Sexual Ethics in Islam (18 page)

Muslim discussions of “other people’s homosexuality” are less controversial than intra-Muslim dynamics when some Muslims desire or adopt a “gay” identity (as opposed to merely selecting a sexual partner of the same sex).
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Moderate and lib- eral Western Muslim discourses display an acceptance of the notion of innate sexual orientation but do not question trad- itional religious prohibitions of same-sex activity. The “don’t ask, don’t tell”philosophy informs views such as those presented in the Muslim Women’s League position paper, “An Islamic Perspective on Sexuality.” In a subsection on “Homosexuality,” it states that:

Human beings are capable of many forms of sexual expres- sion, orientation and identification. The existence of such variety again is not found in any other species and thus fur- ther demonstrates our uniqueness among God’s creations. The potential for behavior, such as homosexuality, does not mean that its practice is lawful in the eyes of God. Therefore,

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individuals are expected to control themselves and not act on their desires if such action is contrary to the guidelines of Islam. Homosexuality, like other forms of sexual relations outside of heterosexual marriage, is thus prohibited.
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The statement goes on to imply that individuals should not seek to“prosecute or judge” those known to engage in “pro- hibited acts;” only conviction through witnessing or confession can allow for “punishment by the State.” In the absence of pun- ishment, those who engage in such acts “will then deal with the consequences of their behavior in this life and will be account- able to God on the Day of Judgment. How He ultimately judges is known only by Him.” The most obvious aim of this statement is to argue against the imposition of punishments for “homo- sexuality,” but since this is an American group, writing in the United States, the question of punishment is effectively moot. More relevantly, the exhortation not to “prosecute or judge” maintains the fiction of social harmony and adherence to rules by not exposing behavior “contrary to the guidelines of Islam.”

In seeking to avoid public acknowledgment of same-sex sexual activity, the Muslim Women’s League statement con- tinues the traditional legal stance toward same-sex behavior; in other respects, however, it departs quite dramatically from the classical understanding that governed discourses surrounding same-sex attractions in acknowledging not only the possibility of an exclusively homoerotic “orientation” but also its poten- tially God-given nature. This view is shared by a number of Muslim groups from across the socio-political spectrum; not only Muslim gays and lesbians seeking a“theological accommo- dation” of their sexuality, but also some conservative Muslims who strongly oppose any such accommodation, agree on the modern idea that homosexual orientation is an inborn com- ponent of the human psyche.
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The question of whether the innateness of desire requires an acceptance of same-sex sexual activity, however, is subject to strong disagreement.

Conceding the naturalness or God-givenness of an exclusively same-sex oriented desire puts conservative scholars into a logical bind. An essay by British Muslim Abdal-Hakim

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Murad, “Fall of the Family,” exemplifies the perils of this approach. Murad accepts “homosexuality as an innate dispos- ition”in some (though not all) cases, seeing a potential biological basis for it. Yet, like the Muslim Women’s League, Murad stresses that there are no circumstances under which an individual with homosexual “tendencies” – which he likens to the impulses of a pyromaniac “mental patient” – can lawfully act on his or her desires. The only religiously acceptable option for someone with a homoerotic orientation is permanent chastity: Murad sees it as a test from God. His stance coincides with the Muslim Women’s League statement that “individuals are expected to control themselves.” However, this expectation of self-control as a defense against sexual sin runs contrary to what is prescribed not only by most medieval texts, but also by Murad elsewhere in the same essay, which focuses primarily on male/female sexual misconduct. He argues in favor of sex segregation in daily life where practical, to assist in maintaining sexual morality by sup- pressing opportunities for illicit sex; most individuals, he claims, are not super-moral figures who can reject temptation when freely accessible.
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(Ironically, he does not consider the effects of sex segregation on those who are exclusively attracted to members of the same sex.) Even in a largely temptation-free society, there must be lawful outlets into which sexual desire can be channeled.
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For heterosexuals, this lawful channel is mar- riage, but for those with exclusively homoerotic desires, there can be no lawful satisfaction of desire. (Most medieval Muslim authors did not confront this precise problem, at least insofar as the desire for attractive male youths was generally not con- sidered solely a desire for them; it was the same desire as that directed toward women, and could therefore be sated with lawful partners.)

