Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (101 page)

"'Sound's' behavior was extremely unfriendly, especially in the early going.
`Sound' regarded the interest we were displaying in the group's work, in the
people and the methods and techniques of obtaining information, as completely extraordinary, unjustified interference by us in his affairs that had
never taken place before. `Sound' insisted that the question of sources for material and the techniques for obtaining it should play no role for us. We had no
reason to know all the details about the people, since he didn't always know
them himself and wasn't interested in this. `Sound' believed that fellowcountrymen [CPUSA members] must not be made into agents. His people must remain fellowcountrymen, and teaching them the skills of intelligence work was
wrong and harmful. Despite this position held by `Sound' regarding our role in
his work, we did gradually manage to familiarize ourselves in part with his people and to convince him of the need to keep us informed about all matters involving the group. Subsequently `Sound' began to inform us in more detail
about the operational and organizational aspect of the work. The material became less depersonalized and began to meet our needs better."34

Under pressure, Golos gradually surrendered some of his sources.
The first group of agents he turned over was the network of engineers
organized by Julius Rosenberg, after the KGB convinced him that their
technical work was better suited to be overseen by Semen Semenov, a
technical intelligence specialist. Zarubin also successfully detached
Sergey Kurnakov and Michael Tkach, journalists he wanted for courier
and talent-spotting duties. With Moscow's consent, Zarubin next proposed that Golos transfer the large apparatus run by Gregory Silvermaster to Iskhak Akhmerov and that he allow Joseph Katz access to his other
Washington sources. At first, Golos categorically refused, insisting that
neither Silvermaster nor any of his people would agree, saying that "he
had gotten his people from the "Helmsman" [Browder], that any organizational changes whatsoever would require the latter's approval, that he
would uphold his viewpoint in communicating with "Helmsman," and he
even threatened to stop working with us." Zarubin placated him, and at
their next meeting Golos was more accommodating. After being reassured that "`he would still retain a very big and important segment of the
work, that he was very highly thought of in the C. [Center] and his work
would very soon receive recognition,"' he "`grudgingly agreed to the
transfer of several people,"' but not before traveling to Washington to
argue personally with Zarubin.35

Golos's death on z6 November 1943 slowed the reorganization. The KGB
also quickly learned that "Clever Girl" (Elizabeth Bentley), the woman
whom it assumed had been simply Golos's courier, was more than that.
Bentley made it clear, according to Zarubin: "`She was privy to all of
"Sound's" [Golos's] work and after his death began to consider herself the
boss of his entire group. Regarding our role in the work of "Sound's"
group, she expressed precisely the same views as he had."' Immediately
after Golos's death Akhmerov met with Bentley. She described in detail
the circumstances of his death and the measures she had taken to destroy or safeguard any documents in his apartment that might compromise his networks. She also let him know for the first time that she and
Golos had been lovers, that rather than just a message carrier, she had
been Golos's agent handler and shared his opposition to a direct KGB
takeover of his party-based sources. Although Akhmerov was annoyed by
her resistance, he reported, "`She made a good impression on me. She's
an intelligent, sensible and well-mannered woman. She gives the impression of a sincere person.' "36

Elizabeth Zarubin met with Browder on iz December, and he
vouched for Bentley, who was "`up to date on absolutely everything `So.'
["Sound"/Golos] was doing, since he trusted her completely."' But the
KGB was not about to allow her the same freedom that Golos had exercised or be as patient with her as it had been with him. Golos had been
a Russian, an old Bolshevik, and had a record of cooperation with the
KGB going back to 1930. She was a young American Communist with
no ethnic ties to Russia, and the KGB had barely heard of her before
Golos's death. Zarubin sent a telegram to Moscow in mid-December
1943 that he would shortly begin taking over sources from her, beginning
with Duncan Lee and Maurice Halperin. Eventually, he wanted all of
her agents split into small groups handled by illegal station chief Iskhak
Akhmerov or veteran American agent Joseph Katz. By the end of April
1944 Akhmerov reported that although he had finally met with Silvermaster in March, Bentley continued to throw up obstacles to arranging
more direct meetings and that efforts to assume supervision of Lee,
Halperin, Mary Price, Robert Miller, and Joseph Gregg were met with
excuses from Bentley: "Helmsman's [Browder's] personal approval is
needed, a probationer [source] is too squeamish and fearful, equipment
is needed for communications, and so forth."37

