Saddam : His Rise and Fall (19 page)

From 1971 Saddam assumed responsibility for dealing with the oil consortium, together with Murtada al-Hadithi, the oil minister. Saddam's opportunity to engage in the confrontation the Baathists had been waiting for came soon afterward when the IPC decided to slow down oil production in Iraq in favor of that in other countries. The IPC decision meant that, in effect, foreign companies were dictating the earning power of the Iraqi government, an intolerable position for any self-respecting government and one that smacked of neoimperialism. It was a provocation that the nationalist wing of the Baath, as represented by Bakr and Saddam, could not let pass without a challenge. The manner in which Saddam engineered the course of events that would result in the nationalization of the Iraqi industry is an instructive case study in Saddam's ability, even at this relatively early stage in his political career, to manipulate circumstances to suit his own ends.

The Baath Party had, for some time, given consideration to forming an alliance with a “nonimperialist” power, the most likely candidate being the Soviet Union, which, perversely, was not deemed by the Baathists to nurture imperial ambitions. Although Saddam and Bakr were anticommunist, they realized that an alliance with Moscow would enable them to withstand any pressure that Washington might bring to bear on Baghdad. Although Bakr and Saddam had little sympathy with communism and had spent most of the past decade viciously persecuting members of the Iraqi Communist Party, an alliance with Moscow made good diplomatic sense for the Baathists. The centuries-old ambition of generations of Russians of reaching the warm southern seas was a constant source of consternation for the shah of Iran, with whom Iraq shared a one-thousand-mile border. An alliance with Moscow
would help to curb any aggressive instincts the shah might nurture toward Iraq, particularly over sensitive issues like the Shatt al-Arab waterway, Iraq's only access to the Gulf which was crucial for its oil exports. Developing good relations with the Soviets would also give Iraq the opportunity to make massive arms purchases and build up the strength of its armed forces. This was a top priority for the Baathists, who were aware that they needed to strengthen their military position to defend themselves against the belligerence of the Iranians, to participate fully in any future war against Israel and to deal with any internal conflicts, such as the constant threat of the Kurds to declare autonomy. The foundations of an alliance with the Soviets had been laid during Saddam's 1970 visit to Moscow to sort out the Kurdish problem, and in February 1972 Saddam returned to Moscow as Bakr's personal emissary for a series of meetings with Soviet prime minister Alexei Kosygin. Saddam's mission must have been a success for, despite Soviet reservations about the Baathists' treatment of Iraqi communists, it was reciprocated the following April when Kosygin flew to Baghdad and signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. After the formalities had been concluded, Kosygin was given a conducted tour of the marble halls of the Presidential Palace, accompanied by a handsome blonde who had been provided by Saddam.

Saddam was forced to make many unpalatable concessions to the Soviets. The treaty guaranteed Soviet access to Iraqi air bases. By way of compensation the Soviets agreed to provide training of thousands of Iraqi officers at Soviet military academies. It also referred to the “harmonization” of Soviet and Iraqi foreign policy, a polite way of saying that the Baathists would take orders from Moscow on issues such as Iraq's votes at the United Nations. In return the Soviets agreed to help keep the Baathists in power, and to help them with their nationalization plans. Commenting on the deal years later, Saddam was quite pragmatic about the concessions he had made to Moscow. “We never expected that the Soviets would support us without guarantees that our friendship would serve their strategic interests.”
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Saddam did not enjoy being beholden to a superpower, and the terms imposed on him by the Soviets were to have an important bearing on his future dealings with Moscow.

Even so the Moscow pact put Saddam in an immeasurably stronger position to take on the foreign oil consortium, as the alliance gave him the confidence to tackle the oil barons. He was well aware that any attempt to break the IPC's stranglehold over the Iraqi oil industry would provoke a hostile reaction, with the big oil companies attempting to bully the Iraqis into submission,
as they had done on many occasions in the past. The alliance with Moscow, however, together with the pledge the Soviets had given that they would purchase any Iraqi oil surpluses, bolstered Saddam's chances of success. He was also greatly assisted by indications that Iraqi oil officials had received from Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the French trade minister, that France would decline to join an anti-Iraq boycott, so long as French interests were not harmed.