If one accepts that exclusive desire for partners of the same sex is (at least in some cases) natural and divinely origin- ated,
and
acknowledges, as Murad does, that long-term abstin- ence from all sexual contact will likely fail for most individuals, then one presumes that most Muslims with orientations toward members of the same sex
will
commit transgressions. The stress on not discussing these sexual acts creates a safe space for

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transgression to occur without challenging the normative view that such relations are forbidden. At the same time, while such relative freedom to act has some benefits, it also puts individuals in danger from the usual concomitants of illicit liaisons (with partners of whatever sex), including not only the spread of HIV and other sexually transmissible diseases but also the unethical behavior of possibly betraying marriage vows and, indeed, one’s self-respect.

The naturalness of same-sex desire for certain individu- als constitutes the basic point of departure for queer-positive Muslim organizations. As the Rainbow Crescent website declares, in what is presented as an appeal to“Logic and Reason,” “being Gay is not a matter of choice – but rather a divinely cre- ated reality.” The exclusion of “Gay people” “from Islam ... would be excluding a whole dimension of The Creation and this would in fact undermine any claim by Islam to be The Truth (which it is).”
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This tactically shrewd position removes the element of choice from the equation; gay (and lesbian) Muslims cannot be blamed for something innate. As intended by some gay-positive Muslim discourses, the acceptance of the view that sexual orientation is not a matter of choice but rather divine decree creates a space for queer Muslims to press for religio-legal acceptance of same-sex relationships, however unlikely wide- spread acceptance of this view seems as of this writing.

However, aside from the social difficulties such a strategy faces, the “just created that way”
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discourse of sexual identity is a fundamentally ahistorical move, and requires one to ignore the complex ways in which same-sex desire and practices have oper- ated in other times and places. What accounts for the fact that men’s sexual desire for other men in the past – or in non-Western Muslim contexts today – is not viewed as “innate” in the same way? A Foucauldian approach, recognizing the historicity of desire and its representations in social and individual contexts, is attractive for historians and scholars concerned with under- standing the past.
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How does it work, though, to transform the present and shape the future, if one is concerned with determin- ing God’s stance on sexual licitness and following it? Jeffrey Weeks argues convincingly for understanding sexual identities as

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“necessary fictions” and “historical inventions,” and themselves “sites of contestation,”
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3
but how does this matter to a Muslim concerned with whether God approves of his or her partner choice and form of relationship? Is there a middle ground between essentialist and constructionist views of sexual orienta- tion and desire, where Muslims can grapple with same-sex sexual orientation – their own or that of other Muslims? Is it possible to think that individuals are neither “created” to think and act in a particular way nor do they simply “choose” a homoerotic orien- tation? What does the view of “the erotic as highly socially malleable”
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mean when one confronts the Qur’an which is both a timeless text and a historically contextualized one?

There is broad agreement among Muslim thinkers that individuals bear moral responsibility for any sexual acts that they engage in by free choice and that illicit desires themselves do not result in any culpability before God. If one accepts the view that homoerotic desire is neither freely chosen nor inherently blameworthy, but can have no licit satisfaction, then one is left with the untenable stance that those who desire a satisfaction that cannot be obtained through licit means are, through no fault of their own, destined to choose between a celibate life devoid of sexual gratification and one of sexual release obtained through sin.
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Both options are unpalatable. One avoids having to choose between these unacceptable alternatives if one rejects either the innateness of homoerotic orientation or the inherent sinfulness of all same-sex intimacy. If one holds that same-sex desire is not innate but rather constitutes freely chosen debauch- ery (as in the case of the men of Lot’s story), then one does not confront the issue of divine injustice in creating individuals without providing the means for them to fulfill lawfully their basic human need for sexual expression. Yet this notion that an exclusive same-sex sexual attraction is freely chosen is problem- atic for a variety of reasons, including its lack of conformity with the expressed experience of modern Western queer individuals.

