Snow (16 page)

Rantzau also gave McCarthy some useful information regarding new German technological advances, and these included an attempt to make parachutes invisible. Allegedly, the project had failed because the chutes were too heavy. Rantzau arranged for Doebler to show McCarthy how to make invisible ink, and gave him a lengthy intelligence questionnaire concealed in five microdots. He was handed 3,000 dollars which he was instructed to pass to J
OHNNY
, keeping £400 for himself. Most importantly for MI5, B
ISCUIT
was also given a suitcase wireless set and instructions on how to use it.

Before his departure Rantzau told McCarthy that Reichmarshal Hermann Göring was to ‘open the bird-cage on 14 August but that the big show would not begin then but would start later’. This, in retrospect, would be the first indication that the Luftwaffe would initiate what became the Battle of Britain, an intensive conflict fought over the skies of southern England in anticipation of what was intended to be a Nazi invasion across the Channel.

Upon his return to London, when McCarthy was debriefed by MI5, he recalled that he had detected some friction between Doebler and Rantzau, despite the fact that they worked together. Apparently Doebler could not understand how Rantzau had climbed to such seniority in the Abwehr, and he had even accused Rantzau of being a liar, but McCarthy found Doebler himself to be rather gullible and thought that it would be easy to plant an agent on him.

Whilst in Portugal B
ISCUIT
had been asked to find somewhere in Britain where explosives could be dropped by parachute, so on his return he visited
the Quantock Hills in Somerset. However, B
ISCUIT
was not comfortable in the countryside, because he lacked a sense of direction, and was so
disorientated
that on one occasion he missed his train because he had to return to the farm where he had lodged in order to retrieve his revolver which he had left under his pillow. Eventually a suitable site was found and the location passed on to the Germans with the suggestion that it would make a good place to drop agents.

MI5 had learned that three German agents would be sent to Wales so Major Ford, the Regional Security Liaison Officer based in Cardiff, had obtained a house in the Swansea area that could serve as a safe-house. Gwilym Williams had received instructions to make the house ready for occupation by the trio and a Mr Doust of the Post Office Research Station at Dollis Hill installed microphones so all the conversations could be recorded. In addition, S
NOW
was told to go to Swansea, accompanied by his supervising radio operator Maurice Burton, to establish contact with Williams, but Owens was advised not to let him know about the three German agents. Instead, Owens was ordered to tell the Germans to contact Williams direct, and he was then to tell the Regional Security Liaison Officer (RSLO), Major Ford, once they had done so. This expedient was intended to enhance G.W.’s role and status, and give him an independent communications link with the Abwehr, thereby increasing his value to MI5 and reducing the burden on S
NOW
. MI5 was also keen to use G.W. to keep tabs on S
NOW
.

The other unfinished business from B
ISCUIT
’s visit to Lisbon was his questionnaire, which included a request for J
OHNNY
to pick up
information
about aerodromes and air-raid damage. Although MI5 had previously expressed concern about his independent collection efforts, Robertson authorised him to accept the task and assured him that anything he spotted could be reported to the Abwehr. Adopting this policy meant that if anyone checked on his information, it would stand up to scrutiny, but it would also include some ‘chicken-feed’, false information about an anti-aircraft device that shot wires into the sky to ensnare aircraft.

During his travels in search of information, Owens reported seeing
thirty-three
Spitfires, three Hurricanes, two Blenheims and one biplane under cover at Northolt. All were visible from the road and, as MI5 had already obtained a clearance from the Air Ministry’s Intelligence Directorate that anything which could be seen from a public road could be given to the enemy, a request was made for this item to be transmitted. The response from the Ministry was that ‘under no circumstances’ was the information to
be sent. Whilst this ban was respected, the location of the landing-ground in the Quantocks was sent and the response from the Germans was a request for continuous reports on several aerodromes. The actual reply ended with the ambiguous order ‘Let B
ISCUIT
do nothing else’ which Burton took to mean that B
ISCUIT
should only concentrate on aerodromes, but Owens interpreted it to mean that McCarthy should cease everything.