Akhmerov explained to Moscow that Bentley insisted Browder had selected her to replace Golos and "that she was working for H. ["Helms-
man"/Browder] and not for us." She presented herself as Browder's proxy
and stated that she and her party-based networks fully accepted that their
"`task is to provide information. But no one has the right to interfere in
the organizational aspects of our [the CPUSAs] work except the leaders
of the fraternal [CPUSA]."' Even when Akhmerov met Silvermaster, the
latter had not been told with sufficient clarity that he now had to take orders from the KGB. His "`antagonism toward all of our activities reflects
a petit-bourgeois, proprietorial ideology, which, combined with a purely
American anarchism, is one of the most typical traits of a very large number of local fellowcountrymen [Communists]."' To clear up the confusion, Moscow ordered Zarubin to arrange for his wife to meet with Browder, tell him that Bentley was being recalcitrant, instruct Browder to
order her to obey, and also immediately turn over one of Bentley's networks, the Perlo group, to direct KGB control. The meeting took place
in late May 1944. Browder complied, agreed to give up control of the
Golos-Bentley networks, and indicated the blame for the feuding rested
with Bentley's stubbornness. But seeking to keep his hand in, Browder
"requested that organizational matters be discussed with him in advance;
any change in the procedure of contacting probationers [agents], or turning them over to other individuals."3H

Although he had initially evaluated her as a serious, stable person,
Akhmerov began to have second thoughts the more he worked with Bentley. On 15 June 1944 he noted:

"She has a rather complicated and contradictory personality. In her work and
conversations she usually behaves like our operative, in her comments she
says `we,' implying our organization [KGB] and including herself in this concept.... Her behavior changes, however, when I ask her to arrange a meeting
for me with `Pal' [Silvermaster] or to get any of the probationers [sources] in
contact with our operative. She becomes a completely different person and,
apparently restraining herself, declares that she isn't our operative, that she
works for `Helmsman' [Browder].... Sometimes I sense from the criticisms
that are made that deep down she dislikes us.... She says that we all care little about Americans, that the USSR is the only country we love and for which
we work. I tried to explain to her that she is wrong."

Akhmerov assured Bentley "`that by helping the USSR, we are working
out of deeply held ideological motives and we don't stop being Americans.... She told me in response that `Pal' isn't an American and that his
wife isn't an American ... that `Raid' [Perlo] isn't an American, that he's
a Russian.... [Still] I believe that she is indisputably loo percent our person. I believe that with a tactful attitude, friendly treatment, and a
firm, businesslike arrangement of a working relationship, her behavior
can be corrected."' Fitin was not persuaded; he worried about her "unbalanced and erratic personality."39
- - - - - - - - - - -- - -

It took a while, but by the end of 1944 Bentley had handed over most
of her agents to the KGB, although the KGB documents indicate there
was a protracted transition that lasted into early 1945, longer than had
been thought from earlier material available.

The KGB had long been aware that the party-based networks practiced
poor "konspiratsia" and were ill-disciplined by KGB standards. But until
it took them over, it did not realize just how serious the problem was.