The other alternative is to accept, in contrast to the near totality of Muslim thinkers, that homoerotic desire is innate
and
that its satisfaction through lawful means is possible. This view requires tricky exegetical maneuvering around the male/female

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dynamics of various Qur’anic verses describing creation and mating,
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but can be reconciled with the view that same-sex acts become reprehensible or forbidden when, and only when, same- sex intimacy is freely chosen as a transgressive act by those who would ordinarily seek satisfaction with different-sex partners. It is only in this case, where same-sex desire is viewed as not sinful because it is part of a divine plan, that recognition and legit- imization of intimate partnerships between same-sex couples becomes an objective.

Murad’s terminology proves helpful in thinking about this new perspective. He does not identify those who have or act on same-sex desires as homosexuals, considering private behav- ior outside the realm of social concern. Rather, he uses the intriguing, if awkward, term “homosexualist,” reserving it for those who seek to make same-sex intimacy a publicly respectable form of socio-sexual partnership. In this, he revalidates the con- ventional view that illicit sexual activity is a matter between an individual and God but that challenges to religio-legal regula- tions constitute a major transgression. Monogamous marriage between two men or two women, in its insistence that same-sex relationships can be licit, is a more disturbing prospect than multiple casual sexual relationships that, even if they constitute something of an open secret, nonetheless do not directly chal- lenge the prohibition of same-sex intimacy.
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Same-sex marriage

Muhammad Abdul-Ra’uf, writing in 1977, declares that “toler- ation of an evil leads to other evils. First, we condone public exposure [of women’s bodies]; next dating and easy mixing; next, pre-marital ‘games’, extra-marital relations, and open marriages; next, the elevation of homosexuality to an acceptable moral status; and next, uni-sex marriages. Where, and when, shall we stop?”
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In this litany of increasingly serious “evils,” same-sex marriage is the worst Abdul-Ra’uf can imagine. Yet, aside from the question of what makes it an evil – divine censure being the obvious answer for Abdul-Ra’uf – the notion of relative

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seriousness of sinful acts is an interesting one to apply to the case of same-sex intimacy. The acts he discusses as “evils” are uni- formly consensual acts; there is no mention of rape, sexual abuse of children, or any other inherently coercive practice, such as non-consensual marriage or slave concubinage – practices which would undoubtedly violate his twentieth-century sens- ibilities, but which were widely accepted by Muslim scholars of preceding centuries.
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Just what about same-sex marriage makes it so threatening that it becomes the pinnacle of all sexual sins?

When Abdul-Ra’uf was writing in the 1970s, same-sex marriage was not even on the horizon for nascent gay-rights movements in the West. A few years into the twenty-first cen- tury, marriage between persons of the same sex has gained legal standing in several places in Europe and North America, includ- ing the U.S. state of Massachusetts. The notion of marriage of a man to a man or of a woman to a woman is completely outside the frame of reference for classical Muslim jurists. Most do not even consider it a possibility in order to dismiss it. Even where it is mentioned, it is merely as a brief disqualification in terms of who can marry. The definition of
nikah
in the
Durr al-Mukhtar
, a seventeenth-century Hanafi commentary on an earlier legal manual, makes a claim regarding gender as relevant to marriage:

[
Nikah
] according to jurists is a contract which is product- ive of an exclusive right of enjoyment, i.e., which validates the enjoyment by a man, of a woman, with whom marriage is not prohibited by reason of any legal impediment. Thus are excluded (from the objects of enjoyment) a male, an idolatress, a hermaphrodite – because of the possibility of the hermaphrodite’s being a male – prohibited females,
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a
jinnee
woman, and a watery person [
insan al-ma’
] because of the difference of genus.
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