However, S
NOW
’s interpretation of this ambiguous message may have been connected with a recent incident. Owens claimed that B
ISCUIT
had turned up drunk at his house and threatened to murder him, Lily and their
newborn
baby Jean Louise, unless he was given some money. Lily had almost died giving birth so emotions were already high. Owens, who was usually the person accused of drinking too much, had taken the threat seriously and had written McCarthy a cheque for £200. As McCarthy was occasionally seen to suffer from delirium tremens, MI5 tended to believe S
NOW
’s version of events. Thereafter, B
ISCUIT
’s behaviour became increasingly erratic and he missed an arranged trip to the north, claiming that he had misunderstood the instructions. McCarthy was also confused over how much he and
C
HARLIE
were meant to know about each other, despite having been instructed to speak quite freely and mention the proposal to have an Abwehr radio expert lodge with him.

Due to the concern within MI5 about the nature of the German message regarding B
ISCUIT
, Robertson decided that the best policy was to ask the Germans what they meant when they said that ‘B
ISCUIT
should do nothing else’. Burton suggested it would be simpler to tell the Germans that B
ISCUIT
was going to Manchester to concentrate on aerodromes, his reasoning being that if the Abwehr did not want him to do anything then they would tell him not to go.

No such message was forthcoming, and a day later B
ISCUIT
was sent to Manchester to see C
HARLIE
in order to ask if he would be willing to have an enemy radio expert lodge with him, the idea being that the radio expert would operate the new transmitter that B
ISCUIT
had brought back from Lisbon. Burton received a call from B
ISCUIT
in Manchester reporting that everything was alright up there, although there were conflicting reports from displeased MI5 sources that B
ISCUIT
was mostly to be found drunk in the local pub and that his cross-examination of C
HARLIE
over the latter’s knowledge of Dr Rantzau was entirely inappropriate.

On 2 September 1940 Robertson met B
ISCUIT
and was told about the location that had been chosen for the landing-ground in Somerset. It was
decided that a transmission should be sent to the Germans with a request that J
OHNNY
should let McCarthy know when the drop was to be made so that he could be in attendance. McCarthy also reported that C
HARLIE
did not think much of Owens as an agent. The growing number of agents in the network was beginning to produce rivalries between the double-cross spies.

Despite B
ISCUIT
’s behaviour in Manchester C
HARLIE
still expressed himself willing to provide a room for the new German transmitter and its operator. There were domestic difficulties to overcome as C
HARLIE
was concerned that his sister-in-law might become suspicious, and MI5 realised it might be
difficult
to keep an eye on him in C
HARLIE
’s house. An alternative was simply to arrest the man on his arrival and take him to London for interrogation. If he could be turned, MI5 could then take him back to Manchester where he could operate under supervision. The difficulty with this option was that if other agents wanted to contact him and he was not available, suspicions could be aroused. It was therefore decided to establish a safe-house in
Manchester
and install the operator there. Accordingly, instructions were sent to Germany to inform the Abwehr that C
HARLIE
intended to find a house for the radio expert, but on 9 September, before the message was transmitted, a further problem arose. During an enemy air-raid a bomb was dropped near Owens’ house which failed to detonate, but damaged local power cables and cut the electric current so the signal had to wait.

Such delays were frequent. The management of S
NOW
had been relatively easy when he had worked alone, albeit with his imaginary network of Welsh saboteurs, but the recruitment of B
ISCUIT
and C
HARLIE
had complicated matters, especially as Owens had been led to believe that C
HARLIE
was an authentic German spy in direct contact with the Abwehr. For instance, when MI5 wanted to send information regarding Canadian aircraft which had recently arrived in Britain it was decided that this information would have to come from S
NOW
via C
HARLIE
, who had been asked to obtain it by B
ISCUIT
. It was then necessary to wait for C
HARLIE
to come to London so that he could pass it on. MI5 considered the time-lag to be necessary as it made the whole process more plausible.