On June 1, 1972, two months after signing the pact with Moscow, the Baath nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company. The importance of this event cannot be stressed enough, both in terms of its impact on Iraq and its future development, and in confirming the legitimacy of the Baath Party. Without oil, Iraq would be impoverished; with oil, Iraq had the potential to be one of the world's richest nations. The nationalization of the oil industry had been the long-standing cri de coeur of generations of Iraqi nationalists, and its implementation was arguably the single most revolutionary event to take place in Iraq since its establishment. Because of the alliance with the Soviets and the duplicity of the French, the ability of the expelled members of the consortium to protest was limited, particularly after Saddam traveled to France at the end of June and struck a deal with President Georges Pompidou. Pompidou agreed to accept nationalization in return for French companies being allowed to participate in the future development and exploitation of Iraqi oil fields, and to purchase Iraqi oil at a specially agreed low price.

Freed from the constraints imposed by the IPC, Iraq was able to exploit a range of oil fields that the IPC had declined to develop. The surge in Iraqi oil production resulted in a massive boost in government revenues. These enabled the Baath to embark upon its ambitious building project to turn the country into a modern state, and to raise the general living standards of ordinary Iraqis. They also financed the massive buildup in the country's armed forces, which saw the army's strength almost double in size between 1970 and 1975.

No one was more aware of the revolutionary implications of Iraq's oil nationalization than Saddam, who wasted no time making sure he received the lion's share of the credit for the takeover, while also ensuring that, in so doing, he did not detract from the standing of President Bakr. Saddam had, after all, conducted the crucial negotiations both with the Soviets and the IPC. Having fully discussed the available options with Bakr, Saddam had personally conceived the ultimatum that was made to the IPC in the full knowledge that they would refuse, thereby giving the government no alternative other than to proceed with nationalization. Radio Baghdad broadcast endless
revolutionary slogans such as “Arab Oil for the Arabs,” and Saddam named June 1, 1972, as “Victory Day.” Saddam himself stated, “Our wealth has returned to us.” A few years later, talking to one of his official biographers, Saddam reemphasized the role he had played personally in effecting the takeover of the IPC. “All the experts and advisers warned me against nationalisation; not one was in favour. Yet the decision was taken…. Had I listened to the Oil Minister, the decision would never have been made.”
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Saddam's personal involvement in the nationalization of the IPC provides a telling insight into how, even as early as 1972, he had acquired a range of highly sophisticated political skills. As has been shown, oil nationalization did not happen overnight. Indeed, according to those Iraqis who were closely involved in the nationalization process, the plan to take IPC under Iraqi control was originally conceived as early as 1970, and most of the groundwork was carried out by Murtada al-Hadithi, the oil minister, rather than Saddam himself, a fact that may explain why Murtada would later perish in one of Saddam's purges. The Baathists were aware they needed to proceed with caution, knowing that any precipitate move on their part might cause the West, the main consumer of Iraqi oil, to close ranks and boycott the country's main export, which would quickly bring the country to its knees. The Baathists were hindered by the expert assessment of the Iraqi Oil Ministry that Iraq was not capable of running the oil industry on its own. Numerous economic studies were undertaken to assess how Iraq might be able to survive on a given percentage of its oil revenues. And in fairness to Saddam, the advice from the technical advisers, right up to the moment of nationalization, was that Iraq was not yet ready for such a dramatic move. The key to the success of the gamble on nationalization was the support provided by the Soviets, for which Saddam could take the credit, and the support of the French, for which he could not.