First, the KGB came to appreciate that the issue was deeper than just
Golos and Bentley. Although it finally convinced Bentley to allow direct
contact with Gregory Silvermaster, which the latter welcomed, it soon
discovered that he, in turn, was reluctant to allow the KGB to have direct
contact with his sources, fearing a weakening of his authority as a party
leader. At one contentious meeting in New York with Helen Silvermaster (Gregory's wife) and Ludwig Ullmann (Silvermaster's assistant and
housemate) Akhmerov heard their objections to his plan for a direct connection with George Silverman, who Helen insisted could not be trusted,
was mentally ill, and could "`be kept under control only if he is subordinate to Robert [Gregory Silvermaster]."' Silvermaster himself bitterly
complained that because of Harry White's direct contact with a KGB officer he "`had started putting on airs and acting independently of them."'
Although irritated by Silvermaster's resistance and wounded amour-propre, Akhmerov backed away from demanding further access to other
sources, justifying the coddling of Silvermaster on the grounds that it produced information:

"I had planned for quite some time to establish a direct connection with
Zhenya [Sonia Gold] and Milton [Bela Gold]. I did not insist on it, because I
knew how Robert would react to this, and I also took into account the consideration that they should not in fact be singled out. Neither I nor any other of
our people could achieve such effective results from working with them as
Robert, Donald [Ullmann], and Dora [Helen Silvermaster] during these important years of the war. I thought that it was much more important to maintain a regular flow of important documentary materials, than to engage in a
feud with him with regard to establishing direct contact with these people .-40

But when KGB officers finally got direct access to Silverman, they got
an earful. Vladimir Pravdin met with Silverman in October 1945, and he
let loose on Silvermaster, denouncing him as "`a petty tyrant"' who had
alienated everyone else in the group except for Ullmann. He "`treats the
members of his group as his dependents, rudely coercing them and refusing to tolerate objections of any kind."' If his "`orders are not carried
out unquestioningly, he yells, curses, issues threats of punishment, and
then tells everyone that the `guilty party' is a scoundrel, a bourgeois, and
a Trotskyite, and that nothing good can be expected of him."' Moreover,
he "`completely ignores the most basic precautions in our work and attracts the attention of surrounding people with his behavior,"' phoning
Silverman at work and scheduling meetings during work hours. When his
orders were not carried out, he became abusive, screaming and ranting:

"According to A. ["Aileron"/Silverman], when Robert [Silvermaster] was over
at As apartment recently with Dora [Helen Silvermaster] and Pilot [Ullmann],
he started rudely scolding A. for his inability to manage his own family in front
of As nineteen-year-old son. The son, outraged by Robert's antics, left the
house, having scolded his father for letting R. talk to him like that. R's behavior has frequently led to misunderstandings between A. and his wife. Pilot
treats A. the same way R. does. His behavior at As place of employment has,
according to the latter, discredited him in front of other officials, because no
one could understand how As subordinate could talk to him like that. Pilot
also attracted the other employees' attention because he did not do any of his
work on the official line and acted impudently toward A. in front of other people, as if purposefully ignoring the fact that A. was his superior. According to
A., Dora was constantly interfering in As professional and personal life and occasionally was even more rude than Robert or Pilot."

According to Silverman, the only reason he and several other members
of the Silvermaster group had continued to work for the KGB was their
recognition of the Soviet Union's wartime needs: "`This is why my friends
and I carried out this work under Robert's [Silvermaster's] leadership,
despite the persecution and humiliation to which he subjected us. Patience, however, always runs out. In the last several months, we have decided to stop working with Robert. We would rather work on the fraternal [CPUSA] line."' He added: "`From now on I want to live in dignity,
without having to endure the harassment of a madman like Robert."'41

The KGB also learned of another complication about the leadership
of the Silvermaster apparatus. Akhmerov had understood that while Gregory Silvermaster was the central figure, Helen Silvermaster and Ludwig Ullmann functioned as his chief lieutenants in running the group. Ullmann had been closely associated with the Silvermasters since 1938, when
they jointly purchased a house in Washington in which all three lived. But
it was not until mid-1945 that Akhmerov realized just how intimate the relationship was. In August he reported: "It was learned (and Reed [Harry
White] confirmed this) that Robert's wife [Helen Silvermaster] is cohabiting with Pilot [Ullmann] with Robert's [Gregory Silvermaster's] knowledge and consent. `Without question, these unhealthy relationships between them cannot help but have a negative influence on work and
behavior with us."' The KGB didn't like this news, but inasmuch as it was
breaking up the Silvermaster group anyway, it put it aside.42