In Manchester C
HARLIE
was given the task of acquiring a safe-house in Salford, the cover for which was a photographic studio. The radio operator’s cover was that of a man from the south whose house had been bombed, but C
HARLIE
was always nervous and concerned about how much help he should give the new German agent. What if he was asked to take photographs of an aerodrome or even help blow one up? MI5 instructed him to co-operate with
the man and gain his confidence, and to bolster his nerve the local police were briefed and asked to watch the new agent when he arrived. C
HARLIE
then declared that he had arranged to decorate the flat, a cause of some dismay at MI5 because of their plan to install microphones. C
HARLIE
was persuaded to delay his redecoration and, with the cover story intact, a message was sent to Germany that the transmitter and safe-house were in place.

During the invasion in the summer of 1940 the Germans asked S
NOW
for details of British plans for a counter-attack, and requested information about the new fortification of the south coast. He was also warned about the arrival of new agents, and in early September 1940 he received an urgent signal:

Swedish friend in fields near Oxford. How can he contact you at once please. Answer at once he is also standing by for your answer.

MI5 immediately responded with:

Can meet booking office High Wycombe Railway Station. Will wear white button hole. Password, have you seen the station master. What time?

The Germans then replied:

Trying to make arrangements tonight at 2 a.m. for tomorrow at 11 a.m. Man is 5ft 11in. Slender, mostly glasses. Can you come again tomorrow at 7 a.m.

S
NOW
then answered: O.K. will call at 7p.m.

MI5’s responses to the German message were in fact an act. In reality, an Abwehr parachutist had landed in Northamptonshire and soon afterwards had been arrested by the Home Guard and delivered to Camp 020, a secret detention centre at Ham Common in west London, for interrogation by MI5.

When questioned, the agent, Gösta Caroli, said that he was quite
prepared
to be shot as a spy and was not interested in his own life but merely that of another spy whom MI5 said they knew would soon be joining him. He claimed that he had been reluctant to become a spy, but having taken the job was prepared to see it through and was determined not to give away his friend. The skilled MI5 interrogators succeeded in persuading him that the Germans had given him a very raw deal and had sent him over here
ill-equipped
and under somewhat false pretences. He came round eventually to this view and agreed to work his wireless and under supervision transmitted a ‘safe-arrival’ signal to his controllers, explaining that he was living rough in
the countryside. Having turned Caroli, MI5 codenamed him S
UMMER
and devised an elaborate plan to make use of the opportunities offered by a new transmitter and a new double agent.

In response to the Abwehr’s request that Owens should help Caroli, whom they still believed to be in hiding, MI5 decided that the rendezvous should actually take place in case the Germans had arranged to be at the railway
station
in order to watch the meeting. However, it was also agreed that Owens should not attend the meeting himself. Ever since the trawler episode those supervising the operation had not felt they could trust Owens as before. MI5 was also keen to separate the various spies now in harness so that if one was compromised the whole system would not collapse. Instead, the plan called for Sam McCarthy to be deployed as he was someone who could be trusted. McCarthy was to meet S
UMMER
and walk with him until they were picked up by MI5 cars. He was warned that this could mean quite a bit of walking and therefore he should not visit any public houses en route. This left MI5 to decide what they should tell Owens, and in turn what he should tell the Abwehr. The very fact that the Abwehr had put S
UMMER
in touch with Owens showed how important he was to them, and as S
UMMER
might only be the first of many spies intended for Britain this was an operation that had to be undertaken with care.

The meeting between McCarthy and S
UMMER
duly took place at High Wycombe railway station, but nothing unusual happened and no German agents were present. MI5 now had to work out what story would be given to Owens to pass on to Germany about the arrival of S
UMMER
. Due to the length of time it had taken to break him, S
UMMER
theoretically had been on the run for about a fortnight, so an explanation was prepared for what would have been said to McCarthy when the two men had met. As his needs would have included shelter and a new identity, the message was prepared claiming that he was hiding in the countryside.