The moment Saddam believed nationalization was possible he sacked Murtada and took control of the whole project himself. “Saddam wanted to get his hands on the nation's oil wealth because he could see that this was his gateway to fame,” recalled a former Iraqi official who was closely involved in the nationalization program. “After receiving all the technical advice, it was Saddam who took the political decision.”
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The manner in which Saddam made the historic decision to go ahead with nationalization reveals how Saddam, at this relatively early stage in his career, was able to exploit the Iraqi body politic for his own ends. Although the political decision was essentially
Saddam's, he nevertheless took care to ensure that he had President Bakr's full support before making his move. That such a momentous decision should have been taken by Saddam, and not Bakr, says a great deal about how the balance of power in Baghdad was shifting away from the president and into the hands of his deputy. Having secured Bakr's support, Saddam was careful to ensure that his decision had the full backing of the Baath Party's main decision-making body, the Revolutionary Command Council, of which he was vice president. A meeting of the RCC was duly called at which Saddam received its full backing to proceed with nationalization. Saddam wanted to make sure that, if his bid for glory backfired, it would be the Baath Party collectively, and not Saddam alone, that would bear responsibility for the consequences. But if the gamble succeeded, the glory would all belong to Saddam. This tactic of sharing the burden of political accountability in the face of adversity was to become a recurrent theme of Saddam's political career.

Saddam's role in negotiating the cooperation pact with Moscow and the oil nationalization program meant that, for the first time since the Baathists came to power in 1968, his reputation extended beyond Iraq. With the cold war at its height, the activities of “Revolutionary Command Council Vice President Takriti,” as he was referred to in the
New York Times
in 1972, in seeking a “solid strategic alliance” with the USSR was regarded as a matter of grave concern in U.S. diplomatic circles.
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Questions over the precise nature of the new Baghdad-Moscow alliance intensified in the spring of 1973 when Iraqi forces occupied a Kuwaiti border post, once more reigniting Baghdad's irredentist claims to the sheikhdom. Washington regarded the Iraqi action as being part of a plot by Moscow to challenge American oil interests in the Gulf, which had been a major concern of U.S. policymakers since the 1950s. This suspicion persisted even after the dispute was resolved by the mediation of the Soviets, which occurred during a visit by Saddam to Moscow in March 1973, at which he had further talks with Kosygin on improving Soviet-Iraqi cooperation. The key role played by Saddam in the oil nationalization program did not pass unnoticed. When Washington and London, outraged by the typically Gallic deal President Pompidou had negotiated with Baghdad to protect French interests, threatened Paris with punitive action, Saddam responded by declaring in an interview with
Le Monde,
“We will not tolerate any wrong inflicted on France…. Any attempt to harm French interests would be considered as an act of hostility against Iraq.”
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Saddam's emergence as a key player in Baghdad's power politics was recognized by both the State
Department in Washington and the Foreign Office in London and before long articles were appearing in the Western press in which Saddam was flatteringly described as Iraq's “Nasser.”
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If the outside world was starting to take notice of Saddam, foreign observers were merely catching up on the political reality that had pertained in Baghdad since late 1970, when Saddam had successfully dispensed with his main political rivals, Tikriti, Ammash, and Shaikhly. For the two years that Ammash had held the office of deputy prime minister, senior advisers in the Iraqi government had enjoyed personal contact with Bakr, and meetings would be held at the Presidential Palace on an almost weekly basis. Officially, Bakr was head of all the government departments and committees, dealing with every aspect of the administration, such as education, health, and transport. In practice he left the day-to-day running to Ammash, and he chaired the meetings so that he could remain in touch with developments. But after Saddam moved into Ammash's office, the meetings at the Presidential Palace became more and more infrequent until they stopped altogether. Saddam took charge of all the main government departments, and chaired the key planning meetings, and Bakr became more and more removed from the machinery of government.

At this stage in his career Saddam's obsession with security was starting to manifest itself. Officials attending meetings at his office in the National Assembly Building were subjected to various checks. Saddam himself entered his office by a special, secluded entrance. Although he was gradually usurping Bakr's position at the heart of the administration, Saddam was careful not to give the impression that his status was in any respect superior to Bakr's. He made sure that his office was smaller than Bakr's, and when he traveled around the country he was insistent that he should have fewer bodyguards than Bakr. In everything he did Saddam took great care not to upset his mentor. When a government department had reached the point where a decision needed to be made, Saddam would visit Bakr and, in an amicable way, suggest that the president should authorize a particular course of action. Having heard Saddam's analysis of the issue, Bakr would invariably accept Saddam's judgment, as he did with the nationalization of the IPC. If for any reason Bakr did not agree, Saddam would be disinclined to challenge him directly, but would manipulate him over a period of time—weeks, if necessary—until he got his way.