Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse (24 page)

‘For the second time in ten days Phillips had chosen not to strengthen his force with another major warship.
Revenge
, a vintage battleship dating back to 1916, had been berthed in Ceylon when Force G arrived, but the Admiral was content to leave her behind when the other ships sailed for Singapore.’
⁹

Again, the addition of
Revenge
would simply have slowed Force Z down, a force whose only chance of success or survival was to use its speed to surprise an enemy and then to get away quickly. Speed was the only true advantage Force Z had over its enemy. As it was,
Prince of Wales
met up with
Repulse
in Ceylon, with Admiral Phillips ordered to fly on to Singapore ahead of his ships in a Catalina flying boat, to discuss the situation regarding the Japanese with Singapore High Command and, if possible, meet Admiral T. C. Hart, Commander in Chief of the American Asiatic Fleet, in Manila.

Force Z sailed into Singapore on the afternoon of 2 December, with Tom Phillips there to meet her on the quayside, with much fuss being made of
Prince of Wales
and her name and presence released to the media, in order to enhance the deterrent effect. In practice, this gave vital Intelligence to the Japanese, and was the direct cause of them making available the very aircraft that sank
Prince of Wales
and
Repulse.
The publicity given to the arrival of a naval force also made it almost impossible for Phillips not to respond to Japanese aggression and be seen to sail. To the intense annoyance of her crew,
Repulse
was not named in the publicity, it being thought that silence on the number and nature of the other ships might serve to exaggerate their power to the Japanese. There were many who thought the arrival of the ships in Singapore was a triumph for the British: Singapore had been told it might have to wait ninety days for the Navy to arrive, and here it was before a single shot had been fired.

The Admiralty appeared concerned that Phillips’s ships would be caught in harbour by Japanese aircraft, and signalled him on 1 December, the day a state of emergency was declared in Malaya, that he might take his ships out to cruise east of Singapore ‘to disconcert the Japanese’, and again on the 3 December to suggest the two ships should get away from Singapore. This was probably the result of Intelligence sightings of twelve Japanese submarines heading in the direction of Singapore, presumably to bottle Force Z up in the event of war. Critics have cited these signals as the Admiralty realizing how weak Force Z was and suggesting it hide in the islands. In fact the signals were more likely to show a post-Taranto fear and a desire to give Force Z freedom to steam where it willed, rather than being trapped in Singapore by the submarine threat. Phillips compromised, pointing out that he was detaching
Repulse
on a good will visit to Darwin that would get her out of Singapore.

What has not often been seen as significant is Phillips’s request to the Admiralty at this time for all four ‘R’ class battleships to be sent now, and a request that
Warspite
could call in at Singapore for a week on its way back from repair in the States, to give a further impression of strength. It clarifies little as regards the ‘secret alliance’ issue. Phillips, in his later discussions with Hart, negotiated a deal whereby four of his destroyers stationed in Dutch Borneo would sail to Singapore, but only if the three British destroyers at Hong Kong transferred to Singapore. Presumably the presence of no less than six British battleships in Singapore and a battle-cruiser could have given Phillips considerable bargaining power in the tit-for-tat world he seemed to be in, particular if
Indomitable
would also shortly be arriving. Equally, if hostilities were going to break out, the more ships Phillips had at his disposal the better, and he was pragmatist enough to ask only for the ships he knew he was most likely to be granted.

Phillips has been accused of being ‘insufficiently alert to the pressing realities of the strategic situation in which he was involved.’
¹⁰
He had gone to Manila to talk to his opposite number Admiral Hart of the US Navy on 4 December for a meeting on the 5 December which went through to the next day when the alarm was sounded, and
Repulse
was on her way to Australia for her flag-waving visit. Phillips left for Singapore within the hour and
Repulse
was called back, but the result was that Force Z set sail too late to have a significant impact on the Japanese invasions. Phillips, it has been said, thus missed a major chance to disrupt the Japanese invasions by a lackadaisical response, and failing to act at the start of the attacks when the Japanese were at their most vulnerable:

‘If the Eastern Fleet had been able to sail immediately the sighting reports were received and had successfully intercepted the Japanese invasion force at sea there is a good chance that the enemy might have been persuaded to turn back, for the stakes were high and the Japanese had not anticipated being discovered quite so early in the game.’
¹¹

‘During a vital period, neither Phillips nor his capital ships were ready for action.’
¹²

This is unjust criticism.
Prince of Wales
was undergoing boiler cleaning and having her bottom scraped
,
both essential housekeeping if a ship that had just completed a very long passage was to remain at full operational efficiency. As it was, the pictures of
Prince of Wales
leaving Singapore on her last voyage do not reveal that she could steam on only four of her eight boilers, the remainder not being able to be fired up until she was in the open sea as the result of them being closed down for cleaning:

‘The point is that the four pairs of boilers were then in different stages of cleanliness. The loss of efficiency (there is no record of how much power was lost through the dirty boilers) was regrettable, yet it is doubtful whether the ability of
Prince of Wales
to make better speed would have been enough to get her “out of the hole” on the fatal 10 December. For certain, though, it did not help her.’
¹³

What has emerged since the above was written some time prior to 1981 is that
Prince of Wales
was disabled and caused to be sunk by a torpedo hit on her stern whilst she was turning, and that if that torpedo had struck a few feet off where it did she might well have survived. Rather than Phillips not being ready to attack, it is more likely that circumstances forced him to take his ships to sea before they were fully ready.

A further factor was that at the time the alarm was first sounded, Force Z was not authorized to attack the Japanese, and to do so without authorization would be tantamount to a declaration of war. It is one of the absolute commandments of military life that commanders in declaring war do not act on their own initiative. We have seen that the absence of
Repulse
had a sound strategic reason behind it, the visit to Admiral Hart even more so. One does not need to believe that Churchill’s agenda in sending out his most modern battleship was to help America declare its alliance with Britain against Japan before war broke out. The avowed purpose of Phillips’s visit, to broker a consolidation of the two fleets and a rationalization of their bases, could have saved Singapore and changed the whole nature of the war in the Pacific had it succeeded. It was important enough to merit Phillips’s absence.

It is difficult, even with hindsight, to blame Phillips, and indeed most armed forces and their governments, for failing to realize just how fast the Japanese would move. Their plan was staggeringly ambitious, almost ludicrously so. Any naval officer in the Royal, Dutch or American navies who predicted no less than five surprise, out of the blue offensives (Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Guam and associated islands, Hong Kong and Siam, Malaya and Singapore) would be launched at the same time would have been laughed out of court. Who dared won, at least at the outset.

Those who criticize Phillips for not being able to sail immediately reports of Japanese activity were received also fail to recognize the chaos that was prevalent at this time, the uncertainty as to what was actually happening and the danger of sending the two ships on a wild goose chase. Bad monsoon weather had meant that only fleeting glimpses had been caught of Japanese ships, and the RAF crews lacked experience in what they were doing. Neither did the Japanese lie back and wait to be spotted, shooting down a Catalina reconnaissance flight.

Chapter 12

The Loss of
Prince of Wales
and
Repulse
:
A Revaluation – The Action

8 December

B
y 8 December Phillips could be in no doubt that Britain was at war with Japan. The night before, his time, the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor and bombed Singapore. He had four options: sail out to attach the Japanese invasion barges; retreat to Darwin; hide out in the islands and attempt to exert the same sense of menace that
Tirpitz
did so effectively in northern waters; stay in Singapore. The final option – retreat from Singapore – was not in his gift, but could only happen in response to a direct order from the Admiralty.

Phillips called a conference on board his flagship at 12.30 on 8 December primarily for ships’ Captains, and asked his commanders for their views:

‘The atmosphere was calm and quietly thoughtful – fatalistic perhaps. To the best of my recollection I remember Admiral Phillips saying, “Gentlemen, this is an extremely hazardous mission and I would liken it to taking the Home Fleet into the Skagerrak without air cover. Nevertheless, I feel we have to do something.’”
¹

Phillips asked for comments. The silence was broken by Tennant, the captain of
Repulse,
who said they had no option but to set sail in search of the enemy. There was no disagreement. An increasingly ill-looking Tom Phillips was reported as summing up: ‘We can stay in Singapore. We can sail away to the East – Australia. Or we can go out and fight. Gentlemen, we sail at five o’clock.’
²

Though there has been some criticism of his decision to attack – ‘Still, there is a point where a decision ceases to be courageous and becomes rash, and Phillips’s decision came close to that point’
³
– the majority of commentators recognize that he had little option. The impact on local morale of the Royal Navy sitting tight in harbour would have been disastrous, apart from the inevitable accusation of cowardice that would have been made against Phillips had he failed to take any action. There was a real chance to disrupt Japanese actions, and perhaps change the course of the war before it had properly begun. Nor was there any certainty that any attempt to hide his ships would not have been discovered. He had clearly signalled his intention to set sail and attack to the Admiralty, and by the conventions of the day the failure of the Admiralty to gainsay this amounted to their permission and support. On 7 December the Admiralty had sent Phillips a ‘prodding’ signal, asking what action it would be possible to take against Japanese forces, a clear indication that they expected some action to be taken.

