, and spoken the password. He had replied immediately, much to her relief. She now told him the reason for her hesitation: that she had been expecting to see an old lady. Garry laughed out loud, told his fiancée and said: ‘And she bought these carnations to give to me.’

The amusing incident over, Marguerite was presented with the flowers and Noor began to relax. Marguerite soon discovered that she had not eaten for 24 hours, since she had left England. She had been given a ration book by London, but she wasn’t sure how to use the coupons and so rather than arouse any suspicion she had simply gone without any food. Clearly, Beaulieu training had not taken into account the need to teach the agents how to actually use the ration books. All Noor had bought on the way was a bottle of Vichy water and the bunch of flowers for her contact.

Marguerite immediately got busy in the kitchen making Noor something to eat. Over dinner Garry told Noor about the circuit and how he was working for Francis Suttill, head of the whole region. Garry had a residential address in Paris and one in Sarthe, Le Mans. He travelled between both and had a false card describing him as an engineer in the Société Electro-Chimie of Paris. Marguerite was also active in the Resistance and helped F-section agents. She was secretary to Max Bonnafous, Minister of Food and Agriculture, and had helped Antelme to get a much-needed official ‘Mission Order’ on behalf of her ministry which gave him access to any train, at a time when it was nearly impossible to travel by rail.
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Noor gave Garry and Marguerite her code name – Madeleine – which they already knew. She also told them her cover name, which was Jeanne-Marie. This was the name that she would be using in France.

Both Garry and his fiancée took an immediate liking to Noor although they thought her too young and vulnerable to be on such a dangerous mission. She told them about how hard it had been to say goodbye to her mother, and said that her mother had no idea where she was. Since she had nowhere to stay, Garry and his fiancée invited her to stay at their apartment. Noor gratefully accepted the offer as by now she was completely exhausted.

The very next day she met Antelme, head of the Bricklayer circuit, who worked closely with Prosper. His code name was Renaud and his cover name was Antoine Ratier. He was a tall, sporty Mauritian officer in his forties who took an immediate paternal interest in Noor. He took her out for two days so she could get on her feet in occupied France and reported to London that ‘Madeleine had arrived safely’ and was ‘happy and all right’.
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Noor was also contacted by Francis Suttill and his radio operator Gilbert Norman, and she now got to know the immediate ring of circuit members she would be working with. Norman turned out to have been to the same school as Noor and was two years her junior. On 20 June, two days after her arrival, Norman took her to Grignon and introduced her to Professor Alfred Balachowsky of the National College of Agriculture, a distinguished biologist, and his wife, Emily Balachowsky, as well as the Director of the National College, Dr Eugéne Vanderwynckt, his wife and two daughters.

Noor’s radio set had not arrived yet, so Norman took her to see his transmitter, which was concealed in a greenhouse on the premises in Grignon. Noor immediately made her first transmission to London from there. It was less than 72 hours after her departure and was the fastest response from any agent in the field after landing. Poste Madeleine was in operation. The message was received with relief by Maurice Buckmaster and Vera Atkins, who had been nervous about how the shy Indian girl was getting on.

Since the German listening machines were constantly circling the streets listening for transmissions, for their own security radio operators were asked to go on air only when necessary and to keep their transmissions short (maximum 10–15 minutes). Noor, like other wireless operators, used an A Mark II, which was a transmitter and receiver in one. It weighed 30lb and fitted into an ordinary-looking suitcase about 2ft long. Its frequency range was quite wide but its signal weak (20 watts at best). It also needed 70ft of aerial, which was the dangerous bit, since it could attract the eye of a policeman. The frequency the set worked on was determined by removable crystals, of which each operator needed at least two, one for night-time and one for day transmission.

Crystals were extremely delicate and could be broken if dropped. They were also impossible to disguise as anything else. Their only advantage was that they were small enough to fit in the palm of the hand and could be concealed on the person. If an agent was discovered with crystals they were highly incriminating and it would take a lot of luck to explain away their presence.

If the wireless operator was running their sets off the mains, there was further chance of getting caught. The German intelligence service’s wireless direction-finding (D/F) teams were ruthlessly efficient (far more so than their counterparts in Britain). In Britain it could take about an hour to trace a transmission. But in France, wireless operators found that if they had a long transmission from a large town, D/F vans could be at their doorstep within half an hour.
²⁰
The Germans would camouflage the D/F vehicles as bakers’ vans or laundry vans, and the soldiers wore plain clothes so they could not be spotted. They had also worked out a way of establishing what part of a town a clandestine operator was working in, by cutting off the electricity sub-district by sub-district and noting when the transmission was interrupted. They would then concentrate on the area which they had isolated and get to work finding the block from where the transmission was taking place. Once they had got close, one of the soldiers would get out of the van and walk round the neighbourhood to pinpoint a precise address. He would carry a hidden antenna and the wire would pass through his sleeve to his ear, and he would casually stroll through the area trying to pick up the transmission.
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The agents did their best to protect themselves by having someone keeping a lookout for D/F vans while they transmitted. Even a man sauntering up the street wearing a beret and with his collar turned up could be a Gestapo officer with a miniature listening set in his ear and the agent would have to be warned to hide the set and leave the building. Transmitting from an isolated place in a country was usually safer, but Noor’s area of work was Paris, and so she had to be constantly on the alert. As events developed around her she never actually went to work in Le Mans as originally intended by F-section, but remained in the city.

Staying on air for a very short time, and changing crystals frequently during transmission in order to confuse the enemy were precautions agents could take. Another safeguard was constantly changing the place of transmission. The operator could also use the accumulator instead of the mains, but there was the problem of keeping the accumulator charged.

SOE laid out rules for its radio operators, including Noor, to ‘do nothing but w/t [wireless telegraph] work, to see his organiser as little as possible, if at all, and to have contact with the fewest possible number of people in the circuit’.
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In the field, however, this didn’t always work.

In the early days of the SOE, wireless messages were received by MI6 at Bletchley Park. These were then decoded and passed on to the SOE country section. From mid-1942, the SOE managed to get their own listening post at Grendon Underwood, north-west of Aylesbury in Buckinghamshire. It was called Station 53a.

Messages sent by the operators were now received directly in Grendon, where 400 FANY women operators manned the radio sets. Before they left for the field all operators would be given their daily schedules or ‘skeds’ – details of the frequency and time they should come on air to transmit back home.

In Grendon, the ‘skeds’ were posted on big boards in the transmission room, along with the agents’ code names. Noor’s first transmission came in on Norman’s radio and his frequency. Knowing that the agent was transmitting under very difficult circumstances, in hiding and with D/F vans circling around while he was on air, the operator taking down the message in Grendon wanted to be as fast as possible and try to get it down without asking the agent to repeat themselves too much.

Sometimes the operators would add a small personal line to the agent just to let them know there were people back home thinking about them. Noor was informed about Vilayat’s commission by Vera Atkins while she was in Paris. Once the operator sent her a message and ended with the words: ‘May God Keep You.’ It moved her greatly knowing they thought of her as someone more than just an operator on the other end of a wireless line.
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When the signallers had taken down the code, they would then send it to the building next door where coders sat on long pine tables working in pairs to break the code. Once these messages were deciphered they would be passed to the section office at Baker Street. Sometimes the codes arrived badly garbled and it was the job of the coders’ office to try and crack them. Because the agent in the field could be put at great risk if asked to repeat the code again the next day, Leo Marks had a policy that no code would go unbroken before the agent came on the air on his or her next ‘sked’, which could be in the next 48 hours. There was no greater failure for the code-breakers than to know that an agent had risked his life to come on the air and they had not been able to read his message. Marks developed a personal relationship with the wireless operators, meeting each one before they left so he would get to know the personal style of the operator and see if there was a certain pattern of errors from their training files. This would help him to crack the code accordingly. So if there was a person who spelt badly, or an agent who was particularly nervous or slow, he would know what had gone wrong in the message.

Marks made a rule: ‘There shall be no such thing as an in-decipherable message’ and he got a team of operators to work round the clock if necessary to break an agent’s muddled code and get it ready for the next ‘sked’.
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The messages from the field needed to be brief, accurate and as watertight as possible. It was also important for the receivers in England to watch out for the security checks being sent by the agents. If caught, the agent was supposed to alert London by dropping their security check. However, this did not always work as there were many lapses in the London listening room, with disastrous consequences.