Just as importantly, the only way that Phillips could have led his ships into hiding would have been on a direct order from the Admiralty: ‘Lacking either a plan of action or a balanced force, The
Prince of Wales
and
Repulse
should have been ordered away from Singapore and out of harm’s way. That is not, however, what happened.’
⁴
And: ‘Given that the Admiralty had sent the prodding signal… the only thing that would have stopped him from sailing to attack the Japanese would have been a direct order from London to take his ships out of harm’s way: to do otherwise would have seemed like running away.’
⁵

The significance of the 12.30 meeting held in the Admiral’s day cabin on board
Prince of Wales
is greater than has sometimes been acknowledged, and agreement with the plan to attack seen as a mere formality in a service where people were expected to obey orders, not challenge them. This is a misrepresentation. The silence that greeted Phillips’s outline of his plans was not mere servile obedience to orders, but born of a realization of how dangerous was the mission on which they were to embark. Unlike historians, these men’s lives depended on what action they took, and the lives of many others, and such circumstances tend to focus the mind on more than obedience. Phillips’s conference was also excellent man-management. It meant that this was an agreed mission and that he had his commanders united behind him – would that someone had achieved the same unity among the other defenders of Singapore – and further testimony to that unity is that not one of those commanders subsequently broke ranks to be critical of Phillips. Indeed, there was remarkable support for him and his actions from all the officers who actually fought the battle. Criticism came from those who fought the battle from their armchairs.

How risky was the mission? Highly so, but so were Pearl Harbor, Dunkirk, Overlord and the German Channel Dash. Other factors undoubtedly influenced what we would now call Phillips’s risk assessment. He had some good intelligence, both from the Americans and from RAF reconnaissance that had worked, and he knew that there were no Japanese aircraft carriers near enough to launch an attack on his ships, and that other Japanese surface units involved were inferior to his firepower. He knew also the whereabouts of the recently-laid Japanese minefields off Singapore. His ships were fast enough to out run submarines –
Prince of Wales
had done just this when she had crossed the Atlantic unescorted carrying Churchill to meet Roosevelt – whilst the bad monsoon weather, which had made British reconnaissance so difficult, would cloak his force from discovery as it had cloaked Japanese forces from the British. He believed he was out of range of Japanese land-based torpedo aircraft, and the record to date of battleships resisting air attack successfully, and particularly high-level bombing, was good. The key was surprise, the stakes a massive and crucial victory that could affect the whole course of the war. Another key, of course was air cover.

There has been debate about the discussions Phillips had over air cover before the departure of his ships, which will never be fully resolved unless startling new material emerges, for the simple reason that any meetings were unrecorded and those who were there are now dead. However, Phillips sent a telling signal to the Admiralty late on 7 December. It is not clear how much Phillips actually knew about the nature of the Japanese offensive at this time, though he certainly knew an offensive had been launched:

‘If the relative strength of the enemy force permits, endeavor will be made to attack the expedition by night or by day. If we are inferior in strength a raid will be attempted and the air force will attack with bombs and torpedoes in conjunction with our naval forces.’
⁶

What this clearly shows is that Phillips was hoping to undertake action as a joint striking force with the RAF. The inevitable conclusion was that the subsequent lack of support was not the result of Phillips not wanting or dismissing it, but rather the result of the RAF’s inability to supply it. This is confirmed by the conversation with Phillips reported by one of his aides:

‘“I’m not sure”, he told Captain Bell, his senior aide, “that Pulford realizes the importance I attach to fighter cover over Singora on the tenth. I’m going to write him a letter stressing the point, and asking him to let me know for certain what he can do.”’
⁷

Force Z was ready to go to sea, but Phillips showed judgment and skill in delaying the departure until the evening, meaning that the speed and direction of his attack would be hidden in darkness from the Japanese. The two destroyers
Express
and
Electra
had been out much of the day practising minesweeping, something perhaps not to be expected of a force commanded by an Admiral who did not know one end of a ship from another, and further proof of Phillips’s ability to move from diplomat to combat leader.

There is one other area where Phillips has been criticized where perhaps the criticism has been allowed to stick rather too easily. When Japanese bombers made their night attack on Singapore, why did Phillips not realize that he was clearly in range of Japanese land-based aircraft, whose bomb load could be exchanged for torpedoes? The simplest answer is that no, he did not realize, any more than anyone on the British side realized the ease with which Japanese aircraft could switch weapon. More telling was the fact that despite the two British warships lying at anchor in the face of the air force that had just launched the most devastating attack by torpedo on battleships ever in history, there was no hint of torpedo bombers in the force that attacked Singapore. Surely the Japanese of all people would have sent them if they had them? Finally, heavy cloud and bad weather meant that of fifty-four bombers on the mission only seventeen actually reached Singapore, giving a false impression of Japanese strength. It was reported even that some in Singapore thought the attacking aircraft were from carriers, which if it was the case would presumably have high-tailed it out the minute they recovered their aircraft. In any event, the raid was as ineffectual as Singapore’s defence and contained nothing to warn Phillips or anyone else of the lethal power of Japanese aircraft.

Force Z slipped its moorings at 1735, its original intention to attack Japanese invasion barges off Singora. In company with the two capital ships were four destroyers –
Electra, Express
and two First World War veterans,
Tenedos
and the Australian
Vampire.
There is perhaps one cruiser Phillips might have been able to take, but in the event he prioritized mechanical reliability and speed. Two destroyers detached to him from the Mediterranean fleet were ‘crocks’ – one taking on a major list when full of oil, and the other described as having a ‘corrugated bottom’ – and were too damaged to sail, so Phillips’s escort was the bare minimum. Admiral A. B. Cunningham must therefore bear some responsibility for weakening the defences of Force Z.

Phillips asked for air reconnaissance ahead of his force on 9 December, and reconnaissance and fighter cover off Singora on 10 December. As Force Z sailed it was flashed a signal from the Changi signal station from Pulford saying: ‘Regret fighter protection impossible’, at which Phillips is said to shrug his shoulders and say: ‘Well, we must get on without it.’

Eight hours after they set out Palliser signalled to Phillips that Kota Bharu airfield had been abandoned, the military situation there was unclear, a Catalina flying boat could provide reconnaissance on 9 December. Ominously the signal warned of large numbers of Japanese bombers based in southern Indo-China and possibly Thailand, and that the Americans had been asked to use their long-range bombers to attack these airfields. Unfortunately, the Japanese had mounted a pre-emptive strike and destroyed most of the American aircraft. What is perhaps the crucial part of the signal read: ‘Fighter protection on Wednesday 10th will not, repeat not, be possible’.
⁸

This signal has caused much controversy. It is usually thought to be an error, in that what it should have added was the key phrase ‘off Singora’. However, a great many less people would be convicted at law if they could claim as a defence what they ought to have done. What Palliser did was send an unequivocal signal that stated, and repeated, that air cover was not available and that therefore one of the key ingredients for a successful mission was no longer in place, surprise being the other. Furthermore, Palliser’s signal was the second one Phillips had received stating that fighter cover was not available. Two unequivocal signals are surely enough to persuade any man, or group of men, that what the signals say is true. Phillips (and, for that matter, the much-praised Tennant of
Repulse
) did not call for fighter cover because they had been told, unequivocally and categorically, that there was none to be had, and been told by their own people.

On receiving the signal that no air cover was available Phillips decided to head for the nearer Kota Bharu, rather than Singora, which is 120 miles further north. We know that he was far from dismissing the risk from air attack. He had even made it clear to his ships that this was a hit-and-run mission. The decision to stay at sea had been criticized:

‘… although the information available to Phillips gave him no reason to foresee the full extent of the threat from Japanese aircraft, there was clearly
some
danger from air attack, and his decision to continue on and to hazard two very valuable capital ships, rather than returning to Singapore or sailing elsewhere, was a very risky one.’
⁹

‘Early on 9 December Phillips was told by signal … that the Royal Air Force would not be able to provide air cover, because all the airfields in northern Malaya were being evacuated. Nevertheless he elected to press on. Lack of experience, his belief, despite all the evidence of the past two years of war, in the invincibility to capital ships, and his own temperament led to this unwise decision.’
¹⁰

The case against Phillips at this point is that once he knew air cover was not available he should have called off the operation. Yes, it was a risky decision: battles usually are. No, it was not the result of inexperience. No-one in the Royal Navy had experienced this situation before. No, he did not believe capital ships were invincible. As for the decision being a function of his own personality, it was not challenged by the numerous other personalities on his bridge and the bridges of his ships. Rather than a personal decision, it has all the hallmarks of one that was a practical inevitability. In fact, the decision Phillips took was a compromise. The fine weather had broken and there was low, heavy cloud with frequent rain storms. Phillips could make use of the cover this provided to steam north on 9 December, and if not spotted by Japanese aircraft, make a dash to attack Japanese invasion forces and make a high-speed retreat thereafter to Singapore.

The morning of 9 December broke to low cloud, mist and rain. Phillips handled Force Z well. He sent
Electra
ahead to sweep for mines and ordered a zigzag course and speed of 17.5 knots, fast enough to put the ships beyond anything except a lucky shot from a submarine but economical enough on fuel to keep the maximum number of options open, reaching Japanese invasion areas in twenty-four hours but leaving plenty of fuel for a top-speed dash back to Singapore.